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Abstract 
This thesis examines the EU's commercial relations with Asia (in this case, South East Asia 
and North East Asia), with a particular focus on the investigation of the EU's commercial and 
business engagement at three different levels - transregional (ASEM), interregional (EU-
ASEAN) relations and bilateral (EU-Thailand) relations - during the period 1994-2004. Its 
most general inspiration is the study ofIntemational Political Economy (IPE), particularly the 
interrelations and interactions between states and firms, or goverrunents and business, in the 
changing global political economy. It argues that one can no longer conceive ofEU-Asia 
commercial relationships during the post-Cold War period only as traditional government-to-
government relations, but that business and firms (non-states) and the EU (a quasi-state) have 
become significant actors performing commercial roles alongside states in these relationships. 
Hence, the focus of the thesis is to explore EU business engagement within the broad 
framework of its commercial diplomacy towards Asia since the first Asian strategy adopted 
by the European Commission in 1994. The thesis draws upon the idea of Triangular 
Diplomacy (Stopford and Strange, 1991) and other conceptualisations of 'competition state' 
(Cemy, 2000c), 'catalytic state' (Weiss, 1998) and 'confrontation to cooperation' (Dunning, 
1993b) producing what might be termed the 'cooperation state' in state-firm relations, as a 
means of generating questions about the roles played by the EU, as a quasi-state, towards 
business and firms. It establishes that since the mid-1990s business engagement has emerged 
as part ofEU commercial diplomacy and that the EU plays 'proactive' roles in relation to 
business and firms - comparable to those of competition, catalytic and cooperation states -
engaging and incorporating them closely into its commercial diplomacy framework. 
After examining the formulation of the EU's commercial and business engagement strategies 
in Asia, three empirical studies investigate the implementation of these strategies, at three 
different levels: the Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF) integrated as part of the ASEM 
economic process at the transregionallevel, economic co-operation programmes as 'soft' 
commercial instruments to indirectly engage business in interregional (EU-ASEAN) relations, 
and the roles played by the European Commission Delegation in Thailand assisting and 
cooperating with different commercial stakeholders (both states and firms) through a process 
of commercial networking a the local level.' The empirical investigations uncover significant 
variations in the patterns of the EU coimnercial and business engagement in Asia. The EU has 
different instruments and strategies, performs different roles, and attempts to engage different 
stakeholders at these three distinctive but interconnected levels. On the basis of this finding, 
the thesis asks whether a reformulation of ideas about state-firm relations in commercial 
diplomacy is appropriate or practical. 
Key Words: State-Firm Relations, EU Commercial Diplomacy, Business Engagement, 
EU-Asian Commercial Relations 
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Introduction 
'The rise of Asia is dramatically changing the world 
balance of economic power ... the European Union needs 
therefore to accord Asia a higher priority than is at 
present the case ... and to strengthen the Union's 
economic presence in Asia in order to maintain the 
Union's leading role in the world economy' 
(European Commission, 1994: 1-2) 
In the past decade Asia has increasingly become important for the European Union (EU) and 
the EU's presence in Asia has become progressively more visible. Economic and commercial 
interests, especially in the Asian markets, have formed the EU's major focus and priority in 
this region, as explicitly stated in the EU's first Asian strategy 'Towards a New Asia Strategy' 
adopted by the European Commission in 1994 . Since this first Asian strategy, the EU via the 
European Commission has initiated a number of commercial strategies and instruments to 
engage Asia and its sub-regions I and has also developed a set of institutional frameworks to 
promote closer co-operation between Europe and Asia at different levels: transregional (best 
represented by the Asia-Europe Meeting - ASEM), interregional (represented here by 
relations between the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN), and 
bilateral relations with different Asian countries. Through these three levels of commercial 
engagement in Asia, the EU has pursued economic and commercial objectives, particularly in 
promoting trade and investment and strengthening economic ties between the two regions, as 
set out in the EU's commercial strategies towards Asia. 
More specifically, business engagement has emerged as a significant element of 
overall EU commercial strategies towards Asia. This has happened alongside a shift from a 
protectionist approach during the late 1970s-early 1980s towards a more liberal approach in 
the EU's trade and commercial strategies during the 1990s (McGuire, 1999: 82; Hanson, 
I Sub-regions in Asia include South Asia, South East Asia, North East Asia, and Australasia - as defined by the 
Commission (200Ic: 6). However, this thesis only focuses on South East Asia and North East Asia. 
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1998: 56). In response to the changing global political economy of the post-Cold War period, 
the EU has performed a more proactive role towards business and firms in the global political 
economy, engaging and incorporating them more closely into its commercial diplomacy 
framework. Hence, the EU has tried to pursue positive business engagement, by acting in 
support of business and firms in accessing Asian markets. This in turn helps to increase the 
EU's global competitiveness and to secure its position as an economic power in the global 
political economy (in competition with the US and Japan). 
Viewed against this background, the main objective ofthis thesis is to investigate the 
EU's commercial diplomacy towards Asia (in this case, South East Asia and North East 
Asia)2 with a specific interest in exploring the place of business engagement within the EU's 
broad commercial strategies towards Asia at three different levels of engagement-
transregional (ASEM), interregional (EU-ASEAN) relations and bilateral (EU-Thailand) 
relations - during the period 1994-20043• This investigation of the EU's commercial and 
business engagement strategies towards Asia is linked to two broad concerns about the nature 
and characteristics ofEU commercial diplomacy, and more generally about the relations 
between states and firms and the study of International Political Economy (IPE). 
The first concern relates to the EU as a commercial actor and its commercial 
diplomacy in the global political economy. The EU has undoubtedly become a formidable 
player in the post-Cold War international economic order, though it is not recognised as a 
state in traditional terms. Whilst representing a quasi-state actor4, the EU plays significant 
roles as a commercial actor engaging with both states and firms from the EU and the rest of 
'This thesis gives a particular focus on analysing the EU as a commercial actor (in its own right) in Asia. While 
acknowledging the importance of Member States in this analysis, this thesis does not aim to examine the 
Member States' diversified, sometimes conflicting, interests in Asia. In this thesis, the EU means EUI5 and 
EU25 after the 2004 Enlargement; and Asia means the Asian 'ASEM 10' - Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Japan, South Korea - including only 7 of ASEAN members 
(but not Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar), and excluding South Asia and Australasia. 
3 The period of 1994-2004 means from the emergence of the EU's 'Look East' policy (Richards and Kirkpatrick, 
1999: 689-690), and particularly the European Commission's first Asian strategy' in 1994, up to the ASEM5 
Summit in the autumn of 2004 in Hanoi, Vietnam. 
4 When mentioning 'quasi-state', the thesis does not refer to Robert Jackson's acclaimed concept of 'quasi-
states' (1990); rather it focuses on analysing 'statelike' features (Laffan, O'Donell and Smith, 1999: 52; Smith 
I 994a, Smith 1994b) of a quasi-state actor and the extent to which it can perform a number of state-functions. 
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the world. Within the area of commercial diplomacy (of the First Pillar), the EU performs a 
number of state-functions, for example, forming its own commercial strategies, representing 
EU common interests and exercising influence in different international arenas, namely 
multilateral, interregional and bilateral. In particular, the European Commission, despite the 
fact that its commercial autonomy is still limited by the restriction inherent in the 
Community's commercial competence and its interaction with Member States (through the 
Council) within the complex and politicised EU policy-making process, has played a leading 
role in formulating the EU's commercial strategies and projecting its commercial ideas, 
priorities, objectives, and influence throughout the rest of the world. Thus, the EU can have 
an immense impact in the global political economy. However, the question informing this 
research is, what are the characteristics and roles of the EU as a statelike commercial actor in 
Asia in particular, and in the global political economy in general? 
The second concern informing this research relates to the broad scope of the relations 
between states (or in this case, quasi-states) and firms in the global political economy, and 
more generally to the study ofIPE. Mutual interdependence of relations between states and 
firms, govemments and businesses, or more broadly politics and economics, has been the key 
theme in the study ofIPE. 'Structural changes' (Strange, 1992: 2) in the post-Cold War period 
have posed great challenges to the traditional roles of states, resulting in the emergence of 
new actors, non-states such as firms, as well as quasi-state such as the EU, performing their 
roles alongside traditional state actors in the international arena. This also leads to a 
fundamental change in the nature of diplomacy, producing a new kind of diplomacy referred 
to by the term 'Triangular Diplomacy'. It represents a theoretical model for the understanding 
and the explanation of the interactions between states and firms in the global political 
economy, proposed in 1991 by John Stopford and Susan Strange (1991: 22). 
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Inspired by Stopford and Strange's idea of Triangular Diplomacy and various works 
of Strange on the EUs which highlighted' ... an awareness of the ways in which the European 
project should be located within processes of global economic integration ... ' (Smith, 1998b), 
the thesis aims to explore the impact of the EU dimension on state-firm relations by 
assuming that the EU, though it is not a state but a quasi-state, has also joined state-firm 
interaction in this new kind of diplomacy. In this respect, the broad focus of this thesis is to 
explore the EU-Asian commercial relationship during the period of 1994-2004 in the light of 
the particular context of mutual engagement between states (or quasi-states) and firms, and 
more broadly of the study ofIPE. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MAIN ARGUMENTS 
Influenced by the two broad research concerns outlined above, this thesis is devoted to a 
multi-level investigation of the EU's commercial and business engagement strategies towards 
Asia. The investigation is guided by the following specific research questions: 
First, what are the main features of the EU's commercial strategies towards Asia and 
how have they been translated into EU-Asian institutional frameworks at different levels of 
EU commercial engagement in Asia? Specifically, how far do these strategies reflect a multi-
level approach, and how far do they reflect the aims of business engagement? 
Secondly, how have the aims ofEU commercial strategies been translated into 
specific activities within EU-Asian relations? Specifically, how has implementation taken 
place at different levels, and how has it incorporated business engagement? 
Thirdly, what are the key areas of variation between business engagement activities at 
different levels, and how effective have EU activities at these different levels been? 
S For example, the last piece of Sus an Strange's work on the EU called 'Who are EU? Ambiguities in the 
Concept of Competitiveness' (\998) 
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These three specific research questions are designed to focus the broad analytical 
concerns relating to EU commercial policy, and the roles played by the EU in global political 
economy against the background of state-firm relations. The conceptual background to these 
concerns is set out in Chapters 1-2 ofthe thesis. While the first specific research question will 
be addressed in general terms in Chapter 3, the second and third questions will be dealt with 
both in Chapter 3 and in the detailed empirical study presented in Chapters 4-6. 
The above set of research questions is reflected in the main argument of this thesis 
that: the study of state-firm relations provides a means of generating questions about the 
dynamics of institutional development and policy implementation within the EU's 
commercial diplomacy towards Asia. More specifically, this research perceives the EU's 
commercial diplomacy towards Asia as a reflection of composite dynamics both on the 
traditional state-level- commercial policy-formulation of the EU and Member States6 
towards Asian host governments (government-ta-government relations) - as well as (and 
more significantly) of the extent to which the EU incorporates and engages business interests 
into its commercial strategies. In this respect, the thesis draws upon the idea of Triangular 
Diplomacy and those of other authors on the concepts of 'competition states' (Cemy, 2000c), 
'catalytic states' (Weiss, 1998) and 'confrontation to cooperation' (Dunning, 1993b) 
producing what might be termed the 'cooperation states' in state-firm relations in order to 
explore variation in EU business engagement within the broad framework of its commercial 
strategies. 
Business engagement has emerged as part of overall EU commercial diplomacy since 
the mid-1990s. In responding to structural changes in the global political economy during the 
post-Cold War, the EU has adopted a number of different commercial instruments and 
·It is not an aim of this thesis to analyse the roles of different Member States in the EU-Asian commercial 
relations. However, it is undeniable that Member States are in fact involved in this analysis due to their 
interactions with the EU within the broad EU commercial policy. This means the thesis only aims to explore the 
roles played by the EU as a commercial actor and the extent to which and how it engages and incorporates 
business and firms (through some state-functions) closer to its commercial diplomacy framework at different 
levels of engagement in Asia. 
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strategies to engage business and firms more closely into its commercial diplomacy 
framework, for example by assisting and setting a framework for them to access third country 
markets (through the market access strategy), as a means to promote European 
competitiveness in the global political economy. In this respect, the thesis assumes that 
business engagement has emerged as part ofEU commercial diplomacy, and that the EU 
seems to play positive and proactive roles - comparable to those of competition, catalytic and 
cooperation states - in engaging business and firms more closely to its commercial 
diplomacy, especially in the case of Asia, whose markets have received increasing attention 
from the EU. These positive and pro active roles can be observed through the EU's attempt to 
formulate a number of distinctive business engagement strategies and instruments at different 
levels of EU commercial engagement in Asia, aiming to assist European business to access 
Asian markets and to facilitate trade and investment between the two regions. The empirical 
investigation in Chapters 4-6 of this thesis will explore this core assumption and will evaluate 
how effectively EU business engagement strategies towards Asia have been implemented at 
different levels. It is also expected that this multi-level analysis of the EU's commercial and 
business engagement strategies in Asia could help facilitate a general understanding of the 
EU's position in the global political economy. 
Policy Research: Formulation vs. Implementation of Strategy 
This thesis is partly an exercise in 'policy research', which aims to contribute to both 
academic and policy debates. In conducting policy research (as opposed to analysing policy 
and strategy only from official policy/strategy papers), it is crucial to have access to key 
policy-makers in order to obtain information about the current situation in the particular area 
of research (in this case the EU-Asian commercial relations), as well as gain insight into the 
motivations behind and the implications of such policy and strategy papers, adopted at 
particular times with particular purposes. 
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While aiming to evaluate the European Commission's strategies towards business in 
Asia - the extent to which and the way in which they engage business closely into the EU's 
formal commercial framework - the thesis also makes a distinction between 'formulation' 
and 'implementation' of strategy. It is important to note that this is done not with the intention 
to compare the EU's commercial roles and activities in Asia to those of the US and Japan-
their major economic competitors in the region - as such; instead the emphasis is on 
evaluating the achievement of the objectives set out by the European Commission in a set of 
strategies towards Asia. This is pursued in the three key contexts of ASEM, EU-ASEAN 
relations, and EU-Thailand relations, and the thesis then explores the extent to which and also 
the process of how these strategies and instruments have been successfully implemented. In 
other words, a key part ofthe process is to distinguish the difference between strategy 
'formulation' and 'implementation' or, to put it more crudely, 'what the European 
Commission is aiming to do' and 'what actually has been implemented/translated into 
action?' Chapter 3 will be devoted to the exploration of the first question, then Chapters 4-6 
to the later. Hence, this distinction between strategy formulation and implementation frames 
the general scope of this research. 
Multi Level-Analysis 
The empirical section of this thesis (Chapters 4-6) emphasises the utility of multi level-
analysis for exploring the place of business engagement at different levels ofEU commercial 
engagement in Asia: transregional, interregional, and bilateral. In this context, the 
transregionallevel is taken to refer to the ASEM, the interregionallevel to EU-ASEAN 
rehtions, and the bilateral level to EU-Thai relations. 
The proposition of multi-level analysis takes its cue from the words ofChris Patten, 
the 1994-2004 External Relations Commissioner, who insists that 'given the sprawling variety 
of Asia, it is absurd to think of a monolithic EU-Asia relationship: a single policy or 
approach, equally valid across the whole region' (Patten, 2002). Therefore, as a result of this 
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diversity of Asia, the EU engages the region at different, but interconnected levels: 
transregional, interregional, and bilateral. More importantly, in these three distinctive levels, it 
is assumed that the EU adopts different instruments and strategies, and performs different 
roles in its engagement with different stakeholders. Despite such variation in strategies, 
instruments, roles, and stakeholders, the EU's commercial and business engagement strategies 
at these different levels are arguably interconnected, reflecting the policy-linkages and 
differing priorities ofEU's commercial diplomacy towards Asia. This is because EU 
commercial interests in Asia at these three distinctive levels might be overlapping and 
intersect, and the EU might give more priority on one level than the other, depending on 
particular times and contexts. 
RESEARCH METHODS AND SOURCES 
This section addresses the sources this research has relied on and the methodological 
approach this research has adopted in exploring and investigating the research questions and 
assumptions mentioned earlier. A significant segment ofthe literature on EU-Asian relations 
has been mainly focused either on the Member States' or the EU's external relations with 
Asia and individual Asian countries at the government-to-government or intergovernmental 
level. This has meant that the investigation of the EU's commercial relations with Asia in the 
context of state (or quasi-state)-finn relations has remained largely under-researched. It is 
argued that in order to understand EU-Asian commercial relations during the post-Cold War 
period, it is crucial for this thesis to take into account the business involvement and 
particularly the complex interactions and interrelations between states, firms and the EU, as 
part of the broad picture ofEU-Asian relations. This means injecting an IPE angle into the 
study of the EU's external relations towards third countries, in this case those of Asia. Such a 
focus on EU business engagement activities is central to the contribution of this thesis to the 
existing literature on the EU-Asian relations. 
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Research Resources 
Literature on EU-Asian commercial relations from various secondary sources has 
provided this thesis with a broad understanding of the EU's commercial engagement in 
Asia at different levels through different institutional frameworks and mechanisms, 
including the ASEM, EU-ASEAN relations, and EU-Thailand relations; as well as how 
the EU intends to use them as a means to foster EU-Asian commercial relations, 
particularly to promote trade and investment between the two regions. However, in 
order to gain empirical evidence for the study ofthe EU's commercial and business 
engagement strategies in Asia, the thesis not only relies on secondary sources conducted 
and written by leading scholars in the field of EU-Asian relations, but also capitalises on 
access to primary documentary sources, such as official publications and documents of 
the EU, Chairman's Statements and Minutes from different Summits and meetings 
between Europe and Asia'. 
In studying the formulation ofEU's commercial strategies, the research treats not only 
the European Commission's Communication papers but also papers produced by the Council, 
the European Parliament and other EU institutions as the main sources for an exploration of 
EU commercial strategy, addressing the question 'what is the EU, particularly the European 
Commission aiming to do in Asia?' These Asian strategies adopted during the period of 1994-
2004 can be broadly divided into different types according to the different levels of 
engagement: apart from the broad Asian strategy papers, which aim to set up overall strategy 
and also state priorities, aims and objectives, there are ASEM strategy papers, strategy papers 
for ASEAN or the South East Asian region, and bilateral strategy papers for different Asian 
countries. The inferences of this thesis also reply heavily on information obtained from 
interviews, questionnaires, policy-networking and constant contacts with officials and policy-
7 See Bibliography, Section A. on Primary Sources, page 310 
9 
makers in order particularly to address the question 'what actually has been 
implemented/translated into action?'. 
Interviews, Questionnaires and Policy-Networking 
Interviews, questionnaires and policy-networking are three key qualitative research methods 
used as part of this research. Starting in October 2001,39 in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews, 9 sets of questionnaire feedback forms (out of approximately 60 sent out), as weII 
as constant interactions and other networking activities with officials and policy-makers were 
conducted in order to obtain empirical evidence, particularly for Chapters 4-6. In doing so, the 
author targeted not only officials and policy-makers who have knowledge and expertise in 
this particular policy area from both the EU and Member State organisations, but also other 
stakeholders (i.e. Business Associations and Chambers of Commerce) involved in the EU's 
commercial relations with Asia. 
At the initial stage of this research, approximately 60 open-ended questionnaires 
were sent out via email to four target groups of people, including responsible persons on 
AsiafIhailand at the European Commission in Brussels as welI as its Delegations in 
AsiafIhaiIand, Member State organisations, Thai govemment organisations, and 
representatives of business and private sector organisations (see Annex 6.1 for a sample 
of questionnaire form). The questions were formulated differently according to different 
target groups. However, the direct feedback received from questionnaires method was 
of marginal significance. Only a few questionnaires were completed and returned. 
Rather, informal meetings with an opportunity for interviews and face-to-face 
discussion were often offered by policy-makers as an alternative means of responding to 
the questionnaires, particularly officials from the European Commission in Brussels. 
As a result 'elite interviewing', particularly 'semi-structured interviewing' 
(Burnham, GiIIand, Grant, and Layton-Henry, 2004: 205) was a key method for this 
research, especially as a useful tool to deepen the research findings for Chapters 4-6. It 
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is recognised that this method is subject to limitations arising out ofrespondent 
confidentiality; although there were variations in the conditions imposed by the wide 
range of respondents, the decision was taken in the context of the thesis to withhold all 
interviewee names. The questionnaires were used as a basis for interview questions sent 
to the interviewees in advance. However, in practice different interviews were handled 
differently according to the position, expertise, personality, and interest in the subject of 
the interviewees. 
The interviews, which were mainly undertaken in Brussels and in Thailand, covered 
for example: the European Commission in Brussels (mainly DG Trade, DG External 
Relations, EuropeAid Co-operation Office); the European Commission Delegation in 
Thailand (particularly economic and commercial sections); Member State Embassies in 
Thailand (particularly economic and commercial sections); business associations 
(particularly, Chambers of Commerce, Member States' trade and industrial federations, 
UNICE, etc); Thai government organisations (for example, Mission of Thailand to the 
European Communities in Brussels, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, 
Government House).8 It is important to note that the 39 interviews conducted during 2002-
2005 also included a number of follow-up interviews with the same policy-makers and 
officials. For example, the author conducted research fieldwork in Bangkok 4 times (in 2001, 
2002, 2003 and 2004), and in Brussels 3 times (in 2003, 2004, and 2005), meeting with some 
new interviewees as well as conducting some follow-up interviews with the same officials 
and policy-makers who are experts in that particular area. Moreover, among the officials and 
policy-makers, the author observed that higher level officials were more likely than the lower 
level ones to provide positive and uncritical evaluations of the implementation and outcomes 
of the EU policy/strategy towards Asia. Thus, in order to obtain a more critical and concrete 
8 A full list of interviews is provided in the Bibliography, page 316. 
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evaluation of policy implementation, the author focused more on semi-structured interviews 
with area-specific policy-makers and experts, rather than high-level officials. 
However, obtaining business and private sector views on the EU's commercial 
strategies towards Asia proved to be more difficult. The author made a number of 
attempts to contact business people for interviews or discussions about the EU and its 
commercial policy, but this was often unsuccessful. This is perhaps because European 
businessmen/women (in this case, in Thailand) are less interested in discussing EU 
policy since they view this EU issue as marginal to their business activities. Thus, the 
views and attitudes from the business community presented in this research are the 
result of more indirect access, firstly through some interviews with Business 
Associations and Chambers of Commerce, who can also represent business voices, and 
secondly through informal contact/discussion with business people (for example, in 
some social and networking events organised by Chambers of Commerce in Thailand). 
It is worthy of note in this context that the sources of interview evidence not 
only reflected the policy expertise of those interviewed but also reflected the overall 
complexion ofthe policy areas concerned, in gender-related terms. In terms ofthe 
research findings for Chapters 4-6, it can be observed that the empirical investigations 
on the AEBF (in Chapter 4) and on commercial networking in Thailand (in Chapter 6), 
particularly with business community and private sector organisations, reflect a male-
dominated area; however the interviews conducted with the European Commission in 
Brussels show evidence of a more equal gender-balance. It is apparent that in this 
respect the research findings obtained from the interviews are broadly representative 
and given the variations it was seen as appropriate to use gender-neutral terms 
throughout the thesis9• 
9 See examples ofa neutral-gender terms in Chapter 4, page 161 and page 163 
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The range and content of the data obtained from different interest groups, 
institutions and organisations involved in EU commercial diplomacy towards Asia as 
weB as the author's close contacts and networks with policy-makers both in Thailand 
and in Brussels have provided the thesis with additional insight and up-to-date 
information on the EU's commercial and business engagement strategies towards Asia. 
In this manner, a combination of research methods is reflected in the thesis: policy 
research as a general method for the research project, a multi-level analysis as a framework 
for the empirical study, and significantly qualitative methods in the form of interviews, 
questionnaires, and networking and relaying with officials and policy-makers. This made it 
possible to explore their experiences, practices, critical perspectives, and evaluation in-depth 
and thus to enrich the analysis of the implementation of the EU's commercial and business 
engagement strategies towards Asia. The use of such a combination of methods provides 
complementary data which can strengthen the research findings. 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
To explore commercial strategies and business engagement in the EU's relations with Asia, 
the thesis has been broadly divided into seven chapters. Chapters 1-3 review the analytical 
and policy background; Chapters 4-6 investigate in detail the EU's business engagement 
activities in Asia, whilst Conclusion reviews the evidence from Chapters 4-6 and re-evaluates 
the more general ideas discussed in Chapters 1-3. 
Chapter 1 will review the !PE debate on states and firms and their roles in the global 
political economy, focusing on Susan Strange's approach as an alternative approach (from 
either realism/internationalism or liberalism/globalism) to understand the increasing 
importance of non-state actors, while not dismissing the important roles played by states. 
Rather, it offers an analysis based on 'differentiated' and 'modified' roles of states and a 
'redefinition' of state-functions in the changing global political economy, but not the end of 
statehood. Hence, in Chapter 1, Strange's approach and particularly Stopford and Strange's 
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(1991) conception of Triangular Diplomacy - a new diplomacy of bargaining relations 
between states and firms - has been proposed as a useful framework generating questions 
about the increasing importance of non-state actors such as firms and quasi-state actors such 
as the EU as participant in the world arena. The chapter complements Stopford and Strange's 
approach with other approaches focusing on the more positive and pro active roles of states, 
namely those relating to 'competition states' (Cemy, 2000c), 'catalytic states' (Weiss, 1998) 
and 'confrontation to cooperation' (Dunning, 1993b) in state-firm relations producing what 
might be termed 'cooperation states', in order to understand the role played by the EU 
alongside both states and firms in the global political economy. 
Chapter 2 is devoted to the exploration of the EU's commercial diplomacy, drawing 
on ideas of commercial autonomy, representation, and influence; though still operating 
alongside the Member States, the EU has its own commercial diplomacy, and plays 
significant commercial roles through different strategies and instruments in the global arena. 
More specifically, Chapter 2 will focus particularly on the European Commission's roles in 
formulating the EU's commercial strategies, pursuing its commercial ideas, objectives and 
priorities towards the rest of the world. Through these commercial strategies, the Commission 
- as a strategy initiator - has not only established intergovernmental relations with other 
states, govemments and regional groupings, but has also engaged firms and business closely 
into these relations. Furthermore, and more significantly, Chapter 2 also observes the 
emergence of business engagement as a crucial element of overall EU commercial diplomacy 
towards the rest ofthe world since the mid-1990s. 
By focusing specifically on the EU's commercial diplomacy towards Asia, Chapter 3 
examines the general picture of contemporary EU-Asian commercial relations and 
particularly the formulation of the EU's commercial strategies towards Asia during the 1994-
2004 period. As a consequence of the large and expanding markets of Asia, which have held 
the EU's attention, it is assumed that business engagement has become crucial as part of the 
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EU's commercial strategies towards Asia since 1994. Hence, the drive for EU business 
engagement in this region is even more notable. 
On the basis of Chapters 1-3, the thesis concludes provisionally that the EU seems to 
envisage proactive roles alongside both states and firms in commercial diplomacy and that the 
framing ofEU commercial diplomacy assumes a form of 'competition' or 'catalytic' state 
embodying 'cooperation' rather than 'confrontation' in relations with states and firms. In turn, 
this implies assistance to Member States and firms enabling them to compete with others, as a 
means to enhance European competitiveness in the global political economy; the EU in this 
way can play a 'proactive' as well as a 'defensive' role in commercial diplomacy. This broad 
conclusion is then investigated in more detail in Chapters 4-6 of the thesis. 
Chapters 4-6 are devoted to an empirical investigation of the place of business 
engagement within the EU's broad commercial strategies towards Asia at the three different 
levels of commercial engagement already identified: transregional (ASEM), interregional 
(EU-ASEAN) relations, and bilateral (EU-Thailand) relations. Through exploration ofthese 
distinctive but interconnected levels of engagement, the thesis aims to investigate the way in 
which the EU engages or incorporates businesses and firms into its overall commercial 
diplomacy framework by examining what instruments the EU has, what strategies the EU 
pursues for whose interests (which business stakeholders) and finally what roles the EU plays 
in different levels ofEU commercial engagement in Asia. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to analysing ASEM as part of the EU's commercial engagement 
in Asia by focusing on the Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF), which under the ASEM 
economic framework is the EU's most visible attempt to engage business into its commercial 
diplomacy at the transregionallevel. The purpose is to evaluate the extent to which the AEBF 
has been a successful EU strategy in supporting business co-operation and promoting trade 
and investment between the EU and Asia. 
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Chapter 5 investigates the EU's commercial and business engagement strategy at the 
interregionallevel of EU-ASEAN relations. Particular attention will be paid to the new 
ASEAN strategy' A New Partnership with South East Asia' and particularly the 'Trans-
Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative' (TREA TI) initiated by the European Commission in 
2003 and a number ofthe EU's economic co-operation programmes as the EU's indirect 
strategy to engage business at this interregionallevel. 
Chapter 6 examines the EU and particularly the role of the European Commission 
Delegations in assisting business at the bilateral level, using the case of the EU in Thailand. It 
explores the emergence of a commercial network and the co-operation between the 
Delegation, Member State Embassies, and other business associations such as national 
Chambers of Commerce at this local level, with the aim of supporting business and of 
strengthening EU-Thai trade and investment relations. 
The Conclusion begins by reviewing the results of the empirical investigations in 
Chapters 4-6. This review suggests that there is considerable variety ofpattems of activity 
and their effectiveness at the three levels ofEU-Asian commercial relations. On this basis, it 
can be suggested that different patterns ofinstruments, strategies, stakeholders and roles 
produce specific types of business engagement and influence their effectiveness. Thus, whilst 
Stopford and Strange's concept of Triangular Diplomacy can be seen as a classic model for 
the analysis of state-firm relations in IPE, the thesis asks whether this is not a rather restrictive 
model with which to analyse state-firm relations in the European context, where the EU has 
modified classical relations between traditional states and firms. It is argued that an approach 
based on differentiation between types of business engagement strategy, and focusing on the 
proactive role of state or quasi-state authorities is more appropriate. 
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Chapter 1 
States, Markets and Firms 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Central to IPE has been a vigorous debate on states and markets and their roles in the world 
economy. Two traditional IPE schools of thought, realism and liberalism have embedded 
contrasting approaches to the role of states and markets. While realism on the one hand gives 
primacy to states, liberalism on the other emphasises the role of markets. Changes in the post-
Cold War period - which can be traced back to earlier developments in the 1970s and 1980s-
have challenged this conventional debate. In particular they have introduced a new dispute 
between internationalism and globalism, which has focused on globalisation and its 
implications for the roles of states in the global political economy. Equally important, these 
structural changes during the past thirty years, and particularly in the post-Cold war era, have 
also resulted in a new or a renewed prominence for diverse sets of actors - non-states (such as 
firms), Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), international organisations, and quasi-states 
(such as the EU) - performing their increasingly significant roles alongside traditional state 
actors in the global political economy. Within this broad framework of the study ofIPE, this 
chapter focuses on analysing the relations between state (or quasi-state) actors and firms in 
the changing global political economy. 
The chapter first reviews the debates between realism and liberalism, and then 
between internationalism and globalism, which are regarded here as two opposite ends of the 
spectrum of post-Cold War discussions in IPE. Rather than taking sides with any of these 
contrasting positions, the chapter proposes Susan Strange's structural approach as a middle 
way, which helps bridge the divide between realism/liberalism and internationalism/globalism 
as well as facilitate the understanding of the roles of states, non-states (particularly firms), and 
quasi-states like the EU in the changing global political economy. As part of Strange's 
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structural approach, particular attention will be paid to Stopford and Strange's (1991) idea of 
'Triangular Diplomacy' - a classic model to explain the 'mutual interdependence of states 
and firms' (1991:1) during structural changes within the world economy. 
Hence, it is also an aim of this chapter to explore both the variations in the form and 
the differentiation of the roles played by states within Stopford and Strange's Triangular 
Diplomacy model. This model makes possible the analysis of non-states and quasi-states as 
actors in their own right performing their roles alongside states in the international system, 
while not dismissing (nor diminishing) the role of states. This chapter thus proposes to take 
Strange's structural approach and particularly the idea of Triangular Diplomacy as a means of 
generating questions about the interrelations between states (or in this case quasi-states) and 
firms and the roles played by the EU in the changing global political economy. However, to 
explore the EU, which represents an advanced-industrialised quasi-state economy, the chapter 
suggests some other conceptualisations of a more proactive role for the state: Philip Cerny's 
idea of the 'competition state' (1990, 2000c), Linda Weiss's theory ofthe 'catalytic state' 
(Weiss, 1998), and John Dunning's concept of 'Confrontation to Cooperation' (1993b) 
producing what might be termed the 'cooperation state', leading to some modifications to the 
roles of states as put forward in the original version of Triangular Diplomacy proposed by 
Stop ford and Strange. 
1.2 CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO STATES AND MARKETS: REALISM AND 
LIBERALISM 
There is a continuing debate in lPE between realism (or mercantilism) and liberalism. These 
two dominant schools of thought have proffered opposing views on the roles of states and 
markets lO• In this part, the chapter reviews contrasting approaches between realists and 
liberals, particularly in relation to the nature and role of states in the international system. 
10 It is not a purpose of this chapter to give a detailed account of all IPE schools of thought. It is accepted that 
Marxism dependency theory and other IPE theories also give their distinctive views on states and markets, which 
are different from both realism and liberalism. 
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1.2.1 Realism and Mercantilism: A State-Centric View 
Realism (and in more economic tenus mercantilism) is seen as representing a state-centric 
view in IPE. Realism assumes that states are the major actors in world affairs (Morgenthau, 
1973:10; Waltz, 1979: 95) and that there is no central authority above states in the 
international system. Thus, the order between states is explained as an 'anarchical', 'self-help' 
system, in which states have to struggle in order to survive and achieve their own 'national 
interest' (Waltz, 1979: 105-107). According to Gilpin, realism is thus 'a doctrine of state-
building' and for realists 'the market should be subordinate to the pursuit of state interests' 
(1987: 26). 
Realism is concerned primarily with 'the sources and uses of national power in 
international relations and power relations between nation-states' (Mastanduno, Lake, and 
Ikenberry, 1989: 460). In Morgenthau's (1973: 31) words, 'international politics, like all 
politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is 
always the immediate aim'. For the realist, inter-state relations are 'always power politics' 
(Carr, 1981: 145). 
When it comes to economic issues, mercantilism not only focuses on the state 'as the 
predominant actor in international relations and as an instrument of economic development' 
(Gilpin, 1987: 46) but also 'identifies a favourable balance of trade with national security' 
(Gilpin, 1987: 33). This means that mercantilism stands firmly within the realist school of 
thought, in particular by its emphasis on the linkages between 'wealth' and 'power'. As Jacob 
Viner (1948:19) points out, the 'mercantilist doctrine ... put[s] great stress on the importance 
of national economic interests' and asserts that 'wealth and power are each proper ultimate 
ends of national policy'. Therefore, while intending to provide both economic and military 
security for a given territorial unit, 'the [mercantilist] state could attempt to accumulate 
wealth and power relative to other states' (Gill, 2000: 50). Viewed in this context, Gilpin then 
described two different fonus of mercantilism: the first is defensive or 'benign', and the 
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second aggressive or 'malevolent' mercantilism. In the former, particularly as revealed in the 
work of Friedrich List,11 states look after their national economic interests because this is an 
important ingredient in their national security; such policies need not have overly negative 
effects on other states. In the latter, states attempt to exploit the international economy 
through expansionary policies: for example, the imperialism of the European colonial powers 
in Asia and Africa (Gilpin, 1987: 32). 
Neo-realism or structural realism has developed further (although with some 
divergence) the inferences of classical realism12. Kenneth Waltz's (1979) analysis is the 
strongest and most prominent example of structural realism. Within this school, the theory of 
hegemonic stability informs the study ofIPE with the assumption that the stability of the 
world economy depends upon the existence of a hegemon (Kindleberger, 1973; Gilpin 1987). 
As stated by Charles P. Kindleberger (acknowledged as the father ofhegemonic stability 
theory) 'for the world economy to be stabilised, there has to be a stabiliser, one stabiliser' 
(1973: 305). This idea was adopted by the neo-realists in order to analyse international 
economic relations. For example, Gilpin argued, 'the creation, maintenance, and successful 
functioning of a liberal international economy requires the exercise of political 
leadership ... and for several decades, the US performed this leadership or hegemonic 
responsibility' (1987: 367). Krasner (1976) has also developed a 'state-power' theory of 
hegemony to illustrate how states act upon interests defined in terms of economic power. As 
Krasner (2000: 20) points out, the leading state perceives its interests in systemic terms and 
enforces a relatively liberal international economic order. Therefore, the hegemony of a 
leading power is necessary for the creation and continuance of free trade. 
Based on the realist assumptions outlined above, notwithstanding some differences 
between them, realism, mercantilism, and neo-realism (hegemonic stability theory) represent 
11 List argues why certain states, Gennany in particular, should be given a chance, through protectionism, to 
ascend the ranks to industrialised status (Crane and Amawi, 1997: 6). 
12 As Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry (1989: 460) noted, 'structural realists are sensitive to the levels of 
analysis ... the structure of the international system is understood in terms of an ordering principle, such as 
anarchy, and a particular distribution of power'. 
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a state-centric view in IPE. For them, states are concerned with 'relative gains' and each state 
tries to improve its position vis-a-vis other states. As a result economic relations are often a 
'zero-sum game' in which one state's gain equals another state's loss. Realism does not seem 
to be interested in markets and firms, as for them markets and firms are outside the political 
field. Moreover, 'the existence of various transnational, multilateral, transgovernmental, and 
other non-state actors ... can only be understood within the context of a broader structure that 
ultimately rests upon the power and interests of states' (Krasner, 2000: 36). As Gilpin (2002: 
238) noted, 'although realism does not ignore the importance of such non-state actors as 
multinational firms, international organisations, and non-governmental 
organisations ... realism insists, however, that the state continues to be the principal actor in 
both economic and political affairs'. Non-state actors 'are decidedly less important' (Viotti 
and Kauppi, 1993: 35) and generally operate within the rubric of state policies. 
1.2_2 Liberalism: Beyond the State 
Liberalism has a rather different view from realism and mercantilism on the role of states: it 
rejects the idea that states are the dominant actors, and instead recognises individual human 
beings as the primary international actors. As Zacher and Matthew point out, 'liberalism is 
committed to the steady, if uneven, expansion of human freedom through various political 
and economic strategies, such as democratisation and market capitalism' (1995: 111). First, it 
is important to note that liberalism has developed into theoretically wide-ranging and different 
approaches and 'there is no canonical description ofliberalism' (Doyle, 1986: 1152). One of 
the liberal branches is political liberalism, which has as a goal the harmonisation of 
conceptions of self-interest tPJough political action: 'these goals are realised through the 
promotion ofliberal democracy, through international cooperation, law, and institutions, and 
through social integration and technological development' (Underhill, 2000: 13). While 
recognising this conceptualisation of political liberalism, this thesis concentrates on the 
economic aspects of liberalism. 
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Economic liberalism assumes that 'a market arises spontaneously in order to satisfy 
human needs and that, once it is in operation, it functions in accordance with its own internal 
logic' (Gilpin, 1987: 27). Conceived by John Locke in the seventeenth century, 'laissez-faire 
liberalism conceptualised governments, or the state, as a necessary evil that has to be sharply 
constrained in order to allow the private sector to flourish' (Zacher and Matthew, 1995: Ill, 
112). During the late-eighteenth and nineteenth-century, Adam Smith did much more than 
criticise mercantilism - 'he founded a new line ofIPE theory' (Crane and Amawi, 1997: 6) by 
espousing the 'freer trade' principle. This meant that 'irrational political intervention or 
economic collusion, can, and in time did, undermine the felicitous consequences of free 
markets' (Crane and Amawi, 1997: 6). David Ricardo (1911: 114) in The Principle of 
Political Economy and Taxation even claimed that free trade 'binds together by one common 
tie of interests and intercourse, the universal society of nations throughout the civilised 
world'. Therefore, as Tooze noted, 'this principle of free trade, translated to economic 
relations among nations, means that trade based purely on liberal economic criteria (i.e. free 
trade) is harmonious, both nationally and internationally' (1992: 235). 
In sharp contrast to the realists, economic liberals view markets as 'self-regulating' if 
individuals are left largely to their own economic devices and thus 'government has the key 
but limited function of providing security and maintaining law and order domestically and 
globally' (Tooze, 1992: 235). Furthermore, economic liberals believe in a 'non-zero-sum 
game', in which conflict can be managed because bargains can be struck between entities on 
the basis that everyone could gain' (1992: 236). 
Another branch of liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism, also challenges the realist 
state-centric view by focusing on international rule-making and institution building as an 
attempt to find an alternative to state power and interstate competition. Neoliberal 
institutionalism pays particular attention to the significance of non-state actors and 
organisations in the international system. International organisations and Multinational 
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Corporations (MNCs), for example, are perceived as independent actors in their own right and 
the pattern of international interactions is more than a framework in which sovereign states 
compete. In their landmark study, Keohane and Nye (1977: 29-38) argue that the international 
system is characterised by processes of 'complex interdependence' in which states pursue 
different goals simultaneously and transnational actors, such as NGOs and MNCs, pursue 
their own goals independent of state control. Keohane and Nye are nevertheless at pains to 
emphasise that realism is not irrelevant or obsolete: 'it is not impossible to imagine dramatic 
conflict or revolutionary change in which the use of threat of military force over an economic 
issue or among advanced industrial countries might become plausible. Then realist 
assumptions would again be a reliable guide to events' (1977: 28). Keohane and Nye's 
conception of 'interdependence' is regarded here as more balanced in its approach than that of 
economic liberals and is thus seen as 'a combination of international relations realism and 
liberal IPE' (Crane and Amawi, 1997: 13). 
According to this review of realist and liberal assumptions, it is possible to conclude 
that realism and liberalism, particularly economic liberalism, are two opposite ends of the 
spectrum when viewing the role of states and markets in the international arena. They have 
different areas of interests; realism gives primacy to states, while economic liberalism gives it 
to markets. As Gill (2000: 51) argued, economic liberalism is 'more a doctrine of the primacy 
of market forces rather than of the state'. Moreover, Underhill (2000: 13) suggests, 'if realism 
is a political theory of relations among states, then economic liberalism ... has become a theory 
of the interaction of individuals in the economic sphere'. Neo-liberal institutionalism seems to 
offer a middle way between liberalism and realism and can (still) be located within the liberal 
paradigm, but closer to the realist end of the spectrum. 
Nonetheless, changes in the world political economy ofthe past thirty years, 
particularly globalisation, have posed major challenges to all disciplines engaged in the 
conventional debate on the role of states and markets. The next section will discuss a new 
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phase in this debate debate - the contention between internationalism and globalism - which 
tends to be regarded as both a re-emphasis and a continuation of the dispute between realism 
and liberalism on the role of states and markets. 
1.3 INTERNATIONALISM AND GLOBALISM 
In the post-Cold War period, there have been dramatic changes, bringing to prominence those 
broader structural changes of the past thirty years that have already been outlined. The most 
striking phenomenon happening in the world political economy has been labelled 
'globalisation,ll. This growing interconnectedness and the increasing international economic 
forces of globalisation have posed great challenges to territories, sovereignty, and the control 
of nation-states. There have been widespread arguments among scholars about the impact of 
globalisation on states: Is the state in retreat? Does the role of the state remain the same, 
decline or change? 
This section explores the 'great globalisation debate' (Held and McGrew, 2000:1) 
from internationalist and globalist perspectives, with a particular emphasis on the implications 
of globalisation for the role of states in the changing global political economy. It is argued 
that the changes in the post-Cold War period and the process of globalisation have re-focused 
the traditional debate about states and markets between realists and liberals discussed earlier 
into a vigorous contention between internationalists and globaIists. They are seen as two 
different ends of the spectrum of discussions on the role of the state: (i) internationalists-
who still focus on the primacy of states; (ii) and globalists - who give particular attention to 
the increasing importance of markets. The realist approach tends to be frequently associated 
with internationalists, while the liberal perspective is espoused by the globalists. However, it 
has to be noted that it is difficult to perceive either of those positions as definitive or fixed. In 
fact, there are a variety of other analytical views on the role of states and the impact of 
Il Despite globalisation being a contested and multi-faceted phenomenon, this chapter does not aim to define the 
concept of globalisation; rather it focuses only on the economic aspects of globalisation and what happens to 
states as a consequence of the processes of economic globalisation. 
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globalisation. For instance, Held and McGrew (2002: 98) point out that there are three broad 
theoretical camps: (i), neoliberals, liberal internationalists, institutional reformers who favour 
globalisation; (ii) global transformers, statistiprotectionists, and radicals (Marxists) who 
oppose it; and (iii) cosmopolitan social democrats who offer overlapping (if not eclectic) 
perspectives. Rather than attempt to distinguish between these different positions, this chapter 
focuses on the contrasting views of internationalists and globalists on the role of states in the 
process of globalisation. 
1.3.1 Internationalist 'Persisting-State' Views 
Instead ofthe term 'globalisation', internationalists offer 'internationalisation' as a more valid 
conceptualisation of current developments; in particular the growing links between essentially 
discrete national economies or societies and the geographical clustering of cross-border 
economic and social exchanges in the form of , re giona lis at ion' or 'triadisation' (Ruigrok and 
Tulder, 1995; Hirst and Thompson, 1996). For internationalists, the process of globalisation is 
greatly 'exaggerated' (Hirst and Thompson, 1996) as states retain many crucial capacities for 
governance. In fact, as Hirst stated, 'we have been global for a long time' and the 'global' 
economy is not historically unprecedented l4 (1997: 410). 
When it comes to explaining regionalisation, internationalists like Hirst argue that the 
growth of trade blocs like the EU and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
has promoted the regionalisation oftrade regulation, even as the new General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) treaty and the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
'have witnessed concerted interstate action to extend the sale and scope of trade liberalisation 
measures'. Therefore, 'far from being global, the world economy remains dominated by the 
three major blocs of wealth and power: the Triad of Europe, Japan and North America' (Hirst, 
1997: 410-413). Additionally and in opposition to the globalist concept of 'global 
governance', internationalists claim that 'governance beyond the state is conceived primarily 
14 For example, 'the belle opoque, namely the period from 1870·1914' (Hirst, 1997: 411). 
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as an intergovernmental affair - dominated by power politics and the historic struggle for 
relative national advantage (including the competition between national monopoly 
capitalisms)' (Krasner 1985, quoted in Held and McGrew 2002: 73). Moreover, the 
internationalists view MNCs as remaining predominantly the captives of national or regional 
markets, contrary to their popular portrayal (by globalists) as 'foot-loose capitai' (Tyson 
1991; Ruigrok and Tulder 1995). 
To conclude, internationalists emphasise the continuing primacy of territory, borders, 
place and national governments in the distribution and location of power, production and 
wealth in the contemporary world order. For internationalists, states remain unquestionably 
fundamental and sovereign even in the changing global political economy and in the 
globalisation process during the post-Cold War era. 
1.3.2 Globalist 'Disappearing-State' Views 
Globalists generally contest the internationalist claim that states remain primary actors even in 
the changing world political economy. Instead they argue that 'states are undergoing 
transformation as the dynamics of globalisation accelerate' (Rosenau 1998: 2). 'Hyper' 
globalists declare 'the end of the nation state' (Ohmae, 1996). 
Seen as a hyper globalist, Kenichi Ohmae (1990) puts forward the concept of extreme 
globalisation where advanced technology and modern communication are said to bring us 
together towards a 'borderless world'. For Ohmae, 'traditional nation-states have become 
unnatural, even impossible business units in a global economy' (1996: 5); instead Ohmae 
diagnoses the emergence of a borderless economy of 'region states' - 'an area (often cross-
border) developed around a regional economic centre with a population of a few to 10-20 
million' (1996: 143). Region states are the likely organisational units ofthis globalised world; 
in any case, power over economic activity will devolve from nation-states to 'the borderless 
network of countless individual market decisions' (1996: 39). John Naisbitt, in a similar vein, 
claimed that 'the nation-state is dead' (1994: 43). He explains that 'not because states were 
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subsumed by super-states, but because they are breaking up into smaller, more efficient parts-
just like big companies ... As we move toward linking up millions of host computer networks, 
countries will become irrelevant and begin to fade away' (1994: 58). 
Other more moderate globalists, instead of dismissing the state, challenge the 
traditional conception of states and statehood, i.e., sovereignty and legitimacy, by arguing that 
national governments are deeply embedded in systems of multilayered economic governance, 
and that their role and power continue to be qualified decisively by economic globalisation 
(Reich 1991, Sassen 1996, Rosenau 1997). For example, Sassen has argued that 'globalisation 
[particularly] the formation of a new economic system centred on cross-border flows and 
global telecommunication ... has entailed a partial denationalising of national territory and a 
partial shift of some components of states sovereignty to other institutions, from supranational 
entities to the global capital market' and 'this would represent a transformation in the 
articulation of sovereignty and territory as they have marked the formation of the modem 
state and interstate system' (1996: xi). Rosenau has also pointed out that 'the authority, 
effectiveness, and sovereignty of states are under severe strain, the ramifications for global 
governance are enormous' (1997: 363); nonetheless, he added, 'state sovereignty has eroded, 
but it is still vigorously asserted. Governments are weaker, but they still possess considerable 
resources and they can still throw their weight around' (Rosenau, 1998: 3). 
Additionally, in contrast to internationalists who view regionalisation as 'triadisation' 
of three major blocs of powerful states, globalists perceive regionalisation as complementary 
to globalisation. As Hettne argued, 'globalisation and regionalisation can be seen as 
complementary processes, modifying each other, in the formation of a new world 
order ... world regions rather than nation-states may in fact constitute basic units in a future 
multilateral world order' (2000: 156). Therefore, as Held and McGrew (2000: 12) conclude, 
for globalists 'national government is increasingly locked into a multilayered system of 
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governance -local, national, regional and global- and can barely monitor it, let alone stay in 
command'. Hence, markets have been the most dominant forces in such a globalising world. 
Viewed as two opposite ends of the spectrum, both internationalists and globalists 
(particularly hyper globalists), offer a rather limited understanding of the roles of states. This 
is because they seem to view states as either 'persisting' (for internationalists) or 
'declining/weakening' (for globalists) and even 'disappearing' (for hyper globalists) during 
the process of globalisation. It is, however, possible to propose a middle way, which enables 
an alternative analysis of the 'changing/modifying' roles of states in the international political 
economy. 
1.4 'THE MIDDLE WAY' APPROACH OF SUSAN STRANGE 
Instead of taking one of the opposing positions discussed so far (i.e. realists/internationalists 
or economic liberals/globalists) this thesis proposes Susan Strange's structural approachls as 
an alternative explanation of the 'changes' in the world political economy since the 1970s, 
particularly after the end of the Cold War and in the context of the on-going process of 
globalisation. As Tooze and May noted, 'Susan Strange was ... concerned to make sense of the 
myriad changes and developments in the global political economy in ways that could be 
communicated and shared' (2002: 4). By refuting hyper globalism/liberalism without turning 
to internationalism/realism, Strange's approach tends to bridge the gap between differing 
conceptualisations on the role of the state. Such a perspective makes possible the analysis of 
state-roles as 'modified', instead of 'persistent' (internationalists) or 'disappearing' (hyper-
globalists), in the changing international political economy. 
Opposed to both realist and liberal views, Strange's approach questions not only the 
validity of realist state-centric approaches to international relations but also the credentials of 
IS According to Palan (1992), Susan Strange was 'the second structuralist'. The first structuralists were the 
Waltzian realists who interpreted change in international relations in terms of the shifts in state power between 
states. The second structuralists are international political economists who interpret change in world politics in 
terms of shifts in structural power over outcomes in world society and economy (Palan, 1992, quoted by Strange, 
2000, note 9: 89). 
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a wide range of theories in economics, especially those of a liberal persuasion. Strange (2000: 
83) explicitly argued that 'it is no good looking to theories of international relations ... nor is it 
any good looking for help from neo-liberal economics in understanding globalisation' and 
'there is little in conventional theory to help us come to terms with such developments'. 
While rejecting the realist assumption that the state is the sole source of authority in the global 
political economy, unlike economic liberals, Strange did not say that states are obsolete, or 
that MNCs are replacing them. Rather, she emphasised 'changes' and particularly argued for 
'structural changes' in the international political economy, which for her were 'changing the 
character of the state and ofthe state system- and changing them rather rapidly and 
fundamentally' (1994a: 212). 
1.4.1 Structural Changes and A New Diplomacy 
The changes in the international political economy identified by Strange include: 'structural 
changes' (Strange, 1992:2) in the world economy, an emergence ofthe new diplomacy with 
an increasing importance of non-state actors (Stopford and Strange, 1991) and 'important 
shifts in the quality as well as quantity of state power and authority' (Strange, 1996 cited by 
Scholte, 1997: 428); all these changes led to 'differentiated' and 'modified' roles of states in 
the global political economy. 
According to Stop ford and Strange in their book Rival States, Rival Firms, the crucial 
structural changes in the international political economy have been both political and 
economic. For instance, politically these alterations have been instanced by the melting of the 
Cold War confrontation, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its empire, and the drive 
for multiparty democracy and national self-determination not only in Europe but in many 
developing countries. In the economic sphere these changes are exemplified by the drives 
towards deregulation in developed countries and towards privatisation in most countries 
around the world (1991: 205). As Strange further pointed out, the driving forces of these 
structural changes in terms of economics are: i) the accelerating rate and cost of technological 
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change which has speeded up in its turn the internationalisation of production and the 
dispersion of manufacturing industry to newly industrialised countries; ii) increased capital 
mobility which has made this dispersion of industry both faster and easier; and iii) changes in 
the structure of knowledge which have made transnational communications cheap and fast 
and have raised people's awareness ofthe potential for material betterment in a market 
economy (1992: 2-3). 
As a consequence of these structural changes, there has also been 'a fundamental 
change in the nature of diplomacy' (1992: 1), producing a new kind of diplomacy called 
'Triangular Diplomacy' (Stopford and Strange, 1991: 22). It adds two new dimensions to the 
traditional state-state type of diplomacy: (i) the bargaining between governments and firms, 
especially MNCs; and (ii) bargaining among firms. Within this new kind of diplomacy, the 
importance of firms as major actors in the world system is explicitly emphasised (Stopford 
and Strange, 1991; Strange, 1992: 10).16 
Nonetheless, while recognising the increasing significance of non-state actors-
particularly firms - in the global political economy, Strange did not dismiss the roles of states. 
In States and Markets, Strange (1994b) suggests further the interrelations between states and 
markets by detailing four kinds of 'structural power' - 'security, production, finance, and 
knowledge'. She argues that in only one of these four aspects did states take the leading role-
security (and even then they often needed the support of other states). In the exercise of all 
other kinds of structural power, non-state actors played a large part in determining 'who-gets-
what'. 
Rather than simply replacing the roles of states with new and stronger roles of non-
states, especially firms, Strange emphasises the 'fundamental change in the economic base of 
the world of states, in the power and even possibly the legitimacy of the state' (1994a: 210). 
Furthermore, she argues that' states themselves have taken decisions that augment the power 
16 The model of Triangular Diplomacy will be discussed in detail later on in this chapter. 
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· of markets over governments' and 'they have decided that survival as an individual may 
require adapting to new circumstances and new forces of change; and adapting may require a 
limitation of autonomy as the price of survival' (Strange, 2000: 85). This means that Strange's 
approach gives a particular focus on the 'modified' roles of states in the changing global 
political economy. 
1.4.2 Strange's Approach and the EU 
While recognising the increasing importance of non-state actors in the world economy, 
Strange's approach suggests not only the roles played by firms, but also by other types of 
non-state actors, including mafia, international organisations, regional organisations and 
international bureaucracies, including the EU (Strange, 1996). Thus, the model of Triangular 
Diplomacy emphasises that 'changes in the world system are, to be sure, the product of a 
myriad of actions by all actors, whether individuals, firms, states or intergovernmental 
bodies ... Taken together, their actions have limited the independent options for states during 
the last two decades or so' (Stopford and Strange, 1991: 204). 
In The Retreat of the State, Strange explicitly argued that 'the declining authority of 
states is reflected in a growing diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations, and 
to local and regional bodies' (1996: 4). Such diffusion of power in the world economy also 
includes the diffusion of state authority towards regional bodies, like the EU. As she stressed, 
'we have to escape and resist the state-centrism inherent in the analysis of conventional 
international relations ... The study of globaIisation has to embrace the study of the behaviour 
of firms no less than of other forms of political authority' (1999: 354). This suggestion 
recognises not only firms but also other non-state and quasi-state actors, including the EU, as 
new actors (in their own right) alongside states in the global political economy. 
Strange hinted at this proposition when she later acknowledged that rather than States 
and Markets she should have titled her book Authority and Markets as she wanted to include 
all forms of authority, whether located in the state, international institutions, corporations or 
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the markets themselves, and not just the state. This submission encapsulates her focus on the 
fundamental relationship of politics and economics, on authority and markets (Tooze and 
May, 2002: 6). 
However, Strange perceives the EU as an 'extreme case' and unlike other large 
multilateral organisations like the United Nations (UN) or the World Bank. She doubted the 
extent to which 'authority has significantly moved from national capitals to the central 
institutions of the EC' and 'if the Member States of the EU or Community really have 
institutionalised policy coordination amongst themselves' (1996: 171). In fact, Stopford and 
Strange had also addressed the EU's statehood problem that '[in the EU] there are problems 
of defining the state' (1991: 57). This idiosyncrasy of the EU polity points not only to its 
problematic structure, but also suggests that a divergence of Member State interests make it a 
distinctive actor in the global political economy. This query into the transfer of authority from 
nation-states to EU institutions raises another crucial question about the nature of the EU as a 
quasi-state actor in the global political economy, which is also a central concern of this thesis. 
This ambiguous status of the EU will be dealt with in Chapter 2 when analysing the EU as a 
commercial actor and its commercial diplomacy. 
After this overview of the approach developed by Strange, the following section of 
this chapter focuses specifically on the model of 'Triangular Diplomacy' proposed by 
Stopford and Strange in 1991 in their book Rival States, Rival Firms. 
1.5 'TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY' 
Seen as a crucial part of Strange's approach, the 'Triangular Diplomacy' model proposed by 
John Stop ford and Susan Strange is recognised as a classic theoretical explanation for the 
understanding of 'the mutual interdependence of states and firms' (1991:1) in the global 
political economy. Rather than believing in the old type of diplomacy (i.e. state-state 
relations) Stopford and Strange made the case for a 'new "Triangular Diplomacy" where the 
traditional players have been joined by members of other government ministries and by the 
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executives of finns, both local and multinational' (1991: 21). This new diplomacy is a net 
result of global structural changes already discussed earlier, which 'have exerted a dominant 
influence on the behaviour of governments and firms and pushed finns more centre-stage' 
(1991: 3). 
Triangular Diplomacy when proposed offered a new research agenda in international 
relations: the study of firms as actors in world politics and ofstate-finn and finn-finn 
bargaining as two new dimensions to diplomacy. It maintained that in the process of 
bargaining and negotiation between states and finns 'no longer can national boundaries define 
the rules, for the game is now one where negotiation and action is carried out on triangular 
basis' (Stopford and Strange, 1991: 21). This classic argument on 'bargaining between host 
governments and foreign enterprises' (1991 :22) can be understood in its most simple fonn by 
the triad of relationships, shown in Figure 1.1. The two major actors - states and finns-
produce three dimensions of the game, comprising state-state, state-finn, and finn-finn 
relations. In addition to the old side of state-state diplomacy, 'the other two sides of the 
triangle are just as important in deciding all the who-gets-what questions basic to the study of 
any kind of politics' (Strange, 1994a: 211). 
Figure 1.1: Triads of Relationship in Triangular Diplomacy 
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Triangular Diplomacy differs from either the realist type of state-state diplomacy or 
the liberal market driven type as it is structured not by the actions of either firms or states 
alone but by complex, dynamic interactions between the two sets of actors. In the above 
Triads of relationships, Stopford and Strange emphasised '[an] asymmetry in the relative 
importance of the three sides of the triangle' (1991: 22) which is illustrated through the use of 
arrows which point towards each other, indicating asymmetric interaction both within and 
between the three relationships of Triangular Diplomacy. This interrelationship between states 
and firms indicates that 'we could not understand much of what had been decided and done 
without explicitly taking into account shifts elsewhere; if one looks at only one side of the 
triangle, one misses important factors' (1991: 23) . 
. There can be identified three asymmetric dimensions within Stopford and Strange's 
Triangular Diplomacy: state-state relations, state-firm relations, and firm-firm relations. 
The first dimension is the traditional form of state-state diplomacy, in which the state 
used to compete for power over territory. However, Stopford and Strange argued that the 
nature of the competition between states had changed: the state had lost interest in the 
acquisition of more territory, but 'states are now competing more for the means to create 
wealth within their territory than for power over territory' (1991: 1). This implies the new fact 
that macroeconomic management and industrial policies may be more important for 
governments than conventional foreign policy. 
The second dimension is state-firm relations. As a result of structural changes in the 
world economy, this new and crucial dimension of state-firm diplomacy has emerged. As 
Stopford and Strange argued, 'no longer do states merely negotiate among themselves; they 
now must also negotiate - if not as supplicants then certainly as suitors seeking a marriage 
settlement - with foreign firms' (1991: 2). This means that governments are obliged, as never 
before, to bargain with firms for their economic success and survival, simply because it is the 
34 
transnational enterprises that have control over the technology, the privileged access to 
capital, and the established entry to rich markets that states need, and must have. Equally a 
product of structural changes noted earlier is the bargaining that goes on between firms. 
The third dimension is thus firm-firm diplomacy. According to Stopford and Strange, 
'multinational firms themselves are increasingly having to become more statesmanlike as they 
seek corporate alliances, permanent, partial or temporary, to enhance their combined 
capacities to compete with others for world market shares' (1991: 2). This is because 
intensified global competition pushes them to collaborate with each other and pool resources 
and innovations. Thus, firms now have to bargain and make strategic alliances with other 
firms - again because of the accelerating pace and rising costs of technological change. 
Despite three significant dimensions within Stopford and Strange's model, Triangular 
Diplomacy is particularly seen as a model contributing to the understanding of the process of 
state-firm bargaining in the global political economy, and it also emphasises the increasing 
importance of firms bargaining alongside states as actors in the world politics, while not 
dismissing the roles of states. The concern of this thesis is primarily with the ways in which a 
quasi-state actor - the EU - develops a strategy for supporting firms and engaging with them 
in the global political economy. Hence, this chapter focuses particularly on exploring state-
firm relations, particularly on the 'differentiated' and 'modified' roles of states (or quasi-
states) in the changing global political economyl7. 
1.5.1 Differentiated Roles of States in Triangular Diplomacy 
While Stopford and Strange challenged the realist state-centric view by arguing for the 
increasing importance of firms as actors/participants in world politics, they at the same time 
rejected globalist views by arguing that Ohmae's (1990) view ofa 'borderless' world was 
'perhaps no more than a portent of the long-run future'; rather 'governments, both host and 
home, continue to play a crucial, and perhaps paradoxically, an increasing role' (1991: 7). 
17 While acknowledging the importance of the other two dimensions of Triangular Diplomacy, state-state 
relations and firm-firm relations, this chapter does not aim to analyse them. 
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Following this approach, the roles of states in Triangular Diplomacy are not seen as 
'unchanged' (realists) or 'defunct' (hyper globalist), but 'modified'. Some major 
characteristics ofthe roles of states in Triangular Diplomacy can be identified as follows: 
First, in Triangular Diplomacy, the roles of states seem to be 'modified' towards more 
economic-oriented roles. This idea ofthe modified roles of the state in Triangular Diplomacy 
un surprisingly follows the same line of Strange's structural approach discussed earlier. As 
Stopford and Strange argued, 'the new game of competing for world market shares alters the 
order of importance ofthe functions of the states ... In most states the economic functions of 
the state become more important and more powerful' (1991: 56). Moreover, 'most states have 
become more directly engaged in the competition for shares of the world's wealth, and not 
solely concerned in their foreign policy with power' and 'they have therefore adjusted their 
frameworks of thought and priority for allocating national resources in ways that promote the 
accumulation of wealth-creating resources' (1991 :204). This indicates that the traditional 
roles of the state (as stipulated by realists) have been undergoing important transformation 
and that the state both required and acquired new roles in correspondence with the increasing 
importance of firms in the global arena. Taking into account these adjustments, such 
'modifications' in the roles of the state indicate that firms are being understood as 'allies, 
whether liked or not' (1991: 211). 
Secondly, the model of Triangular Diplomacy suggests that states have different 
capacities. Stopford and Strange noted that some states are manifestly better positioned than 
others to use their power and resources in this game of state-firm diplomacy. For instance, 
they show that 'small, poor countries face increased barriers to entry in industries most 
subject to global forces of competition. They must look to their investments in skills as a 
primary means of hooking into the growing international systems and avoiding constant 
relegation to the periphery of investor's concerns' (1991:2). At the same time, however, 
Stopford and Strange point that 'the (politically) strong state is less effective in international 
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competition than the shrewd states' (1991: 217). This indicates that variations in state 
capacity are crucial to Triangular Diplomacy. 
Thirdly, and more importantly, the model of Triangular Diplomacy seems to allocate 
states 'defensive' roles. It has to be stressed that Stopford and Strange particularly refer to 
'host-states' or 'host-governments' of developing states, bargaining with foreign-owned firms 
or foreign investors (mostly from developed and advanced-industrialised economies). In this 
context, they use the model of Triangular Diplomacy to investigate the cases of the host-
governments in three developing countries (Kenya, Malaysia and Brazil) bargaining with 
foreign-owned firms. Therefore, the roles played by states in the Triangular Diplomacy model 
seem to be rather defensive. This means that governments tend to perceive 'themselves as 
caught between an upper millstone of structural changes that forces them to compete for 
world market shares and the nether millstone of their dependence for survival both on foreign 
investors and on local political support' (1991: 203). This defensive nature of states in 
Stopford and Strange's model of Triangular Diplomacy is reflected through their image of a 
government as a 'gardener, each with his patch of ground' (1991: 210). Stopford and Strange 
insisted that 'the gardener's prime concern used to be the fencing: to protect the plants, it had 
to be secure enough to keep marauders out. .. even today, fences are not totally obsolete; many 
gardeners still need them' (1991:210). This metaphor of states as 'gardener/fence-keeper' 
implies that, for them, states somehow still have to defend themselves (their markets as well 
as their local firms) against outsiders (foreign firms) in the world economy. 
At the same time, however, Stopford and Strange maintain that 'most gardeners now 
pay more attention to husbandry, to improving the water supply, to enhancing the fertility of 
the soil, and to keeping a proper balance of sun and shade so that small plants grow bigger 
and established plants produce more and better flowers and heavier crops' (1991: 210,211). 
And, 'forward-looking gardeners are now learning about becoming good husbandmen rather 
than effective fence-keepers' (1991: 211). This seems to suggest that states in Triangular 
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Diplomacy are not only involved in the production of defensive ramparts for the protection 
from foreign-owned firms and investors, but that they are also engaged in bargaining with and 
attracting foreign firms to invest in their markets in order to get the value-added produced on 
their territory and not elsewhere. More importantly, the issue of 'competitiveness' (which 
came to prominence during the 1990s) is also implicated by the state-firm relationship 
depicted by the model of Triangular Diplomacy. As Stopford and Strange (1991: I) 
emphasise, states are competing for world market shares as the means to wealth and survival. 
The three characteristics of the roles of states discussed earlier have shown that the 
roles and functions of states in Triangular Diplomacy can be considered 'differentiated' from 
either the realist/internationalist or the liberallglobalist perspectives. The model of Triangular 
Diplomacy emphasises that states have modified their roles and adjusted their functions to the 
new global environment. This also means not only states but also other non-state actors 
participate on more equal terms in the global political economy; this thus results in a 
differentiation in the role of the state and a redefinition of state-functions in the global 
political economy. 
Crucially, the model of Triangular Diplomacy has also opened the door for analysing 
the variations in the forms ofthe state as well as introducing the possibility for examining the 
impact of a quasi-state actor such as the EU on the world economy. In contrast to the 
traditional realist state-centric views, in the new game of Triangular Diplomacy states do not 
possess primacy anymore; rather they 'have become more directly engaged in the competition 
for a share of world wealth, and not solely concerned about their foreign policy with power' 
(1991: 204) and thus they play their new roles alongside both non-state and quasi-state actors 
in the pursuit of wealth and competitiveness in the global political economy. 
1.6 FROM 'DEFENSIVE' TO 'PROACTIVE' ROLE OF STATES 
Mutual relations between states and firms are seen as an essential element in Stopford and 
Strange's model of Triangular Diplomacy. As already noted, the original version of 
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Triangular Diplomacy was used by Stopford and Strange to investigate the relationships 
between host-states from developing countries and foreign-owned firms (mostly from 
developed or advanced-industrialised countries). It thus seems to suggest a rather defensive 
role for these host-states. This thesis aims to broaden the investigation of state-firm relations 
by injecting the idea of mutual relations between states and firms, or more generally the !PE 
approach, into EU commercial diplomacy. This also means taking the model of Triangular 
Diplomacy forward and investigating the relationships between the EU (which is an 
advanced-industrialised quasi-state economy) and the European businesses and firms, 
particularly in relation to the emerging economies of Asia. Consequently, this thesis takes into 
account the pro active role of the state (or quasi-state) in state (quasi-state)-firm relations. In 
this way, it adds to the rather defensive roles explored by Stopford and Strange in their 
original investigation of Triangular Diplomacy. 
This chapter details three conceptualisations ofthe proactive role played by states in 
the state-firm relations: (i) Philip Cemy's idea of the 'competition state', (ii) Linda Weiss's 
theory of 'catalytic state', and (iii) John Dunning's concept of 'Confrontation to Cooperation' 
producing what can be termed the 'cooperation state'. These three positive perspectives on the 
role of states can be seen not only as complementary but also value-added to Stop ford and 
Strange's Triangular Diplomacy model. 
1.6.1 The Rise of the 'Competition State' 
The first conceptualisation of the pro active role played by states is Cemy's notion of the 
'competition state' (1990; 2000c: 301-305). Cemy argued that had there been a slow erosion 
of the 'industrial welfare state' IS, moving it towards the form of the 'competition state' that: 
"For Cerny (2000c: 301). 'the essence of the postwar national industrial and welfare state lay in the capacity 
that state actors and institutions had gained. especially since the Great Depression. in insulating certain key 
elements of economic life from market forces while promoting other aspects of the market. These mechanisms 
did not merely mean protecting the poor and helpless and pursuing welfare goals like full employment or public 
health. but also regulating business in the public interest. 'fine-tuning' business cycles to promote economic 
growth. nurturing 'strategic industries' and 'national champions'. integrating labour movements into corporatist 
processes to promote wage stability and labour discipline .... and the like'. 
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'today, rather than attempt to take certain economic activities out ofthe market - to 
"decommodify" them as the welfare state was organised to do - the competition state has 
pursued increased marketisation to make economic activities located within the national 
territory, or that otherwise contribute to national wealth, more competitive in international and 
transnational terms' (1990; 2000c: 301). Therefore, the state 'must act more and more as a 
collective commodifying agent (i.e. putting activities into the market) and even as a market 
actor itself (2000c: 305). States, therefore, for reasons of domestic economic and political 
objectives (including capturing the benefits of globalisation for coalition-building purposes) 
seek to convince (or pressure) other states and transnational actors such as MNCs or 
international institutions to adopt measures which shift the balance of competitive advantage 
towards their domestic constituents (2000a). Therefore, for Cerny, the state can act as 
'financier, middleman, advocate, and even entrepreneur in a complex economic web where 
not only do the frontiers between state and market become blurred, but also where their cross-
cutting structures become closely intertwined and their behavioural modes become less and 
less easy to distinguish' (2000c: 305). 
The rise ofthe 'competition state' as proposed by Cerny complements the model of 
Triangular Diplomacy proposed by Stopford and Strange. Importantly, while studying the 
pursuit of competitiveness by states, Cerny (2000c: 306) acknowledged that they 'are 
becoming more involved in Stopford and Strange's Triangular Diplomacy'. However, Cerny 
(2000c: 306) argued that the Triangular Diplomacy concept 'must be widened further' and 
that 'complex globalisation has to be seen as a structure involving (at least) three-level games, 
with third level (transnational) games including not only firm-firm diplomacy but also 
transgovemmental networks and policy communities, internationalised market structures, 
transnational cause groups, and many other linked and interpenetrated markets, hierarchies, 
and networks'. Cerny's argument thus represents a basis on which to include the EU into the 
Triangular Diplomacy-model. It also allows us to identify a number of EU-business 
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transgovernmental dialogues and networking, which the EU has created and in which it is 
actively involved, and to include them in the pattern of Triangular Diplomacy. 19 
1.6.2 The 'Catalytic State' and the 'State Capacity' Concept 
Linda Weiss (1998) proposed the concept of the 'catalytic state' as an aid to understanding 
the role played by states in the process of globalisation. Weiss argued that 'we are now 
witnessing the end of an era marked by the integral state, with assured territorial control over 
the means of legitimacy, security, and production .... But in place of the integral state we are 
now witnessing the rise of the catalytic state' (1998: 209). 
According to Weiss, 'catalytic states' are states which are 'consolidating national and 
regional networks of trade and investment and strengthening partnerships with other (state 
and non-state) power actors' (1998: 209). She borrowed the term 'catalytic state' from 
Michael Lind, who insisted that 'as a catalyst, this kind of state is one that seeks to be 
indispensable to the success or direction of particular strategic coalitions while remaining 
substantially independent from the other elements of the coalition, whether they are other 
governments, firm, or even foreign and domestic populations' (1992: 3, quoted by Weiss, 
1998: 209). 
In the process of globalisation, while internationalists often view globalisation as the 
enemy of state power, Weiss (1998: 208) in contrast points out that 'a number of states are 
seeking directly to promote and encourage rather than constrain the internationalisation of 
corporate activity in trade, investment, and production'. These states are recognised by Weiss 
as 'catalytic states' who 'seek adaptation to new challenges, e.g. internationalisation by 
forging or strengthening partnerships with other (state and non-state) power actors, rather than 
going it alone' (Weiss, 1998: 211). In a similar vein to the conceptualisation of states in the 
model of Triangular Diplomacy, Weiss's catalytic states also 'adapt their functions' (Weiss, 
19 An analysis of the EU in Triangular Diplomacy and the use of transgovemmental dialogue and networking to 
engage business will be undertaken in Chapter 2, particularly in a section on business engagement, and Chapter 4 
on the detailed investigation of Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF). an EU-business alliance as part of the 
ASEM process. 
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1998: xi) but in a more positive way - i.e. through 'tighter rather than looser connection with 
economic actors' (Weiss, 1998: xi). Therefore, Weiss's conceptualisation of catalytic states 
undoubtedly reflects a more positive view ofthe roles of states in the global political 
economy. And, as we shall see, the EU seems to perform a number of these catalytic roles 
described by Weiss. 
Moreover, Weiss also introduced the 'state capacity' concept by arguing that 'some 
nation-states are notably more successful than others in anticipating and responding to 
economic change' (1998: 4). She emphasised that while competitive advantage lies at the 
heart of the state capacity concept, 'transformative' capacity - the ability of the state to 
coordinate industrial change to meet the changing context of international competition - is 
also crucial (Weiss, 1998: 5~7). This focus on the different capacities of states in the global 
political economy proposed by Weiss can be also linked to Stopford and Strange's (1991: 2, 
217) argument about variations of state capacity in Triangular Diplomacy, mentioned earlier. 
More importantly, Weiss added that in the globalisation process 'strong states act as 
facilitators not as victims of global is at ion' (1998: 196). Strong states like Japan and the New 
Industrialised Countries (NICs) adapt to external pressures for change by pursuing 
internationalisation strategies in collaboration with their business sectors. Weiss used the 
Japanese case to provide a useful example of how a government itself may be part of the 
globalisation process playing a facilitator role, arguing that for Japanese government 
'internationalisation is [thus] a key strategy of bureaucracy, implemented through agencies 
such as Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)2o through its variety of strategies 
and tools' (1998: 205). These strategies of catalytic states which were examined by Weiss 
through the cases studies of Japan and other NICs will be useful when analysing later the role 
of the EU in global political economy, and particularly in commercial diplomacy. 
20 In 2001, MIT! was reorganised and changed its name to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (MET!) 
(MET! website at www.meti.go.jp). 
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1.6.3 'Confrontation to Cooperation' and the 'Cooperation State' 
John Dunning (1992, 1993a, 1993b) examined government-Multinational Enterprise (MNE) 
relations in the light of new theories of international competitiveness. He proposed the 
concept of 'confrontation to cooperation' (1993b), which offers a positive view of state-firm 
relations. The concept of 'confrontation to cooperation' focuses on the changing nature of 
'systemic interactions' between governments, as they promote national welfare, and MNEs, 
as they seek global profits, by arguing that there has been a shift away from state regulation to 
co-operation with MNEs as a result of the new competitiveness agenda adopted by nation-
states (1993b: 59), hence producing what can be termed the 'cooperation state'. 
According to Dunning, 'perhaps the most striking development which has affected 
government attitudes and policies towards MNEs since the 1980s has been the globalisation 
of the world economy' (1993b: 69). Dunning argued that since the 1980s there has been a 
change in the economic focus of many nation-states and 'the increasing need to be 
competitive in global markets, or with foreign firms in domestic markets, has become a major 
catalyst for action' (1993b: 70). In the 1990s, competition in the world economy 'shows itself 
both in the attempts by many governments to attract inward direct investment to help enhance 
their indigenous innovatory capacity, and to improve the competitiveness capabilities of their 
own MNEs in foreign market' (1993b: 72). This means inward and outward Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) can be seen as complementary to domestic investment. As a result, 
governments are starting to play a pro active role in upgrading industry resources and 
capabilities, thus enabling more cooperative and positive policies towards MNEs. 
In this respect, Dunning gave Western Europe (with the prospects ofthe completion of 
the internal market in 1992), and the newly industrialised developing countries, especially 
East Asia (with their high growth rate), as examples. He argued that 'such inroads into the 
markets of the leading industrial nations have led governments of these countries to 
reconsider the factors influencing the competitiveness of their own resources and 
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competences; and to judge the contribution ofMNEs in this light' (1993b: 70). Viewed in this 
context, both the EU's commercial strategies during the 1990s, which reflect both an 
increasing concern with the issue of European competitiveness in the global political 
economy and the emergence of new commercial strategies to engage and support their firms 
to compete in the world economy (See Chapter 2), fit into Dunning's concept of 
'confrontation to cooperation'. The increasing level of competition in the world economy and 
the changing role of states as 'enablers and sustainers of wealth-creating activities' (Dunning, 
1993b: 70) implied by the concept of 'confrontation to cooperation' are compatible with the 
model of Triangular Diplomacy. Yet, the 'cooperation state' makes visible a more proactive 
aspect of the roles of states. 
It is possible to conclude, therefore, that these three conceptualisations of a more 
pro active role for states - Cemy's 'competition state' and Weiss's 'catalytic state' and 
Dunning's 'cooperation state', - rely mainly on the analysis of industrialised developed 
countries. Hence, they are seen as a useful framework contributing to the analysis of the EU 
as a commercial actor and its commercial and business engagement strategies towards Asia 
since the mid-1990s. 
1.7 CONCLUSION 
The roles of states and markets in IPE have long been contested. This chapter has examined 
the debate on the roles of states and firms in the changing international political economy and 
particularly in the globalisation process from two contrasting approaches: 
realist/internationalist and liberal/globalist, which represent two different ends of the 
spectrum. While realism and internationalism view the primary roles of states as being 
'persistent' and firms as operating within the rubric of state policies, on the other hand, 
economic liberalism and globalism view the roles of states as 'declining/weakening', or even 
'disappearing' (for some hyper globalists) with firms or other organisations replacing them. 
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Rather than seeing states as either unchanged or as defunct, this chapter has examined 
Susan Strange's structural approach as a middle way to bridge the divide between 
realism/internationalism and liberalism/globalism. Particular attention has been paid to 
Stop ford and Strange's Triangular Diplomacy - a new diplomacy of bargaining relations 
between states and firms. The chapter has taken Strange's approach and particularly Stopford 
and Strange's idea of Triangular Diplomacy as a useful source of questions for the thesis as it 
best facilitates the understanding of changes in the global political economy after the end of 
the Cold War in two ways: 
First, Strange's approach offers a useful explanation of structural changes in the world 
political economy and can be seen as an alternative approach (from either 
realism/internationalism or liberaliSm/globalism) for understanding the increasing importance 
of non-state actors, while keeping in mind the important roles played by states. Rather, it 
offers an analysis of 'differentiated' roles of states in the changing global political economy. 
The model of Triangular Diplomacy suggests that the roles of states are being 'modified' and 
that states have been given a number of new functions (i.e., negotiating and bargaining with 
firms and other non-state actors). Such understanding points to a significant 'redefinition' of 
state-functions in the global political economy; yet not to the end of statehood. 
Second, while challenging state-centric views that statehood is the only criterion for 
participation in the world political economy, Strange's approach opens the door for an 
analysis of both non-state and quasi-state authorities as participants in the global political 
economy alongside states. This, therefore, enables us to recognise the EU as a participant (in 
its own right) in the global political economy, though it is not a state in traditional statehood 
terms. 
While seeing the Triangular Diplomacy model as a source of questions about the EU, 
this chapter has given a particular significance to the analysis of state (in this case quasi-
state)-firm relations, only one dimension of Triangular Diplomacy. The chapter also reveals 
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the complementarities between the arguments proffered by Stopford and Strange, on the one 
hand, Cemy's idea of the 'competition state' (2000c), Weiss's theory of 'catalytic state' 
(1998) and Dunning's concept of 'confrontation to cooperation' (1993b), on the other. While 
the states in the original Triangular Diplomacy model seem to perform rather defensive roles 
as they represent the bargaining relations between host-states/governments of developing 
countries and foreign-owned firms, the arguments in Cemy's 'competition state', Weiss 
'catalytic state' and Dunning's concept of 'cooperation state' refer mainly to the relations 
between advanced industrialised states and firms. These positive conceptualisations of the 
proactive roles of states will be useful to understand the EU - as a quasi-state cornmercial 
actor - and its commercial and business engagement strategies analysed in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2 
The EU's Commercial Diplomacy and Business Engagement 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The EU has undoubtedly become a fonnidable player in the post-Cold War international 
economic order. Although the EU's international status is ambiguous (Hill, 1993), it is 
indisputable that the EU ranks alongside the most powerful economic and political groupings 
in the world arena (Piening, 1997). The previous chapter has laid the theoretical ground for 
including non-states as well as quasi-states like the EU as actors in the global political 
economy alongside states, by exploring Stopford and Strange's idea of Triangular Diplomacy 
- a new kind of diplomacy centred on trilateral bargaining relationships between states and 
finns and other ideas about the proactive role of the state in state-finn diplomacy. This 
chapter takes the argument forward by arguing that the EU (although it is not a state) has also 
joined the state-firm interaction in this new pattern of diplomacy. 
Central to this chapter is an exploration of the EU's commercial diplomacy and its 
strategies for engagement of businesses and firms. It is argued that the EU is not only a 
commercial actor bargaining alongside, or on behalf of, its Member States' governments, but 
that it also plays a distinctive part through its own strategies, i.e., cooperating, bargaining, and 
networking both with firms and other host governments, through its commercial policy 
framework. In other words, this chapter aims to set a framework for analysing the EU's 
commercial instruments, strategies and roles against the background of state-firm relations in 
the global political economy. 
The required qualification is that the EU presents a special case as it is not a state. The 
first part ofthis chapter focuses on the EU's statehood problem and its 'statelike functions' 
(Laffan, O'Donnell and Smith, 1999: 52), which result in unique characteristics for the EU as 
a commercial actor in the global political economy. In this respect, rather than 'sovereignty', 
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'recognition' and 'control' respectively which are qualifications of statehood, the EU's 
commercial diplomacy should be analysed through three credentials of 'autonomy', 
'representation' and 'influence' (Hocking and Smith, 1995, chapter 5) - basic qualifications 
in which the EU performs some significant state functions, particularly under the First Pillar 
ofthe European Community. 
The second part of this chapter focuses more on an investigation of the EU's strategies 
in engaging businesses and firms, which have become increasingly evident as part of the EU's 
overall commercial diplomacy since the mid-1990s. While examining different types of EU 
business engagement strategies, namely market access, business dialogue and networking, 
economic co-operation programmes, and the role of the European Commission Delegations in 
third countries, the chapter notices some pro active roles performed by the EU - comparable to 
those of 'competition state', 'catalytic state', and 'cooperation state' - in relation to business 
and firms. 
2.2 THE EU AS AN ACTOR IN GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: PERFORMER 
OF STATE-FUNCTIONS 
There has been a long debate about the nature of the EU, its statehood problem and the extent 
to which the EU can or should be seen as a form of 'state'. Many attempts have been made to 
define the status ofthe EU. While not displaying the traditional features of the 'state' (as 
normally understood by realists), the EU has been variously defined as: a 'system of multi-
level governance' (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996), a 'political system, but not a state' (Hix, 
1999), a 'policy-making state' (Richardson, 1996), a 'regulatory state' (Majone, 1996), a 
'trading state' (Caporaso 1996), or an 'incomplete political system' which is neither a state, 
nor a straightforward supranational organisation nor a intergovernmental regime (Wallace, 
1996: 451). 
Despite its contested nature, it is indisputable that the EU does have its international 
'presence' (Alien and Smith, 1991). In the words of Alien and Smith, 'presence is a feature or 
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a quality of arenas, of issue-areas or of networks of activity, and it operates to influence the 
actions and expectations of participants' (1991: 97). This concept of 'presence' explicitly 
challenges traditional state-centred images of the international system as it 'permit[s) 
consideration and analysis of forces in the international arena without committing the analyst 
to a state-centric or actor-centric version of international processes' (1991: 98). Crucially, it 
also enables an analysis of the EU as an international 'actor' in the global political economy. 
This in turn indicates the fact that in the international system after the end of the Cold War 
statehood is often seen not only as the qualification for entry onto the world stage, and as the 
quality that enables its possessors to act effectively in the world political process, but that 
there are powerful challenges to this notion, and alternative conceptualisations that focus on 
less formal and restrictive qualifications for 'actorness' (Laffan, O'Donnell and Smith, 1999: 
168). Therefore, as suggested in Laffan, O'Donnell and Smith (1999: 171), 'the standard of 
classical statehood is inappropriate to judging the international role and impact of the EU'. 
Instead, 'softer qualifications' such as 'autonomy rather than sovereignty, representation 
rather than recognition, influence rather than control' (1999: 168) are also relevant 
qualifications for actors to participate in the world arena. 
In this respect, Hocking and Smith (1995, Chapter 5) argue that while traditional terms 
of statehood are not irrelevant, they need to be supplemented with others that reflect the more 
complex and fluid reality of the post-Cold War era. Sovereignty is often not as important as 
autonomy - a property that can be possessed by a wide range of organisations including but 
not restricted to states and their governments. Recognition may not be as important as 
representation - the capacity to act on behalf of an interest or a cluster of interests in the 
world arena, including but not restricted to those of states and governments. Control of the 
kind implied by sovereign statehood may be less significant in many situations than the ability 
to exert influence by appropriate forms of mobilisation and communication. 
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Consequently, this chapter argues that, although it is not a state in conventional tenns, 
the EU is undoubtedly recognised as an international actor and a valid participant in the 
global political economy. Adopting the perspective of 'soft' qualifications (i.e. of 'autonomy', 
'representation' and 'influence') the claim here is that the EU exercises 'statelike functions' 
(Laffan, O'Donnel and Smith, 1999: 52) particularly in its economic and commercial 
diplomacy under the First Pillar. As Smith argued, the EU's 'statelike' roles can be explicitly 
seen in the First Pillar of the EU (1 994a, 1994b); however, it has to be acknowledged that in 
the area of foreign and security policy it seems to be more difficult 'to separate the notion of 
foreign policy from the idea of a state with a set of interests identified by a government' 
(Allen, 1996: 303) and in this area the EU's statelike features are not so well developed. 
While recognising the linkage between political and economic issues in the EU's external 
relations, it is not the purpose of this thesis to provide an analysis ofthe EU as a political 
actor; rather it focuses on the EU as an economic and commercial actor and only on the First 
Pillar or Economic Pillar of the EU, in which the EU's statelike features seem to be more 
evident. 
On the basis ofa 'redefinition of state-functions' and 'differentiated' roles of states in 
the global political economy already argued in Chapter 1, this chapter maintains that the EU is 
perfonning state-functions in the area of economic and commercial diplomacy (or the First 
Pillar), and is thus a fonnidable statelike actor in the global political economy. Next, the 
chapter explores to what extent and how the EU perfonns these state-functions and what 
distinguishes the EU's commercial roles from other states in the global political economy. 
2.3 THE EU'S COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY: AUTONOMY, REPRESENTATION, 
AND INFLUENCE 
As already suggested, when compared to other commercial policy actors, the EU is 
'distinctive' (Smith, 2001: 790). In order to investigate the EU's commercial diplomacy this 
chapter uses the criteria of autonomy, representation and influence - qualifications of non-
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state actors - as its analytical framework as opposed to evaluations of the EU in tenns of the 
qualifications of traditional statehood, namely sovereignty, recognition and control. Using 
these three criteria means analysing the EU as a commercial actor without falling into 'a 
conventional analysis' by comparing the EU's commercial roles with that of other state 
actors. Many of the established views of the EU tend to subject it to the tests ofa traditional 
model offoreign economic policy and to identify the ways in which the EU falls short of the 
implied standards of statehood, which is likely to be misleading (Smith, 2000b: 333). Through 
the exploration of these qualifications, three major questions concerning the EU's commercial 
diplomacy will be illustrated: First, what characteristics does the EU have as a commercial 
policy actor and how it is distinguishable from other state actors? Secondly, what is the 
mechanism and policy process of the EU's commercial diplomacy? Thirdly, what effect does 
the EU's commercial diplomacy have in the global political economy? The chapter explores 
three credentials of commercial autonomy, representation and influence - the basic qualities 
in which the EU plays its commercial roles and perfonns some state-functions as follows: 
2.3.1 Commercial Autonomy 
Rather than sovereignty, which is the qualification of statehood, this section emphasises on 
analysing the EU's commercial autonomy. The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) has been 
embedded since 1961 as the oldest and most potent manifestation of the Union (Bretherton 
and Vogler, 1999: 49; Meunier and Nicolaidis, 1999: 478) and the EU (more specifically the 
European Communities) has long been granted an exclusive autonomy to handle the 
international trade agenda at the European level. However, there have always been tensions 
between the EU (through the Commission) and its Member States (through the Council) 
concerning their 'shared' autonomy over the EU's commercial policy. Two issues tend to 
bring these players to loggerheads: first, the commercial competence problem and second, the 
complexity of the commercial decision-making process. 
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The European Commission and Member States have had a long dispute over the 
question ofEU's commercial competence. Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome (now 
renumbered as Article 133 of the Consolidated Treaties), gave the Community explicit and 
exclusive competence for commercial policy, including the power to conclude tariff and trade 
agreements with third countries and international organisations. This exclusive competence in 
the management of external trade in goods is seen as a necessary corollary to the creation of a 
customs union with a Common Customs Tariff (CCT). However, it is important to notice that 
Article 113 '[made] no definition of commercial policy' (Woolcock and Hodges, 1996: 304). 
Since the mid-80s, the exclusive competence which covers only trade in goods has 
been seen only as a part of the trade story; other 'new issues' have also emerged on the 
international trade agenda, for example, intellectual property, trade related investment 
measures and services, and this 'started to question the clear foundations of the Community's 
trade competence' (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 1999: 483). This then developed into what 
Meunier and Nicolaidis termed, 'the battle over the scope of trade competence of the EU' 
referring to the attempts made by Member States to regain some of their lost sovereignty in 
the realm of trade (1999: 478). An early result of this dispute was the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) Decision 119421 , which held that the Member States and the Community shared 
competence in dealing with the 'new issues'. As WooIcock argued, this Court decision 
'significantly limits the scope for EU competence in international services' and 'raises the 
spectre of the EU losing its single voice in negotiations, with member governments 
challenging the European Commission's authority to negotiate'(WooIcock, 2000: 377). 
In the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) the Commission argued, as it had in 
the 1991 IGC, that services and intellectual property should come under exclusive EU 
competence; but this was rejected by the Member States (Woo1cock, 2000: 378). The Treaty 
21 Court ofJustice of the European Communities, Opinion 1194,15 November 1994, 1-123. 
(I) The Community has sole competence, pursuant to Article 113 of the EC Treaty, to conclude the 
multilateral agreements on trade in goods. 
(2) The Community and its Member States are jointly competent to conclude GA TS. 
(3) The Community and its Member States are jointly competent to conclude TRIPs. 
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of Amsterdam amended Article 113 (and renumbered it 133), 'but only so far as to establish a 
mechanism whereby the scope of the CCP can be extended to international negotiations on 
services and intellectual property by a unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers' (Young, 
2000: 100). This was only a 'compromise solution' (Woolcock, 2000: 378) to disputes 
between the EU and Member States over commercial competence, which allowed for the 
future expansion of exclusive competence to the excluded sectors through a unanimous vote 
of the Council. The Amsterdam Treaty thus left future decisions up to the political will of the 
Member States. 
Apart from the new trade issues, the Commission also attempted to gain more 
commercial competence in the area of investment. For instance, at the Nice negotiation in 
2000 the European Commission (2000c) tabled a proposal to amend Article 133 to include 
services, investment and intellectual property in order to cope effectively with future WTO 
multilateral negotiations22• However, the result of the Nice negotiation was that 'the 
Commission did not succeed' in including investment in the scope ofthe CCP (Krenzler and 
Pitchas, 2001: 311). Hence, despite broadening the scope of exclusive competence to include 
trade in services, unanimity is required for provisions to be adopted. Moreover, after the Nice 
Treaty 'the negotiation and conclusion of significant agreements - be they bilateral or 
multilateral- will remain subject to unanimous agreement within the Council and ratification 
by Member States' (Krenzler and Pitchas, 2001: 312). Nonetheless, another attempt (at least 
from the Commission) to reform Article 133 was undertaken in the framework of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe. 
It is these tensions underwriting the developments from the Treaty of Rome to the 
Treaty of Nice which indicate the lack of clarity on matters of commercial competence and 
also reflect the Commission's attempts to acquire more 'statelike' competences from its 
Member States. While the European Commission has gained more autonomy and competence 
22 As Leal-Areas (2004) noted in January 2000, the European Commission's Opinion clearly expressed that any 
change in voting procedures to Article 133 would not be the best option. Rather, a better option would be the 
inclusion of services, intellectual property and investtnent into Article 133. 
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over trade issues, investment remains mainly the competence ofthe Member States. This 
'unevenness' of the Commission's commercial autonomy in trade and investment and on-
going Commission-Member States bargaining for influence over the EU's commercial 
autonomy illustrates one of the distinctive characteristics of the EU as a commercial policy 
actor. 
A second aspect which distinguishes the EU from other commercial policy actors are 
its 'complex, multilayered, and politicised' (Collinson, 1999: 208) commercial policy-making 
processes, in which the Commission possesses some statelike features, though subject to 
monitoring and approval by its Member States through the Council. In the area of 
international trade negotiations, the actual conduct of negotiations, their initiation and content 
is the prerogative of the Commission (Woolcock, 2000, Johnson, 1998, Meunier and 
Nicolaidis, 1999). However, the Member States through the Council need to give the 
Commission a negotiation mandate. As Nugent (2001: 307) noted, 'the Commission has the 
Council looking over its shoulder and monitoring its actions'. The main channel of 
communication between the two institutions is through the Council's Article 133 Committee, 
to which to the Commission reports on the progress of negotiations. Hayes- Renshaw and 
Wallace observed that the Committee 'works with, rather than against', the Commission, 
indicating to the latter what is and what is not likely to be accepted by the ministers and what 
should be referred back to the Council for reconsideration and perhaps for new or modified 
negotiating mandates (1997: 90). Therefore, the Article 133 Committee can be seen as a 
driving engine behind decision-making in the EU's commercial policy and as the link 
between the European Commission and the Council. However, when an agreement has been 
initialled, it must then be submitted back to the Council for a final decision on approval or 
adoption. As Nugent noted, the Commission 'has always to keep an eye on what is likely to 
be acceptable to the Member States for they have to ratify final agreements' (2001:322). 
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Importantly, it is worth noticing the mUltiple interests influencing the EU's decision-
making process, both internally (within and between the EU institutions itself) and externally 
(business lobbyists, NGOs, and think tanks). As CoIIinson has argued, '[this] relative 
autonomy enjoyed by the Commission vis-a-vis the Council can vary from one set of 
negotiations and from one issue-area to another according to the particular interests and 
sensitivities that they invoke among the ministers and other national representatives in the 
Council' and 'many policy measures or negotiations will fall within the interest of more than 
one sectoral Council, Council committee, Commissioner, or Commission DG, and these 
interests will sometimes compete or conflict' (1999: 209). This overlapping and interacting 
'network of action' (Smith, 1994a: 287, quoted by CoIIinson, 1999: 211) in the EU's 
decision-making processes then creates all sorts oftensions and opportunities within and 
between the EU institutions that can affect external and other areas of EU commercial policy. 
Apart from the internal interests within the EU's institutions, it is also crucial to note external 
interests, for example, business interests influencing the EU policy-making process (Cowles, 
1998; Coen, 1997; Greenwood 1997; and Mazey and Richardson, 1993). As Greenwood 
observed, both cross-sectoral and sectoral European level business associations23 have been 
used as 'front' organisations for the firms' interests in influencing the EU's commercial 
policy, particularly through the European Commission (1997: 52, 125). Moreover, Member 
States also have some branches oftheir national business associations in Brussels (for 
example, the Federation of German Industries (BD!) and the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI» which represent their business interests at the EU. 
2J Cross-sectoral organisation include, for example, UNICE (Union ofIndustrial and Employers' Confederations 
of Europe), EUROCHAMBRES (Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry), ERT (European Round 
Table) comprising the chief executives of some of the largest European firms, AMCHAM-EU (EU Committee 
of the American Chamber of Commerce) organising American firms in Europe, and also a variety of 
organisations seeking to represent the interests of small firms in Europe, for example, UEAPME (European 
Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises), and EUROPMI (European Committee for Small and 
Medium-sized Independent Companies). Sectoral organisations include, for example, European Automobile 
Manufactures Association (ACEA), Association of European Airlines (AEA) and etc. These sectoral 
organisations account for the majority of the Euro groups. 
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As illustrated through this discussion of disputed commercial competence and 
complex decision-making processes, whilst the Commission can play a leading role in the 
EU's commercial policy framework, 'there are limits to its autonomy and effectiveness' 
(Laffan, O'Donnell and Smith, 1999: 66). Its role is 'autonomous, but not independent' 
(Nuttall, 1996: 131). The Commission, therefore, possesses limited autonomy over the EU's 
commercial diplomacy as its autonomy is shared by the Member States through its interaction 
with the Council within the complex policy-making process. More importantly, the 
Community's autonomy is uneven in different commercial areas: exclusive autonomy in 
trade, but not in investment. This reflects the uniqueness of the EU as a commercial policy 
actor in the global political economy. 
2.3.2 Commercial Representation 
Rather than recognition - the term normally used as a qualification of state actors when 
participating in the international system - a more appropriate term in the contemporary global 
arena is that of representation (the second criteria used here for the analysis of the EU's 
commercial diplomacy). Although it still operates alongside the continuing activities of 
Member States (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 13), the EU is centrally placed in many global 
institutions and organisations and its commercial 'representation' has increasingly been 
developed and become more evident in different arenas of the world economy: multilateral, 
regional and bilateral. Meunier and Nicolaidis argue that regardless of the level, 'whether in 
bilateral, regional or multilateral trade negotiations, Europe formally "speaks with one voice" 
and negotiates through one agent, the European Commission' (1999: 478). 
At the multilateral level, the EU's commercial 'representation' seems to be most 
highly-developed in the WTO. This representation has sometimes led to a form of 
'recognition' in the international arena that acknowledges the European Commission as the 
EU's negotiator in multilateral trade negotiations. This has arguably strengthened the EU's 
statelike qualities. In this respect some commentators have insisted that this role of the 
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Commission makes it 'the main, and usually sole, negotiator for the EU in bilateral and 
multilateral trade negotiations with non-Member States under the CCP' (Nugent, 2001: 297), 
as well as the 'exclusive spokesman of the Community on questions regarding trade in 
manufactured goods' (Nuttall, 1996: 130). An early instance of this development was the 
Tokyo Round of the GATT negotiations (1973-1979), when the Commission conducted the 
negotiations (on the basis of directives from the Council, as if under the CCP), although the 
European Community (EC) was represented at the September 1973 Tokyo Ministerial 
Summit by a joint delegation and the nine national delegations that participated (Bourgeois, 
1982). Also, at the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (1986-94), which raised 
competence questions for the EU on 'new trade issues' (i.e., services, intellectual property 
and investment measures) the member governments agreed to negotiate with one voice even 
in areas of mixed competence (Johnson, 1998; Woolcock and Hodges, 1996). In recent years, 
the governments of Member States have shown a general willingness to cooperate in 
international negotiations in areas beyond the formal scope ofthe EU's competence 
(Woolcock, 2000; Young, 2002: 35-42). This increasing importance of the Commission's 
negotiating role in WTO multilateral negotiations demonstrates further the strengthening of 
'statelike' qualities, and has led to the recognition of the EU (though not as a state) as a major 
actor in the WT024. However, a clear distinction needs to be drawn between the negotiation 
and the conclusion of an agreement. In this respect, the Commission has negotiating powers, 
but not the powers to conclude an international agreement on behalf of the EU and its 
Member States (which remain with the Council). 
Apart from multilateral negotiations, the 'representation' function can also be 
observed in the EU's negotiation of bilateral and interregional association, cooperation and 
partnership agreements with third countries and emerging regional economic or trade 
24 The EU (known for legal reasons as the European Communities in WTO matters) has been a WTO founder 
member since 1 January 1995. The 25 member States of the EU are WTO members in their own right. The EU is 
a single customs union with a single trade policy and tariff. The European Commission speaks for all EU 
Member States at almost all WTO meetings (WTO Website at www.wto.org). 
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groupings. These include, for instance, the development of the Lome/Cotonou regime, the 
continuing trans-Atlantic trade talks, EU-ASEAN co-operation, the negotiation of 
'partnership' agreements between the EU and Mediterranean third countries, and the EU-
MERCOSUR agreement. Such engagement with other regional actors, both at bilateral and 
interregionallevels, indicates another form of the EU's commercial representation in the 
global political economls. 
A third distinguishing type of representation is the EU's commercial representation on 
the ground. Through the European Commission, the EU also has its external representatives -
the European Commission Delegations - in a growing number of non-member states and 
international organisations (OECD, OSCE, UN, WTO, FAO). As Smith observed, 'some of 
the missions in overseas capitals have the formal status of Embassies headed by 
Ambassadors, as in Washington and Tokyo. Other missions are attached to international 
institutions such as the OECD, the GATT (since 1995, the WTO) or the UN, where they play 
an important continuous negotiation role as well as that of representation. Equally important 
are the many diplomatic missions accredited to the Community (effectively the Commission) 
itself (2005: 313). 
From 1954 when the first European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Delegation 
was established in Washington DC to 2004 the EU has built up a global network of 130 
European Commission Delegations with more than 5,000 staff and encompassing all 
continents (European Commission, 2004b: 3). However, as Bruter noted, it is only since the 
beginning of the 1990s that the external service of the European Commission has grown 
rapidly. Before that' a few more offices were opened in Asian and American countries in the 
1960s and 1970s, as well as about seventy in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries after the Yaounde and Lome conventions had been signed' (1999: 183). This 
indicates the fact that the EU's external relations were not comprehensively extended further 
2l The EU's commercial engagement in different levels will be explored in detail in Chapters 4-6 of the thesis in 
relation to South East Asia and North East Asia. 
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than its 'immediate neighbours' (Piening, 1997: 143) until the 1990s (this will be illustrated 
further in the case ofEU's relations with Asia in Chapter 3). Since the 1990s, this diplomatic 
network of European Commission Delegations has been strengthened and attained the status 
of a comprehensive, organised and consistent network of Embassies and representations 
around the world. However, as Bruter argued, these Delegations 'represent neither a state, nor 
even a super-state, but a particular institution of a unique super-national organisation', and 
can be seen as 'Embassies without a state' (1999: 183). Spence (2005) in similar vein has 
viewed the Delegations in third countries as a 'quasi-diplomatic service' in parallel to those of 
Member States. 
Viewed specifically in the area of commercial diplomacy, this chapter argues that the 
Delegations (in some countries, perhaps not all) can be regarded as the EU's 'commercial 
representation' at local level (though not yet the political one), co-operating with the Member 
State Embassies and representing the EU common interest in third countries. Despite the fact 
that their autonomy is still limited by the restrictions in the Community's commercial 
competence, the Delegations have a major responsibility in trade policy as commercial 
authority has in many respects been transferred from Member State Embassies. However, 
issues such as trade and investment promotion still fall under the responsibility of Member 
State Embassies. Apart from their major roles in the trade policy area, the Delegations have 
developed increasingly important roles in the areas of development related aid, humanitarian 
help, technical and scientific co-operation, and economic developmene6• 
2.3.3 Commercial Influence 
Although the EU cannot claim to have full control over the 'European' territory or markets, 
the above discussion of the EU's commercial representation in different global arenas affirms 
that the EU does have remarkable influence in the world economy. Importantly, its immense 
26 The commercial roles of the Delegations will be also dealt in Section 2.4.5 of this chapter, when analysing EU 
engagement with business, in Section 3.3.3, when analysing the EU in Asia, and in Chapter 6, when analysing 
the EU as a commercial actor in Thailand. 
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international economic weight is also observed and taken into consideration by other 
international actors (Smith 1994a; Piening 1997). Therefore, this section argues that the EU 
asserts different types of influence through different types of commercial strategies in these 
different levels. 
At the multilateral level, the EU's commercial influence and action seems to be most 
visible, partly as a result of the European Commission's highly-developed commercial 
autonomy and representation, particularly in the WTO. There is no doubt that during the 
1990s, the European Commission had a strong interest in the multilateral framework via the 
WTO. Pascal Lamy, the EU Trade Commissioner from 1999-2004 also gave a strong 
emphasis to the EU's policy of 'multilateralism first' - 'which means that the EU gives 
priority to promoting multilateralism, while continuing to be an active player in regional trade 
policy' (2002: 140 I )27. This strategy was confirmed in 2003 by a DG trade official who noted 
that 'the EU commercial strategy always focuses first at the multilateral level, then the 
regional strategy will support the EU's aims in the multilateral level' (Interview, European 
Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 13 June 2003). 
As a major 'trading state', 'the EU has an inevitable concern with predictable and 
stable conditions in the global arena and does not process the more directly coercive 
mechanisms with which others might be able to enforce their will' (Smith and Woolcock, 
1999: 454). Despite the sensitive and disputed area of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
the role of the EU in the multilateral arena has been in favour ofliberalising and supporting a 
more open market economy, rather than the coercive use of multilateral rules. This can be 
illustrated through the diminishing centrality oftraditional trade tools (for example anti-
dumping) in EU trade policy (McGuire, 1999a: 91). Instead, there has been a shift toward the 
liberalisation of trade and a market access strategy in relations to third countries within the 
framework ofWTO, where 'the EU has been a supporter of this deregulation process' 
27 Perter Madelson, the Trade Commissioner from 2004-recently (under Barroso Commission) also gives a 
particular importance to multilateralism. 
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(McGuire, 1999a: 91). For the EU, this focus on multilateralism and trade liberalisation has 
become the most important channel in asserting its commercial influence towards the rest of 
the world, notably through its market access strategy (See Section 2.4.2). 
Not only does it emphasise multilateralism, but the EU has also placed considerable 
weight on interregional cooperation or group-to-group arrangements (Edwards and 
Regelsberger, 1990), which 'make up an impressive list of activities undertaken by Europe 
towards the world' and 'have entered a remarkable period of growth since the early 1980s' 
(Regelsberger,1990: 5). Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger (2005) insist that since the end of 
the Cold War there has been an increase in the number and the importance ofinterregional 
cooperation arrangements as a foreign policy objective of the EU. The claim is that this 
represents one of the most attractive frameworks for both the EU and third countries to meet 
their respective foreign policy interests through dialogue and negotiation. 
These interregional dialogues between the EU and different regional groupings in the 
world, however, vary in formats, objectives, and agendas. For instance, the EU and the ACP 
countries started a dialogue in 1975 with the Lome Convention, which in effect set up a 
comprehensive trade and aid agreement. This gradually developed (Lome II-IV, 1980-1990), 
culminating in June 2000 in the Cotonou Agreement. Other exampled are: the Euro-
Mediterranean (Euromed) Partnership launched in 1995 , for the EU and the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East region; the EU's cooperation with the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), 
which started in 1989 and focuses on economic, political, security issues; the Interregional 
Framework Cooperation Agreement (formalised in 1995 and entered into force in 1999), 
which mainly deals with economic and trade issues between the EU and MERCOSUR 
countries; and last but not least the EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement signed in 1980 and 
the ASEM were initiated in 1996 for the EU and Asia. Additionally, it is important to note 
that economic and commercial interests are likely to be dominant in the EU's interregional 
relations with Latin America and Asia - two major emerging economies. Chapter 3 will 
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explore the EU's commercial relations with Asia, focusing on the EU's particular interests in 
the Asian markets and adoption of different commercial strategies towards Asia. 
Aggarwal and Fogarty maintain that these dialogues represent different types of 
interregionaIism and they do not necessarily link the EU with coherent counterpart regional 
groupings (2004: 4). Thus, Aggarwal and Fogarty defined the EU-MERCOSUR agreement as 
'pure interregionalism' since it formally links two free trade areas or customs unions; the 
Lome Agreement as 'hybrid interregionaIism' meaning that a customs union negotiates with a 
group of countries from another region, but the second group is not a customs union or a free 
trade agreement; and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEM 
agreements as 'transregionalism', because they link countries across two regions where 
neither of the two negotiates as a grouping (2004: 5). In this respect, they label the EU's 
strategy at interregional level as a 'hub-and-spoke' system with the EU at the centre of a 
series of economic relationships in which it maintains ties to other regions that mayor may 
not have ties to one another and it allows the EU to be the senior partner in any interregional 
arrangement (except perhaps with North America), given its greater economic weight and the 
far more advanced institutionalisation of its regional member states (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 
2004: 12). The conjecture is that such a hub-and-spoke strategy 'could act as a guarantor of 
economic security in the face of the not-unimaginable dangers of the collapse ofthe WTO and 
the multilateral trading system and/or a protracted trade war with the US' (2004: 13). Thus, 
apart from multilateralism, the EU's regional strategy (both transregional and interregional) 
underwrites the EU's economic and commercial influence in the global political economy. 
Through these dialogues and networking at the regional level, 'the EU acts as a 
catalyst for openness, dynamism, and political and economic innovation [and] the role of the 
EU's organs [is] to negotiate access to markets of other states and regions and push for the 
conclusion and implementation ofmuItilateral agreements for liberalisation of trade and 
investment' (Robles, 2004: 13). In the case of Asia, the ASEM transregional process and EU-
62 
ASEAN interregional relations (which will be explored in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 
respectively) can be seen as examples of the EU's attempt to play a proactive role-
comparable to those ofa 'competition state' (Cerny, 2000c), 'catalytic state' (Weiss, 1998) 
and 'cooperation state' (Dunning, 1993b) - in building a network oftransregional and 
interregional relations with other economic groupings in the world as the means to promote its 
trade and investment activities abroad and particularly to access markets in other regions, thus 
asserting its commercial influence and balancing the US power in the global political 
economy. 
While the EU's commercial influence seems to be visible in both multilateral and 
regional contexts, at the bilateral level the EU also asserts its commercial influence on the 
ground through the work of European Commission Delegations. As already argued, although 
the Delegations exist alongside the Member State Embassies, both seem to cooperate and thus 
build a network of commercial policy-makers, which promotes the collective interests of the 
EU in third countries (See Section 2.4.5 in this Chapter and Chapter 6). 
2.3.4 EU Commercial Strategy: The European Commission as Initiator 
Although the EU is neither a state nor possesses the traditional state qualifications of 
sovereignty, recognition and control, it is argued here that the EU does have a potent 
commercial diplomacy in terms of its 'statelike' qualifications of commercial autonomy, 
representation and influence. Within the EU's commercial diplomacy, notwithstanding its 
sharing of commercial autonomy and competence with Member States within the complex 
decision-making processes, the EU's commercial representation and influence in different 
levels ofthe global arena (multilateral, regional and bilateral) affirm its 'presence' in the 
global political economy. In other words, the EU is recognised here as not only a valid 
participant but also a formidable commercial policy actor in the global political economy, 
though not a state. 
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Viewed in this context, the chapter argues that besides operating alongside Member 
States, the EU does have its own commercial instruments and strategies and plays its own 
commercial roles, which seem to be differentiated from those of traditional state actors (this 
follows from what has already been argued in Chapter I on the differentiation in the roles of 
states in the global political economy, page 38). More importantly, the EU's commercial 
strategies and roles are also differentiated at different levels ofthe global arena (multilateral, 
regional and bilateral) through a variety of commercial instruments. A central task of this 
thesis is, therefore, to investigate these commercial instruments and strategies and the ways in 
which they characterise the roles of the EU as a commercial actor in Asia. 
It is important to note that to explore the EU's commercial diplomacy means to focus 
particularly on the role of the European Commission. While bearing in mind its limited 
commercial autonomy mentioned earlier, it is argued that in the economic and commercial 
framework of the First Pillar the European Commission has played a leading role as a 
'strategy initiator' or as, Smith put it, 'a source of and channel for policy' through 'a 
substantial bureaucratic and diplomatic machinery' (2005: 305, 312). More importantly, 
within the European Commission itself, there can be observed overlapping and interactive 
responsibilities and the work of different Directorate Generals (DGs) in formulating the EU's 
commercial diplomacy and strategy. As Smith observed, after 1999 the Prodi Commission 
established a 'team' of external relations Commissioners and DGs nominally headed by Chris 
Patten as Commissioner for External Relations 1999-2004 (and head ofDG External 
Relations or DG RELEX28) (2005: 312). This means the EU's commercial diplomacy 
involves co-operation among a number of different DGs, for example DG External Relations, 
DG Trade, as well as an increasing importance of the EuropeAid and Co-operation Office 
(through an increasing use ofEU co-operations programmes as commercial instruments). 
28 As Smith noted, from the 1970s-1990s, OGI (External Economic Relations) - which was structured in 
accordance with the main concerns of the CCP - developed an extensive mechanism of international 
representation and reporting, responsibility for which was then transferred to OG IA and later (under the Prodi 
Commission) to OG RELEX (Smith, 2005: 313). 
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Following Smith's argument that 'the Community has established a major presence in 
the international arena', and 'the Commission is central to this presence' (2005: 314)29, this 
thesis, rather than focusing on analysing the EU's commercial policy in a broader sense, gives 
a particular emphasis to the European Commission's roles in 'formulating' and 
'implementing' EU commercial strategies30• Therefore, in this thesis when the term EU's 
commercial 'strategy' is emphasised, this particularly means the European Commission's 
ideas, objectives and priorities in pursuing the EU's commercial strategy towards the rest of 
the world. The next section moves on to focus more specifically on the EU's (particularly the 
European Commission's) commercial strategies in engaging business. 
2.4 BUSINESS ENGAGEMENT IN EU COMMERCIAL STRATEGIES 
Since the 1990s, there has been an increasing concern with business involvement within the 
EU policy-making process, with many studies concentrating on business as a lobbying agent 
in Brussels (Mazey and Richardson, 1993; Cowles, 1998; Greenwood, 1997; Coen, 1997). 
This chapter, however, focuses on a rather different aspect of the EU-business interaction. It 
aims to investigate the EU's business engagement, which has become more evident as part of 
the overall EU's commercial strategies towards third countries since the beginning of the 
1990s by emphasising the strategies and roles of the European Commission in engaging and 
incorporating business and firms more closely into its commercial diplomacy framework. 
Building on Stopford and Strange's model of Triangular Diplomacy as a means of generating 
questions about state-firm relations in EU commercial diplomacy, this chapter focuses on 
proactive roles of the EU in relation to business and firms - that is to say on 'engagement' as 
a positive strategy a!ld source of activities. 
29 Smith (2005: 313) argued that 'the foundations of Commission action and mechanisms in the realm of external 
relations are not merely those that are found in the Treaties, extensive as they are. These constitutional powers 
are supplemented by the growth of a bureaucratic and diplomatic network and by the perceived status of the 
Commission as a focus of attention for outsiders, both at governmental and non-governmental levels '. See more 
detail about the European Commission and external relations in Smith (2005). 
30 Chapter 3 is devoted to examining the formation of EU commercial and business engagement strategies 
towards Asia, and Chapters 4-6 to their implementation at three different levels. 
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2.4.1 The Emergence of the EU's Business Engagement Strategy in the 1990s: A New 
Area of Commercial Diplomacy 
Since the 1990s, the EU's engagement with business has emerged as part ofthe overall EU 
commercial diplomacy, alongside a shift from a protectionist approach during the late 1970s 
and early 1980S31 towards a more liberal approach in the EU's trade and commercial 
strategies during the 1990s (McGuire, 1999a: 82; Hanson, 1998: 56). As Hanson noted, 'in 
the 1990s, despite ominous warnings and theoretical expectations, fortress Europe has not 
been built, to the contrary ... since the late 1980s not only have few new trade barriers been 
erected, but external trade policy in Europe has been significantly liberalised' (1998: 56).1n a 
similar vein, McGuire also observed the EU's more liberal approach through 'the dwindling 
use of traditional trade instruments such as safeguards, anti-dumping or countervailing duties 
(CVDs) legislation, which may signal the declining utility of these instruments' and a shift 
toward 'a more externally-oriented trade policy' (1999a: 88-91). 
This significant development of the EU's commercial strategies and the emergence of 
EU business engagement in the 1990s resulted from the changing nature of both the European 
and the global political economy. A first driving force was the structural changes in the global 
political economy and globalisation process (already discussed in detail in Chapter 1), which 
lent weight to a broad range of Non-Tariff Barrier (NTB) issues and regulatory policies, or 
what Smith and Woolcock (1999: 440) referred to as 'the wider concept of commercial 
policy'. Second was the creation of the Single European Market in 1993, which 'set up an 
institutional structure that placed the EC ever more firmly on the path of economic 
liberalisation' (Hanson, 1998: 81). As McGuire argued, 'this internal liberalisation made it 
easier [ ... ] to contemplate greater external liberalisation ... 1ndeed European policy-makers 
31 Hanson noted that this protectionist approach in the EU trade policy followed the serious recessions of the 
1970s and 1980s which were characterised by stagnating or declining levels of output and rising levels of 
unemployment. At the time most Europeans saw rising unemployment as the direct result of growing imports, 
particularly from Japan and the NICs. Thus many concluded that increased protectionism was necessary, and 
numerous economic theories were advanced, particularly in Great Britain, France, and Germany, advocating 
higher trade barriers (1998: 58). 
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quickly found that the Single Market gave them leverage in international trade negotiations; 
they were able to leverage access to the European market in exchange for great access to 
foreign markets for EU firms' (1999a: 78). Thirdly, the creation of the WTO in 1995 
(replacing the GATT) also required the EU to act in further promoting trade and investment 
liberalisation and supporting the open market economy. While there has been an increasing 
competition among the Triad (US, Japan and Europe) in the world economy and the EU 
expects to play a leading role, the European Commission has been focusing on the use of the 
multilateral framework, chiefly the WTO - the forum where the Commission's commercial 
autonomy and representation seem to be highly-developed, as a platform to assert the EU's 
commercial influence in the world economy. 
As a result, in the 1990s the European Commission, rather than only protecting its 
domestic markets, became more concerned with the issue of global competitiveness and its 
link to the development of domestic markets, emphasising a strategy of access to third-party 
markets worldwide. As stressed in the Commission's 1993 White Paper on Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment: 
'Open markets world wide are one of the keys to securing faster growth and more 
rapid job creation in Europe. If European industry is to reap the full benefits of improved 
competitiveness policies at home and to take advantage of the economies of scale that 
operating in an increasing integrated market would imply, the EU must shape its approach to 
international economic relations with a view to improving the climate in which European 
firms operate' (European Commission, 1993, Chapter B.II.6). 
This strategy reflects a significant change in the belief ofthe European Commission 
from a protectionist to a more liberal approach. As Hanson noted, in the 1990s 'European 
policymakers abandoned their belief in the virtues of protectionism and ... adopted the 
neoliberal economic belief that exposing domestic firms to international competition is more 
effective than protection for improving the competitiveness of domestic producers and 
promoting economic prosperity for the society' (1998: 66). 
Consequently, in order to support European business and enhance its competitiveness 
in the world economy, in 1996 the Commission adopted its 'market access strategy' 
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(European Commission, 1996b), which can be seen as a strategy that 'shifts the locus of trade 
policy away from protection of the home market and toward gaining or maintaining access to 
foreign markets' (McGuire, 1999a: 88). In this strategy paper, the Commission emphasised 
that '[this] openness of the European economy to international competition enables firms to 
find goods and services for intermediate consumption and to finance themselves under the 
best conditions world-wide, thus enhancing their international competitiveness and creating 
jobs in Europe' (European Commission, 1996b: 2). This indicates that in the 1990s the issues 
of competitiveness and market access became a key theme of the EU's commercial strategies 
and more importantly, that business engagement strategy emerged as a 'new' area ofED 
commercial diplomacy. 
Alongside the traditional trade policy instruments, i.e., anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, 
and safeguards, which seem to present a rather defensive aspect of EU commercial 
diplomacy, the business engagement strategy shows a more proactive role of the EU in 
relation to business, both home and host firms. This positive strategy to engage business is 
explicitly used by the EU as a means to improve European competitiveness and secure its 
position as an economic power in the global political economy, particularly in competition 
with the US and Japan in the Triad. The business engagement strategy, therefore, appears to 
demonstrate the EU's attempt to play a proactive role, comparable to those ofthe 
'competition state'-which 'pursues increased marketisation to make economic activities 
located within the national territory, or that otherwise contribute to national wealth, more 
competitive in international and transnational terms' (Cerny, 2000c: 301) or a 'catalytic state' 
- which 'forges or strengthens partnerships with other actors, i.e., firms, rather than going it 
alone' (Weiss, 1998: 211). The EU has embodied a move from 'confrontation to cooperation' 
(Dunning, 1993b) in relations with business and firms, thus performing a role ofa 
'cooperation state'. In other words, state-firm relations and interactions have also emerged as 
a crucial part of the EU's commercial diplomacy when the EU performs positive and 
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proactive strategies in engaging and incorporating firms more closely into its commercial 
diplomacy framework. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the EU is not the only actor which has 
performed such pro active roles towards business and firms. Rather, other advanced-industrial 
states also pursue the same strategy. While examining her theory of the catalytic state, Weiss 
viewed Japan and the NICs, i.e. Korea and Taiwan as examples of catalytic states, who 
'pursue intemationalisation strategies in collaboration with their business sectors32 , (1998: 
205). For example, in the case of Japan, there can be observed a number of agencies-
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Economic Planning Agency to 
Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) and the Export-hnport Bank - ensuring that 
firms are assisted in choosing appropriate foreign investment locations abroad. Overseas 
Development Aid (ODA) is another tool which Japan has used for externalising its alliances 
throughout the Asian region (1998: 205). 
In the case of the US, Peterson and Cowles noted that apart from the Commerce 
Department which can be seen as a channel for 'high intensity advocacy' of US business 
interests abroad, the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) (which actually refers to 
a global network of independent organisations, normally affiliated to the US Chambers of 
Commerce in Washington) acts either as an information point for US firms which need to 
become familiar with local rules on tax, investment, etc or as mere social clubs (or both) 
(1998: 251). Particularly in Europe, the American Chamber of Commerce to the European 
Union (AMCHAM EU) is an important agent of Washington's influence in Brussels, which 
monitors the EU's activities in relation to their impact on US firms (1998: 253). The US has 
used this style oflobbying not only in Europe, but also in the rest of the world. 
32 Building on the Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese cases, Weiss (1998: 207) distinguished four strategies of 
catalytic states: first, the state encourages local finns to finance their investment projects through the overseas 
issues of corporate bills and convertible bonds. Second, state agencies supplement private overseas investment 
with ODA to assist business expansion in developing countries. Third, local finns receive strong financial 
support to enter joint ventures or technology partnership with MNCs in strategic sectors. Fourth, the state 
facilitates internationalisation through direct on-the-ground assistance for finns to relocate operations overseas. 
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In the case of Europe, some Member States themselves have undoubtedly become a 
form of 'competition', 'catalytic' and 'cooperation' state, performing positive and proactive 
strategies in supporting their business and firms33• However, when it comes to the analysis of 
the EU, its case indicates a distinctive commercial policy actor in the global political 
economy due to its limited and shared commercial autonomy with Member States, its 
complex and politicised policy-making processes and the unevenness in the EU's commercial 
competence between trade and investment. Consequently, a number of questions arise in 
relation to the ways in which the EU as a statelike actor performs these pro active roles in 
engaging and supporting European business in the world economy and the effects of the EU's 
engagement with business as part of the EU's commercial strategies. 
This chapter identifies different types ofthe EU's business engagement as follows: 
market access, business dialogue, EU economic co-operation programmes, and the roles of 
the European Commission Delegations - all of which reflect the EU's proactive roles in 
relation to business and firms. 
2.4.2 Market Access Strategy 
Market access, or the granting, conditioning or denial of access to the European Single 
Market, is seen by Smith and WooIcock as 'perhaps the most powerful instrument available to 
the EC for the implementation of commercial policy' and 'a key statelike function' of the EU 
(1999: 451). As already noted, in 1996, the European Commission adopted its first 'market 
access strategy' and emphasised that: 'the Community must strive to achieve improved 
market access in third countries in parallel to the continued progressive opening of its own 
market, both by ensuring the full implementation by its partners of their Uruguay Round 
obligations and through other market access actions' (1996b: 3). In this strategy paper, the 
J3 Cemy (2000c: 305) gave examples of different kinds of putative competition states: Germany, Austria and 
Sweden as 'European neocorporatist model' and the UK as 'Anglo-Saxon model'. While acknowledging the 
emergence of a form of competition, catalytic, and cooperation state in some Member States, this thesis does not 
aim to analyse Member States, but the EU. For differences between different models of competition state, see 
Cemy (2000c: 305). 
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European Commission insisted that the goal of its market-opening strategy is that: 'the 
Community's trading partners should effectively adhere to and comply with the numerous and 
complex obligations arising out of the agreements now covered by the WTO' (1996b: 4). For 
developing countries, the European Commission also stressed an attempt to 'support and 
encourage their integration into the multilateral trade system' (I 996b: 4). Such a statement 
makes it clear that the EU's market access strategy is embedded as part of the multilateral 
framework or multilateralism - the context in which the EU has the most highly-developed 
commercial autonomy, representation and influence. 
The market access strategy of the EU demonstrates its proactive stance in promoting 
European business access into third country markets as a means to 'achieve competitiveness 
in the global economy' (European Commission, 1996b: 3). The Commission maintains that as 
European firms encounter a 'multitude of obstacles abroad of a very different nature' and as 
they are exposed to a much greater degree of competition 'they should have the opportunity to 
compete on equal terms, especially in foreign markets, and not to be hindered by trade 
barriers' (1996b: 3, 2). Therefore, 'the active support of European business' and the 
'emphasis on the objective of third country market opening in the Community's commercial 
policy' (1996b: 4) are essential elements in the EU's market access strategy. 
Furthermore, as part of this strategy, on 1 January 1995, the 'Trade Barrier Regulation 
(TBR),34 came into effect as one ofthe EU's crucial commercial instruments which seeks to 
defend the interests of European firms in third markets. As the European Commission noted, 
the TBR is 'unique' among the Community's commercial policy instruments as it is a 
'proactive rather than a defensive' instrument to open markets (DG Trade Website at 
http://europa.eu.intlcommltrade). The TBR procedure is carried out when either Member 
States, firms, or groups of firms bring a complaint to the Commission. The Commission then 
investigates and, should it be determined that EU commercial interests have been damaged, 
34 In December 1994, the Council adopted the Trade Barriers Regulation (Council Regulation W3286/94) 
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the Commission uses bilateral negotiations or the WTO dispute settlement process to remedy 
the situation (McGuire, 1999a: 74). Moreover, it is noted that 'the costs to a firm or industry 
association of filing a TBR case are near to zero as the Commission conducts its own research 
on the case' (Sherman and Eliasson, 2003: 10). Unlike many traditional ties between Member 
State governments and businesses seeking market access abroad, the TBR is a formal process 
carried out in the European Commission, which can also be viewed as a means of enhancing 
the statelike role of the EU (particularly through the European Commission), both at the 
multilateral level through the use of the WTO dispute settlement and at the bilateral level 
through bilateral negotiations. 
The European Commission itself has stressed the importance ofTBR in assisting 
business to access third country markets and in ensuring that trading partners effectively 
comply with their international commitments (apparent either through action taken by the 
third country to eliminate the obstacles to trade or through WTO dispute settlement): since 
1996,23 TBR examinations procedures have been initiated. Out of the 23 TBR investigations 
carried out so for, 12 led to satisfactory actions by a third country; 1 has been terminated since 
no trade barriers were identified; 1 is still under TBR examination procedures; 5 are under 
review; and 5 resulted in WTO dispute settlement cases of which in 4 the EU prevailed partly 
or totally before the panel or Appellate Body (Commission, 2005c: 14). The evidence from 
the WIO also shows that the EU is the single most important user of the dispute settlement 
procedure to enforce rights arising from the Uruguay Round (WTO, 2000: 18). Importantly, 
the EU's participation in WTO dispute settlement reflects the general willingness of its 
Member States to cooperate in international negotiations in areas beyond the formal scope of 
the EU's competence (Woolcock, 2000; Young, 2002: 35-42), which also enhances the 
European Commission's role as a sole negotiator in the multilateral arena. 
Some business complaints, however, do not proceed all the way to the WTO dispute 
settlement level. Bilateral consultations and diplomatic pressure are often used by the EU as a 
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means of raising individual trade problems and of finding wherever possible an amicable 
solution. Such bilateral contacts are especially possible in dealing with barriers in third 
markets which do not involve a breach of international commitments as such. In this respect, 
the European Commission Delegations play a significant role in helping business to solve 
trade disputes at the local level (often through direct lobbying ofhost-govemment 
organisations).35 
As a result of the EU's market access strategy launched in 1996, besides the use of 
TBR the European Commission has also implemented the Market Access Database36 for 
assisting European exporters. It provides basic information to businesses on the conditions for 
exporting to and investing in key third country markets. The European Commission has 
claimed that the market access database receives over 100,000 'hits' per day (Commission, 
200Ia). 
Since 2004, the new management of the Barroso Commission (Jose Manuel Barroso 
as President of the European Commission and Peter MandeIson as Trade Commissioner), has 
identified better access to third country markets as one of the top priorities of the EU Trade 
policy. Such market access strategy can be seen both as a crucial part and as an external 
aspect of the Lisbon Strategy7 whose aim is to increase growth and jobs in Europe (which are 
also major focus of the Barroso Commission). In this respect, Mandelson has noted that 
'better access to third country markets for trade and investment represents a major engine of 
growth and productivity gains [ ... ] I regard the EU's market access strategy as an important 
competitiveness instrument' (European Commission, 2005b: I). During the September 2005 
Market Access Symposium, he re-emphasised this significance, by acknowledging that 'the 
II See Chapter 6, Section 6.4 
36 Available at hnp:llmkaccdb.eu.int 
37 In March 2000, EU heads of state and government adopted the Lisbon Strategy to make the EU 'the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion'. On 22-23 March 2005, the Spring Council discussed the 
Commission's mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy for economic, social and environmental renewal. More 
focus on growth and employment, simplification and national ownership via national action plans are the key 
elements to relaunch the Lisbon reforms agenda. (Euractive website at 
hnp:llwww.euractiv.com/Artic1e?tcmuri=1cm:29-11751 0-16&type=LinksDossier) 
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European economy stands or falls on our ability to keep markets open, to open new markets, 
and to develop new areas where Europe's investors, investors and entrepreneurs can trade' 
(Mandelson, 2005). 
2.4.3 Business Dialogue and Networking 
Apart from the market access strategy, business dialogue and networking is another form of 
EU business engagement. Since the mid-90s a number of EU-business alliances have emerged 
- for instance, the Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), the EU-Japan Business 
Dialogue Roundtable, the Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF), and the EU-MERCOSUR 
Business Forum (MEBF) - which offer business a leading role in steering economic relations 
between the EU and third countries. These alliances suggest an important mode for 
incorporating business into the EU's formal commercial diplomacy framework. They also 
establish fora for dialogue and networking between public and private sectors, in which 
business can discuss behind-the-border barriers to trade and investment with policy-makers 
and inject useful policy inputs in strengthening economic and commercial relationships 
between the EU and its economic partners. 
In 1995, the TABD was established as 'an informal process where European and 
American companies and business associations develop joint policy recommendations to 
discuss with the EC and US administrations' (Coen and Grant, 2000: 8-9). Consequently, it 
developed into the most ambitious private agent in EU-US relations (Cowles, 1998). The 
initiative came from the European Commission and the US Department of Commerce; 'the 
US Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, together with his counterparts in the European 
Commission, Martin Bangemann and Sir Leon Brittan38, created the "dialogue" system as a . 
mechanism to encourage public and civil society input to fostering a more closely integrated 
transatlantic marketplace' (TABD's official website at www.tabd.com). Sir Leon Brittan 
(1996) acknowledged that 'we [the European Commission] and the American govemment... 
38 Martin Bangemanu was former EU Industry Commissioner 1995-1999; Sir Leon Brittan was former EU Trade 
Commissioner 1995-1999. 
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asked businessmen from both sides of the Atlantic to get together and see if they could reach 
agreement on what needed to be done next. If they could, governments would be hard put to 
explain why it couldn't be done'. 
According to Coen and Grant, the T ABD represents a 'business-government policy-
making body which brings together top American and European chief executives to co-
ordinate business responses to international trade, standards and regulation questions' (2000: 
2). Hocking and McGuire added that 'the T ABD has taken a clear view about the need for 
early private sector involvement in the development of economic policies affecting business 
and has sought to assume the role of an "early warning system" in regulatory trade disputes' 
(2002: 453). 
As a business-led and particularly CEO-led process, the TABD has produced several 
clear successes, particularly in facilitating intergovernmental negotiations between the EU and 
US administrations. One of the TABD's vital achievements was its supporting role in 
reaching the EU-US Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) officially announced in Brussels 
and Washington in June 1997; in fact a number ofTABD companies were actively involved 
in the negotiations (Peterson and Cowles, 1998: 266; CEO, 1999). Moreover, as Peterson and 
Cowles noted, the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) calling for zero tariffs was also 
a direct result of TA BD negotiations (1998: 266). Following the T ABD's achievements in 
strengthening EU-US economic relations during the 1990s39, the TABD was thus recognised 
by the EU as a model to incorporate business more closely into the EU commercial diplomacy 
framework, by building a channel for dialogue and networking between government and 
business sectors, which cuts across formal governmental and departmental responsibilities in 
political arenas. This in turn provides firms with an institutionalised access to diplomatic and 
policy-making levels. 
" However, it is important to note that TABD went through a slump in the early 2000s, before being revived in 
2004/2005. 
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Following the pattern of the TABD, business dialogue and networking has become an 
important element of the ED's commercial strategy with the rest of the world. In the late 
1990s, a number of other similar structures were also initiated. The AEBF was established in 
1996 as part ofthe ASEM and the MEBF in 1998 as part of the ED-MERCOSUR 
Interregional Framework for Cooperation Agreement (EMIFCA). The AEBF and MEBF 
indicate the ED's use of dialogue and networking as a means to engage business both from 
Asia and from Latin America, the two emerging economies whose large markets seem to hold 
the attention of the ED, closely into its 'hub-and-spoke' interregional commercial strategy 
mentioned earlier. 
During the first ASEM Summit a specific emphasis was placed on the importance of 
business and the private sector and both the ED and Asian leaders agreed 'to encourage the 
business and private sectors, including Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) of the two 
regions, to strengthen their cooperation with one another and contribute towards increasing 
trade and investment between Asia and Europe by agreeing to establish in due course an Asia 
Europe Business Forum' (Paragraph 14, Chairman's Statement, ASEM1). The AEBF was 
initiated only 6 months after the first ASEM Surnmit with the aim of establishing 'a dialogue 
between entrepreneurs' and 'a dialogue between businessmen and government 
representatives' (Chairman's Statement, AEBF1)4o. 
Another instance of the use of dialogue and networking as instruments for the 
involvement of business is the EMIFCA which notes that '[the ED and MERCOSUR] shall 
promote cooperation in business with the aim of establishing a climate which favours 
economic development in their mutual interest'. Such business cooperation shall essentially 
take the forms of: 
(i) more organised contact between the Parties' operators and networks, through 
conferences, technical seminars, fact-finding missions, attendance at general and specialist 
fairs and business meetings; 
40 Chapter 6 undertakes the evaluation of AEBF as a fonn of the EU business engagement in Asia. 
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(ii) suitable initiatives to back cooperation between small and medium-sized 
enterprises, such as the promotion of joint ventures, the establishment of infonnation 
networks, encouraging the opening of trade offices, the transfer of specialist know-how, 
subcontracting, applied research, licensing and franchising; 
(iii) promoting initiatives to increase cooperation between Mercosur economic 
operators and European associations, with the aim of establishing dialogue between networks; 
(iv) training schemes, encouraging the establishment of networks and backing for 
research (EMIFCA, 1996, Title Ill, Article 11, Paragraph 3). 
Following the above statement of the EMIFCA, the MEBF was established in 1998. 
While the AEBF seems to produce marginal outcomes in supporting the EU-Asia trade and 
investment relations (see Chapter 4), a UNICE official viewed that 'the MEBF is more active 
in supporting EU-MERCOSUR economic relations [than the AEBF supporting the EU-Asia 
relations], (Interview, UNICE, Brussels, 28 January 2004). For example, as the European 
Commission has also noted, MEBF has been active in EU-MERCOSUR negotiations for an 
Association Agreement, which would establish the first ever region-to-region free trade area, 
by giving the necessary input on the most important technical issues that only business, with 
the practical experience of companies and federations, is able to provide (European 
Commission News, 2005).41 
It has to be noted that while the market access strategy is closely linked to 
multilateralism, AEBF and MEBF represent the EU's inclination to incorporate business into 
its 'hub-and-spoke' interregional commercial network (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2004: 13), in 
which business can play a crucial role in supporting and strengthening the EU's economic and 
commercial interests in different regions of the world. Such forums can be regarded as 
another example of the EU attempt to play a pro active role as either a 'catalytic state', a 
'competition state' or a 'cooperation state'. In other words, it consolidates regional networks 
oftrade and investment, by strengthening partnerships with other economic actors (both states 
and finns). At the same time, this interregional strategy is likely to be supportive of and 
consistent with the WTO multilateral framework, often referred to by the European 
Commission as the 'WTO-plus' policy (Interview, European Commission, DG Trade, 13 June 
41 However, this thesis does not aim to evaluate effectiveness of the MEBF activities in supporting and 
promoting the EU-MERCOSUR economic relations. 
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2003}. Therefore, it is not surprising that the WTO-plus policy is seen as the basic framework 
of both the EU's interregional co-operations and the EU's business dialogue and networking 
with Asia and Latin America (See Chapter 4). 
2.4.4 Economic Co-operation Programmes 
It is increasingly evident (particularly in the case of Asia and Latin America) that the EU's 
extensive aid policy is closely linked to its commercial strategy. Thus, economic co-operation 
programmes are becoming important as commercial instruments towards these regions. 
Rather than focus only on donating aid and on development assistance, in the late 1990s the 
European Commission launched a series of economic co-operation programmes which aim at 
facilitating trade and investment, strengthening business cooperation and increasing 
cooperation among SMEs between the EU and its economic partners in Asia and Latin 
America. 
In Latin America, examples are: AL-INVEST - a programme intended to encourage 
relations between companies in the two regions, in particular SMEs; and ATLAS - a project 
from 2001-2003 to support relations between Chambers of Commerce in both regions. In 
Asia, for example, there are Asia-Invest Programme, the European Business Information 
Centre (EBIC), and other EU-ASEAN co-operation programmes. These programmes are 
managed by the EuropeAid Office of the European Commission, which has been increasingly 
involved in the EU's commercial diplomacy framework, alongside DG Trade and DG 
External Relations. 
More specifically, while examining the EU-ASEAN interregional relations (see 
Chapter 5), it is observed that the EU's use of economic co-operation programmes can be 
seen as a 'soft' commercial policy instrument, and particularly an indirect business 
engagement strategy of the EU towards ASEAN (not only ASEAN but also other Asian 
countries, for example, China and South Asia). These economic co-operation programmes as 
'soft' commercial instruments adopted by the EU at the interregional (EU-ASEAN) level are 
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considered distinctive from the AEBF mentioned earlier - which represents an EU formal 
channel of business engagement at the transregionallevel (with its close link to the 
multilaterallgloballevel). In addition, the implementation of these programmes and projects is 
closely linked to the roles and activities of European Commission Delegations at the local 
level (See next Section 2.4.5). However, two sets of questions: i) how the EU's business 
engagement strategies at transregional and interregionallevels differ and ii) the extent to 
which these business engagement strategies have been successfully translated into business 
engagement activities in Asia will be illustrated further in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
2.4.5 Roles of the European Commission Delegations 
Last but not least, the roles of the European Commission Delegations in assisting business at 
local level are vital and worth analysing as part of the EU business engagement. As argued 
earlier, since the 1990s the EU has expanded its diplomatic network of 130 European 
Commission Delegations and Offices around the world, working alongside and co-operating 
with Member State Embassies. These Delegations, as noted above, can be seen as the EU's 
external 'representation' in third countries. The European Commission has given the 
following description of their roles and scope: 
(i) exercise powers conferred by the treaty on the European Community, in third 
countries. This means promoting Europe's interests as embodied in the common policies-
chiefly the common commercial policy, but others as well, including the agriculture, fisheries, 
environmental and health and safety policies 
(ii) play a key role in development assistance 
(iii) play an increasing role in the conduct of CFSP 
(iv) provide support and assistance as necessary to the other institutions and actors of 
the EU, including the High Representative/Secretary General, the European Parliament, the 
Presidency and Delegations increasingly serve an important information function, providing 
background and updates on European integration and EU policies to host Governments and 
administrations, business circles and civil society (200lf: Paragraph I). 
In most cases, the Delegations still operate alongside the Member State Embassies, 
which represent individual member states' interests. Although the European Commission 
stresses that 'the Delegations are not there to "compete" with Member State Embassies ... the 
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task of the Delegations, beyond the representation of Community interests, is one of co-
ordination and cooperation in the interests of projecting the image of a Union which is active, 
imaginative and united'. Since 'Article 20 of the Maastricht Treaty42 also requires the 
Delegations and the Member States' diplomatic missions to "co-operate" in ensuring that the 
Common Positions and joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and 
implemented' (2001[: Paragraph 1.2), the extent to which the Delegations and Member State 
Embassies co-operate and represent the EU common interest in the third country (particularly, 
for this thesis, in the commercial diplomacy framework) has to be empirically explored. 
This focus on 'what actually happens' follows Bale's (2002:9-10) insistence on the 
importance of the 'mundane' level of diplomatic co-operation and the roles of the European 
Commission Delegations in third countries, in the context of the EU's Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). The chapter applies Bale's argument particularly to the area of 
commercial diplomacy, in which the EU in many significant respects owns commercial 
autonomy and competence (though still shares it with the Member States) and performs some 
state like functions. In this regard, it is argued that the Delegations can be recognised as the 
EU's local 'commercial representation', co-operating with Member State Embassies in 
assisting business, particularly on the trade policy, WTO issues as well as other commercial 
policy issues, i.e., agriculture, which fall under the Union exclusive competence. This leads to 
the involvement ofDe1egations in 'diplomatic co-operation' in third countries (Bale, 2002: 
10) thus establishing 'commercial networking' among commercial attaches and counsellors of 
the Delegation and Member State Embassies, as well as other national business organisations, 
i.e., Chambers ofCommerce.43 
4l Article 20 of the Maastricht Treaty declares: 'The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and 
the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to 
international organisations, shall co-operate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions adopted by 
the Council are complied with and implemented. They shall step up co-operation by exchanging information, 
carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 20 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community'. 
4l Chapter 6 will detail the 'diplomatic co-operation' and 'commercial networking' in Thailand. 
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Among the roles and activities ofthe Delegation mentioned earlier, trade policy and 
economic and commercial issues seem to be dominant. Nonetheless, it is important to note the 
different emphasis of Delegations' activities in different host-countries. Thus, although seen 
as 'embassies without a state' (Bruter, 1999: 183,203) - i.e. they lack the leadership, the 
resources and the diplomatic corps - these Delegations do perform some autonomous actions 
particularly in the areas of trade, and cooperation and development. However, the 
autonomous actions ofthe Delegations may vary in places because of the dissimilar technical 
means of individual Delegations, the nature of the relations between the EU and the host 
country, and the expected evolution of these links (1999: 196). Bruter distinguishes between 
three types ofDe1egations: trade-oriented, development-oriented and mixed. Trade-oriented 
Delegations are found mostly in developed countries, newly developed East-Asian countries 
and oil-producing countries. Development-oriented delegations are found in those countries 
with which the EU has signed development agreements, but which are not major markets for 
EU companies. So-called mixed Delegations are found in countries that, at present, need help 
in development but that represent markets of sufficient interest to EU companies in 
competition with other countries (the USA, Japan). This category includes most of Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the most developed Latin-American countries (1999: 196). 
Particularly in the case of Asia, the Delegations play a significant role in the opening 
of local markets and in defending the interests of European business through diplomatic 
pressure and lobbying host-governments to solve trade disputes and deal with trade barriers in 
third markets. In addition, as already noted, development projects and economic co-operation 
programmes are often proposed by the EU in exchange for closer trade relationships and used 
as means to promote closer business cooperation between the EU and its economic partners44• 
In May 2000, the Commission adopted the Communication on the reform of the 
management of external assistance (2000b) in order to improve the EU's external assistance. 
44 See Chapter 5 for the case of ASEAN, and Chapter 6 for the case of Thailand. 
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One of its aspects is the 'Devolution to Delegations' policy4S, which reiterates the roles of the 
Delegations and enables them to play a key role in implementing cooperation and 
development programmes. This Devolution-to-Delegations process means that 'anything that 
can be better managed and decided on the spot, close to what is happening on the ground, 
should not be managed or decided in Brussels. It will be far easier to ensure effectiveness and 
ownership of aid management' (European Commission, 2000b: 20). Thus, 'the Delegations 
would take over the management of these EU assistance and co-operation projects, for 
example, the budgetary and financial management will be transferred to the Delegations in a 
close co-operation with EuropeAid Co-operation Office in Brussels' (Interview, European 
Commission Delegation in Thailand, Bangkok, 26 August 2003). 
Furthermore, in July 2002, the European Commission (2002c) adopted a proposal on a 
new regulation for its co-operation with Asia and Latin America (ALA). This proposal aims 
to increase the quality, effectiveness and speed of project implementation. The underlying 
philosophy for the new regulation is characterised by: (i) the achievement of faster 
commitment and disbursement of aid; (ii) the improvement of the quality of country and 
regional strategies through rigorous planning for periods of 5 to 7 years; (iii) the development 
of financial management of assistance through simplified decision- making procedures; (iv) 
the implementation of aid more coherently through increased co-operation with Member 
States and other aid donors. This refonn of External Assistance involves greater effectiveness 
in implementing a number of economic and co-operation programmes with Asia and Latin 
America and thus aims at promoting trade and investment and fostering business co-operation 
between the EU and these two emerging economies. 
In this respect, Romano Prodi (the 1999-2004 President of the European Commission) 
has stated in supporting an increasing importance of the roles of the Delegations at the ground 
4' This policy was carried out in stages during the 2001-2004 period. Increasingly, not only Delegations are 
closely involved in programming, but they can also manage projects directly from start to flnish, in close contact 
with the EuropeAid Co-Operation Office and host country authorities (DO External Relations Website, accessed 
7 February 2005). 
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level that 'the role of the Delegations has changed constantly ... they now carry out tasks 
relating to almost all the areas where the EU has a part to play. This reflects the Union's 
growing importance as a world global player (European Commission, 2004b: 5). However, 
while the focus on managerial reform characteristic ofProdi's Commission 'broke the mould 
of the Commission's haphazard approach to management change, and the key reforms 
introduced by External Relations Commissioner Patten clearly made the Commission a more 
effective donor and proj ect manager of aid and technical assistance, there never existed the 
formal intention to create a powerful quasi-diplomatic service in parallel to those of the 
Member States' (Spence, 2005: 2). 
In addition, in more specific terms ofEU commercial policy, it is important to note 
that the Delegations do not represent the EU trade and investment promotion agency per se 
(as the US or Japan have in third countries). Individual Member State Embassies and other 
business agencies (i.e. National Chambers of Commerce) are still responsible for the 
promotion of trade and investment for their home countries and importantly (as noted earlier 
in this chapter) investment still does not fall under the EU's commercial competence. In 
Chapter 6, the roles of the European Commission Delegation and the ways in which it co-
operates with the Member State Embassies and other commercial actors in engaging business 
at local level will be explored in detail by using the empirical study of the EU in Thailand. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Chapter 1 set out an analytic background for the thesis by exploring Susan Strange's 
structural approach and particularly Stopford and Strange's concept of Triangular Diplomacy 
as a tool to generate questions about the relationships between states (quasi-state) and firms 
and the differentiated roles of states in the global political economy. Importantly, Strange's 
approach enabled us to recognise a quasi-state actor like the EU as a valid participant and 
actor (in its own right) in the global political economy, performing significant strategies and 
roles alongside states, though it does not represent a state in conventional terms. In this 
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Chapter, the analysis has turned specifically to the EU as perfonner of state-functions by 
exploring the EU's commercial diplomacy in tenns of its commercial autonomy, 
representation, and influence - three 'soft' qualifications of non-state actors to participate 
alongside states in the global political economy - rather than evaluating the EU in tenns of 
the qualifications of traditional statehood (namely sovereignty, recognition, and control). 
Through exploration of these 'statelike' qualifications, the chapter has illustrated the 
characteristics of the EU as a commercial actor and the EU's commercial diplomacy as 
follows: 
Firstly, within the area of commercial diplomacy (of the First Pillar), the EU perfonns 
a number of state-functions, for example, fonning its own commercial strategies, representing 
EU common interests and exercising influence in different international arenas, namely 
multilateral, interregional and bilateral. In particular, the European Commission, despite the 
fact that its commercial autonomy is still limited by the restriction inherent in the 
Community's commercial competence and its interaction with the Council within the 
complex and politicised EU policy-making process, has played a leading role in fonnulating 
the EU's commercial strategies and projecting its commercial ideas, priorities, objectives, and 
influence throughout the rest of the world. Thus, the EU, though it is not a state in traditional 
tenns represents a fonnidable 'statelike' commercial actor, and through its commercial 
diplomacy and strategy, the EU can have an immense impact in the global political economy. 
Secondly and more importantly, it can be observed that in the 1990s business 
engagement emerged as a crucial part of the EU's overall commercial strategy. Instead of 
only protecting its domestic market, in the 1990s the EU strategy seemed to shift towards a 
more liberal approach. Alongside the old defensive trade policy instruments, the EU initiated 
a number of new commercial instruments to assist European business to compete with other 
members of Triad as a means to improve European competitiveness and support the EU's 
leading position in the global political economy. These instruments include, for example, 
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market access strategy, TBR, business dialogue and networking (TABD, AEBF, MEBF and 
etc), economic co-operation programmes, and the roles of the European Commission 
Delegations in third countries. 
Seen against this background, this chapter has argued that business engagement has 
emerged as part ofthe EU's commercial diplomacy and that the EU performs its own 
business engagement strategy in relations with both states and firms. In this respect, the EU 
seems to perform a proactive role in engaging business closer into its commercial diplomacy 
framework, akin to those of 'competition state', 'catalytic state' and 'cooperation state' which 
embodies the move from 'confrontation to cooperation' in its relations with business and 
firms. 
Building on the ideas discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, this thesis aims to 
empirically investigate the EU's commercial strategies and business engagement towards 
Asia; to explore the ways in which, with what instruments and for whose interests the EU 
engages or incorporates business into the overaIJ framework of its commercial diplomacy in 
Asia. Chapter 3 will examine the formulation of EU's commercial and business engagement 
strategies towards Asia during 1994-2004, while the detailed investigation and 
implementation of these strategies into a form of commercial and business engagement 
activities at different levels in Asia will be dealt with in Chapters 4-6 of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 
EU-Asian Commercial Relations 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The commercial linkages between Europe and Asia can be traced back to the times of 
colonialism. Colonialism is perceived by Gilson as an initial form of Western penetration, by 
Western governments and businesses into Asia (2002: 34). This colonial pattern reveals initial 
linkages between governments and business or states and markets per se since the beginning 
of Europe-Asia relations. For example, the British extended their interests - often through the 
East India Company - from India, China, and Singapore into Burma, and took a much greater 
interest in Malaya. The Dutch East India Company focused on coffee and other plantations on 
the Indonesian archipelago. Meanwhile, the French came to occupy large tracts of Indochina. 
The Philippines, which had been conquered by the Spanish in 1521, were subsequently seized 
by the Americans and annexed in 1899. Japan and Thailand are the only Asian to escape 
formal colonisation (Gilson, 2002: 34). These European and Asian commercial linkages 
during the sixteenth-century tend to be explained from the perspectives of realism or 
mercantilism. As Maull, Segal and Wanandi (1998: 4) emphasise, the western colonial 
powers sought to gain taxes, and to impose legal, educational and local authority structures in 
line with their own national interests, but also to 'trade and plunder in the region'. Gilpin thus 
described the exercise of European colonial power in Asia as a 'malevolent' form of 
mercantilism (1987: 32). 
However, the period of post-war decolonisation from 1946-1958 meant that 'the 
formal colonial structure in South East Asia was effectively dismantled' (Dixon, 1991: 138), 
and occurred in parallel with the beginning ofthe European integration process. Since then, 
there was a shift from colonial relations towards more equal commercial relations between 
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Europe and Asia, particularly in the 1990s. This had a two-fold impact on the pattern of 
Europe-Asia commercial relations: 
First, over this period the Triad relationship between Asia, the US and the EU 
emerged. A significant shift in the global political-economic balance (especially from the 
1970s onwards) resulted from 'the end of US pre-eminent power in the global system' and the 
concomitant 'Europe/Asia Rising' (preston and Gilson, 2001: 4). The rather underdeveloped 
relations between Europe and Asia (compared to stronger Transatlantic and Asia-Pacific ties) 
during the 1970s-1980s underwrote the EU's new strategies towards Asia in the mid-1990s 
(Preston and Gilson, 2001: 15; Dent 2001). 
Second, the structural shifts in the patterns of power within and between Europe and . 
Asia (which reflected the increasing political participation of non-states such as firms and 
quasi-states such as the EU) challenged the traditional role(s) of the state and the conventional 
government-ta-government relations between Europe and Asia. This process directly links to 
the 'structural changes' (Strange, 1992, 1994a) and the new state-firm diplomacy (Stopford 
and Strange, 1991) in the global political economy mentioned in Chapter 1. As argued in 
Chapter 2 (particularly, in the post-Cold War context) the EU has not only emerged as a 
formidable commercial actor in the global political economy, but has also become an 
important player in Asia (alongside its Member States), engaging both states and firms. 
Hence, one can no longer conceive of Europe-Asia commercial relationships during the post-
Cold War period only as traditional government-to-government relations, but that business 
and firms (non-states) and the EU (a quasi-state) have become significant actors performing 
commercial roles alongside states in these relationships. 
Central in this chapter is, therefore, to give an overview of contemporary EU_Asia46 
commercial relations, particularly the EU's commercial strategies and business engagement 
towards Asia since 1994 until 2004, which have been translated into EU-Asian institutional 
46 Rather than 'Europe-Asia', this chapter emphasises the 'EU-Asia' commercial relations, due to the focus of 
this thesis on the EU as a commercial actor on its own right in Asia (while acknowledging the importance of 
Member States in this relationship). 
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frameworks at different levels: transregional (ASEM), interregional (ED-ASEAN) relations, 
and bilateral relations with different Asian countries. In this way, the chapter addresses the 
first research question of this thesis: what are the main features ofthe ED's commercial 
strategies towards Asia and how have they been translated into the ED-Asian institutional 
frameworks at different levels ofEU commercial engagement in Asia? Specifically, how far 
do these strategies reflect a multi-level approach, and how far do they reflect the aims of 
business engagement? 
In undertaking this analysis, this chapter distinguishes the ED's commercial strategies 
between: (i) strategy formulation' - what the ED/or the European Commission is aiming to 
achieve in Asia; and (ii) strategy 'implementation' - how and in which way these strategies 
have been translated into action. In doing so, the chapter first examines the development of 
the EU's Asian strategies (as formalised by the European Commission) since 1994, focusing 
on their objectives, priorities and instruments in Asia, and argues that business engagement 
(mentioned in Chapter 2) is evidently seen as a crucial part of the formulation ofEU's 
commercial strategies towards Asia. Secondly, in terms of strategy implementation, the 
chapter distinguishes three levels of EU' s commercial engagement in Asia: transregional 
(ASEM), interregional (ED-ASEAN) dialogue and bilateral relations between the EU and 
different Asian countries, in which the ED seems to have different commercial instruments 
and strategies and to perform different roles. This reflects the ED's multi-level approach 
towards Asia. Thus, before moving on to the detailed investigation ofthe ED's commercial 
and business engagement in Asia in Chapters 4-6, the chapter concludes that business 
engagement has emerged as a crucial but differentiated part of the ED's commercial strategies 
towards Asia. 
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3.2 THE EU'S COMMERCIAL STRATEGIES TOWARDS ASIA: FORMULATION 
OF STRATEGY 
Within the EU's complex policy-making processes (described in detail in Chapter 2), the 
European Commission plays a leading role in terms of strategy formulation - formulating 
commercial ideas, objectives, and priorities towards the rest of the world on behalf of the EU. 
It was not until the beginning of the 1990s that the European Commission started to adopt its 
first explicit Asian strategl7• In this part, the chapter explores the development of the 
European Commission's Asian strategies since 1994, which illustrates the EU's strategic 
objectives, ideas and priorities in Asia. 
3.2.1 The Early 1990s: The 'Look East' Policy and the 1994 'New Asia Strategy' 
Although several EU Member States have had long-standing economic and commercial ties 
with Asia stemming from European colonisation of Asian territories, during the 1970s-1980s 
Asia was relatively ignored as a rest of the EU's preoccupation with 'matters close to home' 
(Wiessala, 2002). Traditionally, the EC's early relations with Asia were less structured than 
those with either ACP countries, the CEE countries, or the Mediterranean countries. The 
strong historical and geopolitical ties dictated that the EU's association agreements with the 
ACP countries and the post-1989 changes in Eastern Europe took precedence over an Asian 
strategy. Therefore, a heavy concentration on the CEE and Mediterranean countries, and a 
focus upon intraregional rather than interregional and external relations characterised EU 
policy during the 1970s and 1980s. As Piening (1997: 143) put it, 'the EU was focusing too 
much on its immediate neighbours while neglecting the wider world'. 
Yet, early in the 1990s, the EU adopted a 'Look East' policy (Ri chards and 
Kirkpatrick, 1999: 689-690) as a result of the growing awareness that Asia is both a 
'challenge' and an 'opportunity' for Europe. Phatharodom (1998: 1) called this period a 'new 
47 A list of the European Commission's strategies towards Asia during 1994-2004 shown in Annex 3.1, page 
331. 
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era
48 
of EU-Asian relations marked by a new European strategy'. According to Richards and 
Kirkpatrick, 'as for the fast growing economy and the huge market of the Asian region, the 
EU's Asian policy started to change at the beginning of the 1990s when a more positive and 
pro active Look East policy was adopted, placing Asian markets near the centre of the EU's 
new strategy for globalising its economy and its view of international relations' (1999: 689-
690). In response to the Asian challenges and opportunities, the European Commission (1994) 
adopted its first Asian strategy in 1994 called 'Towards a New Asia Strategy' (referred to by 
this chapter as the 'New Asia Strategy'). Both the Asian economic boom and the increasing 
influence of the US in the region (through the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation forum (APEC) in 1993) had a catalytic effect on the development of this 
strategy. While APEC involved cooperation between the US and 28 countries around the 
Pacific Rim, it became evident that the EU would be excluded and miss out on the benefits 
from the economic exchange with the region. Thus, in order to maintain its economic interests 
in Asia (and balance the US position in the global system), the EU had to make its presence 
felt and play a more proactive role in the region. The Commission acknowledged this 
rationale by its explicit statement that 'the rise of Asia is dramatically changing the world 
balance of economic power ... the EU needs therefore to accord Asia a higher priority than is 
at present the case ... and to strengthen the Union's economic presence in Asia in order to 
maintain the Union's leading role in the world economy' (1994: 1-2). Moreover, the 
Commission went on to list the following objectives of the EU in Asia: 
(i) to benefit from the economic opportunities and to respond to the economic 
challenges in the region which contains the world's fastest growing countries, and 
which could represent between a quarter and a third of the world economy by the year 
2000; 
(ii) to integrate into the open, market-based world trading system those Asian 
countries such as China, India or Vietnam which are moving from state controls to 
market-oriented economies; and 
(iii) to assist in the enormous problem of poverty alleviation (1994: 5-10). 
48 Phatharodom (1998) identifies three distinct phases in the EU-Asia relationship: (i) the frrst phase (1967-1980) 
began setting up the machinery for regular institutional contact; (ii) the second phase (1980-1994) focused on 
broadening economic and political contacts; (iii) the third phase (I 994-present) bears witness to a 'new era' of 
EU-Asia relations. 
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In this context, it is clear that while political motives are mentioned in general terms, it 
is economic and commercial interests that dominate the 'New Asia Strategy'. Such a reading 
of this first Asian strategy of the EU seems to show that instead of 'Asian states', in the early 
1990s it focused mainly on 'Asian markets,49. Thus, the development of new and proactive 
EU commercial strategies for promoting and assisting European businesses expose the 
Commission's apprehension that: 
'The Union stands to lose out on the economic miracle taking place there [in Asia] 
because of the strong competition: from Japan and the United States, and also increasingly 
from companies within the region's newly industrialised and capital rich countries such as 
Korea or Taiwan ... If European companies are unable to take a full share of the world's main 
centre of growth in the next decade this will affect their profits and competitiveness, not only 
in Asian markets, but also world-wide' (European Commission, 1994: 13). 
Therefore, the EU's role is 'to pursue market-opening for both goods and services and 
to overcome obstacles to European trade and investment by encouraging a favourable 
regulatory environment for business in Asia' (1994: 2). The Commission further maintained 
that 'this can only be achieved by the Union and its Member States in co-ordination and with 
the direct participation of the European private sector' (1994: 10). In this respect, the chapter 
argues that the 1994 New Asia Strategy tends to be perceived both as the initiation of the 
EU's business engagement in Asia and as a reflection ofthe EU's intention to play a more 
proactive role in its relations with businesses and in assisting them to access Asian markets. 
These developments corroborate the proposition developed in Chapters 1 and 2 that the EU 
has performed a proactive role, comparable to those of 'competition state' , 'catalytic state' 
and 'cooperation state' embodying 'co-operation', rather than 'confrontation' with firms and 
businesses in order 'to create wealth and to survive competition in the global political 
economy' (Stopford and Strange, 1991). 
Subsequently, the 1994 New Asia Strategy was elaborated further for specific 
countries or sectors in a number of more targeted Commission strategies, dealing for example 
49 This point will be also elaborated further in Chapter 4, particularly on ASEM as the EU's transregional 
commercial engagement in Asia in Section 4.3. 
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with the EU's relations with China, India, and in the energy sectorso. More importantly, in 
July 1996 the European Commission (1996c) announced the Communication 'Creating a New 
Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations' which was the first European Commission strategy paper 
dealing with ASEAN since the EC-ASEAN interregional dialogue that began in 1980. This 
was followed by the establishment of ASEM in 1996 as a mechanism for regional cooperation 
in which the EU's economic relations with East Asia 'are hoped to flourish' (Dent, 1997: 
495).51 These strategies adopted by the European Commission up to the mid-1990s reflect the 
EU's initial efforts to establish a framework for the EU's commercial diplomacy, and more 
particularly positive business engagement with Asia. However, such an attempt on behalf of 
the EU can be seen as relatively belated, in comparison to that of the US and Japan which had 
already established strong commercial and business linkages with Asia. 
3.2.2 The 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2001 Updated Asian Strategy 
The Asian financial crisis started in July 1997 not long after the EU's first major effort to 
establish its commercial diplomacy framework and promote business engagement with Asia. 
The crisis called into question not only the economic health of Asia, but also probed the 
response of various regional organisations. For instance, Chirathivat (1999: 13) argued that 
'the ASEAN grouping has not been effective enough to cushion the crisis impact on its 
individual members'. In a similar vein, Dosch (1999: 9) noted that that the 'under-
institutionalisation' of ASEAN and APEC has revealed their inadequacy in dealing with 'the 
crisis situation'. Instead, rescue operations in the affected countries were undertaken under the 
control of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a global financial institution in which the 
US plays a leading role. 
so See 'A long-term Policy for China-Europe Relations' - COM(95) 279, 5 July 1995, 'EU-India 
Enhanced Partnership' - COM(96) 275, 25 June 1996, 'Europe-Asia Cooperation Strategy for Energy' -
COM(96) 308, 18 July 1996). 
" The differences between the EU's strategies in ASEM and EU-ASEAN relations will be discussed in detail 
later in this Chapter and in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. 
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On a positive note, however, Sir Leon Brittan (1999) has maintained the centrality of 
the EU's response to the Asian crisis (as part of the IMF framework) because the 'EU 
Member States contributed substantially to the bailout packages. About 18 percent of the total 
came from Europe, more than the US' 16 percent and close behind Japan's 20 percent' . 
Moreover, 'in concrete terms, the EU agreed to contribute to an AS EM Trust Fund at the 
World Bank, appointed a special envoy to the region and created a team of European financial 
experts to advise ASEM governments'. On the other hand, Forster (1999: 756) has argued that 
the EU's response was 'modest' for a variety of reasons - notably lack of geographical 
proximity, economic asymmetry, and preoccupation with CEE. Forster went on to argue that 
'despite warm words of solidarity from Tony Blair, the host of the ASEM2 [Summit], 
proclaiming "that Europe is and will stand by Asia in its hour of need", little of substance has 
been forthcoming in part because the Europeans felt they had contributed through the IMF' 
(1999: 756). In this context, despite some supportive assistance from the EU via global 
institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the ASEM Trust Fund52, it did not seem to 
perform better than ASEAN or APEC in responding to the crisis. Rather, the EU seemed to 
miss a vital opportunity to demonstrate the stronger attention towards Asia that it had stressed 
in its 1994 New Asian Strategy. Such an unconvincing response tends to demonstrate 'the 
limited convergence of interests between the two regions' and that 'South East Asia will 
remain a marginal area of engagement for the EU' (Forster, 1999: 744). Wiessala also noted 
that 'this indifference confirmed some of the constraints ofEU-Asian relations' (2002: 28). In 
turn, as a result of the financial crisis there was a drastic decrease in European investment 
rates in Asia, reaching its lowest figure in 1998, down to 1.6% ofEU global FDI. At the same 
time, there was an increase ofEU investment to NAFTA (the US, Canada, and Mexico), 
" The ASEM Trust Fund coordinates the EU programmes for consolidation of the process of economic and 
social refonn in the Asian countries affected by the financial crisis of 1997. The ASEM Trust Fund Phase I was 
undertaken from 1997-2002 and ASEM Trust Fund Phase II from 2002-2005. 
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reaching 63.1 % of the total EU outward FDI in 1998 and 67.5% in 1999 (European 
Commission 2001d, Table: EU FDI (extra-EU), 1995-1999). 
Moreover, during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, EU-ASEAN relations were 
also embittered by unsolved political problems, particularly the human rights and democracy 
situation in South East Asia which had long been obstructing the further development of EU-
ASEAN interregional relations. The East Timor human rights problem led Portugal to object 
to giving the Commission a mandate to negotiate a third-generation Cooperation Agreement 
with ASEAN as proposed in 1996, and Myanmar's accession to ASEAN also resulted in 
frozen relations between the two institutions during 1997-1999 (explored in more detail in 
Chapter 5). 
Following the Asian financial crisis and the embittered relationship with ASEAN in 
the late 1990s, in 200 I the European Commission (200 1 c) adopted an updated Asian strategy 
called 'Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships'. Its stated aim 
was 'to review and update its approach to Asia, to provide a new strategic framework which 
will address the changes since 1994, and to establish a coherent, comprehensive and balanced 
strategic approach for its relations with Asia in the coming decade' (200Ic: 5). In this strategy 
paper, the European Commission (2001 c: 8) identified the following trends: in Asia, the 
1997-1998 Asian economic crisis and more importantly the increasing efforts to build "East 
Asian" regional dialogue and co-operation (i.e. the birth of the "ASEAN+3" dialogue with the 
gradual strengthening of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a confidence-building forum) 
with increasing signs of a growing sense of East Asian identity; in Europe the launch of the 
Euro as a single currency in 1999, and EU Enlargement from 2003 onwards; at the global 
level, the further strengthening of the multilateral trading system under the GATT, and now 
the WTO. In order to cope with these changes, the objectives of the EU in Asia stated by the 
Commission in this updated Asian strategy are to: 
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(i) contribute to peace and security in the region and globally, through a broadening of 
our engagement with the region; 
(ii) further strengthen our mutual trade and investment flows with the region; 
(iii) promote the development of the less prosperous countries of the region, 
addressing the root causes of poverty; 
(iv) contribute to the spreading of democracy, good governance and the rule of law; 
(v) build global partnerships and alliances with Asian countries, in appropriate 
international fora, to help address both the challenges and the opportunities offered by 
globalisation, and to strengthen our joint efforts on global environmental and security issues; 
(vi) and help strengthen the awareness of Europe in Asia (and vice versa) (2001c: 15). 
Thus, following in the footsteps of the 1994 strategy, the 2001 updated strategy 
continued to emphasise economic and commercial issues as one of the EU's major interests in 
Asia. Its underlying objectives are to: 'further develop the bilateral economic relations with 
Asian partners, strengthen private-sector cooperation between Europe and Asia through 
support for contacts between economic operators in Europe (particularly SMEs) and in Asia, 
strengthen a dialogue on economic and financial policy' (Commission, 2001c: 16). However, 
it is noticeable that unlike the previous strategy in which economic interests were dominant, 
this strategy offers a more balanced mixture between economics, security, and development 
issues. Thus, despite its broad scope, the 2001 strategy represents an updated approach to 
ensure the EU's interests in Asia during the period of post-Asian financial crisis. 
3.2.3 Asian Diversity and Snb-Regional Strategies 
'Diversity is clearly a major characteristic of Asia' emphasised the EU Trade Commissioner 
during 1999-2004, Pascal Lamy (2003: 3) while addressing the 2001 updated strategic 
framework for the EU's overall relations with Asia. Given the diverse economic, political and 
cultural geography of Asia, the Commission's 2001 updated Asian strategy geographically 
divided the region into four sub-regions: 
(i) South Asia: through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) and in particular the bilateral relationship with India; 
(H) South East Asia: through the ASEAN and the ARF; 
(iii) North East Asia: China, Hong Kong and Macao, Taiwan, Japan, Korean 
Peninsula; 
(iv) Australasia: Australia and New Zealand (2001c: 6) 
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While the 1994 Strategy paper covered South, South East and North East Asia, it is 
important to note that the 2001 updated strategy covers, for the first time, Australasia - 'given 
that the economic and political links of Australia and New Zealand with their neighbours to 
the north, and their geographic proximity, are sufficiently great that they should be treated 
here as part of the wider Asian and Asia-Pacific region' (Commission, 200lc: 6). Moreover, 
at that time while ASEM membership remained problematic, i.e., the membership of 
Myanmar and new EU Member States after the 2004 enlargement, in this strategy the 
European Commission considered the possibility of also including Australia and New 
Zealand into the ASEM process (200 le: 25). Despite the definition of Asia given by the 
Commission (1994, 200lc), this thesis only aims to cover the two sub-regions of South East 
Asia and North East Asia or the Asian' ASEMl 0'. 
It is important to notice that the four sub-regions comprise relatively independent 
groupings with little in the way of common structures and few fully fledged common policies. 
South East Asian countries integrate among themselves as the ASEAN, while South Asia 
operates through the SAARC. South East Asia and North East Asia cooperate with each other 
through the fora of ASEM or ASEAN "plus 3" (i.e. China, Japan, South Korea). But South 
Asia, Australia and New Zealand are not even included in the ASEM process. In 2004, the 
ASEM5 Summit only extended ASEM membership to cover 10 new members ofthe EU, and 
3 new members on the Asian side. India is also linked to ASEAN via the ARF. (See Figure 
3.1) Importantly, 'in contrast to the EU's relations with Latin America or with the 
Mediterranean or ACP countries, there is no one inter-regional forum in which Europe and 
Asia interact' (Commission 20Dlc: 25). 
Building on this great diversity in Asia, the 2001 updated Asia strategy, therefore, 
calls for sub-regional strategies and approaches to be developed (European Commission, 
200lc: 26). Rather than a single strategy across the whole region, it argues that the EU needs 
different strategies for different levels of its commercial and political engagement. In effect, 
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Chris Patten has admitted that 'given the sprawling variety of Asia, it is absurd to think ofa 
monolithic EU-Asia relationship: a single policy or approach, equally valid across the whole 
region' (Patten, 2002). In this respect, the European Commission has adopted a number of 
sub-regional strategies as instanced by the 'New Partnership with South East Asia' and 'A 
Maturing Partnership - Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China relations' in 2003. 
To conclude the argument so far, the EU's Asia strategies formulated by the European 
Commission from the early 1990s until recently, are not only characterised by diversified 
strategic approaches towards different sub-regions in Asia, but also reflect the primacy of 
economic and commercial interests. In particular, during the mid-1990s, the Commission's 
New Asia Strategy in 1994 and the creation of ASEM in 1996, can undoubtedly be seen as 
reflecting the EU's major concern - its commercial and business interests in the Asian region. 
For the EU, and particularly the European Commission, its interests in Asian markets, rather 
than Asian states, were a key rationale behind initiation ofthese strategies. In this respect, the 
EU as an economic power in the global political economy could not risk being excluded from 
the growing markets of Asia, while the US and Japan had already asserted their commercial 
influences and their businesses have long been in the region. 
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Figure 3.1: Regional Groupings in Asia (2000) 
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3.2.4 Unevenness in EU-Asian Trade and Investment 
It is important to note that while the Asian region as a whole (in this case the ASEMl 0) has 
been the EU's major trading partner for both imports and exports, EU FDI flows towards Asia 
are relatively lows3• Notwithstanding the phenomenal economic success within Asia in the 
early 1990s, the region had consistently failed to become a priority area for EU investors. In 
1996 the Commission (l996d), realising that EU businesses were failing to capitalise on the 
opportunities offered by the 'East Asian miracle', adopted the Joint UNCT ADlEuropean 
Commission report 'Investing in Asia's Dynamism: European Union Direct Investment in 
Asia' in order to encourage more EU FDI towards Asia; however, the trend did not improve. 
The EU provided Asia with only a small share of its total FDI. According to the Commission 
(2001c: 35-36), during the 1995-1999 period the average FDI flows from the EU to Asia 
amounted to only 11.488 billion Euros, representing only 7.8 % ofEU total outward FDI, of 
which North East Asia (China, South Korea, and Japan) accounted for 7.525 billion Euros or 
5.1 %, and ASEAN only 0.511 billion Euros or 0.3% ofEU total FDI (See Figure 4.5 in 
Chapter 4). Some of the reasons for this neglect include the European business focus for the 
most part on new enterprises in CEE, continuing problems with Asian tariff and Non-Tariff 
Barriers (NTBs), structural differences in economic organisation and the dominant presence 
of American investors and traders (Gilson, 2002: 65). 
Moreover, the financial crisis in 1997-1998 further decreased FDI levels from the EU. 
Among the Triad, the EU seems to be a rather reluctant investor and European businesses are 
underrepresented in Asia, compared to the US and Japan. On the other hand, in terms oftrade, 
as mentioned earlier, Asia accounted represents one of the largest trading partners of the EU 
in the world - accounting for 22.6 % of the total EU trade imports and exports in 2004 
(European Commission, 2005d: I). Moreover, there was an overall increasing trend in EU-
Asia trade during this 1996-2004 period and a rapid recovery from the financial crisis which 
53 See EU-ASEAMIO trade and investment statistics in Section, 4.2 in Chapter 4. 
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only resulted in a sharp decrease ofEU exports to Asia in 1998 (2005d: 1). Importantly, it is 
worth noting that this unevenness in the EU-Asia trade and investment trends coincides with 
the unevenness ofEU commercial competence discussed in Chapter 2: while the EU holds an 
exclusive competence in trade, investment is still under Member States' competence. 
Furthermore, the post-Asia economic crisis period has also shown the EU's strong 
interests in promoting more trade and investment and maintaining its position in Asia. In 
order to maintain its leading role in the global political economy, it is important that the EU 
engages Asia and plays a more proactive role promoting trade and investment and supporting 
business between the two regions. Therefore, a business engagement strategy can be seen as a 
crucial part of the EU's commercial strategies towards Asia during 1994-2004. Next the 
chapter will examine the way in which these Asian strategies and sub-regional strategies 
formulated by the Euroepan Commission mentioned earlier are translated into more specific 
institutional frameworks at different levels of EU commercial engagement in Asia. 
3.3 THE THREE LEVELS OF EU'S COMMERCIAL ENGAGEMENT IN ASIA 
This part of the chapter examines how and in which ways the strategic objectives, ideas and 
priorities of the European Commission set out in its Asian strategies have been translated into 
specific institutional frameworks ofthe EU in Asia. In South East and North East Asia which 
are the focus of this thesis54, the EU's commercial engagement can be identified at three 
distinctive but interconnected levels: 
(i) 'Transregional': the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
(ii) 'Interregional': the EU-ASEAN relationship (or dialogue) 
(iii) 'Bilateral': relations between the EU and Asian countries55 
54 While recognising the diversity in the term' Asia', it is important to note that this thesis focuses primarily on 
South East Asia and the ASEM Members in North East Asia (or the Asian ASEM 10 - Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Japan, South Korea.), while excluding South Asia 
and Australasia from its focus. 
" The order used in this chapter is from transregiona~ interregiona~ to bilateral levels, according to the degree of 
inclusiveness of these three levels of engagement, but not historically as Riiland (200 I a: 5; 200 Ib: 44) did when 
presenting the concepts of bilateral interregionalism and transregionalism. 
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Within this multi-level analysis ofEU commercial engagement in Asia, there are two 
interconnected levels ofEU regional engagement in Asia, namely the AS EM (transregional 
level) and the EU-ASEAN dialogue (interregionallevel), which have overlapping 
memberships and activities. ASEAN members are members of both the ASEM and the EU-
ASEAN dialogue and both have a common aim of strengthening economic ties between two 
regions through a range of activities, for example, trade facilitation and investment 
promotion. In addition, there exist traditional bilateral relations between the EU and different 
Asian countries. 
However, it is important to note that these two interconnected levels of the EU's 
commercial engagement in Asia are different in nature, and that the EU has different 
objectives and strategies and plays different roles within them. As Commission officials, both 
from DG Trade and DG External Relations confirm, ASEM and EU-ASEAN relations are 
different, but complementary, frameworks. They have different aims and objectives 
(Interview, European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 28 January 2004; Interview, 
European Commission, DG External Relations, Brussels 27 January 2004). 
In order to explore the different natures of ASEM and the EU-ASEAN dialogue, this 
chapter follows Riiland (200Ia: 5; 2001b: 44) in focusing on two types of inter regionalism: 
First, an older bilateral interregionalism or bi-regionalism can be traced back to the 
1970s. Bilateral interregionalism such as the EU-ASEAN relationship can be defined as 
group-to-group dialogues with more or less regular meetings centring around exchanges of 
information and cooperation (projects) in specific policy fields (trade and investment, 
environment, crime prevention, narcotics trafficking etc.). It is based on a low level of 
institutionalisation, usually at the ministerial, ambassadorial and senior officials levels, 
sometimes supplemented by permanent or ad hoc experts working groups. There are no 
common overarching institutions, and both sides rely exclusively on their own institutional 
infrastructure (Riiland, 2001a: 5). Second, nascent forms of transregionalism emerged in the 
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1990s. As Riiland notes, transregional institutions such as the ASEM or the APEC forum have 
a more diffuse membership which does not necessarily coincide with regional organisations 
and may include member states from more than two regions. New members of regional 
organisations represented in a transregional forum will not be automatically allowed to enter 
the respective forum. As the agenda grows in complexity, transregional fora may, unlike 
bilateral interregional relations, develop their own organisational infrastructure such as a 
secretariat for research, policy planning, preparation and coordination of meetings and 
implementation of decisions (2001a: 6). 
Riiland also notes that these two types of interregionalism are defined on the basis of 
the vast literature on regionalism56• In this regard, he distinguished two waves of regionalism. 
The first wave in the 1950s and 1960s was basically inspired by the early successes of 
European integration. It gave rise to the formation of regional organisations particularly in 
Latin America and to a lesser extent in Asia, Afiica and the Arab world. This first wave of 
regionalism is thus related to bilateral interregionalism. A second wave of regionalism, known 
as the New Regionalism, can be observed from the mid-1980s onward and is usually closely 
linked to the unfolding forces of economic liberalisation and globalisation. The New 
Regionalism is related to transregional institutions such as ASEM and APEC created during 
the 1990s (2001 a: 4-5). 
In relation to Riiland's characterisation, the ASEM is associated with New 
Regionalism and 'transregionalism', while the EU-ASEAN group-to-group dialogue that 
emerged in the 1980s can be seen as part ofthe first wave of regionalism and 'bilateral 
interregionalism'. Additionally, the EU still pursues its bilateral relations with different Asian 
countries. Therefore, following Riiland, the three levels of the EU's engagement in Asia are: 
"This chapter aims neither at an overview of the vast literature on regionalism, nor provides a deep analysis of 
its patterns. Instead, the analysis here refers to regionalism as a broad concept to explain the EU's commercial 
engagement in Asia. 
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transregional, interregional57, and bilateral. These three levels can also be seen as part of the 
global and multilateral level or multilateralism. Next the three levels of the EU's commercial 
engagement in Asia will be explored in detail. 
3.3.1 'Transregional': The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
Since its first meeting in Bangkok in March 1996, the ASEM has been seen as a significant 
focus of the EU's commercial engagement in Asia at the transregionallevel. In many crucial 
respects, the decision to launch the ASEM in 1996 reflected both ASEAN and EU attempts to 
find a new mechanism to revitalise their relationships which 'feH weH short of new 
expectations on both sides' (Forster, 1999: 752). The establishment of AS EM was seen to 
offer 'a way out of the deadlocked and rather stale relationship with ASEAN' (Forster, 1999: 
752) and a new mechanism for EU commercial engagement in Asia. 
When the ASEM was first initiated, some scholars even argued that AS EM became 
the principal focus of Europe-Asia relations, eventuaHy replacing the EU-ASEAN 
relationship as the process gathered momentum (Leifer, 1998). Pelkrnans in a similar vein 
noted that while the ASEAN-EU framework has never had a summit meeting, ASEM began 
with one and more were to foHow. Thus, ASEM might develop the same potential problem 
that APEC posed for ASEAN: 'higher speed, greater intensity of work and regular summits 
driving the process', while ASEAN-EU relations have 'only slowly developed and with much 
less vision and determination' (1997: 49). 
Moreover, it was also observed that some ASEAN countries were driven by fear of 
being suffocated by the Asian giants in ASEM. As Lim noted, 'ASEM might have opposing 
effects on EU-ASEAN relations by enhancing a much wider Asian context and focus for the 
EU than ASEAN only. ASEM might be seen as risking to dilute the bond between ASEAN 
and EU' (1999: 5). This reaction was not surprising because at the beginning of the ASEM, 
"In this thesis, the term 'interregional' is used, instead ofRiiland's 'bilateral interregionai'. This is to avoid 
confusion between bilateral and interregionallevels. 
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the EU seemed to give more emphasis to the ASEM process than to the EU-ASEAN 
relationship, which was obstructed by political problems. In particular the EU saw the ASEM 
economic process as a new mechanism to strengthen trade and investment between EU and 
Asia. Although the ASEM comprises three major pillars - economic, political and cultural-
its economic dimension has always been dominant and seems destined to make the most 
progress. 
Under the ASEM economic pillar, a number of meetings between both economic and 
financial ministers from both sides have been initiated, and trade and investment action plans, 
including the Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP) and Investment Promotion Action Plan 
(JP AP), have also been put forwarded. Moreover, the Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF) -
a business body which was established as an integrated part of the ASEM economic pillar, 
tends to indicate the most institutionalised expression of the EU's business engagement 
strategy in Asia. However, after almost a decade of its operation, the ASEM's and the 
AEBF's capability to produce tangible outcomes in strengthening EU-Asian commercial 
relations still seems under question.58 
3.3.2 'Interregional': the EU-ASEAN Relationship 
The EU-ASEAN interregional dialogue which began in the 1970s has been recognised as a 
cornerstone of EU-Asia relations. Edwards and Regelsberger (1990: 4-5) noted the 
importance of interregional or group-to-group dialogue, which began to take shape in the mid 
1970s with the Euro-Arab Dialogue and cooperation with the ACP Group within the Lorne 
Convention of 1975, followed later by agreements with Mediterranean countries. Thereafter, 
contacts were extended towards Asia in the form of EC-ASEAN interregional dialogue. As 
already noted, in the 1990s, there can be seen an increasing importance of interregional 
dialogue as a pattern of the EU strategies towards different regional groupings in the world 
(Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2004; Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger 2005), though some ofthem 
"The evolution of the ASEM economic framework and particularly the AEBF as the centrepiece ofEU business 
engagement in Asia will be dealt with in Chapter 4. 
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'have either faded away (as in the case of the CEE countries once they became EU members), 
have been subsumed into other models (as with the Euro-Arab dialogue) and/or are to be 
understood as ad hoc working relations between the European Commission and third partners' 
(Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger 2005: 322). 
The EC was in fact the first dialogue partner to establish informal relations with 
ASEAN in 1972, and then the formal EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement was signed in 
1980. Since then, relations between the EC/the EU and ASEAN have been based on this 
agreement. Partners to the agreement are the EC and the countries of ASEAN (Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam); but Myanmar, Laos and 
Cambodia, although now members of ASEAN, have not yet signed. This agreement is not 
preferential and covers 'trade, economic cooperation and development' with the common will 
'to contribute to a new phase of international economic cooperation and to facilitate the 
development of their respective human and material resources on the basis of freedom, 
equality and justice' (EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement, Kuala Lumpur, 7 March 1980). 
On the basis of the 1980 Agreement, EU-ASEAN interregional relations have been developed 
within a broad framework emphasising issues of technical assistance and commercial and 
economic cooperation (in addition there are three bilateral 'third generation' agreementsS9 
with Vietnam in 1996, Cambodia and Laos in 1999, prior to their inclusion in ASEAN). 
However, the relatively limited interest of the EU in ASEAN in its early years of co-
operation (1970s-1980s) can be observed. Later EU attempts to implement its first ASEAN 
strategy adopted in 1996 were hampered by the political problems in South East Asia 
(especially Myanmar's accession to ASEAN in 1997) and the financial crisis in 1998. Such 
factors led to the failure of the Commission's first attempt to adopt a new EC-ASEAN Co-
operation Agreement and then to the relatively frozen state ofrelation5 during the late 19905. 
"In particular these third generation agreements feature the so-called 'essential element clause' concerning the 
human rights and democratic principles. Other provisions concern intellectual property rights, environment, 
information and drug abuse control, which are not covered in the EC-ASEAN agreement (European Connnission 
News, 2003). 
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After some years of frozen relations, there was a reactivation of EU-ASEAN interregional 
relations when the Commission announced a 'New Partnership with South East Asia' strategy 
and the Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREA TI) in July 2003, which 
represented a more flexible EU approach to managing its relationship with ASEAN. The 
detailed investigation of the EU's commercial and business engagement through EU-ASEAN 
relations, particularly the Commission's 2003 ASEAN strategy and TREA TI as a new EU 
approach towards ASEAN during the beginning of2000s will be undertaken in Chapter 5. 
3.3.3 'Bilateral': Relations between the EU and Different Asian Countries 
Apart from two types of regional relations - ASEM and EU-ASEAN - the EU also engages 
Asia through its bilateral relationships with different countries in the region. Traditionally the 
EU conducts its bilateral co-operation with many countries and regions in Asia, as elsewhere, 
in the framework of Trade and Co-operation Agreements. In the case of ASEAN, it is 
important to notice that there is no bilateral Co-operation Agreement with individual members 
of ASEAN60, but only the 1980 EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement, which is outdated and 
has not yet been updated due to political issues (See Chapter 5, Section 5.2.4). Nonetheless, 
the Commission's new ASEAN strategy adopted in 2003 has offered an opportunity for 
bilateral agreements with different ASEAN countries, replacing the 1980 EC-ASEAN 
agreement (2003a: 4). As the External Relations Commissioner from 1999-2004, Chris Patten 
emphasised: 'today's Communication sets out a flexible strategy for deeper co-operation with 
individual countries within a regional framework' (European Commission News, 2003). This 
reflects a growing emphasis ofthe EU's Asian strategies on a bilateral approach, but within 
the regional framework. Thus this section focuses on the management of EU bilateral 
relations through the networks of relations conducted via European Commission Delegations. 
When taking into account the EU's representation in third countries, the EU's bilateral 
relations are managed through the European Commission Delegations in different Asian 
60 With an exception of three bilateral 'third generation' agreements with Vietnam in 1996, Cambodia and Laos 
in 1999. 
106 
countries, working alongside and co-ordinating with Member State Embassies. Since the 
1990s the European Commission has been expanding its network of Delegations in Asia from 
10 Delegations in 1994 to 19 Delegations in 2004 (see Table 3.1). Recently, new Delegations 
were opened, for example, in Singapore (in January 2003) and in Malaysia (in April 2003) as 
well as a European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan (in March 2003). The Commission 
emphasised an economic rationale: 'the growing commercial importance of Malaysia and 
Singapore major trading partners of the EU ... and Taiwan soon joining the WTO the 
Commission is expected to have a major role in monitoring market access, the application of 
WTO commitments, and other matters related to its policy' (200lf: Paragraph 3.2) 
Table 3.1: List of European Commission's Delegations and Representation Offices in 
Asia61 
1. Katmandu accredited to Nepal 2002 
2. Ventianne accredited to Lao PDR 2003 
3. Taipei accredited to Taiwan 2002 
4. Singapore accredited to Singapore 2003 
5. Kuala Lumpur accredited to Malaysia 2003 
6. PhnomPenh accredited to Cambodia 2002 
7. Colombo accredited to Sri Lanka, and to 1995 
the Maldives 
8. Dhaka accredited to Bangladesh 1988 
9. Islamabad accredited to Pakistan 1985 
10. New Delhi accredited to India, and to 1983 
Bhutan and Nepal 
11. Bangkok accredited to Thailand, and to 1979 
BurmaiMyanmar, Cambodia, 
Laos, and Malaysia 
12. Hanoi accredited to Vietnam 1996 
13. Jakarta accredited to Indonesia, and to 1988 
Brunei and Singapore 
14. Manila accredited to the Philippines 1991 
6\ Including North East Asia, South East Asia, South Asia and Australasia. 
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15. Beijing accredi ted to China, and to 1988 
Mongolia 
16. Hong Kong covering Hong Kong and Macao N/A 
17. Seoul accredited to South Korea 1990 
18. Tokyo accredited to Japan 1974 
19. Canberra accredited to Australia, and to 1981 
New Zealand 
Source: European Commission, DG External Relations Website at 
http://europa.eu.inticommlextemaIJelations, accessed 13 June 2004), incorporated with 
information from Delegation in Bangkok, Thailand (received 24 February 2005) 
In the 2001 updated Asian strategy, the European Commission emphasised its aim to 
'raise the EU's profile across Asia, [through] strengthening and broadening the network of 
Delegations across the region, enhancing EU coordination at all levels, and intensifying 
information and communication efforts across the region' (2001c: 19). This reflects an 
increasing importance ofthe network of Delegations as an EU commercial instrument in Asia, 
which can be seen as happening in line with the Commission's radical programme in 2000 
aimed at improving the quality and delivery of aid and technical assistance programmes 
(European Commission, 2000b) and embarked on a far-reaching adjustment of 
responsibilities between headquarters and the Delegations (See Chapter 2, Section 2.4.5). 
As already argued in Chapter 2, this network of Delegations can not only be seen as a 
significant fonn of EU representation in Asia, but also plays a crucial role in building a 
process of 'diplomatic co-operation' (Bale, 2002: 10) at this local level; and specifically in the 
area of commercial diplomacy, in establishing 'commercial networking' among commercial 
attaches and counsellors of the Delegations and Member State Embassies, as well as other 
national business organisations, i.e., Chambers of Commerce, with a common aim to promote 
trade, investment and business co-operation between the two regions. In other words, the 
European Commission Delegations can be seen as a significant EU commercial instrument at 
this local level in managing its bilateral relations with different Asian countries (though 
within the regional framework). In many respects commercial authorities have already been 
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transferred from Member State Embassies to the Delegations particularly in trade policy. 
However, it is important to note that these Delegations still operate alongside and co-ordinate 
with Member State Embassies, which still hold a certain degree of commercial competence, 
i.e., trade and investment promotion and investment, and undoubtedly still represent Member 
States' interests in traditional statehood terms. 
The questions worth raising here are: what role does the Delegation play in managing 
relations with Member State Embassies and other commercial actors, to what extent do they 
co-operate and in which ways has the commercial network been established at this local level. 
These questions will be taken forward for further investigation in Chapter 6 by using the 
example of the EU in Thailand, which wiII give a particular focus to the roles of the 
Delegation as the EU's commercial and business engagement in Thailand. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the development of the contemporary EU-Asian commercial 
relationship and the EU's commercial strategies towards Asia formulated by the European 
Commission during 1994-2004: from the early 1990s the 'Look East' policy, and more 
specificaIIy the 1994 New Asia strategy, the 1996 ASEAN strategy, and the 1996 creation of 
ASEM (when the Asian markets was rapidly growing) to the post-financial crisis period, the 
2001 updated Asian strategy, and the 2003 new ASEAN strategy. These strategies have been 
implemented into more specific institutional frameworks of the EU in Asia at three different 
but interconnected levels: transregional (ASEM), interregional (EU-ASEAN) relations, and 
bilateral relations between the EU and different Asian countries through the network of 
European Commission Delegations. Though these three levels, the EU has performed 
different instruments, strategies and roles engaging different business stakeholders. The 
pattern of contemporary EU-Asian commercial relations and characteristics of the EU's 
commercial diplomacy towards Asia during the 1994-2004 can be summarised as foIIows: 
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First, the post-Cold War period observed a dramatic change in the pattern of Europe-
Asia commercial relations towards more equal commercial relations, and importantly more 
participation of non-state actors (business and firms) and a quasi-state actor (the EU), 
challenging the role of states and the old pattern of inter-state relationships. Since the 1990s, 
the EU, particularly the European Commission, has emerged as a significant player in its own 
right in Asia, adopting its own strategies, objectives, and priorities in Asia and acting 
alongside Member States' activities. 
Second, the priority of the EU's Asia strategies has always been the EU's economic 
and commercial interests in 'Asian markets'. The Commission through its formal Asian 
strategies set up since 1994 has expressed its attempt to play a more proactive role in 
expanding its trade and investment in Asia and in assisting business to access Asian markets. 
This EU attempt was strongly driven by the structural changes and the issues of 
competitiveness in the global political economy (already argued in detail in Chapters 1 and 2), 
particularly among Triad members. While the US and Japan had long established their 
commercial and business linkages with Asia, the EU. as one ofthe most significant players in 
the global political economy. could not neglect Asia; and it had to increase its global presence 
and support European business to enter the Asian markets as a means to improve European 
competitiveness in the world economy. This Commission strategic aim thus characterised the 
EU' s commercial strategies towards Asia during the 1990s. 
Thirdly. as a result of rationales mentioned earlier. it is not surprising that business 
engagement is evidently seen as a crucial part of the EU's commercial strategies towards 
Asia. This follows a more liberal approach in the EU's overall commercial diplomacy during 
the 1990s (argued in Chapter 2). when the EU initiated a number of new commercial 
instruments and business engagement strategies aiming to support business to compete in the 
competitive global economy, as well as to engage business more closely in its commercial 
diplomacy framework. Examples in the case of Asia are the creation of AEBF in 1996 as a 
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form of business dialogue and networking under the ASEM economic framework, a number 
of economic co-operation programmes to promote business co-operation between two 
regions, and the roles of the European Commission Delegations in assisting business at the 
local level. Viewed in this context, it is assumed that elements of state-firm relationships are 
likely to be visible as part ofthe EU's commercial strategies towards Asia and that the EU has 
performed a proactive role akin to those of 'competition state', 'catalytic state' and 
'cooperation state' in its relations with business and firms through its business engagement 
strategy. 
Fourthly, despite the proactive roles of the EU, it is important to bear in mind the 
unevenness of the EU's statelike qualities as a commercial actor (discussed in Chapter 2): the 
EU has exclusive competence only in trade, but not in investment, which stilI falls under the 
Member States competence. This uneven commercial competence also coincidentIy reflects 
the unevenness oftrade and investment trend between the EU and Asia shown in Section 
3.2.4 of this chapter. While trade between the EU and Asian countries has been growing 
during the 19905-20005 period, the same cannot be said for investment. 
Next the thesis moves on to a detailed empirical study of business engagement 
activities in EU-Asian relations. The aim is to investigate the place of business engagement 
within the EU's broad commercial strategies towards Asia in three different levels of 
commercial engagement: transregional (ASEM), interregional (EU-ASEAN) relations, and 
bilateral (EU-Thailand) relations. By examining these distinct but interconnected levels of 
engagement, the thesis aims to explore the way in which the EU engages or incorporates 
businesses and firms into its overall commercial diplomacy framework by examining what 
instruments the EU has, what strategies the EU pursues, for whose interests (which business 
stakeholders) the EU engages, and finally what roles the EU plays in Asia. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to analysing the ASEM as a form ofEU commercial 
engagement, and the AEBF - a business body under the ASEM economic framework-
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as the focus of the EU's fonnal business engagement activities in ASEM. Chapter 5 will 
investigate the EU's commercial and business engagement at the interregionallevel of 
EU-ASEAN relations. Particular attention will be paid to the 'New Partnership with 
South East Asia' strategy and especially the TREAT! established by the Commission in 
2003. Moreover, economic co-operation programmes as the EU's 'soft' strategy to 
engage business at this interregionallevel will also be investigated. Chapter 6 will 
examine EU-Thailand relations, and particularly the roles ofthe European Commission 
Delegation in assisting business in Thailand. It will explore the emergence of a 
commercial network and co-operation among the Delegation, Member State Embassies, 
national Chambers of Commerce, and other commercial actors at the local level with a 
common aim to support business and to promote trade and investment between EU and 
Thailand. 
The detailed investigation ofEU business engagement activities in Chapters 4-6 
will address the second and third research questions set out at the beginning of the 
thesis. The second research question is: how have the aims of EU commercial strategies 
been translated into specific activities within EU-Asian relations? Specifically, how has 
implementation taken place at different levels, and how has it incorporated business 
engagement? The third research question is: what are the key areas of variation between 
business engagement activities at different levels, and how effective have EU activities 
at these different levels been? 
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Chapter 4 
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and 
the Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This first empirical investigation is devoted to an exploration of the EU's commercial and 
business engagement at the 'transregional' level, by focusing on ASEM which was 
established in 1996, as an endeavour to enhance relations between Europe and Asia. This new 
transregional co-operation among European and North East Asian and South East Asian 
countries through the ASEM framework has attracted attention from a number of scholars 
who have defined the ASEM process from different perspectives and using different 
approaches. For example, as Dent has noted, the emergence of ASEM is precisely seen, in 
particular by neo-liberalists, as a 'cooperative regime' to manage the complex 
interdependence that prevails in the international economy system, or as 'a symbolic joining 
of two Triad powers [Asia and Europe] into a pack of deeper mutual understanding' (1997: 
515). Yeo has analysed the ASEM process through three images: 'summit diplomacy' 
(realist), 'regional-integrator' (social constructivist), and 'mega-regime' or 'an institution for 
regime creation' (liberal institutionalist) (2003: 183). While recognising the different 
approaches to understanding ASEM, this chapter focuses particularly on examining the 
ASEM economic and commercial framework as one of the EU's most important commercial 
initiatives towards Asia, and explores the place of business engagement within it. The Asia 
Europe Business Forum (AEBF) can be seen as the focus of the EU's formal business 
engagement at this transregionallevel. In doing so, it deploys the framework developed 
within the thesis so far. 
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It is argued that the ASEM can be seen as a significant instrument of the EU's 
commercial engagement in Asia at transregionallevel (alongside interregional EU-ASEAN 
relations - see Chapter 5). This initiative not only covers ASEAN countries but also includes 
the wider context of the Asia-Pacific region; within this framework the EU seems to give 
particular emphasis to the AS EM economic pillar, though in fact the ASEM represents a 
multi-dimensional process of economic, political, and cultural dialogue. In other words, the 
EU focuses on using the ASEM economic and commercial framework as a new mechanism at 
transregionallevel to engage with Asian markets as well as to enhance trade and investment 
relations between the EU and Asia. 
To analyse the ASEM economic process, one can no longer conceive of ASEM solely 
as government-to-government relations. Business involvement in the ASEM economic 
process has been evident from the outset. The AEBF was established in October 1996 (only 6 
months after the first ASEM Summit in March 1996) as an integrated business body under the 
ASEM economic pillar. In addition, the AEBF was designed to link closely with other ASEM 
economic meetings and specific initiatives such as the Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TF AP) 
and Investment Promotion Action Plan (IP AP), by providing them with a useful policy-input 
from business. The creation of AEBF and its close linkages with other ASEM economic 
bodies can be seen not only as an ambitious attempt to engage business as a means to enhance 
trade and investment relations between the EU and Asia, but also as evidence of the EU's 
drive for business engagement as part ofEU's general commercial strategy through the 
ASEM in response to the structural changes in the global political economy mentioned earlier 
(Chapters I and 2) 
The central aim of this chapter is, therefore, to investigate the place of business 
engagement within the EU's broad commercial strategies at the transregionallevel. The 
chapter begins by examining general trends in the EU's commercial relations with the 
ASEMIO (trade and investment) and identifying the strong economic and commercial driving 
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forces behind the creation of ASEM, arguing that the ASEM economic process can be seen as 
one of the EU's most significant commercial instruments with which to engage Asia. Then, 
the chapter turns to specifically investigate the AEBF as the focus of the EU's business 
engagement strategy. Particular attention will be paid to evaluating the extent to which the 
AEBF has achieved its initial aim of playing a 'policy-input' role in shaping and supporting 
the ASEM economic framework through its institutionalised connection with other AS EM 
bodies and Action Plans. Crucially, the chapter distinguishes between the importance of the 
AEBF as a shaper of outcomes and as a process of networking and linkages, by arguing that 
while the shaping of tangible outcomes by the AEBF seems to be marginal, the value of 
AEBF as a useful process of dialogue and networking is potentially crucial. Thus, the chapter 
evaluates the effectiveness of the AEBF as a means of dialogue and networking between 
European and Asian public and private sectors, and particularly govenunents and business (or 
states and firms), and concludes by analysing the implication of the situation for the EU's 
commercial and business engagement instruments, strategies, stakeholders, and roles played 
by the EU at this transregional level. 
4.2 THE EU'S COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH THE ASEM10 
Trade and investment have been central issues in EU-Asian relations and in the development 
of the ASEM process. This section explores the EU's trade and investment with 10 Asian 
ASEM members, or the ASEMI0 - Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam, China, Japan, South Korea - up to 2004, thus including only 7 ASEAN 
members (not Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar). 
4.2.1 The EU's Commercial Relations with the ASEM10: Trade 
Since the 1980s the ASEMlO has increasingly become an important trading partner of the 
EU. From 1980 to 2003, EU imports from the ASEMl 0 grew by 10.04% on average per year, 
and EU exports by 10.23%. The Figure 4.1 shows the dramatic increase in the amount of 
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trade between the EU and the ASEMIO uniting data from 1980, 1990 and 2003. In 1980, the 
EU imports from Asia only accounted to 27 billion Euros and EU export to Asia 14 billion 
Euros, increasing to 89 and 54 billion Euros in 1990 and reaching 245 and 134 billion Euros 
in 2003 (European Commission, 2004c). See Figure 4.1 
Figure 4.1: EU Trade with AS EM 10 (1980, 1990,2003) 
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Source: European Commission (2004c) 
According to the European Commission (2005d), in 2004 EU imports from the 
ASEMIO amounted to 298.114 billion Euros and EU exports to the ASEMIO 151.395 billion 
Euros, representing an increase of 11.3% and 10.1 % from EU imports and exports in 2003. 
Asia accounted for 22.6 % of total EU trade (29.00 % of total EU imports and 15.73 % of 
total EU exports), making Asia one of the largest trading partners of the EU in the world, 
alongside the US (19.7%) in 2004. See Tables 4.1, Figure 4.2, and Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.1: EU Trade with ASEM 10 (2000-2004) 
Yearly Share Yearly Share Imports 
of total of total Year Imports % EU Exports % EU Balance + 
change imports change exports Exports 
2000 267 185 26.84 129419 15.11 -137766 396604 
2001 255 192 -4.5 25.95 135446 4.7 15.17 -119746 390638 
2002 253699 -0.6 26.93 136 160 0.5 15.12 -117539 389859 
2003 267880 5.6 28.48 137546 1.0 15.65 -130334 405427 
2004 298 114 11.3 29.00 151 395 10.1 15.73 -146720 449509 
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Figure 4.2: EU Trade with AS EM 10 (2000-2004) 
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Table 4.2: Share of EU Trade by Major Trading Partners (2004) 
World 1,993,035 100.0 
USA 391,810 19.7 
2 China 175,043 8.8 
3 Switzerland 136,495 6.8 
4 Russia 126,188 6.3 
5 Japan 116,955 5.9 
6 Norway 86,791 4.4 
7 Turkey 68,975 3.5 
8 Korea 48,066 2.4 
9 Canada 38,200 1.9 
10 Taiwan 36,472 1.8 
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11 Brazil 35,255 1.8 
12 India 33,267 1.7 
13 Singapore 33,100 1.7 
14 Romania 32,085 1.6 
15 South Africa 31,853 1.6 
16 Hong Kong 29,086 1.5 
17 Saudi Arabia 28,681 1.4 
18 Australia 28,557 1.4 
19 Algeria 24,700 1.2 
20 Malaysia 24,514 1.2 
ASIAN ASEM 450,465 22.6 COUNTRIES 
World 1,993,035 100.0 
NAFTA 451,476 22.7 
Latin America 104,404 5.2 
EU Candidates 125,489 6.3 
EFTA 228,921 11.5 
Medit.Countries 97,922 4.9 
ASEAN 111,846 5.6 
Source: European Commission (2005d: 3) 
From Table 4.2, it is evident that among ASEM countries, China, with its increasing 
importance in the world economy, has the biggest share ofEU trade accounting for 8.8%, 
followed by Japan 5.9 %, ASEAN as a group 5.6% and South Korea 2.4%. Moreover, EU 
trade with ASEM is concentrated on the following products: office/telecom equipment, 
power/non-electrical machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, textiles and clothing, 
agricultural products, energy, non-agricultural raw materials, and iron and steel (see Figure 
4.3). 
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Figure 4.3: EV Trade with AS EM by Product (2004) 
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4.2.2 The EV's Commercial Relations with the ASEMI0: Investment 
During the 1990s period, not only did the EU develop its formidable role as a powerful 
trading state but also as a significant investor in the world economy. According to the 
European Commission (200 I d), over the 1996-1999 period, the EU was one of the largest 
investors in the world, accounting for 44 % of world FDI outflows on average, followed by 
the US (27%) and Japan (5%), and in 1999 it accounted for more than 50 % of world FDI 
outflows, shown in Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4: FDI Outflow from the EV, Japan and the VS (1996-1999) 
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In the 1990s, Asia also experienced an economic boom attracting investors from all 
over the world (notwithstanding the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998). While the EU was 
the largest FDI source and Asia was the largest FDI destination, according to the European 
Commission (2001c: 35-36), during the 1995-1999 period the average FDI flows from the EU 
to the ASEMIO amounted to only 11.488 billion Euros, representing only 7.8 % ofEU total 
outward FDI, of which North East Asia (China, South Korea, and Japan) accounted for 7.525 
billion Euros or 5.1 %, and ASEAN only 0.511 billion Euros or 0.3% ofEU total FDL This 
EU FDI outflow to the ASEM, particularly ASEAN, was thus a rather limited proportion of 
the total EU FDI to the world (total 147.682 billion Euros average during 1995-1999), 
significantly lower than EU FDI in NAFTA 59.7%, Central and South America 13.8% and 
Europe outside the EU 13.6%. See Figure 4.5. 
Figure 4.5: EU FDI Outflow (average 1995-1999) 
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The 1997 Asian financial crisis further caused a drastic decrease in European 
investment rates in Asia: going from 21.1 % of EU global FD I in 1996 and reaching the lowest 
figure in 1998, down to 1.6%. The European Commission recognised this decreasing trend by 
noting in its updated Asian strategy - the EU's concern for Asia in the wake of the crisis -
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that 'the bulk ofEU outward FDI continues to go to North America, and EU FDI flows to 
South East Asia, in particular, have not yet recovered from the East Asian Crisis' (200Ic: 12-
13). Figure 4.6 also shows the decreasing trend of the EU FDI towards the ASEMIO until 
2002. 
Figure 4.6: EU FDI towards the ASEMlO (2000-2002) 
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The trade and investment statistics mentioned above have shown that during the 
1990s , Asia (particularly the ASEM 10) became one of the most important trading partners 
for the EU, and one of the most attractive destinations for FDI. However, the EU FDI trend 
towards Asia (the ASEMIO) shows a different picture from the one in trade, reflecting 
unevenness in EU-Asian commercial relations between trade and investment (See also 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4). 
4.3 ASEM: THE EU'S TRANSREGIONAL COMMERCIAL ENGAGEMENT IN 
ASIA 
Since its first meeting in Bangkok in March 1996, the ASEM has been seen as a significant 
focus of the EU's commercial engagement in Asia at the transregionallevel. As already 
argued in Chapter 3, ASEM was created as part of what Riiland called 'transregionalism': a 
process that emerged in the 1 990s, and which has a close link with economic forces of 
globalisation (200Ia: 5). When ASEM was first created (until ASEM5 in 2004), Asia was 
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represented by three North East Asian countries (China, Japan, and South Korea) and seven 
South East Asian! ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the 
Philippines, Brunei and Vietnam) and Europe by the fifteen EU Member States and the 
European Commission. At the ASEM5 Summit in Hanoi in October 2004, ASEM 
membership was extended to the new members of the EU62, and three new members on the 
Asian side: Cambodia, Laos and Myamnar. 
The creation of ASEM in 1996 strongly reflects on the one hand the changing nature 
of Europe-Asia relationships in the 1990s, when the rise of Asia and the shift towards a 
balance of power in the global political economy among the Triad (the EU, the US and East 
Asia) (since the 1970s onwards) as well as the shift towards increasing participation of non-
state actors, including firms, in EU-Asian relations can be observed. On the other hand, it 
also reflects the changing global context, particularly the structural changes in the global 
political economy emphasised by Strange (1992, 1994a) and Stopford and Strange (1991), 
where the interests of states and firms are mutually engaged. As a result, the ASEM was 
created, and the economic dimension seems to be the most dominant and highly-developed 
among the three ASEM pillars - economic, political, and cultural. Importantly, it is argued 
here that the ASEM process, which explicitly incorporates business into its economic and 
commercial framework through the creation of AEBF, indicates the EU's response to these 
changes; this then leads to an emergence of business engagement within the EU's commercial 
strategy in ASEM. To analyse the ASEM economic process, let us begin with examining the 
driving forces behind the creation of ASEM. 
62 cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
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4.3.1 Economic and Commercial Driving Forces 
Opportunities offered by the growing Asian markets attracted the EU's attention towards 
Asia. It can be observed that economic and commercial issues seemed to be major driving 
forces behind the creation of ASEM in 1996. Robles (2001: 4) explicitly emphasises: 'the EU 
receptiveness to the proposal to hold ASEM is proof of a redefinition of European interest, 
based on an awareness that the ED's structural position in interregional trade had deteriorated 
precisely at the time when the East Asian economies were growing rapidly' (2001: 4). It is 
possible to identify four such driving forces as follows: an initial business driving force, the 
EU's interests in Asian markets, Asian concerns about EU markets, and the need to balance 
in the Triad world. 
Business as the Initial Driving Force 
Rather than the EU, the Member States' governments or Asian governments, the business 
community was the main initial driving force towards the creation of the first ASEM meeting. 
Hanggi, while identifying EU-Asia relations as the 'weak side' or 'missing link' within the 
New Triad (the EU, the US and East Asia), notes (about this initial business driving force) 
that: the transnational business community took the first step in calling attention to 'the 
weakness of the Asia-Europe side of the new triangle' and it was the first Europe/East Asia 
Business [Economic 1 Summit organised by the World Economic Forum (WEF)63 in Hong 
Kong in 1992 that concluded that 'a more intensive dialogue between the business 
communities from the two regions was necessary to reduce misunderstandings and to 
reconcile the differences' (1999: 61). However, it was some years before this message from 
the business side made a specific impact on the political side. 
63 The WEF is a Swiss organisation based in Geneva with over 1,000 global companies as members. The WEF 
held its first EuropelEast Asia Economic Summit in 1992 in Hong Kong. Since then, this summit has been held 
annually alternating between Hong Kong and Singapore. The summit is usually attended by hundreds of 
corporate and political leaders, international economists, other leading academics and policy-makers (Yeo, 2002: 
11, footnote 2). 
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At the WEF's third Europe/East Asia Economic Summit in Singapore in October 
1994, this message from business was finally taken up by Singaporean Prime Minister, Goh 
Chok Tong. As Yeo observes, this summit identified 'the strengthening ofthe Europe-East 
Asia relationship as an urgent priority' [thus 1 'the last recommendation specifically called for 
a Europe-East Asia Summit of government leaders' (2002: 11). Yeo went on to note that this 
recommendation was taken up by Singapore's Prime Minister, who visited France not long 
after the WEF's Europe/East Asia Economic Summit. Goh Chok Tong discussed the idea of a 
possible summit with the then French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur. Supportive of this 
initiative, France worked to secure the in-principle support of the other EU Member States. 
Under the French Presidency of the EU, the EU General Affairs Council met on 6 March 
1995 and endorsed the idea (Yeo, 2002: 11). Therefore, the initial impetus from business 
followed by the strong support from Singapore and France, finally led to the initiation of the 
first ASEM Summit where Europe-Asia leaders and heads of state met in Bangkok in 1996. 
The EU's Interests in Asian Markets 
Although it seemed that the Asian partners were a more active force in initiating the ASEM at 
intergovernmental level, Dent, however, noted that: the Singaporeans and other East Asians 
were 'knocking on an open door as far as the EU was concerned' (2003: 229). Several ASEM 
observers have commented that pure economic rationales were behind the ASEM project, in 
particular from the European side. For example, Yeo observes that: on the EU side, the need 
to look beyond Europe for fast-growing markets for its products and services was an 
important consideration. There were strong indications that Europe had lost important ground 
in Asian markets during the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, when many East 
Asian countries were opening up their markets and their economies were growing at rapid 
rates (2002: 21). This might be because, as Riiland notes, in anticipation of the Single Market, 
'European firms had been fully occupied with the need to improve their competitiveness 
within Europe'; and 'not much capital was available for investments in Asia at the time when 
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liberalisation in many East Asian and South East Asian countries was gaining momentum' 
(1996: 27). Compared to the US (especially, through its new engagement via the creation of 
APEC in the early 1990s), Europeans began to fear that they might be disadvantaged in the 
lucrative Asia-Pacific markets. 
Therefore, from the EU perspective, exploitation of Asian markets and promotion of 
EU economic interests in Asia were the EU's crucial motives in accepting the Singaporean 
Prime Minister's initiative to establish the ASEM. The EU's economic interests in Asian 
markets were made clear when the European Council in Madrid (15-16 December 1995) 
stated before the first ASEM Summit that: 
'[ASEM] participating countries represent two ofthe most dynamic regions in the 
world. The current trade and investment flows between these regions do not, however, reflect 
their true economic potential. .. ASEM offers an exceptional opportunity for participating 
leaders to assess this potential and to take steps to exploit it more effectively' (Council, 1995, 
section 3). 
According to Dent, 'the EU's New Asia Strategy had laid the groundwork for a mostly 
positive response from the EU' (2003: 229). Such a positive response to the creation of 
ASEM was also reinforced by the fact that ASEM was unquestionably complementary to the 
EU's early 1990s 'Look East' policy (Richards and Kirkpatrick, 1999: 689-690) and 
particularly the New Asia Strategy adopted by the Commission in 1994, in which the 
Commission stated its aim 'to strengthen the EU's economic presence in Asia in order to 
maintain the Union's leading role in the world economy' (1994: 3). For the EU, the ASEM 
was thus seen not only as a useful, new commercial instrument to translate this new strategy 
into action but also as a means to access growing Asian markets. In consequence, the ASEM 
economic framework was explicitly designed to strengthen trade and investment between two 
regions, reflecting the New Asia Strategy's major objective of accessing Asian markets and 
the EU's response to Asia's economic boom. 
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Asian Concerns 
The Asian perspective reveals that awareness from the Asian side of the need for a meeting 
forum such as ASEM was growing at the time when the European single market was being 
established, and reflected a fear that Europe was in the process of erecting a Fortress. Thus, 
not only was the EU interested in accessing Asian markets, as mentioned earlier, but also the 
issue of accessing European markets was a major concern for all Asian countries. Yeo noted 
these Asian fears of a 'Fortress Europe', for example, reflecting 'concerns about a Europe 
consumed with its own internal affairs and pre-occupied with its enlargement, uncertainties 
about the impact of a single European currency and the lingering fear of being shut out of the 
Single European Market. .. ' (2002: 24). Moreover, 'Asia also needed Europe to keep up the 
pace of human resource development and the technological expertise to transform its 
industries from labour-intensive to capital-intensive ones' (2002: 24). In the meantime a 
strong protectionist streak had emerged in the US as Washington increasingly adopted 
pugilistic and unilateralist trade attitudes and policies towards Asia. Thus, it is argued that 
while both Europe and the US seemed to adopt more protectionist roles in the eyes of Asia, 
generally ASEM could play a role in balancing both economic powers in Asia as well as 
constitute a 'risk-averse strategy' by 'diversifying [Asian] economic relations beyond the 
Asia-Pacific region' (Dent, 1999: 31). 
In particular for ASEAN members (in the ASEM), when the EU-ASEAN interregional 
relationship initiated in the 1970s had not received much recent attention from the EU and it 
had often been hampered by the political problems in South East Asia (See Chapter 5, Section 
5.2.4), ASEM might thus offer a new approach for both the EU and ASEAN to enhance their 
economic and commercial relations. Therefore, some ASEAN countries such as Thailand and 
Singapore were strong advocates of the ASEM, hoping that through ASEM, ASEAN could 
promote itself to the EU as a gateway to the wider Asian region (though, it should be noted 
that there can be observed different views among ASEAN countries). 
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Balancing the Triad World 
Lastly and importantly, it is crucial to mention broad systemic trends in the global political 
economy, including the structural changes and the shift toward multipolarity or balance of 
power among the Triad mentioned earlier, which catalysed the creation of the ASEM. For 
both the EU and Asia, ASEM was seen as an instrument to manage the Europe-Asia 'weaker 
secondary relationship' during the 1970s-1980s (Ferguson, 1997: 396) and 'a strategic 
counter-balance to APEC' (Dent, 1999: 31) in the Triad world, when both the strong 
economic relations between the US and the EU and the increasing US power in Asia through 
the creation of APEC had exposed EU-Asian relations as what Hanggi called the 'missing 
link' or 'weak side' (1999: 67) in the triangular relationship. Goh Chok Tong, the Prime 
Minister of Singapore realised this uneven relationship and then broached the idea of 'an 
Asia-Europe dialogue' which 'would therefore enable global structures and relations ofthe 
21st century to be more stable and integrated' (Tong, 1994/95: 1106 quoted in Robles 2001: 
3-4). This thus led to his initiation of ASEM as a balancing mechanism in the Triad. 
In this respect, Dent emphasised that 'the EU's main motivations for promoting 
ASEM lay in its anxieties over the prospect of potential geo-economic marginalisation in a 
transpacific dominated world economy' (2003: 227), anxieties particularly focused by the 
creation of APEC in November 1993 as means to promote closer cooperation between the US 
and Asia. This US-Asia economic cooperation implied the exclusion of the EU from the fast-
growing and potentially lucrative markets of Asia. Thus, for the EU, the Singaporean 
initiation of ASEM offered a good opportunity to counter both its exclusion from APEC and 
increasing US economic power in Asia. As for the Asian side, ASEM also offered a way to 
diversify their economic dependence on the US. In this context of Triad relations, 'ASEM has 
been justified by the need to bridge the 'missing link' in such triangular relationship' (Hanggi, 
1999: 56). However, scholars view ASEM as the poor third relation within the Triad: Dent, 
for example, saw it as demonstrating 'a Eurasian Cinderella complex' (2001) and generally 
127 
concluded that 'Eurasian links are still relatively under-developed in comparison to their 
transpacific and transatlantic counterparts' (Dent, 2003: 223). 
4.3.2 AS EM Economic and Commercial Diplomacy: More Than an Elite Project 
ASEM was in fact intended to be a multi-dimensional process, which, as the Commission 
emphasised, 'should be based on the promotion of political dialogue, the deepening of 
economic relations and the reinforcement of cooperation, and should contribute to the global 
development of societies in both Asia and Europe' (1996a: 1). The AS EM structure therefore 
comprises three main pillars - economic, political and cultural. 
However, it is obvious that the economic pillar seems to be the most dominant and 
highly-developed one. The comprehensive structure of the ASEM economic pillar illustrated 
by Diagram 5.1 clearly indicates the EU's ambitious aims to build 'ASEM economic and 
commercial diplomacy', which comprises a set of consultative relationships and a network of 
meetings (at both senior official and political levels), action plans, and activities to promote 
trade and investment between the two regions (See the example of ASEM activities under 
political, economic and cultural pillars between 2002-2004 in Annex 4.1). Therefore, it can be 
argued that beyond its role as an elite summit, the ASEM process can also be seen as 
reflecting the EU's most significant commitment to engage Asia at transregionallevel. It is 
thus appropriate to analyse ASEM economic and commercial diplomacy in more detail. 
The ASEM Summits between the Asian and European heads of state have been held 
every two years64 as follows: ASEMl in Bangkok in March 1996, ASEM2 in London in April 
1998, ASEM3 in Seoul in October 2000, ASEM4 in Copenhagen in September 2002, ASEM5 
in Hanoi in October.2004, and (forthcoming) ASEM6 in Finland in September 2006. Besides 
the Summit, there are other consultative meetings that support the Summit. ASEMl decided 
that Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Economics and Finance should meet to carry forward the 
dialogue within their respective fields, and these core Ministerial meetings were held in the 
64 The ASEM Summits have been held alternately in European and Asia. 
128 
years between Summits (in 1997 and 1999) (Chairman's Statement, ASEM1). At ASEM3 in 
Seoul there was agreement that Ministerial meetings would be held normally once a year 
(Chairman' Statement, ASEM3). 
While the Foreign Ministers meetings and Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) belong to 
the political pillar and the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) to the cultural pillar, under the 
economic pillar two types of Ministerial meetings exist- the Economic Ministers' Meeting 
(EMM) and the Finance Ministers' Meeting (FinMM). 
Under the financial umbrella, the FinMM is supported by regular meetings of Finance 
Deputies and a 'core group'. O'Brien observed that this dialogue between Financial Ministers 
has tended to focus on discussions of a macro-economic nature, where they review the global 
economic situation and developments in both regions (2001: 24-25). The economic umbrella 
is built on the EMM and Senior Officials Meeting on Trade and Investment (SOMTI), and on 
the AEBF. ASEM economic cooperation is carried out under the auspices of SOMTI, which 
coordinates all economic activities and projects pursued within the framework of AS EM, 
including the two Action Plans on trade and investment, TFAP and lPAP. While EMM 
represents the ministerial level meeting65, SOMTI represents the meeting of senior 
government officials on trade and investment issues. Closely linked with EMM and SOMTI is 
the AEBF - a business body integrated into the ASEM economic process. 
The initiation of AEBF, TFAP and lPAP is a result of ASEM1 Summit's intention 'to 
promote greater trade and investment between Asia and Europe, to increase European 
investments in Asia from their present low levels, as well as to encourage Asian investments 
in Europe' (Chairman'S Statement, ASEM1, Paragraph 12). The first AEBF met in October 
1996 only 6 months after the first ASEM Summit, and TF AP and IP AP were drawn up and 
officially endorsed and adopted in April 1998 at the second ASEM Summit. 
"It is worth noticing that EMM regularly met among ASEM economic ministers (see a list in Bibliography, 
page 314), however the recent EMM6 in Rotterdam, 16-17 September 2005 was temporarily changed its name to 
'High level Meeting in the Framework of ASEM' as no Economic Minister participated (due to a particular 
political reason), only senior officials from both sides. 
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Diagram 4.1: The AS EM Structure (2000) 
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It is noticeable that the activities of EM M, SOMTI, TFAP, and IPAP and AEBF are 
designed to be interconnected, with particular emphasis on the role ofthe AEBF as a source 
of policy inputs from business sectors to policy-makers. Importantly, the integration of the 
AEBF into the ASEM economic pillar clearly followed the aim explicitly stated in ASEMl to 
'foster greater cooperation between the business and private sectors of the two regions' 
(Chairman'S Statement, ASEMl Paragraph 9), thus leading to the creation ofa formal EU 
business engagement strategy as part of the ASEM process66• 
This comprehensive framework of dialogue and networking under the ASEM 
economic framework indicates the initial enthusiasm of the EU to build ASEM economic and 
commercial diplomacy and to use ASEM as a new commercial instrument to engage Asia at 
transregional level. In its early stages, ASEM was often positively viewed as evidence of 'the 
great potential for "economic synergy" between Europe and Asia' (Ferguson, 1997: 403). 
These optimistic views among both scholars and policy-makers observed during the early 
years of ASEM Summits and meetings led to an expectation that ASEM economic diplomacy 
could potentially help produce tangible outcomes in promoting EU-Asian relations in general, 
and in promoting trade and investment between the two regions in particular. However, this 
enthusiasm and optimism was to be dampened in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
Importantly, the post-financial crisis period reflected a decline in enthusiasm and 
optimism from scholars and policy-makers towards the ASEM process. Considering ASEM 
simply from the dozens of initiatives, meetings, action plans, and activities it generated, after 
some years of its operation the ASEM processes have increasingly been questioned in terms 
of their ability to produce concrete outcomes and achievements. For example, Yeo raised 
some questions: 'ASEM3 more talk or more forward?' (2000: 1) and 'what are the real impact 
or value of all these [ASEM] progranunes, projects and the process itself?' (2002b: 5). 
66 Section 4.4 of the chapter will discuss the AEBF in more detail. 
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4.3.3 Process, Outcomes and Achievements of ASEM 
As indicated above, ASEM has not been without its critics. As Kollner (2002: 4) noted, some 
critics have targeted the general orientation ofthe process - its elitism and lack of a public 
profile, whilst others have aired their discontent about the substance of the process - or the 
alleged lack of it. ASEM is often criticised as a mere 'talking shop' in which controversial 
topics are smoothed over or simply left off the agenda and of which the outcomes have rarely 
been implemented. While recognising the ASEM criticism, an interview with a Commission 
official suggests that for the European Commission the ASEM is seen as 'a process of 
dialogue and networking between Europe and Asia so as to promote greater understanding 
between the two regions' and as 'a long-term partnership, in which progress can only be of a 
gradual nature' (Interview, European Commission, DG External Relations, Brussels, 27 
January 2004). This indicates the Commission's emphasis on ASEM as a process, rather a 
forum to produce immediate and tangible outcomes. 
To emphasise the value of ASEM as a process, in 2001 the European Commission 
(200Je) produced a 'Vademecum on Modalities for Future ASEM Dialogue: Taking the 
Process Forward', which stressed the need to restore the effectiveness of ASEM as a process 
of informal dialogue. In this strategy paper, the Commission set out a number of points to 
improve the ASEM, for example: need for managing the process (coordinators and senior 
officials should play the pivotal role together for managing the process and taking it forward 
and a virtual secretariat could facilitate communication); initiatives not an end in themselves 
(initiatives should be linked back to and support the dialogue, and initiatives should be 
presented in clusters and should, to the extent possible, be supportive of other initiatives 
within the cluster); and interactive and informal meetings (the chair should be active and 
strive for interactivity, longer informal intervals and informal retreat sessions). Moreover, 
Percy Westerlund, Director-General of DG External Relations in the European Commission, 
added 'the danger of having all sorts of follow-up activities simply for the sake of "showing 
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progress" but without any specific orientation or direction [so that ASEM] is not only a waste 
of resources but might also result in "forum-fatigue" and in the long-run, general disinterest' 
(l999: 19, quoted by Yeo, 2002: 107). Such a Commission emphasis and focus on ASEM 
resulted in a turning point in ASEM4 Summit, which marked the Commission's realisation 
and acceptance that 'ASEM is about forging and long-term partnership' ... 'hence progress can 
only be of a gradual and incremental nature' (Yeo, 2003: 161). 
On the matter of what ASEM has actually achieved thus far, it is quite difficult to 
measure. Some scholars have paid attention to the ASEM on its strategic importance in 
producing policy-outcomes at transregiona1level. Yeo, for example, has noted that apart from 
being a dialogue process in creating better understanding, 'it is hoped that the ASEM will 
result in more trade and investment between the two regions, facilitating greater cooperation 
on WIO matters and other global issues; and engaging the US to keep it committed to 
multilateral ism and maintaining a multipolar world' (2002b: 5). Against this backdrop, she 
assessed ASEM as a summit; then went on to assess the results ofIFAP and IPAP, the 
AEBF, and progress of the political dialogue within the ASEM process (2002b: 6-9). 
Other scholars put more emphasis on the ASEM as a process rather than as a set of 
results. Dent argued that the ASEM can be examined in two ways: on one hand, 'the more 
tangible technical progress made by programmes such as IF AP and IP AP on for instance 
smoothing the way for greater interregional trade and investment between the EU and East 
Asia'; on the other hand, in relational terms, 'its contribution to developing micro-networking 
and macro-networking links between the two regions' (2003: 23). According to Dent, micro-
networking broadly relates to socialisation processes, and can be understood by how ASEM is 
building trust relationships between different sets of communities from East Asia and Europe, 
i.e., the policy-making community, the business community, and the civil society community. 
In contrast, macro-networking concerns bringing countries and cultures from both regions 
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closer together as a whole, and forms a basis for evaluating the broader strength of EU-East 
Asia interregionalism and transregionalism (2003: 230-231). 
Against this background, the chapter argues that rather than evaluating ASEM only in 
terms of its ability to produce tangible outcomes, it is also crucial to recognise the long-term 
value of ASEM as a process; this means distinguishing the importance of AS EM as an 
outcome and a process, taking into account both Yeo's result-oriented evaluation and Dent's 
concepts of micro-networking and macro-networking. 
However, it is crucial to accept that such a process of dialogue and networking 
arguably cannot be sustained without producing any outcome or progress. While the political 
dialogues among ministers and policy-makers, i.e., EMM and SOMTI, are easier to maintain 
as they can represent a low-cost dialogue to promote co-operation and understanding at the 
policy-making level, the dialogue with the business community, i.e., AEBF, seems to have 
been more difficult to manage. Business leaders expect to see more 'concrete' outcomes 
produced by the AEBF, when they 'pay' to attend the meetings. Next the chapter turns 
specifically to examine the AEBF as a key part of the EU's business engagement strategy in 
Asia and to assess the AEBF (as well as TFAP and IPAP), in terms of both the shaping of 
outcomes and the generation of processes of networking and linkage. 
4.4 AEBF: THE EU'S BUSINESS ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 
While the previous section explored the ASEM, particularly the ASEM economic and 
commercial process by arguing that the ASEM is seen by the EU as a significant channel for 
EU commercial engagement in Asia, this section focuses specifically on examining the AEBF 
as a mechanism for EU business engagement strategy at transregionallevel. 
From the first ASEM Summit in 1996, the importance of business and the private 
sector was substantially emphasised, when the EU and Asian leaders agreed 'to encourage the 
business and private sectors, including SMEs of the two regions, to strengthen their 
cooperation with one another and contribute towards increasing trade and investment between 
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Asia and Europe by agreeing to establish in due course an Asia Europe Business Forum' 
(Chainnan's Statement, ASEMI, Paragraph 14). Following this initiation, the first AEBF was 
held in Paris. Since then, the AEBF has continued to meet once a year. Table 4.3 shows the 
AEBF meetings from 1996-2006 
Table 4.3: The AEBF Meetings 1996-2006 
AEBF9 
AEBFJO 
(forthcoming) 
Vietnam 
Helsinki 
7-8 October 2004 
2006 
Source: DG External Relations Website 
Parallel with ASEM 
Summit (8-9 October 
Might be parallel 
ASEM 6 Surnmit (14-15 
The initiation of AEBF under the auspices ofthe ASEM economic framework 
represents the EU's fonnal attempt to engage business more closely with its commercial 
diplomacy by building a forum for dialogue and networking between both public and private 
sectors, particularly governments and finns, and thus reflects the EU's business engagement 
strategy towards Asia at the transregionallevel. However, as noted in Chapter 2, the AEBF is 
only one of many examples ofEU-business alliances initiated by the EU during the mid-
1990s, for example, the TABD in 1995, the EU-Japan Business Dialogue Roundtable in 1995, 
and the MEBF later in 1998, through which business is given a significant role in steering 
economic relations between the EU and different countries or groups of countries. 
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Importantly, when reflecting on Hiinggi's concept of 'missing link' or 'weak side' 
(1999) or Dent's concept of 'Cinderella complex' (2001) in the Triad mentioned earlier, this 
chapter argues that the establishment of AEBF can also be seen as being particularly 
motivated by the creation of the Business Advisory Council (ABAC) under the APEC in 1993 
to support the Asia-pacific regions and the T ABD in 1995 to support transatlantic relations. 
Thus, at all levels it is not surprising that the EU attempted to bridge this 'missing link' in the 
Triad business world by creating the AEBF. Let us begin by examining the AEBF's structure, 
its aims and its linkages with other ASEM economic bodies. 
4.4.1 The AEBF Structure 
The AEBF structure, which comprises Chairman, Working Groups, Steering Committee, and 
Contact Points, can be explained as follows: 
Chairman 
Since the first AEBF in Paris in 1996 the AEBF has met once a year, and is chaired by 
different ASEM members on an ad hoc basis67• According to the AEBF Guidelines adopted 
by AEBF8, the host country shall appoint the forum chairman, who will preside over the 
plenary session of the forum and be responsible for drawing-up the chairman's statement. As 
the representative of AEBF, the chairman shall report agreements reached by AEBF to the 
ASEM summit and ministerial meetings and represent AEBF in ASEM-related meetings, 
such as SOMTI and lEG, or designate a representative to do so (Guidelines for AEBF, 2003). 
The Chairman, cooperating with business associations or government organisations, is 
responsible as an organiser ofthe AEBF meeting for that year. For instance, AEBF7 in 
Copenhagen in 2002 was organised by the Confederation of Danish Industries and chaired by 
Mr. Ib Christensen, AEBF8 in Korea in 2003 by the Federation of Korean Industries and Mr. 
Jin Roy Ryu; AEBF9 in Hanoi by the Vietnam Trade Promotion Agency and Mr. Ngo Van 
.7 It usually follows the host country of the ASEM Summit. 
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Thoan. It is important to note that the AEBF Chairman and host organisation play the most 
crucial role in directing the AEBF process and managing the AEBF role in relations with 
other ASEM economic bodies; thus how active the AEBF is also depends on the personality 
and ability of the Chairman as well as the host country organisation. 
Working Groups 
Apart from the Chairman, the AEBF comprises a number of Working Groups (including 
Chair and Co-Chair of Working Groups). At AEBF meetings, business leaders are grouped 
into specific Working Groups, each focusing on a particular sector or industry. The groups are 
then expected to give their feedback and recommendations to the ASEM governments on how 
economic and business ties between the two regions can be strengthened. These papers 
produced by the AEBF through its Working Groups are called 'AEBF Recommendations'. 
In AEBFl in 1996 there were initially only five Working Groups: infrastructure, 
consumer goods, capital goods, financial services, and SMEs (Chairman'S Statement, AEBF1, 
Paragraph 4); but the Working Groups' sectors have changed over time. In 2002, AEBF7 in 
Copenhagen added two more working groups: environment and food. Although the SMEs 
Working Group had disappeared, it was confirmed that 'the topic ofSMEs was discussed at 
each working group' (Chairman's Statement, AEBF7). At the AEBF8 in 2003 in Seoul, the 
main Working Groups were: trade, investment, infrastructure, financial services, food, life 
sciences & healthcare industry, environment, and IT & communications. Investment and 
infrastructure were two separate Working Groups at AEBF7, but they were combined into a 
single Working Group in AEBF8 (See list of AEBF8 Working Groups in Annex 4.2, page 
335). AEBF9 comprises seven Working Groups on trade, investment and infrastructure, 
financial services, information and communication technology, food, tourism, and SMEs. 
Taking into account such variety and changes in the AEBF Working Groups in different 
AEBF meetings, an official from the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented that 
'these could obviously be motivated by the different focuses and interests of the AEBF host 
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countries in order that they can favour their national business interests' (Interview, Belgian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 19 January 2004). 
Steering Committee 
The AEBF Steering Committee, initiated since AEBF 1, comprises the chair in office, the two 
most recent chairs of the AEBF and a representative of the host country of the next forum and 
aims 'to manage and coordinate forum follow-up actions' (Chairman's Statement, AEBFl). 
However, in practice, rather than performing their role of following up AEBF actions and 
maintaining the continuity of AEBF work, the role of the Steering Committee has changed to 
become more like a decision making body of AEBF. As noted by the Confederation of Danish 
Industries, the organiser of AEBF7, 'the Committee decides on the composition of themes to 
be discussed in the Working Groups and appointing the Chairman and Co-chairman of the 
Working Groups, as well as on any other AEBF business, that has to be decided' 
(Questionnaire Feedback, the Confederation of Danish Industries, 5 December 2003). 
Contact Points 
A series of AEBF Contact Points, as had been recommended by Singapore and France at 
SOMTI4, were endorsed during the AEBF2 'in order to facilitate speedy exchange of 
information on AEBF matters' (Chairman's Statement, ASEM2). It is noted that 'member 
countries shall designate a private economic organisation as a Contact Point ... to encourage 
private sector participation in the ASEM and AEBF processes' (Guidelines for AEBF, 2003). 
The Contact Points nominated by ASEM Members normally are the representatives of 
national business organisations, for example, the Federations/Confederations of Industry, 
Trade Associations or other private organisations. 
The AEBF Contact Points are expected (at least by the EU) to play a key role in 
coordinating and supporting AEBF government-business 'networking' by creating an 
informal linkage between the EU and Asian public and private sectors, thus helping to 
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facilitate the ASEM process and more generally promote trade and investment between the 
two regions. As AEBF4 positively emphasised: 'these Contact Points would allow for more 
efficient communication and for tapping future business opportunities and would also be used 
as an important channel to secure dialogue continuity with ASEM in general, and trade and 
investment matters in particular' (Chairman's Statement, AEBF4). However, a number of 
interviews undertaken and questionnaires sent to the different AEBF Contact Points in 
research for this empirical study articulated the fact that the network of AEBF Contact Points 
is still relatively weak and that while some Contact Points are enthusiastic in supporting the 
AEBF work and ensuring continuity, other Contact Points have been changed too often to 
allow follow-up on AEBF activities and to maintain the continuity ofthe AEBF. Moreover, it 
is important to notice that an organisation like the Union of Industrial and Employers' 
Confederations of Europe (UNICE), which could play a useful role in coordinating with both 
businesses and governments (at least from the European side), was not one ofthe AEBF 
Contact Points since the beginning (only until 2005 when UNICE has become part of the 
AEBF Contact Point network). 
Following the informal and non-binding nature of the ASEM in general, the AEBF 
retains its 'loose' structure and there is no AEBF permanent co-ordinator as such (only the 
AEBF Contact Points from ASEM members, which do not seem to actively coordinate); thus 
compared to TABD and ABAC, AEBF is likely to be the weakest link in the Triad business 
world. As a result of this loose AEBF structure, a number of criticisms relating to a lack of 
continuity can be made as well as those relating to a lack of structure and lack of follow-up 
strategy. As 0' Brien, for example, observed, 'AEBF is not one of the more effective 
components of the [AS EM] process. It suffers from a lack of continuity. It cannot be 
favourably compared to the T ABD whose secretariat ensures that consistency is maintained 
between meetings' (2001: 23). Hoedeman, in a similar vein, commented on the lack of an 
AEBF secretariat that: 'the AEBF seems less of a well-oiled machine than the T ABD which 
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runs secretariats in both Brussels and Washington D.C.' (2002: 2). Despite these critics, there 
is still no AEBF permanent body because even the ASEM itself does not have its own 
secretariat; rather the host organisation rotates every year according to the AEBF (and 
ASEM) host country. 
In this regard, it can be observed that the European Commission has played an 
important role in the AEBF process coordinating and implementing AEBF matters, for 
example, producing a report on responses of ASEM members on AEBF Recommendations 
(see detail in Section 4.4.5 of this chapter). However, the Commission official responsible for 
the AEBF as well as representing the Commission's AEBF Contact Point emphasised during 
an interview that 'the EU can only play an observer role supporting in the AEBF process, 
considering the AEBF is a private business organisation' (Interview, European Commission, 
DG External Relations (HI Unit), Brussels, 27 January 2004). Although the Commission is 
officially seen as an observer in the AEBF, it is argued that the Commission has played a 
crucial role in directing the AEBF process and the AEBF can be seen as reflecting the EU's 
drive for business engagement as part of its broad commercial diplomacy towards Asia. 
4.4.2 The Aims of the AEBF: Changing Emphasis over Time 
According to AEBF1, the AEBF aims to establish a twofold dialogue: 'a dialogue between 
entrepreneurs' and 'a dialogue between businessmen and government representatives' 
(Chairman'S Statement, AEBF1). This twofold aim distinguishes two different emphasises of 
the AEBF: the former aims at building closer co-operation and strengthening relationships 
among the EU and Asian business communities themselves, and the latter aims at creating a 
forum for dialogue and networking between governments and business, where the business 
communities from both Europe and Asia are expected to inject information about obstacles, 
barriers on trade and investment, or policy input and recommendations as such, into the 
policy-making community. 
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Taking into account these two emphases, it can be observed that the focus on building 
a 'dialogue of businessmen and government representatives' seemed to dominate the initial 
stage of AEBF. This trend reflected the EU's initial expectation that AEBF would create a 
forum where business would feed input, which is information on trade and investment barriers 
facing them in practice, and play a supporting role in the AS EM economic process, thus 
shaping policy outcomes in ASEM and strengthening trade and investment between the EU 
and Asia. This mechanism to incorporate business into its overall commercial diplomacy by 
creating 'dialogue and networking' between governments and business, as already argued in 
Chapter 2, is often seen as part ofthe EU's broad commercial strategy in creating a 'hub-and-
spoke' commercial network (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2004: 13) to support its position in the 
global political economy. This in turn implies a more proactive role of the EU towards 
business and a more supportive EU strategy to strengthen co-operation among business 
communities between the two regions. 
However, this initial EU attempt to create AEBF as a shaper of policy outcomes seems 
to have been undermined by a number of difficulties during its operation, particularly ASEM 
governments' inability to implement business recommendations into concrete action, thus 
resulting in declining business commitment to attendance at the AEBF meetings. It can be 
argued that the aim and focus of AEBF seems to have changed over time from AEBFl in 
1996 to AEBF9 in 2004. During the later years, the AEBF has been emphasised as only a 
useful device for 'dialogue and networking' among business people, which implies a focus on 
the AEBF more as a 'process', and less as a generator of 'outcomes'. For example, AEBF8 in 
2003 stated its main objective as 'constituting a vitally important bridge between the business 
communities of Asia and Europe' and emphasised that 'the Seoul AEBF8 was an ideal venue 
for business leaders from Asia and Europe to gather and discuss pressing issues as well as to 
strengthen their networks ... AEBF pledges its continued promotion of private sector business 
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partnerships through dialogue and exchange between Asian and European business people' 
(Chairman's Statement, AEBF8). 
In the following section, this chapter identifies this changing trend and relates it to two 
images of the AEBF: first, as a shaper of policy outcomes and second as a process of dialogue 
and networking. 
4.4.3 AEBF as Shaper of Policy Outcomes 
AEBFl clearly stated an ambitious aim: 'to bring about better conditions for trade and 
investment between the two continents, and give the opportunity to business leaders to inform 
the public authorities in a constructive spirit of the problems they are faced with and to make 
suggestions about possible solutions', meaning that 'this will give the opportunity to business 
leaders to help identify the barriers, gaps and any other factors which limit economic relations 
between the two continents' (Chairman's Statement, AEBFl). Research conducted by the 
author for this project suggested that some AEBF Contact Points emphasised even more 
strongly the policy input role of AEBF as its contribution to the ASEM process, arguing that 
'the AEBF is highly important, because without private sector input, AS EM could not operate 
both efficiently and effectively ... , especially in having information and inputs from the 
private sector to tap on, as these ASEM meetings go about in their deliberations' 
(Questionnaire Feedback, the Singapore Business Federation, 2 December 2003). This 
articulated both the EU's and Asian countries' initial intentions and expectations to see AEBF 
playing a 'policy input' role by injecting information on trade and investment into the ASEM 
economic pillar, which could lead to the enhancement of economic and commercial relations 
between the EU and Asia. This image of the AEBF effectively implies the EU's and Asia's 
expectations of that AEBF would be a shaper of policy outcomes. 
In order to play this role, the AEBF is designed to have two main mechanisms 
allowing it to influence and shape the ASEM economic framework: formally through the 
AEBF's Policy Recommendations and informally through the participation of AEBF 
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representatives in ASEM meetings and activities. This institutionalised linkage between the 
AEBF and other ASEM economic bodies thus also enables the AEBF to have an underlying 
role in shaping the ASEM Action Plans, particularly TFAP and IPAP, whose implementation 
can also reflect AEBF inputs. In this respect, this chapter evaluates the AEBF role as a shaper 
of policy outcomes through its institutionalised connection with the ASEM process in three 
ways: (i) AEBF Policy Recommendations, (ii) its link with ASEM Summit, EMM, and 
SOMTI and (iii) its influence on the ASEM Action Plans, i.e., TFAP and IPAP. 
AEBF Policy Recommendations 
AEBF Policy Recommendations normally follow the main themes of AEBF Working Groups 
mentioned earlier. After the discussions during AEBF meetings, each Working Group submits 
a report that outlines and prioritises its discussion and its recommendations to ASEM 
governments. These Policy Recommendations represent accumulated ideas and concerns 
transmitted from business to government. For instance, the AEBF8 Recommendations stated 
eight priority areas: Trade; Investment & Infrastructure; Financial Services; Information & 
Communication Technologies; Life Science & HeaIthcare; Food; and Environment. AEBF 
Recommendations are normally presented as a way to attract business to participate in AEBF; 
as AEBF8 advertised: AEBF 'provides a unique opportunity to influence the political elite as 
the recommendations from AEBF are highly appreciated in the ASEM meetings between the 
participating heads of states and govemments from Asia and Europe' (AEBF8 Website at 
www.imagecity.co.kr/aebfS/). In turn, for the EU these Recommendations can also be seen as 
useful information in tenns of policy input from the business sector injected into the ASEM 
economic process. 
However, the device ofthe AEBF Recommendations is heavily criticised by some for 
being 'too general' and for the tendency to include 'too many apparent priorities' (Interview, 
the Federation ofGennan Industries (BDI), Berlin, 11 December 2003), which could thus 
lead to ineffectiveness in shaping and influencing the ASEM economic process. Meanwhile, a 
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Gennan Contact Point also noted that these' general' characteristics perhaps reflect the 
overall nature of ASEM, which is a dialogue and networking forum, but 'not a forum to solve 
particular problems' (Interview, the Federation of German Industries (BDI), Berlin, 11 
December 2003). To be more positive, the substance of AEBF Recommendations is in the 
hands of AEBF participants and can be easily improved. However, the next question worth 
more concern is how and with what effects these AEBF Recommendations have been injected 
into the ASEM economic process. 
Linkages between AEBF and other ASEM Economic Bodies within the ASEM Economic 
Framework 
It can be observed that AEBF Recommendations are injected into ASEM economic processes 
on several types of occasion: presenting AEBF Recommendations at the ASEM Summit, 
close relations with EMM and SOMTI, and shaping ASEM Action Plans, particularly, TF AP 
and IPAP. 
The first channel through which these AEBF Recommendations can be fed into the 
ASEM economic process is ASEM Summits: In every ASEM Summit usually one or two 
high-level business representatives (Chainnan and Co-chairman ofthe previous AEBF) make 
a short formal presentation to the heads of government, infonning them of the policy 
recommendations and important points raised by the business community during the AEBF 
meetings. It is unquestionable that this represents a significant opportunity for business to 
lobby governments at a high decision-making level; however, several practical concerns by 
both business and the AEBF Contact Points about the extent to which this short presentation 
can influence the ASEM leaders and about the extent to which this business voice has been 
implemented into action can be observed (Questionnaire Feedbacks, AEBF Contact Points, 
December 2003- January 2004). 
One successful example of an AEBF Chairman reporting AEBF Recommendations to 
the ASEM Summit is AEBF3, which ran back-to-back with ASEM2 in London on 3 April 
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1998. Sir Martin Laing, Chairman of the British Overseas Trade Board who chaired AEBF3 
emphasised to ASEM leaders the importance of ASEM supporting SMEs : 'we would like to 
see this SMEs network enlarged ... another imaginative initiative that has been launched 
during our present Conference is ASEMConnect, an electronic network to increase the 
amount of information about business opportunities available to SMEs in Asia via the 
Internet' (AEBF3 Report to Summit Leaders, 3 April 1998). As a result of the idea of 
AS EM Connect initiated since AEBF2, promoted through the active push from AEBF3 to the 
ASEM2 Summit, ASEMConnect 68 was finally put in place as a formal ASEM initiative, 
more particularly under the IP AP activities. This was one case when AEBF could be used 
effectively as a channel to influence and lobby the ASEM leaders at the ASEM Summit. 
The second channel is through EMM and SOMTI. Apart from reporting AEBF 
Recommendations every second year at the ASEM Summit, AEBF Recommendations are 
normally considered at SOMTI every year and then reported to EMM. Through this AEBF 
connection with SOMTI and EMM, it is expected (at least by the Commission) that its 
recommendations can be regarded as a policy input from the business community, injected 
into the ASEM economic process. Moreover, AEBF representatives can also participate in 
SOMTI, EMM and other ASEM meetings (Interview, European Commission, DG External 
Relations (HI Unit), 27 January 2004). As the Chairman's Statement ofEMM2 in Berlin in 
2002 also confirmed, 'AEBF representatives have participated in various TFAP, IPAP, lEG 
and SOMTI meetings, while the Chair of AEBF has been invited to give a brief presentation 
on their work both at the [London] Summit and at the EMM' (Chairman's Statement, 
EMM2). However, in most of the cases they participated in the EMM meetings. For instance, 
at EMM 4 in Copenhagen on 18-19 September 2002, Mr. Park Yong-oh, Chairman of AEBF 
8 reported on the discussion at AEBF7, which was held in parallel with this EMM in 
Copenhagen (Chairman'S Statement, EMM4). At EMM 5 in Dalian on 23-24 July 2003, Mr. 
68 For ASEMconnect, see www.asemconnect.com.Itis noted that the study does not aim to evaluate an 
effectiveness of ASEMConnect. 
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Kyu-Huang Lee, the representative of AEBF8, participated and briefed Ministers on the 
recommendations made during AEBF7 as well as the preparatory work for AEBF8, which 
took place in Seoul, Korea in October 2003 (Chairman's Statement, EMMS). (See Table 4.3) 
Besides AEBF representation in EMM, occasional participation of some AEBF 
Chairmen in SOMTI has also occurred. For example, in SOMTI7 in Brussels in July 2001, 
'the co-chairs asked the representatives of the AEBF to convey the appreciation of SOMTI to 
members of AEBF for their positive contribution within the process and encouraged them to 
contribute to this important task' (Chairman's Statement, SOMTI7); and in SOMETI8 when 
Mr. Christens en, Chairman of AEBF7, participated in SOMTI in Indonesia in July 2002 
(Chairman's Statement, SOMTI8; Questionnaire Feedback, the Confederation of Danish 
Industries (AEBF7 organiser), 5 December 2003). Importantly, a Commission official pointed 
out that in fact 'Member States' officials in SOMTI are also allowed to nominate and bring 
the participation of business into SOMTI with them' (Interview, European Commission, DG 
External Relations, 27 January 2004). In turn, SOMTI officials or ED policy-makers also 
attend and play significant roles in the AEBF meetings. 
In this respect, it is clear how and through which channel AEBF Recommendations 
are regularly injected into the ASEM economic process and that the participation of AEBF 
representatives in both SOMTI and EMM is a regular procedure. In other words, participation 
not only through the formal connection when SOMTI and EMM consider AEBF 
Recommendations during their meetings, but also through an informal and long-term 
connection between business and policy-making communities or the business-SOMTI 'micro-
networking' (Dent, 2003: 23) in particular has been a central aim of the AEBF. As SOMTI5 
in Brussels in 1999 emphasised, welcoming the designation of AEBF Contact Points: 'these 
enhanced linkages are a positive step toward enhanced communication and understanding 
between officials and the business community, and [they] underlined the importance of 
concrete input from AEBF in both IPAP and TFAP' (Co-Chairs' Summary, SOMTI 5). 
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Nonetheless, the question can be raised: to what extent has this AEBF connection influenced 
ASEM economic activities and have these recommendations been implemented into action by 
ASEM members? (These questions will be answered later in Section 4.4.5) 
The third channel through which the AEBF can influence the ASEM process is 
through ASEM Action Plans. Through its institutionalised connection with the ASEM 
economic pillar and the regular participation ofthe AEBF representatives in ASEM Summits, 
EMM and SOMTI, AEBF was also initially designed to be a significant force in shaping 
ASEM's Action Plans on trade and investment: TFAP and IPAP, endorsed by the EMMl in 
Makuhari in 1997. Not only seen as mechanisms 'designed to promote two-way trade and 
investment between ASEM partners' (Chairman'S Statement, EMM1), these Action Plans can 
also be seen as examples of successful influence by the AEBF in shaping the ASEM 
economic process. One of the AEBF contacts pointed out that: 'the most important successful 
results of the AEBF were the TFAP and IPAP' (Questionnaire Feedback, the Confederation 
of Swedish Enterprise, 2 December 2003). The chapter now turns to examine in more detail 
the substance ofTFAP and IPAP, their connection with the AEBF and particularly their 
implementation. 
4.4.4 AEBF and ASEM Action Plans 
Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP) 
TF AP was first initiated during SOMTIl in Brussels in 1996, as senior officials on trade and 
investment from AS EM members noted: 'ASEM partners considered ways to promote greater 
trade between Asia and Europe and to facilitate and liberalise trade between the regions' (Co-
chairman's summary, SOMTIl). The plan was then presented to Economic Ministers in 1997 
at EMMl (27-28 September 1997) with an emphasis on its two major aims: 'reducing NTBs 
and promoting trade opportunities between the two regions' while 'complementing and 
considering work being carried out in bilateral and multilateral fora' (TFAP, 1997). Finally, 
147 
the ASEM2 London Summit endorsed the TFAP. The framework ofTFAP adopted in 1997 
thus identified seven priority areas and in October 2000, electronic commerce was added to 
the list ofTFAP priority areas as the eighth priority (see Table 4.4). 
• Customs procedures: TF AP aims at promoting simplification, 
harmonisation and in customs 
• Standards, testing, certification and accreditation: In supporting 
and enhancing the ongoing cooperation between standards, testing, 
certification and accreditation bodies. 
• Public procurement: TF AP aims at promoting transparency in public 
procurement, in particular through exchanging information on public 
statistics and 
• Other trade activities: TF AP would inter alia aim at 
• 
o promoting an exchange of views among partners, in both the 
public and business sector, on the manner in which market 
access in the distribution sector can best be enhanced, and 
o creating an ASEM data-base or virtual market-place, providing 
the business sector with easy access to comprehensive and up-
to-date information on legal and administrative trade regimes of 
ASEM partners, on business opportunities, and on market 
trends. 
2002-2002 
Following these aims and priority areas, TFAP activities have been focused mainly on 
organising working groups and seminars according to different priority areas. Examples of 
TF AP activities during 1999-2000, as SOMTI6 noted, are for example: the first Seminar on 
Public Procurement in Berlin (14-15 September 1999); the third Meeting on Standards and 
Conformity Assessment in Brussels (4-6 October 1999); the second Seminar on Quarantine 
and SPS Procedures in Beijing (23-26 November 1999); the fourth Meeting on Standards and 
Conformity Assessment in Bangkok (28 February to 1 March 2000); the second Seminar on 
Intellectual Property Rights in Nakornratchasima, Thailand (16-18 March 2000); and the 
fourth Working Group Meeting on Customs Procedures in Brussels (14-15 April 2000) 
(Chair'S Statement, SOMTI6). See list ofTFAP Working Groups (2005) in Annex 4.3. 
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However, as noted in the TFAP framework, TFAP and its activities '[have] potential 
for building understanding, and should be a catalyst of progress on the discussion of trade 
facilitation issues. It [TF AP] shall promote understanding and awareness among ASEM 
partners in these areas' (TFAP, 1997). This clearly indicates the TFAP's major aim to 
facilitate cooperation by providing information, reducing transaction costs, and improving 
communication and coordination. 
The implementation and evaluation ofTFAP is supervised by the SOMTI, by 
evaluating and setting concrete goals for TF AP. This has been done in three phases: i) 1998-
2000, ii) 2000-2002 and iii) 2002-2004. At the end of the TFAP phase I, in 2000 SOMTI6 
provided EMM and the ASEM3 summit with a first evaluation of the achievement of the 
goals set for TF AP for this period 1998 - 2000, and established concrete deliverables for the 
next period 2000-2002 (Evaluation ofTFAP 1998-2000 and TFAP Concrete Goals 2000-
2002 produced by SOMTI6 in 2000). TF AP Phase II ran during 2000-2002 with more 
emphasis on business involvement, particularly of SMEs. TF AP Phase III started in 2002 for 
the period 2002 - 2004 (TF AP Evaluation of Achievement of Concrete Goals 2000-2002; 
TF AP Concrete Goals 2002-2004 produced by EMM4 in 2002). 
During these three phases ofTFAP implementation (from 1998-2004), it has always 
been clear to both the European Commission and ASEM policy-makers that the expectations 
and aims ofTFAP were 'not a forum for negotiations, but it contributes to the goal of 
promoting, facilitating and liberalising trade between Asia and Europe by providing a venue 
for exchange of views and for work on the implementation of commonly agreed deliverables' 
(Evaluation of The ASEM Trade Facilitation Action Plan 1998-2000). An interview with a 
European Commission official confirmed this loose and voluntary nature ofTFAP: 'TFAP is 
only a dialogue for talking and discussing trade issues among policy-makers from Europe and 
Asia' (Interview, European Commission, DG External Relation (HI Unit) Brussels, 27 
January 2004). As Yeo also noted, TF AP thus represents only 'a loose policy consultation', 
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'rather than being a forum for negotiating agreements [and it] will not permit any effective 
binding agreement on rules and regulations' (2002b: 17). 
While emphasising its non-binding character as a form of policy consultation, it is 
important to note that business involvement in the TF AP process as a policy-input is also 
expected, particularly through the AEBF. As emphasised in the 1997 TF AP Framework, 
'business sector participation in the IF AP process will be essential in order to help identify 
issues and priorities, and to generate support for their implementation .... through the ASEM 
Business Forum' (TFAP, 1997). As a result, a number ofTFAP working groups and seminars 
not only included policy makers but intended to attract business, whom the Commission 
expected to play a policy input role by providing information on trade barriers with an aim to 
facilitate trade between the two regions. 
However, for business to participate in the AEBF and contribute to the TF AP process 
(as initially envisaged by the EU) means also seeing tangible outcome from ASEM 
governments, translating TF AP into actions. On the other hand, the loose, non-binding and 
voluntary nature of the TF AP was clearly among its principles and objectives. This leads to 
contradictory ideas on TF AP between policy-makers and business69• 
Investment Promotion Action Plan (IPAP) 
IPAP was first called for at the inaugural ASEM in 1996 (even before the initiation ofTFAP 
by SOMTIl). The ASEM Heads of State meeting at the ASEMl Summit in Bangkok in 1996 
'underscored the urgent need to increase European investments in Asia from their present low 
levels, as well as to encourage Asian investments in Europe' and 'agreed to encourage the 
business and private sectors, including SMEs of the two regions, to strengthen their 
cooperation with one another and contribute towards increasing trade and investment between 
Asia and Europe' (Chairman' Statement, ASEMl, Paragraph 12, 14). The perception that 
existing levels of investment flows between the two regions were too low or inadequate and 
6' This point will be elaborated further in Section 4.4.7 
150 
that European investors had not accorded the same relative importance to developing Asia as 
had investors from the US and Japan was an important issue for consideration during the 
preparation of IP AP. 
Following this ASEMl initiation, the Thai Board of Investment on behalf of the Royal 
Thai government (an organiser of ASEMl), in the preparation of this Action Plan, organised a 
meeting ofan 'ASEM Government and Private Sector Working Group' (7-9 July 1996) to 
draw up the IPAP framework7o• The deliberations ofthe meeting were presented to the 
SOMTI in late-July 1996. Then, an initial draft IPAP was also presented in October 1996 to 
the AEBF held in Paris, with a view to soliciting additional business sector input into the 
IP AP. A draft document was reviewed and finalised at the second meeting of the ASEM 
Government and Private Sector Working Group in Luxembourg on July 28-29, 1997 (ASEM 
Invest Online Website). 
The preparation of the IP AP shows strong business involvement through AEBF within 
the drafting process, which also reflected the aim of 'creating a business/government interface 
mechanism to deal with all aspects of business co-operation' (IPAP, 1997). As it is noted, 
'IPAP was put forward by AEBFl' (Chairman'S Statement, AEBF2) and during AEBFl, 'the 
business leaders [also] noted the importance of enhancing investment relationships between 
Asia and Europe and a need to boost investment between Asia and Europe, they also 
recognised the importance of the ASEM IP AP in addressing these issues and expressed 
appreciation to the IPAP secretariat for their active support of the AEBF' (Chairman'S 
Statement, AEBFl). This demonstrated the AEBF influence on setting up the principles and 
aims ofIPAP. 
Table 4.5 shows the basic IP AP principles mentioned in the IP AP paper of 29 July 
1997. It is possible to note that these IPAP principles not only aim to ensure an active 
business-government dialogue and co-operation in all ASEM investment related activities but 
70 Participants included public and private sector representatives from the 25 ASEM countries; a total of over 80 
persons attended the Meeting. 
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also commit to the concept of open regionalism and support the multilateral commitment, 
principally the WTO. This follows the EU's general means of ASEM as 'a catalyst for WTO 
liberalisation' (Dent, 1999: 31) in particularly supporting multilateral frameworks. 
• Commitment to mobilising business sector resources and ensuring active 
business/government dialogue and co-operation in all ASEM investment-
related . 
• Commitment to non-discriminatory liberalisation and transparency in policy 
in the trade and investment arena. 
• Commitment to the concept of open regionalism, whereby economic 
relations between ASEM partners will be strengthened, while at the same 
time ASEM to trade and investment with the rest of the 
• Commitment that all initiatives will be fully consistent with, and supportive 
the World Trade ation 
• Commitment that all initiatives will be fully consistent with other 
multilateral of ASEM 
Source: JP AP (1997) 
Therefore, to achieve a primary objective of JP AP 'to generate greater two-way 
investment flows between Asia and Europe through enhancing the investment climate 
between and within Asia and Europe' (JP AP. 1997), the JP AP had the foIIowing subsidiary 
objectives. (See Table 4.6) 
• To strengthen business/government co-ordination and co-operation structures 
and mechanisms to ensure that perspectives and inputs from both sides are 
reflected in business-related activities of ASEM. 
• To raise the investment profile of Asia in Europe and Europe in Asia by 
taking a more pro active role in cross-flows of investment in order to promote 
and beneficial 'the two 
• To build on and create synergy among existing programmes designed to 
promote Asia-Europe investment activities, including government initiatives 
such as the European Business Information Centres (EBICs), Asia Invest, the 
European Community Investment Partners (ECJP), and business sector ones 
such as the World Economic Forum Europe-East Asia Summit and activities 
of chambers of commerce. 
152 
ASEM. 
• To create linkages between the business sectors from each region that will 
allow them to benefit from and enhance the economic dynamism and 
synergies of both regions. 
• To establish, if necessary, or enhance information networks and information 
sharing systems to promote investment flows between Asia and Europe. 
Source: IP AP (1997) 
Following this JP AP framework, IP AP was translated into concrete action through a 
series of practical activities under two broad pillars, both of which involved a strong emphasis 
on governmentlbusiness sector co-operation and co-ordination. The two Pillars of IP AP 
activities were: first, the Investment Promotion Pillar, which includes activities designed to 
facilitate and enhance investment and business. These generally involve a stronger relative 
contribution ofthe business sector with government playing a supporting role; and second the 
Investment Policies and Regulations Pillar, which includes all activities relating to the 
regulatory and legal framework governing the investment environment. These issues 
generally involve a strong government contribution, with the business sector providing 
consultative inputs (IPAP, 1997) (See Figure 4.7). The two pillars ofIPAP activities reflect 
the EU's ambition (through the ASEM process) to coordinate and facilitate investment, 
which in fact does not fall under the EU's commercial autonomy or exclusive competence. 
Figure 4.7: The Two Pillars ofIPAP Activities 
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A Strong Asia-Eur~e 
Investment Oimate 
Pillar 1 
Investment 
Promotion 
Pillar 2 
Investment 
Policies and 
Regulations 
I Existing Relationship •... 
153 
IPAP Act. Ides 
High.LeveI 
DWogue 
on 
Key Investment 
I"",. 
In order to implement the IPAP activities, at the EMMl held in Makuhari, Japan (27-
28 September 1997) Ministers agreed to the establishment of an Investment Experts Group 
(lEG) under SOMTI in which 'government officials could discuss investment related issues in 
a balanced manner from both the promotion aspect and the aspect of policies and regulations, 
interfacing with the business sector through the Business Forum'; it was noted that 'the lEG 
shall assist the SOMTI in following up on the initiatives of the IPAP and should meet 
regularly, normally back to back in advance of the SOMTI' (Chairman's Statement, EMM1). 
The IEG had an original mandate of two years (1998-2000). Then it was renewed by EMM2 
in October 1999, and by EMM3 in September 2001 unti12004 (Chairman's Statements 
EMM2 and EMM3). The IEG, which comprises a group of investment experts from each 
ASEM member, can be seen as the mechanism to co-coordinate and implement IPAP 
activities. Six IEG meetings took place from 1998-200271 , and importantly the European 
Commission was also part ofthese meetings as a coordinator. 
One of the IEG activities is to produce 'a list of the Most Efficient Measures (MEM) 
to attract FDI' (initiated at IEG3 in 1999), which is used as a benchmark for investment 
policies of ASEM partners. As mentioned by IEG3 in Brussels in July 1999, the IEG has 
adopted a 'bottom up' approach to its discussion of how best to attract FDI [thus] 'rather than 
attempting to agree at the outset on a set of abstract investment principles towards which 
ASEM partners would strive, IEG is looking first at the practical measures which have been 
already proven to be effective in attracting FDI' (Co-Chair's Statement, IEG3). ASEM 
partners are supposed to report regularly on progress in implementing the list of MEM; and 
then in close cooperation with the Commission, the IEG produced a progress report on how 
the ASEM partners were implementing this MEM list, or IP AP in general. Three MEM 
"lEG! in Evian, France, 24 November 1998; lEG2 in Singapore, 12 February 1999; lEG3 in Brussels, 5-6 July 
1999; lEG4 in Seoul, South Korea, 11-12 May 2000; lEG5 in Brussels, 3-4 July 2001; lEG6 in Bali, Indonesia, 
15-16 July 2002; and lEG7 in Paris, 5 June 2003. 
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progress reports were published, in 2000, 2001 and 200272• Moreover, the ASEM Investment 
Online (AIO) website73 was established to support the work ofIPAP and IEG. 
More importantly, the aim to involve the business community in the work ofIEG and 
IP AP was stressed by the EMM 1 in 1997: 'in order to gain business input, the IEG shall be 
open for consultative inputs from the business sector (AEBF)'. During the IEG3 meeting in 
1999 this was again emphasised: 'the business community [which] will be represented by 
AEBF ... will be invited to participate in IEG discussions on appropriate agenda points and 
ASEM partners will be consulted on the modalities of business community participation at 
IEG meetings'(Co-Chair's Statement, IEG3). This undoubtedly reflects the EU's ambition to 
build connections between the AEBF and the ASEM economic bodies and use AEBF in the 
policy input role identified earlier. 
4.4.5 Has the AEBF Had Tangible Ontcomes? 
As argued earlier, the EU seemed to base its initial aims and expectations in respect of AEBF 
on its potential as a generator of policy outcomes and to hope that the institutionalised 
connection between the AEBF and other economic bodies under the ASEM economic pillar 
could in principle pave the way for the AEBF as a useful tool to produce tangible outcomes in 
supporting the ASEM economic framework, and more broadly EU-Asian economic relations. 
During the early years, AEBF was active in playing such a policy input role: both in 
supporting the works of ASEM's SOMTI, EMM, and IEG and in implementing TFAP and 
IPAP. However, the declining interest of business in participating in the later AEBF meetings, 
and thus a decline in support for the work of AS EM, can be observed during the later years. It 
might be assumed that the marginal nature of AEBF's tangible outcomes and negligible 
72 'Progress reports on implementation of the MEMs (as endorsed by Economic Ministers of ASEM) by ASEM 
partners' by IEG4 in Seoul, 11·12 May 2000; 'Measures Taken by ASEM Partners to Address Consolidated List 
of Obstacles to Investment and Implement the MEMs to Attract FDI', by European Commission, 3 August 2001; 
and 'Measures Taken by ASEM Partners to Address Consolidated List of Obstacles to Investment and 
Implement the MEMs to Attract FOI' by IEG6, 2002. 
73 ASEM Investment Online (AIO) Website, OG External Relations, European Commission, 
http://europa.eu.intlcornmlexternaIJelations/asem_ipap_vie/intro/obst.htm. 
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responses from ASEM governments in implementing AEBF Recommendations and ASEM 
Action Plans could be a main reason for declining business interest in the AEBF process. 
Interviews and questionnaires with the European Cornmission, policy-makers from 
ASEM members and AEBF Contact Points suggest that the tangible outcomes of the AEBF 
were marginal. This sentiment can be understood in two ways: first, the negligible responses 
from ASEM governments in implementing AEBF Recommendations, and second the 
relatively Iow level of success in implementing the TFAP and IPAP. 
Firstly, the lack of effective follow-up mechanisms to ensure the commitment of 
ASEM Member States in translating AEBF Recommendations into action results in a slow 
and often negligible response from the ASEM governments. The European Cornmission, 
nominally an observer in the AEBF, has also played a more supportive and co-operative role 
in facilitating the implementation of AEBF Recommendations by gathering information from 
ASEM Member States on how they have been implementing the AEBF Recommendations. 
According to a Commission official responsible for ASEM, 'the Commission produced 
reports summarising ASEM partners' responses to the Recommendations of AEBF. The first 
report was on AEBF5 Recommendations74, and another similar report was on AEBFT 
(Interview, European Commission, DG External Relations (HI Unit), Brussels, 27 January 
2004). However, as one AEBF Contact Point noted, 'initially there had been seen some 
[AEBF] success, but there now seems to be a certain fatigue both from governments in 
writing implementation reports, and from companies giving input, when actual progress as 
seen by companies has been very slow' (Questionnaire feedback, Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise, 2 December 2003). Therefore, these responses from ASEM governments on 
AEBF do not seem to meet either Commission expectations or the business community'S 
initial expectations for fast and effective tangible outcomes of AEBF. Besides some support 
" This report covered the implementation of AEBF5 Recommendations made by several ASEM partners, 
namely Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, China, Viet Nam, Japan, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei Darnssalam on 
the Asian side, and the European Commission for the EU on the European side (European Commission, DG 
External Relation Website). 
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provided by the Commission in producing this AEBF report, AEBF does not seem to have 
established other more effective follow-up mechanisms, which could assure commitment 
from, or at least encourage, ASEM governments to implement AEBF Recommendations. 
Although the network of AEBF Contact Points among ASEM members was initiated by 
AEBF2 as a mechanism to coordinate and follow up the implementation of AEBF 
Recommendations, this can still be considered a relatively infonnal and weak type of 
networking. 
The second reason for the marginal outcomes of AEBF links to the marginal success 
in implementing the TFAP and IPAP. While the non-binding nature of ASEMlAEBF itself 
shows the lack of mechanisms to ensure ASEM Member States follow its Recommendations, 
and thus produce tangible outcomes, it seems that the only instances where the AEBF 
influenced and played a supportive role in the ASEM economic process during its early stage 
were those ofTFAP and IPAP. 
However, it is important to notice that the AEBF seems to have had more influence 
overland involvement in IP AP than on TF AP, particularly its strong influence on the initiation 
and preparation ofIP AP as well as its participation in the lEG. Apart from the role played by 
AEBFl in the initiation ofIPAP, AEBF4 also played an active role in supporting the 
implementation of both TFAP and IP AP. AEBF4 emphasised the importance ofthe 
implementation of these two Action Plans (Chainnan's Statement, AEBF4, Seoul, 1 October 
1999). The 1st Steering Cornmittee meeting held in Seoul on 17-18 December 1998, in 
preparation for AEBF4, decided to establish the 'TFAP and IPAP Task Forces' to discuss 
issues pertaining to the implementation ofTFAP and IP AP. These Task Forces 'could serve 
as a platfonn for the private sector to provide their inputs to senior officials regarding the 
implementation ofTFAP and IPAP' (Co-Chainnen's Summary, SOMTI4, Singapore, 11-13 
February 1999). As a consequence, AEBF4 established the 'AEBF IPAP Task Force', and in 
order to share practical and valuable infonnation and investors' cross-regional investment 
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experiences, the first AS EM Decision-Makers Roundtable was also held in conjunction with 
AEBF4 (Chairman's Statement AEBF4, Seoul, 29 September -1 October 1999)75. However, it 
seems that this TFAP Task Force has never been established76• 
When considering the role of the EU in this process, it is argued that the EU 
(particularly the Commission) has been involved pushing forward the implementation ofthese 
two ASEM Action Plans. The creation of TF AP and IP AP and its attempt to set up a business-
policy making linkage through institutionalised connection between AEBF and other ASEM 
economic bodies (TFAP, IPAP, lEG, SOMTI) can be seen as the Commission's way of 
strengthening trade and investment between the EU and Asia; this thus undoubtedly indicates 
the role ofEU in Asia as a 'catalytic state' that 'seek[s] to promote and encourage rather than 
constrain[s] the internationalisation of corporate activity in trade, investment, and production' 
(Weiss, 1998: 208) by co-operating with other economic actors, i.e., firms, as already argued 
in Chapters 1 and 2. However, it is also important to note that while the TF AP, which focuses 
on facilitating trade and reducing trade barriers between the two regions, unquestionably falls 
under the EU's commercial competence, the IPAP, which focuses on investment promotion 
and coordinating investment politicise and regulations, does go beyond the scope ofthe EU's 
commercial autonomy (already discussed in Chapter 2). Rather, the issue of investment is still 
the Member States' competence. 
As noted earlier, the EU and ASEM member state officials, particularly under SOMTI 
and lEG, have been supervising the implementation ofTF AP and IP AP by producing a 
number of reports on the implementation of the programmes. However, despite a number of 
progress reports having been produced, the targets set by TF AP and IP AP have not been 
successfully translated into action by the ASEM governments in the eyes of business. The 
7S The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), the host organisation of AEBF4 also conducted a survey on 
'Mobility of Business People' and 'Investment Impediments'. Based on these reports, practical and specific 
recommendations for the implementation of ASEM TF AP and IPAP were adopted at AEBF4 (Chairman's 
Statement AEBF4, Seoul, 29 September -1 October 1999). 
76 However, there can be observed an establishment ofTFAP Facilitator Countries together with Working 
Groups instead. See Annex 4.3, page 336 
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Commission's officials themselves, (both from DG Trade and External Relations) those 
responsible for AS EM, largely shared the view that the implementation ofTF AP and JP AP 
has not been very successful (Interview, European Commission, DG External Relations, 
Brussels, 12 June 2003 and Interview, European Commission, DG Trade, 28 January 2004). 
In a similar vein, one of the Asian officials responsible for the implementation of the TFAP 
and JP AP on the ground also agreed that 'there has hardly been any practical action from 
these Action Plans implemented' (Interview, Ministry of Commerce, Bangkok, 16 September 
2003). 
Experience with AEBF, TF AP and JP AP suggests that while TF AP and JP AP are 
called' Action Plans' aiming at promoting trade facilitation and investment between EU and 
Asia, they seem to be Action Plans with little 'outcome-oriented' implementation. In order to 
evaluate the impact of TF AP and JP AP it is important to bear in mind the explicitly non-
binding nature of these two Action Plans. As Yeo noted, the emphasis ofTFAP and IPAP is 
on the exchange of information and identification of barriers to trade and investments, and 
developing benchmarks applicable to both Asia and Europe. The implementation of the 
effective measures and best practises to remove trade barriers and to improve investment 
climate is entirely up to the individual ASEM member states (2002b: 7). 
Although the TF AP process is on-going with some recent activities going on in 
200577, JPAP's lEG was ended in July 2003 with marginal success. A Commission official 
accepted in June 2003 that 'with its marginal success, the lEG was discontinued after the last 
lEG7 meeting on 5 June 2003 in Paris'[and] 'we need to find a new strategy' (Interview, 
European Commission, DG External Relations, Brussels, 12 June 2003). In 2004, the 
Commission decided to replace the lEG with a network of 'Investment Contact Persons 
(ICP)" which runs networking between former lEG people without any commitment to 
regular meetings, but rather to an 'ad-hoc' seminar or workshop, voluntarily organised by 
77 More recently, TFAP activities have been, for example, the eleventh meeting on Standards and Conformity 
Assessment in Tokyo, Japan, (2-3 February 2005) and the fourth Meeting on E-Commerce in London, UK (23 
Feb 2005) (ASEM infoboard website at www.aseminfoboard.orgIDocumentsD. 
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ASEM Member States to promote EU-Asian investment ties (Interviews, European 
Commission, DG Trade, 28 January 2004). However, the ICP activities have not yet been 
observed. The fact that TF AP seems to be more successful than IP AP might be a reflection of 
the unevenness of the EU's commercial autonomy (i.e., possessing only exclusive autonomy 
in trade, but not in investment) as argued in Chapters 2 and 3. Member States still retain most 
of their commercial autonomy in investment matters, particularly investment promotion, and 
thus the work and co-operation of ASEM members on IPAP faced more difficulties than that 
ofTFAP. 
It can be concluded that the TF AP and IP AP do not seem to represent successful tools 
in generating outcomes for greater two-way trade and investment flows between Asia and 
Europe and that the business side, the AEBF, has been disappointed with the lack of tangible 
outcomes from the process. In other words, the EU's success in using ASEM's economic 
process (AEBF, TF AP and IP AP) to produce tangible outcomes in enhancing trade and 
investment between the EU-Asia is still relatively limited. 
4.4.6 The AEBF as a Process of Dialogue and Networking 
While the EU does not seem to have achieved its initial aim to use AEBF as a policy-input 
mechanism, nor as a generator of tangible policy outcomes through the AS EM economic 
process, in more recent years of AEBF operation the EU seems to have shifted its attentions 
to increasingly emphasising the value of AEBF as a 'process' of dialogue and networking 
between public and private sectors from Europe and Asia: a forum that gathers the 
Commission, EU Member States, Asian officials, policy-makers and business sectors from the 
two regions to (at least) discuss trade and investment issues. A Commission official stressed 
during an interview in 2004 the importance of AEBF as a long-term 'process': 'rather than 
focusing on the relatively low tangible outcomes produced by AEBF in the past, AEBF can 
still be seen as a useful process of dialogue and networking among European and Asian 
businessmen, govemment officials, representatives from industrial federations and trade 
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associations' [which means] 'the soft value of AEBF in enhancing understanding and 
promoting relations between the EU and Asia'(Interview, European Commission, DG 
External Relations (HI Unit), Brussels, 27 January 2004). 
In this section, rather than focusing on the AEBF only as an outcome-oriented forum, 
the chapter focuses on the soft value of the AEBF. Despite being criticised as a mere talking 
shop, the AEBF is still important as a dialogue and networking forum gathering political 
leaders, policy-makers, and big businessmen and business women78 from the EU and Asia 
every year. A volume of questionnaire feedbacks and a large number of interviews with 
AEBF Contact Points in ASEM member countries tend to agree with this soft value of AEBF 
as a long-term process rather than a mechanism to produce immediate outcomes. For 
example, the Confederation of Danish Industries, while viewing AEBF as 'an integrated part 
of the ASEM economic leg, particularly EMM', emphasised the value of AEBF as 'a long 
term-lobbying process' [which] 'could legitimate the ASEM process by putting pressure on 
and providing the specific examples [from the business] to the political world' and 'could 
help Asian and European politicians and civil servants by providing examples of rules which 
may hinder the free flow of trade and investment between the two continents' (Questionnaire 
Feedback, the Confederation of Danish Industries, 5 December 2003). The British 
Department of Trade and Industry, in a similar vein, viewed AEBF as 'an essential link 
between business and govemment, contained within the wider ASEM framework' and added: 
'AEBF provides a platform for high-level discussion and networking covering trade and 
investment issues' (Questionnaire Feedback, the Department of Trade and Industry, UK, 19 
December 2003). 
In fact, the importance of AEBF as a process of dialogue and networking has been 
noted since the initial stage of its operations, but during the earlier years of AEBF operation 
the policy-input and outcome-oriented ambition seemed to slightly overshadow the AEBF's 
78 The use of businessmen and business women here is an example of gender-neutral terms used in this thesis. 
See Introduction, page 12. 
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value as a process. However, it can be argued that when the outcome-oriented ambition did 
not seem to function well, the AEBF did shift its focus to a more process-oriented, one or 
AEBF as a process of dialogue and networking in order to keep its attractiveness to business. 
This also followed the overall trend of ASEM, as Yeo argued, the ASEM4 in 2002 'marked 
the realisation and acceptance that ASEM is about forging a long-term partnership' (2003: 
161). For instance, AEBF8 in 2003 explicitly emphasised the importance of AEBF as a useful 
dialogue and networking mechanism among business for lobbying and meeting with ASEM 
government officials: 'the AEBF strives to strengthen economic cooperation between the 
business sectors of both regions. It provides an effective platform for high-level discussion 
and networking' (AEBF8 Official Website at www.imagecity.co.kr/aebfS/). AEBF9 in 2004 
also focused on its role as a business networking forum, as Mr. Ngo Van Thoan, Chairman of 
AEBF9 emphasised: 'AEBF9 will assume the responsibility for making itself more relevant to 
the business community and the ASEM process and become more co-ordinated and 
continuous than it was in the past' (Welcome Message from Mr. Ngo Thoan, Chairman of 
AEBF9, AEBF9 Official Website at www.aebf9.com).This trend indicates the AEBF's 
response to a decline in business interest in the later AEBF meetings, and thus a less directly 
supportive role for the work of ASEM during the later years. 
4.4.7 Challenges and Criticisms for the AEBF Process 
In promoting economic relations between Europe and Asia, business representatives have 
been a key component of the AS EM process, but involving the business community remains a 
big challenge. While emphasising the importance of AEBF as a process of dialogue and 
networking, this part ofthe chapter turns to identify challenges and criticisms facing the 
AEBF process. 
The first and major criticism facing the AEBF is business disinterest and 
dissatisfaction. Recently the AEBF process has been facing difficulty in recruiting business 
participants. Both a lack of AEBF ability to produce fast and tangible outcomes and a lack of 
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TF AP and JP AP implementation, mentioned earlier, have led to business dissatisfaction and 
disinterest with the AEBF process. A number of AEBF Contact Points noted how difficult it 
has become to recruit business participants in AEBF. According to the German Contact Point 
(Interview, Federation of German Industries (BDI), Berlin, 11 December 2003), '1,000 
invitations were sent out to our members to join AEBF8 in Korea, but the result was not 
successful'. The Finnish Contact Point added: 'businessmen and business women who have 
previously attended the AEBF meetings have expressed their dissatisfaction with the AEBF 
process, which has so far not generated concrete benefits to business' (Questionnaire 
Feedback, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers, 7 January 2004). For 
instance, the German business delegation to AEBF8 consisted of 12 people, one of the biggest 
delegations joining AEBF8. However, it is important to note that among these 12 people, 
there were only 6 businessmen, other were policy-makers, government officers, and 
representatives from business associations or Chambers of Commerce. In addition, very often 
smaller ASEM Member States do not nominate business representatives to attend AEBF; 
instead they send officials or government representatives, for example, their Ambassadors or 
Commercial counsellors based in the organising country. Business disinterest and 
dissatisfaction in AEBF is seen as a major challenge in keeping the AEBF process going. 
A second challenge is a government-business mismatch of interests during the process 
of AEBF. While AEBF participants comprise businessmen and business women and 
government officials/policy makers, it is clear that officials and business participants see the 
benefits of joining AEBF in very different ways. While business expects more tangible 
outcomes and immediate implementation of AEBF Recommendations, policy-makers (i.e., 
officials of AS EM governments) focus more on AEBF as a long-term process in dealing with 
trade and investment barriers (Interview, European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 28 
January 2004). 
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An ASEM Contact Point also noted that on the one hand, government representatives, 
policy-makers and representatives from industrial federations and other lobbying business 
organisations focus on the 'regulatory policy' aspect of AEBF, including market access, trade 
facilitation, and investment promotion. On the other hand, the individual businessmen seem to 
see AEBF as a forum for 'lobbying' government officials and/or 'networking' among 
themselves, where they can meet and build their contacts with government officials and other 
businessmen, and sometimes even would like to raise particular business problems and 
obstacles with political leaders (Questionnaire Feedback, Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise, 2 December 2003). Thus, it is not surprising when some AEBF Contact Points 
from Confederations of Industry or Trade Associations express the concern that the 
participants from individual companies 'seldom have a full systemic view of regulatory 
issues, but are mainly concerned with specific issues of immediate concern to their own 
business and they are not sufficient to bring about the systemic changes which are needed on 
the legislative level to remove most barriers to trade and investment' (Questionnaire 
Feedback, Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, 2 December 2003). Conversely, the business 
side, which focuses on the AEBF as a place for lobbying and networking, often criticised the 
AEBF process on its lack of ability to produce tangible and speedy outcomes. 
The above statements express the mismatch of interests between official and business 
in the AEBF process. In order to retain AEBF as a useful process of dialogue and networking 
for both public and private sectors from Europe and Asia, the two sides have to find a middle 
way to compromise on this mismatch of interests: officials would need to find a new 
mechanism to respond and to implement business recommendations made by AEBF 
meetings, and business would need to play a more proactive role in providing and feeding 
information and policy inputs into the process. 
A third criticism concerns tensions between big business and SMEs representation in 
AEBF. It is important to note that in order to join AEBF, business representatives from 
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companies have to pay their own costs (Questiormaire Feedback, Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise, 2 December 2003). As a result, the limited financial and human resources of 
smaller businesses restrict the participation of SMEs in AEBF. While one major aim of AEBF 
is 'to help promote and strengthen the growth ofSMEs' (Chairman's Statement, AEBF2), the 
participation of SMEs is likely to be limited and is stilI difficult in practice due to these 
financial limitations. Meanwhile the limitations of SME participation in AEBF also lead to 
unavoidable criticism ofthe dominance of big business in the AEBF process. For instance, 
Oliver Hoedeman (2002) of Corporate Europe Observatory (CEOf9 strongly criticised AEBF 
for its 'corporate bias', noting that 'the armual AEBF conferences are only the tips ofthe 
iceberg ...... there is an almost symbiotic relationship between the AEBF and the government 
officials within ASEM, including those from the European Commission'. Although it is fair 
to note the corporate bias of AEBF, it is also important to bear in mind some significant 
AEBF efforts in the past to promote the growth ofSMEs. For instance, 'ASEM Cormect' was 
set up, with a website which aims to facilitate on-line business matching and access to 
information as part of ASEM's efforts to address the needs ofSMEs8o• While the dominant 
position of bigger business in AEBF is unavoidable because of the fact that smaller 
companies have limited financial resources to bear the costs of joining AEBF, the industrial 
federations and trade associations from ASEM member countries can represent SMEs' 
interests. The Federation of German Industries (BDI) confirmed their support of SMEs 
interests in the AEBF meetings (Interview, Federation of German Industries (BDI), Berlin, 11 
December 2003). This shows a positive view: that the representatives from national business 
organisations, who normally have SMEs among their membership, could also represent SMEs 
interests in AEBF meetings. 
79 Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) is a research and campaign group targeting the threats to democracy, 
equity, social justice and the environment posed by the economic and political power of corporations and their 
lobby groups. 
80 The study does not aim to further discuss an evaluation of ASEMConnect. 
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To conclude, AEBF is unlikely to be successful in producing immediate and tangible 
outcomes. The TFAP and IPAP, which can be seen as products of AEBF appear unlikely to 
be implemented successfully or to produce any substantial outcomes. Though it is important 
to give credit to the AEBF as a process of dialogue and networking between public and 
private sectors from Europe and Asia, declining business interest and thus declining business 
participation in this process is still a challenge for the AEBF, and could also result in a 
changing ofthe AEBF's direction, from a 'business forum' to a 'policy-maker forum', as 
argued by a number of ASEM Contact Points. This thus raises the question about 
effectiveness of AEBF as a process and more broadly about the EU business engagement 
strategy at the transregionallevel per se. 
In order to maintain the effectiveness of AEBF (at least) as a process of useful 
dialogue and networking between governments and business and thus to engage business 
more fully into the ASEM diplomacy framework, even ifnot as a forum to produce speedy 
and concrete outcomes, it can be concluded that the AEBF process does need radical reform. 
The Commission does seem to realise this problem, and 'have been working to find out a 
good idea of how to improve AEBF process as a useful and interesting dialogue for both 
policy-makers and business' (Interview, DG Trade, European Commission, 28 January 2003). 
Recently, in order to make the AEBF process more effective, AEBF9 in Hanoi in 2004 
set up a core group, reinforcing the role of AEBF as Business Advisory Council to ASEM, 
and also decided that in the future AEBF will meet every two years in connection with the 
ASEM Summit (Chairman'S Statement, AEBF9). This decision to organise an AEBF meeting 
every 2 years, instead of every year, seems to confirm the EU intention to use AEBF only as a 
dialogue and networking process. Importantly, this confirms the EU's and particularly the 
European Commission's continuing attempt to pursue positive and proactive roles in business 
engagement at this transregionallevel. 
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4.5 CONCLUSION: THE EU'S COMMERCIAL AND BUSINESS ENGAGEMENT AT 
TRANSREGIONALLEVEL 
Since its inception in 1996, ASEM has become an important mechanism for the EU to 
enhance its commercial relations with Asia at transregionallevel. While reinforcing trade and 
investment relations between Europe and Asia has been one of the ASEM priorities, business 
representatives have been included as a key component of the ASEM process through the 
creation of AEBF. This chapter has investigated the ASEM economic process and particularly 
the AEBF, by arguing first that the ASEM can be seen as a significant form ofEU 
commercial engagement in Asia, and that the AEBF should be viewed as a business 
engagement strategy forming a significant part ofthe EU's broad commercial strategies 
towards Asia at the transregionallevel. 
Some scholars evaluate ASEM by focusing on its strategic importance as a mechanism 
to produce concrete policy-outcomes (Yeo, 2000, 2004b), while others view ASEM as a 
process of networking (Dent, 2003: 224). In line with these two different approaches, this 
chapter has evaluated the ASEM economic process and particularly the AEBF by 
distinguishing between the importance of the AEBF as a shaper of outcomes and as a process 
of dialogue and networking. At the early stages of AEBF, it was obvious that the EU seemed 
to emphasise its strategic importance as a generator of policy-outcomes at the transregional 
level, expecting the AEBF to play a policy-input role, providing the ASEM economic bodies, 
particularly EMM and SOMTI, with useful business recommendations, and supporting two 
key ASEM Action Plans on trade and investment, TFAP and lPAP. This then could help 
strengthen trade and investment relations between Europe and Asia. Investigation of the 
importance of AEBF as a shaper/generator of outcomes in the previous sections has illustrated 
that both the AEBF and TF AP and IP AP, do not seem to have produced speedy and tangible 
outcomes in promoting trade and investment between the two regions. However, this does not 
necessarily equate to a failure of the EU's commercial and business engagement strategy in 
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Asia. Rather, the soft value of AEBF as a process of dialogue and networking in enhancing 
understanding and promoting potential long-term relations between the EU and Asia should 
also be recognised. 
Through the investigation of AEBF as an integrated part of the ASEM economic 
process undertaken in this chapter, it is possible to conclude three major characteristics of 
AEBF - as a process of dialogue and networking, as a peak transregional organisation, and as 
a grand and formal business engagement strategy in Asia - which in turn reflect different 
answers to questions posed at the beginning of the thesis about the types of instruments used, 
strategies developed, stakeholders engaged, roles played by the EU in engaging both states 
and firms at this transregionallevel. 
First, AEBF is seen as a process of dialogue and networking. By focusing on its value 
as a process rather than a generator of policy outcomes, this chapter has noted that the forum 
has a close connection with other ASEM economic bodies, i.e., the ASEM Summit, EMM, 
SOMTI, and lEG, both formally (through AEBF Recommendations) and informally (through 
AEBF participation and representation in these sets of ASEM meetings). These linkages with 
other ASEM economic bodies can undoubtedly be seen as a form of useful dialogue and 
networking, linking govemments and businesses in Europe and Asia together, in which the 
EU through the European Commission is also part of the process. This evaluation of the 
AEBF's importance as a process of dialogue and networking seems to follow Dent's 
argument (argued earlier) about the ASEM progress in terms of 'socialisation', meaning 
'fostering the micro-networking links between various communities (government, business, 
civil societal) from Europe and East Asia' (2003: 224). According to Dent, this socialisation 
process is done through the development of 'micro-networking', including the policy-making 
community (e.g. via Ministerial meetings, the summits, TF AP), the business community (e.g. 
AEBF, ASEMConnect), and the civil societal community (e.g. ASEM Youth Co-operation, 
culture-focused activities, NGO engagement) (2003: 230). Undoubtedly, the AEBF can be 
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regarded as a key focus of Dent's business 'micro-networking', which links with policy-
making 'micro-networking', for example EMM and SOMTI under the ASEM economic 
pillar. This indicates AEBF's potentially crucial role as a process in which business and 
government alike can meet, discuss, exchange information and build mutual understanding. 
And, it is on this development of 'micro-networking' ties that 'macro-networking' or 'the 
long-term future of inter-regional partnership ultimately rests' (Dent, 2003: 235). The 
importance of AEBF as a process of dialogue and networking, rather than a forum to produce 
tangible outcomes, seems to be affirmed when AEBF9 in Hanoi in October 2004 agreed to 
organise AEBF meeting every second year in parallel with ASEM Surnmit, instead of every 
year as it had been organised since 1996. This indicates a focus on the soft value of AEBF as 
a forum for dialogue and networking. 
Secondly, while recognising the 'soft' value of AEBF, it is possible to conclude that 
AEBF can be seen as the EU's attempt to create a 'peak' organisation to engage business at 
transregionallevel. Instead of aiming at producing tangible outcomes at the local level 
(bilaterally), this peak organisation aims at gathering both governments and businesses ofthe 
two regions (usually big businesses, and high-level policy-makers) in one forum, and at 
strategically engaging business into the ASEM economic and commercial framework. 
Therefore, it is not surprising when the ASEM process and AEBF is normally coordinated by 
the European Commission's headquarters in Brussels, but not the European Commission 
Delegation on the ground. The Delegation has less concern about the AEBF, or even the 
ASEM activiti es (See chapter 6, Section 6.5). Moreover, evidence also suggested that a 
number of key policy-areas discussed in the AEBF (illustrated through the Working Group 
structure and the AEBF Recommendations) and main principles ofTFAP and IPAP seem to 
have a closer link to the broad issues ofmuItilateral framework, chiefly the WTO. 
Finally, AEBF is seen as a significant EU 'grand' business engagement strategy to 
engage business in Asia, focusing not only ASEAN countries but also including the wider 
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context of Asia-Pacific region. This EU grand strategy represents an EU response to the 
changing global political economy mentioned in Chapter I, including the structural changes, 
the increasing importance of non-state actors and finns, in general, and the growing market in 
Asia and a significant shift towards a greater participation ofEU based non-state actors and 
finns in the EU-Asian regions, in particular. The creation of AEBF not only reflected the EU 
strategy responding to business driving forces and globalisation process, in which both states 
and finns mutually interact, but also aimed to bridge the missing link in the Triad world 
economy. This chapter provides evidence that the ASEM and AEBF is crucial for the EU in 
tenns of supporting its leading position in the global political economy, particularly in 
balancing power in the Triad world economy. If one views AEBF in tenns of its strategic 
importance, the AEBF's tangible achievements seem rather marginal, especially compared to 
transpacific and transatlantic linkages, in which the business-government linkages are 
stronger. Nonetheless, if one views AEBF from its importance as a process of networking, 
AEBF has a long-tenn potential for gradually building government-business partnership 
between Europe and Asia. 
In this sense, it can be argued that through the creation of AEBF and its close 
integration as part of the EU's commercial diplomacy, the EU has made an ambitious attempt 
to set a framework to pursue positive and proactive roles in relations to states and finns -
comparable to those of a 'competition', 'catalytic', and 'cooperation' state - as a means to 
enhance economic relations between the EU and Asia, as well as to support its position in the 
global political economy - but that it has achieved very limited success. 
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Chapter 5 
The EU and ASEAN 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
While the previous chapter examined the EU's conunercial and business engagement at 
transregionallevel through the investigation of the ASEM economic process and particularly 
the AEBF, this chapter is devoted to the exploration of the EU's conunercial and business 
engagement strategies at interregionallevel: EU-ASEAN relations. At the transregionallevel, 
AEBF can be seen as the focus ofEU business engagement adopted as part of the broad 
ASEM economic framework; however, at the interregionallevel represented by EU-ASEAN 
relations, the EU's attention and focus for the engagement of business seems to be rather 
different. 
This chapter starts by outlining the general features of EU-ASEAN conunercial 
relations and examining the evolution and institutionalisation of EU-ASEAN relations, with 
particular focus on the development of the EU-ASEAN economic and commercial framework 
from the mid-1990s. Particular attention will be paid to the new attempt of the EU, especially 
the Conunission, in 2003 to revitalise EU-ASEAN relations, especially by initiating a 'New 
Partnership with South East Asia' (Commission, 2003a) as a new strategy and Trans-Regional 
EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREA TI) as a new trade action plan for ASEAN. The motives, 
priorities, and substance of this New ASEAN Strategy and TREATI will be discussed in order 
to illustrate the EU's intentions in adopting these new interregional instruments, and then to 
explore the ways in which the strategy aims to engage business more closely with the EU-
ASEAN conunercial framework. Unlike the EU formal business engagement strategy at 
transregionallevel through the creation of AEBF as an institutionalised business body under 
the ASEM economic pillar, at interregionallevel, EU-ASEAN relations do not appear to 
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fonnally engage business within its intergovemmental framework. Rather, the EU has 
initiated indirect mechanisms: economic co-operation programmes and projects. 
In its second part, the chapter thus explores the increasing importance ofEU economic 
co-operation programmes, as alternative 'soft' commercial instruments to engage business in 
Asia and ASEAN in the late 1990s. Key examples of economic co-operation programmes 
aimed at engaging business are the European Business Infonnation Centre (EBIC) and Asia-
Invest Programme, the programmes of which ASEAN has been one of the beneficiaries. The 
chapter then evaluates the impact of these programmes in producing concrete outcomes to 
promote EU-ASEAN trade and investment relations. Finally, the chapter concludes by 
analysing the implications of the situation for the EU's commercial and business engagement 
within the EU-ASEAN relations; this then helps illustrate distinct instruments used, strategies 
developed, stakeholders engaged, and roles played by the EU at this interregionallevel, which 
are distinct from those identified at the transregionallevel. 
5.2 EU-ASEAN 'INTERREGIONAL' RELATIONS 
An interregional relationship between the EU and ASEAN was infonnally established during 
the 1970s and officially started with the EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement signed in 1980; 
it emerged as part of 'old' trends in regionalism or what Rilland calls 'bilateral 
interregionalism,81 (2001a: 5) which can traced back to the 1970s. As already argued in 
Chapters 2-3, the EU has placed considerable weight on interregional cooperation or group-
to-group arrangements (Edwards and Regelsberger, 1990), which 'have entered a remarkable 
period of growth since the early 1980s (Regelsberger, 1990: 5). The creation of EU-ASEAN 
dialogue was undoubtedly seen as a product of this interregionalism trend82. 
Against this background, the section examines EU-ASEAN interregional relations in 
more detail, including the recent emphasis on the EU-ASEAN commercial relations {trade 
81 This thesis refers to Rilland's 'bilateral interregionalism' as 'interregional' relations. 
82 For EU interregionalism trends, see Edwards and Rege1sberger (1990), Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004), and 
Alecll de Flers and Regelsberger (2005) already discussed in Chapter 2 (Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3) and Chapter 3 
(Section 3.3.2). 
172 
and investment), the development ofthe EU-ASEAN institutional structure, the political 
issues obstructing EU-ASEAN commercial relations during the 1990s and the more recent 
construction of a stronger economic and commercial framework in 1999-2000. More 
specifically, it explores the place of business engagement at this interregionallevel. It is also 
argued that a more flexible approach ofthe EU commercial strategy towards ASEAN can be 
observed. 
5.2.1 EU-ASEAN Commercial Relations: Trade 
Trade has been the strongest area of the EU-ASEAN interregional relationship. As Robles 
noted, 'from the very start (1980s] the ASEAN and EC identified trade as an area where they 
could forge an interregional relationship' (2004: 64) and 'Europe is more vital as a region for 
ASEAN than South East Asia is for the EU' (2004:66). According to Figure 5.1 and Table 
5.1, in 2004, the EU's trade with ASEAN as a whole region amounted to 111,846 billion 
Euros or accounted for 5.6% of total EU trade (6.71 % oftotal EU imports and 4.44% of total 
EU exports). This can be seen as a rather limited amount, compared to US (19.7%), China 
(8.8%) and Japan (5.9%). (See also Table 4.2 in Chapter 4) 
Figure 5.1: EU Trade with ASEAN (2004) 
"".0 
eo.o 
eo.o 
40.0 
20.0 
·20.0 
-40.0 
75.2 
2000 
Imports 
Exports 
·33.4 
67.7 
7.55 
•. 88 
2002 
-27.2 
7.19 
4.50 
69.1 
2004 
(European Commission, 2005e) 
173 
6.71 
4."4 
Table 5.1: EU Trade with ASEAN (2000-2004) 
Yearly Share of Yearly Share of Imports 
Year Imports % total EU Exports % total EU Balance + 
change imports change exports Exports·· 
2000 75,197 7.55 41,777 4.88 -33,419 116,974 
2001 70,791 -5.9 7.20 43,842 4.9 4.91 -26,949 114,633 
2002 67,725 -4.3 7.19 40,514 -7.6 4.50 -27,210 108,239 
2003 65,764 -2.9 6.99 39,247 -3.1 4.47 -26,517 105,011 
2004 69,098 5.1 6.71 42,748 8.9 4.44 -26,350 111,846 
I····· ___ ~2,?48 0.3 __ ~2,?48_ .. __ .. 42,.?~ .. ~ .. ...... ... _ .•.......•. ....... .•. -"-, .. , ...•. ..... " ........•. ...... __ ... ,,_ ..•. , •.. , ..• , .. - . _--_ .... _- ----_.,--_ .. _ . 3m 
2004 16,958 7.07 9,895 4.47 -7,063 26,853 
3m 
2005 I 16,084 -5.2 6.21 9,866 -0.3 4.25 -6,219 25,950 
Average I 
annual I -2.1 0.6 -1.1 
growth 
(European COnUntSSlOn, 2005e) 
Products traded between the EU and ASEAN are, for example, agricultural products, 
energy, non-agricultural raw materials, office/telecommunication, power/non-electrical 
machinery, chemicals, textiles and clothing, itron and steel (See Figure 5.2). In 2004, 
machinery products accounted for 85.8% of total EU imports from ASEAN, while primary 
products (of which agricultural products and energy) accounted for 12.7%. EU exports to 
ASEAN are also dominated by machinery products (87.5%), while primary products 
accounted for 8.3% (See Tables 5.2 and 5.3). Moreover, as Cuyvers observed, 'the ASEAN 
countries are among those that are benefiting most from the EU's GSP (Generalised System 
of Preferences) scheme offered to developing countries,S3 (1998:9); a further support for trade 
ties between the EU and ASEAN. 
83 Among the top seven GSP beneficiaries in 1995, four are ASEAN countries. However, the new GSP scheme 
was enacted in 1995 (for industrial and textile products) and in 1997 (for agricultural products) (Cuyyers, 
1998:9). For example, Thailand is also a beneficiary of the EU's GSP, especially in respect of its agricultural and 
fishery exports to the EU. Thus, the case on graduation of Thai shrimp from the EU's GSP scheme in 1997 and 
in 1999 caused some difficulties for Thai exporters. See also Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1. 
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Figure 5.2: EU Trade with ASEAN by Product 2004 
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Table 5.2: EU Imports from ASEAN by Product (2004) 
TOTAL 75,197 100 67,725 100 69,098 100.0 
Primary Products 8,502 11.3 8,504 12.6 8,747 12.7 
0/ which: 
Agricultural prod. 7,078 9.4 6,624 9.8 7,012 10.1 
Energy 425 0.6 870 1.3 976 1.4 
Manuf. Products 60,504 80.5 58,801 86.8 59,319 85.8 
o/whlch: 
Machinery 36,137 48.1 34,339 50.7 32,220 46.6 
Transport equipm 1,862 2.5 2,338 3.5 3,249 4.7 
0/ which: 
Automotive prod. 913 1.2 1,233 1.8 987 1.4 
Chemicals 2,530 3.4 2,992 4.4 5,234 7.6 
Textiles and cloth. 6,977 9.3 6,423 9.5 5,998 8.7 
17S 
Textiles and 
clothing Iron and steel 
5." 
fJ7 7S2 655 
6.71 
2.84 
8.84 
0.54 
8.78 
12.69 
3.34 
2.34 
6.06 
8.60 
Table 5.3 EU Exports to ASEAN by Product (2004) 
TOTAL 41,777 100 40,514 100 42,748 100.0 4.44 
Primary Products 3,509 8.4 3,325 8.2 3,532 8.3 3.32 
of which: 
Agricultural prod. 2,299 5.5 2,038 5.0 2,082 4.9 3.55 
Energy 243 0.6 338 0.8 437 1.0 1.57 
Manuf. Products 36,635 87.7 35,761 88.3 37,384 87.5 4.59 
of which: 
Machinery 20,965 50.2 19,265 47.6 19,555 45.7 7.07 
Transport equipm 3,191 7.6 3,211 7.9 4,402 10.3 2.79 
of which: 
Automotive prod. 1,638 3.9 1,620 4.0 1,592 3.7 1.57 
Chemicals 5,011 12.0 5,577 13.8 5,989 14.0 3.94 
Textiles and cloth. 760 1.8 719 1.8 667 1.6 1.96 
(European Commission, 2005e) 
5.2.2 EU-ASEAN Commercial Relations: Investment 
The EU's FDI towards ASEAN is a rather limited proportion ofEU total FDI towards the 
world. Among the ASEMIO, ASEAN only accounted for 0.511 billion Euros or 0.3% ofEU 
total FDI, compared to 5.1 % to North East Asia (See Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4). According to 
Figure 5.3, the recent EU FDI trend with ASEAN during 2001-2003 shows a declining trend. 
Figure 5.3 EU FDI towards ASEAN (2001-2003IBiIIion Euros) 
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According to the European Commission (2005g), Singapore is by far the major 
recipient country ofFDI from the EU with nearly half of the FDI. Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Thailand are in a second group, each receiving 10% to 13% of total EU investment in the 
region (see Figure 5.4). The EU is mainly investing in three sectors: financial services 
(including insurance) with a share of 44% of all EU inflows into the whole region during the 
period 1999-2001, manufacturing recording 19% of investments, and trade/commerce 14% 
(See Figure 5.5). 
Figure 5.4: EU FDI towards ASEAN Country (1999-2001) 
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(European Commission, 2005g: 16) 
Figure 5.5: EU FDI towards ASEAN by Broad Sectors of Industry 
Note: Cumulative 1999-2001, balance of payment basis 
(European Commission, 2005g: 17) 
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5.2.3 EU-ASEAN Institutional Structure 
ASEAN in fact established dialogue relations with the EC as early as 1977 and in 1978 the 
first ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) was held, elevating the dialogue to ministerial 
level. Since then, the AEMM has met regularly, about once every 18 months. It was not until 
1980 that the Co-operation Agreement was signed. This 1980 EC-ASEAN Co-operation 
Agreement 'puts an emphasis on commercial co-operation, granting most-favoured nation 
treatment to the parties on a reciprocal basis and setting out their commitment to overcome 
trade barriers; economic co-operation, encouraging closer links through investment and 
technological progress; and development co-operation, contributing to economic resilience 
and social well-being' (European Commission, 2002d: 4). The 1980 Agreement also 
established a Joint Co-operation Committee (JCC) to co-ordinate and implement various co-
operation activities (ASEAN Secretariat, 1997: 171). As seen in Diagram 5.1, the EU-
ASEAN institutional structure comprises economic and political dialogues with a series of 
meetings between the EU and ASEAN sides from ministerial and senior official levels to 
informal working groups and ad hoc meetings. 
At the apex ofthe political dialogue is the AEMM, where the foreign ministers ofthe 
EU and ASEAN meet to set the direction and pace of the dialogue and to review the political 
and security, economic and functional cooperation between the two sides. However the 
political problems in the ASEAN region, particularly the problems of human rights and 
democracy in Myanmar, meant that the AEMM came under pressure and stopped for some 
years. After AEMM12 in February 1997 and Myanmar's accession to ASEAN, the AEMM 
scheduled in Berlin in 1999 was cancelled. The AEMM was reactivated and held again in 
200084• However, AEMM13, which was held in Vientiane on 11-12 December 2000 with 
Myanmar present as an observer85, did not lead to any positive outcome. Moreover, a 
Commission official emphasised that the AEMM14 in Brussels in January 2003 proved to be 
84 See details on political problems hindering EU-ASEAN relations in Section 5.2.4. 
8l The April 2000 EU General Affairs Council approved an arrangement for the Burmese Foreign Minister to 
participate in the AEMM\3. (European Commission, DG External Relations Website). 
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more successful as most EU and ASEAN foreign ministers participated (Interview, European 
Commission, DG External Relations (South East Asia Unit), 27 January 2004); and they 
agreed on 'the need to further deepen the EU-ASEAN dialogue as a fundamental building 
block for the strategic partnership between Europe and Asia' (Joint Co-Chairmen's Statement, 
AEMMI4, Paragraph 2). The most recent meeting was AEMMI5 in Jakarta on 10 March 
2005. Besides AEMM, since 1995 the ASEAN-EU Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) meets in 
years alternate to the AEMM. During AEMMII in Karlsruhe, Germany in 1994, both sides 
agreed to the formation of an Eminent Persons Groups (EPG) that would recommend long-
term directions for EU-ASEAN relations, and the EPG presented their report to AEMM in 
199686 (European Commission, 1996c, Annex 8). 
Additionally, under the political dialogue there can be observed the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) created in 1994 as the only security forum in Asia, and the Post Ministerial 
Conferences (PMC). In these two forums, the EU is one of the dialogue partners87 injected to 
discuss political and security issues with ASEAN. The ARF meets yearly at ministerial level 
and is an important occasion for interactions at high level with regional partners on major 
security issues such as tourism and regional issues such as North Korea and Myanmar. For 
example, in the recent ARF and PMC meetings in July 2005, Javier Solana, Secretary-General 
of the Council ofthe European Union and the High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, attended and used these forums to express his concern on the issues of 
terrorism and security in Asia (International Herald Tribune, 29 July 2005). The PMC is 
usually organised after ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), comprising two meetings: 
ASEAN with each dialogue partner (including the EU) called' ASEANI 0+ I' and ASEAN 
with all of its dialogue partners. In 2006, ASEAN has 11 dialogues partners (see footnote 87) . 
.. However, any further progress on the EPG activities has not recently been mentioned. 
87 Dialogue partners are US, China, India, Japan, Russia, Australia, Korea, New Zealand, Canada, the United 
Nation Development Programme (UNDP) and the EU. The EU is represented by the Troika at these two 
meetings (European Commission, DG External Relations Website at 
http://europa.eu.intlcommlexternatrelations/aseanlintro/arf.htrn). 
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Diagram 5.1: Institutional Structure of EU-ASEAN Relations (1996! updated 2004) 
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As for economic dialogue, the ICC, which meets every 18 months, deals with activities 
under the EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement. The functioning of the ICC was also blocked for 
a time following Myanmar's accession to ASEAN in 1997, and its meeting scheduled for 
Bangkok in November 1997 was cancelled, for the first time in the history of EU-ASEAN 
relations. After a lapse of more than three years, the ICC13 meeting was held again in Bangkok 
on 24-27 May 1999 (AS EN Annual Report 1999-2000), with Myanmar attending only as a 
'passive presence' that 'cannot participate in EC-ASEAN co-operation actions' (European 
Commission, DO External Relations Website at http://europa.eu.intlcommlextemal_relations/) 
(See also Chapter3). 
The work of the ICC is supported by a wide range of Sub-Committees at a technical level 
on Trade, Economic and Industrial Co-operation, Science and Technology, Forestry and 
Environment and by informal working groups on Intellectual Property and Environment, and 
Narcotics. The ICC and particularly its Sub-Committees on Trade and Economic and Industrial 
Co-operation had been the major driving mechanism for the EU-ASEAN economic relations until 
1999-2000 when the EU-ASEAN institutional framework was deepened (as will be discussed in 
Section 5.2.5, see also Diagram 5.1). However, it is important to note that there had been no 
formal EU-ASEAN Economic Ministers meeting until 2000, when the ASEAN Economics 
Ministers and the EU Trade Commissioner Consultation meeting was created. Before that the 
Economic Ministers from the two sides met on two occasions; once at the Special Meeting of 
Ministers of Economic Affairs from the EC and ASEAN in 1995 in Bangkok, and on another 
occasion during AEMM9 in Luxembourg in 1991 (ASEAN Secretariat Website at 
www.aseansec.org). 
In addition, other ad hoc meetings, including the ASEAN-Brussels Committee (ABC), 
ASEAN-Bonn Committee, ASEAN-London Committee and ASEAN-Paris Committee, also 
assist and maintain the dialogue between EU and ASEAN. An official at one of the ASEAN 
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Embassies in Brussels emphasised an important role of the ABC: 'it is an active network of 
ASEAN diplomats based in Brussels which meet regularly to discuss the ASEAN's position 
towards the EU, and discuss the current EU-ASEAN issues with the Commission' (Interview, an 
ASEAN Member Govemment Official, Brussels, 28 January 2004). 
5.2.4 Political Issues Hindering the EU-ASEAN Relations 
When evaluating EU-ASEAN relations, it is crucial to note that political issues, particularly 
human rights and democracy problems in South East Asia, have long been involved as major 
conditioning factors and sometimes as obstacles to further developing economic and commercial 
relations between the two regions. Particularly from the beginning of the 1990s, as Forster 
observed, the transformation of the EC into the EU brought with it a new set of economic and 
political agendas for EU-ASEAN relations, i.e., the defence of 'European values', including 
human and fundamental rights, democracy and environmental issues88, on which 'fundamental 
disagreements were inevitably going to exist' (1999: 750). In this context, there has also been 
seen the growing influence of the European Parliament in pressing this new agenda and the 
Council in passing resolutions on human rights and development, democracy and a wide range of 
other non-economic issues. Therefore, 'under this pressure the European Commission has felt 
obliged to embrace conditionality as a key feature of a new phase in EU-ASEAN relations. In 
general, the European Commission has been more hesitant, though its position is constrained by 
bureaucratic in-fighting89 , (Forster, 1999: 750). Research conducted by the author also suggests 
that the European Commission seemed to be less interested in the human rights and democracy 
88 Economically [the EU] introduced the concept of 'fair trade', including the need to p~otect international copyrigh~ 
and to raise social legislation and workers' employment conditions from low existing levels to European standards 
before trade could take place on equal terms. Politically, the EU committed itself to contributing to the development 
of the consolidation of democracy, the rule oflaw and respect for human rights (Forster, 1999: 750). 
89 For example, as Forster added, while the Human Rights Directorate is supportive ofthe European Parliament 
(EP)'s commissioning of reports from the EP.sponsored Institute for Europe-Asia Studies, 'the "area" directorate 
generals remain dominant and less keen' (1999: 751, note 34). 
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issues, which is pushed forward by the European Parliament and the Council. A DO External 
Relations official even expressed the view that 'due to the EU's political agenda, especially the 
Common Position adopted by the Council to sanction relations with BurrnalMyanmar, the 
European Commission cannot push forward its economic relations with South East Asia as a 
whole' (Interview, European Commission, DO External Relation (South-East Asia Unit), 
Brussels, 27 January 2004). Moreover, these new EU priorities in defending 'European values', 
including human and fundamental rights, democracy and environmental issues were also 
perceived by ASEAN as divisive and controversial, and highlighted the different value agendas 
of the two regional organisations9o• A Crucial example was when political issues in the South 
East Asian region and constraints within the EU's decision making process finally led to a failure 
of implementing the Commission' first ASEAN strategy adopted in 1996, then to a frozen EU-
ASEAN relations in the late-1990s. 
First ASEAN Strategy in 1996 and its Failure 
In July 1996, the European Commission announced the Communication called 'Creating a New 
Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations' (European Commission, 1996c) which is regarded as 'the 
first European Commission strategy paper towards ASEAN' (Interview, European Commission, 
DO External Relations (South East Asia Unit), Brussels, 27 January 2004). Pelkmans observed 
that this paper is in fact 'a belated, public follow-up of the 1991 AEMM decision to conclude a 
new Co-operation Agreement' and 'a proposal [from the Commission] to the Council and the 
European Parliament to support an 'Asian' informal, and voluntarist approach by the Union ... to 
infuse EU-ASEAN co-operation with more substance' (1997: 52). 
90 For ASEAN, economic and commercial interests have long been their focus in EU-ASEAN relations. As Robles 
noted, 'ASEAN countries tended to believe that relations with a regional organisation in Europe offered 
opportunities to induce European firms to consider Southeast Asia as a profitable region for investment, as compared 
to the ACP or Latin America' (2004: 100). 
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This strategy seems to show a rather belated concern of the EU for ASEAN and the South 
East Asian region as it was the first strategy formaIly adopted by the European Commission since 
the EU-ASEAN interregional dialogue had started in the 1980s. It was evidently adopted as part 
of the EU's 'Look East' policy and the Commission's first Asian strategy in 1994 discussed 
earlier (in Chapter 3), which gave a particular focus to the EU's economic and commercial 
interests in the Asian region. Particularly, in response to ASEAN's decision in 1992 to create 
AFT A, the European Commission explicitly stressed the increasing importance of ASEAN as an 
economic actor and its role in an expanded EU presence in Asia: 'given ASEAN's key role, the 
Commission feels that the launching of a new dynamic in our relations with ASEAN can make a 
considerable contribution to the strengthening of the European presence in Asia' (1996c: 4). In 
order to initiate this 'new dynamic' the Commission proposed to adopt a new Co-operation 
Agreement to replace the old EC-ASEAN Agreement signed in 1980, emphasising that: 
'Relations between ASEAN and the Community have changed radically since the signing 
of the 1980 Agreement. In 1980 our relations were conducted on a donor-recipient basic. Today 
we have a relationship which is characterised by balanced trade, the development of investment 
and greater economic co-operation. The scope and objectives of our 1980 agreement are limited' 
(1996: 8) . 
. However, this European Commission attempt to revise EU-ASEAN economic and 
commercial relations by concluding a new Co-operation Agreement with ASEAN proved 
unsuccessful due to political objections. As Pelkmans noted, 'this decision was never 
implemented because the East Timor issue led Portugal to veto a negotiation mandate from the 
Council to the Commission' (1997: 52). Forster in similar vein added that 'though there was 
willingness on both sides to expand the Agreement into cooperation, and consensus was reached 
on the technical details ... The human rights abuses in East Timor and a massacre there in 
November 1991 further soured the relationship, Portugal (bolstered by the European Parliament) 
led EU opposition to renewing the 1980 Agreement' (1999: 751). 
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The human rights problems obstructing the further development of EU-ASEAN relations 
were also noted in the Opinion ofthe Economic and Social Committee that' .. .inadequate respect 
for human rights and the still unresolved problem of East Timor have been instrumental in 
preventing the EU from reaching the new and wider third-generation agreements which it would 
like' (Economic and Social Committee, 1997, Paragraph 8). Moreover, the European Parliament 
still 'emphasises the importance of respect for human rights ... further, wishes to extend human 
rights conditionality to all ASEAN/EU agreements and to do so in a negotiated manner which 
pays due respect to different value systems and traditions' (1997, Paragraph 16). 
This unsuccessful attempt by the Commission to initiate a new Co-operation Agreement 
with ASEAN and thus the failure of the 1996 ASEAN strategy indicates the limits of the 
European Commission's commercial autonomy within the EU's complex decision-making 
process (discussed in Chapter 2): although the Commission attempted to develop further 
relationships with ASEAN as proposed in its 1996 ASEAN strategy paper, in practice the 
Member States through the Council could object to giving a negotiation mandate to the 
Commission and the European Parliament also had some influence. A Commission official also 
accepted that 'this strategy paper did not help much in fostering relations between EU-ASEAN 
nor proved to be paid much attention from both the EU and Asia sides, given financial crisis, the 
Myanrnar problem and East Timor question' (Interview, European Commission, DG External 
Relations (South East Asia), Brussels, 27 January 2004). Therefore, rather than strengthening the 
relations between EU and ASEAN, this first attempt at a revised ASEAN strategy was followed 
by a period of frozen relationships between the EU and ASEAN. 
'Frozen' EU-ASEAN Relationships 
The political issue which has most obstructed attempts to develop a closer relationship between 
the EU and ASEAN is Myanrnar's human rights and democracy problem, which finally led to a 
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'freeze' in relationships between the two regions during 1997-1999. As Dosch (1999: 15) noted, 
while the EU's policy has been to apply economic sanctions on the Yangon government for its 
bad human rights record and the suppression of the Myanrnar opposition and Myanrnar's 
ASEAN membership was strongly opposed by the EU, in 1997 ASEAN instead announced its 
initiative to admit Myanmar as a new member to the group. Palmujoki (1997: 273) saw this 
reaction as ASEAN wanting to demonstrate its independence on the international stage by 
carrying out a plan which was rejected by the entire Western world. This then resulted in 'a major 
set-back for ASEAN-EU relations' (Dosch, 1999: 15) and 'soured the inter-regional relationship', 
leading to the cancellation of meetings between the EU and ASEAN in the winter of 1997 
(Forster, 1999: 752). 
Moreover, Dosch observed that the controversy between the two groups over Yangon's 
participation in the AEMM led to a 'historical low in inter-regional relations' when the AEMM 
scheduled for 30 March 1999 in Berlin was cancelled as well as an ASEAN-EU SOM two 
months earlier in Bangkok (1999: 15). Research by the author further revealed that while the 
1999 AEMM was cancelled, the next AEMM13, which was held in Vientiane on 11-12 
December 2000 with Myanrnar present as an observer91 , did not lead to any positive outcome. 
Rather the restricted attention of the EU side to this high-level EU-ASEAN ministerial meeting 
meant that 'only a few Ministers from the EU participated' (Interview, European Commission, 
DG External Relations, 27 January 2004). This low participation from the EU side resulted in 
dissatisfaction from a number of the ASEAN governments (Interview, an ASEAN Member 
Government Official, Brussels, 28 January 2003). 
Notwithstanding this set-back, and the soured EU-ASEAN relationship during the late 
1990s, the Council has maintained its political concern with the political problems in Myanrnar 
91 The April 2000 EU General Affairs Council approved an arrangement for the Burmese Foreign Minister to 
participate in EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meetings. (European Commission, DG External Relations Website). 
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through a number of extensions of the EU's Common Position on Burrna/Myanrnar (Council, 
2002; Council, 2003). Recently, on 26 April 2004, the Council (2004) adopted a Common 
Position and a Regulation renewing sanctions against the military regime in Burrna/Myanmar, 
extending measures that were due to expire on 29 April 2005 without either strengthening or 
weakening the effect of the sanctions. According to a Commission official, 'the Common 
Position adopted by the Council on the political and human rights situation in Myanmar has a 
direct impact on further development ofEU-ASEAN economic and commercial relations. The 
Commission cannot push forward further economic and commercial relations with ASEAN as a 
whole ... Thus, a more flexible approach is needed' (Interview, European Commission, DO 
External Relations (South East Asia Unit), 27 January 2004). This flexible approach is reflected 
in the Commission's new ASEAN strategy adopted in 2003. 
S.2.S Deepening EU-ASEAN Institutionalisation: Towards A Stronger Economic and 
Commercial Framework 
After some years of frozen relations between the EU and ASEAN, in 1999 there can be observed 
an initial signal from the EU aimed at revitalising EU-ASEAN economic and commercial 
relations, pushed forward by the Commission and particularly by DO Trade. Alongside the JCC 
(particularly the Sub-Committees on Trade, and Economic and Industrial Co-operation), two new 
mechanisms or two types of consultative meetings were initiated in 1999 and 2000 to strengthen 
economic and commercial relations between the two regions: the ASEAN Senior Economic 
Officials Meeting and EU Consultation (SEOM-EU Consultation) first met in October 1999 and 
ASEAN Economics Ministers and the EU Trade Commissioner Consultation (AEM-EU Trade 
Commissioner Consultation)92 first met in Chiang Mai, Thailand on 6 October 2000. This 
"The 2" AEM-EU Trade Commissioner Consultation in Hanoi, Vietnam, on 12 September 2001; the 3" in Luang 
Prabang, Lao PDR, on 4 April 2003; and recently the 4" in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 20 January 2004 (run back-to-
back with informal ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting (19-20 January 2004). 
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indicated a major development and deepening of EU-ASEAN institutionalisation, and 
importantly the EU's new ambition to construct stronger economic and commercial relations with 
ASEAN (See Diagram 5.1). 
A DG Trade official emphasised the importance of these new mechanisms initiated by the 
OG Trade: 'the SEOM-EU Consultation and the AEM-EU Trade Commissioner Consultation 
were created as new forums for the EU and ASEAN sides to discuss trade and related matters, 
emphasising NTBs; this thus helps to strengthen EU-ASEAN economic and commercial 
ties ... while the SEOM-EU Consultation could provide a platform to discuss trade and related 
matters at the senior official level, the AEM-EU Commissioner Consultation provides a forum to 
negotiate such trade issues at a ministerial level ' (Interview, European Commission, OG Trade, 
Brussels, 28 January 2004). 
It is important to note that this deepening of the EU-ASEAN institutional structure was in 
fact a prelude to the EU's new strategy for ASEAN officially announced by the Commission in 
July 2003. On 4 April 2003, at the 3'd AEM-EU Consultation in Luang Prabang, Lao POR the EU 
announced its intention to issue a communication on a new strategy for EU relations with South 
East Asia. This included the announcement of the TREA TI, which shows the EU's renewed 
interest and a positive development towards strengthening economic cooperation between EU 
and ASEAN countries93• 
5.2.6 Business Involvement in the EU-ASEAN Institutional Structure 
Considering the EU-ASEAN institutional structure and particularly the EU's new attempt to 
build stronger economic and commercial relations in the late 1990s, it is important to note that 
unlike the ASEM institutional framework (in this case the AEBF and IP AP discussed in Chapter 
4), there is no formal business involvement and there is no concrete interregional framework for 
" This point will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.3 of this chapter. 
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promoting investment in the EU-ASEAN institutional structure. Rather, two major focuses of the 
EU-ASEAN economic and commercial ties are on first, trade and second, development and 
economic co-operation. 
However, as for promoting investment between the two regions, Robles in fact observes 
that there were some early efforts by ASEAN in the 1980s to construct an ASEAN-EU 
interregional framework for firms or to include business into this interregional framework by 
turning to an informal group ofEC development co-operation, known as INTERACT, for the 
purpose of attracting European investment through ASEAN Industrial Projects. INTERACT and 
the ASEAN Finance Cooperation (AFC) proposed in 1981 that a 'Joint Committee for Regional 
and Interregional Investment Promotion' be established [under the EU-ASEAN framework], but 
without success (2004: 101). In this respect, Robles comments that at the early stage of their 
relationship' ... the EC itself did not seem to consider an interregional relationship as a 
mechanism for encouraging European firms to invest in South East Asia' (2004: 101) and this 
seems to confirm that before the mid-I 990s the EU, particularly the Commission, seemed to lack 
interest in the Asian markets and in developing a stronger economic and commercial framework 
with ASEAN.1t was only after 1994 when the 1994 New Asia Strategy was adopted, and in 1996 
that the EU formulated its first, but relatively late, attempt to promote investment between the EU 
and ASEAN. 
Reflecting the Commission's realisation that EU business has been lagging behind the 
US and Japan in rapidly growing Asian markets, the Commission adopted in 1996 its first 
Communication for ASEAN called 'Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations' (1996c), 
. following its overall New Asian Strategy in 1994. This strategy also saw the Commission for the 
first time expressing its interest in ASEAN as a 'vast market for the future' and [its] 'certain 
anxiety about being shut out of the region by the dynamic action of other great economic powers' 
(European Commission, 1996c: 10). In order to cope with this new dynamic in ASEAN, this 
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1996 ASEAN strategy aimed for 'an upsurge in trade and investment' by 'facilitating and 
liberalising trade' and' facilitating investment' with ASEAN (European Commission 1996c: 13-
16). hnportantly, in order to facilitate trade and investment with ASEAN, the European 
Commission also for the first time emphasised private sector involvement in EU-ASEAN 
relations: 
'Business should be given the possibility of playing a leading role within the proposed 
new dynamic. This applies to the identification of opportunities and the strategies to exploit them, 
to the creation of support structure as well as to initiatives to facilitate the transfer of technology 
and know-how by holding Industrialists' Round Tables and other industry-led co-operation 
meetings' (European Commission, 1996c: 16). 
Pelkmans also observes that 'this [1996] strategy paper [reflects] the search for strong 
political impetus and effective business involvement, which seem to distinguish the EU-paper on 
ASEAN from past policy'. He added: 'appendix 6 of the Commission 1996 EU-ASEAN policy 
paper provides for trade policy reviews of the ASEAN countries. This is new. It may well be a 
prelude to engaging in market access discussions of the kind that the EU has long been 
conducting with Japan and, in different ways, with the United States. It is hoped that European 
business will provide a practical helping hand to make the reviews relevant and more suitable as 
a basis for talks' (1997: 56). This happened in the same line as the emergence ofEU business 
engagement strategies in the mid-I 990s (argued in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1). 
This Communication can thus be seen as the Commission's first attempt to incorporate 
business into the EU-ASEAN commercial framework. Following this Commission initiative, a 
number of EU-ASEAN economic co-operation programmes to engage business were created, for 
example, the EBIC, which will further discussed later in this chapter. However, implementation 
of this 1996 ASEAN strategy seemed to be overshadowed by the freeze in EU-ASEAN relations' 
during 1997-1999 due to both the unexpected financial crisis in 1997 and unsolved political 
problems in South East Asia, particularly East Timor and Myanmar mentioned earlier. 
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Moreover, the Commission's 'New Partnership with South East Asia', particularly the 
TREAT! adopted recently in 2003 also seems to emphasise only trade issues and more 
specifically the building of a foundation for a future free trade area between two regions. 
Therefore, the institutionalised framework for investment and business involvement in EU-
ASEAN relations seems to be rather marginal, compared to that for trade which represents 
stronger co-operation between the EU and ASEAN. Next the chapter turns specifically to 
examine the Commission's proposal for a 'New Partnership with South East Asia' and TREAT!, 
the EU's intentions in adopting this new strategy towards ASEAN, and asks to what extent this 
strategy envisages an attempt to engage business closely into the EU commercial diplomacy at 
this interregionallevel. 
5.3 THE NEW ASEAN STRATEGY: REVITALISING EU-ASEAN ECONOMIC AND 
COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 
In July 2003, the Commission announced its Communication entitled 'New Partnership with 
South East Asia' as the centrepiece of a 'new visibility strategy' to 'reinvigorate' its long-
established partnership with the ASEAN and South East Asian region (European Commission, 
2003a: 4-5). In order to achieve its major aim 'to revitalise the EU's relations with ASEAN and 
the countries of South East Asia' (2003a: 3), the Commission introduced a new 'flexible 
approach', which is seen as a crucial element of this New ASEAN Strategy. As the External 
Relations Commissioner 1999-2004, Chris Patten emphasised: 'today's Communication sets out a 
flexible strategy for deeper co-operation with individual countries within a regional framework' 
(European Commission News, 2003). This message that the Commission recognised an 
opportunity to start negotiating bilateral Co-operation Agreements with individual ASEAN 
countries but within an interregional EU-ASEAN framework was significant, since past 
experience suggested that to adopt a new regional Co-operation Agreement (to replace the 1980 
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EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement which had already been outdated) would be rather difficult, 
due to political constraints and the Council's Common Position on Myanmar. More importantly, 
the TREA TI - a new regional trade action plan - was initiated by DO Trade and announced as 
part of this new EU strategy towards ASEAN in order to move forward its economic and 
commercial relations with ASEAN. 
As for the ASEAN side, an appreciation for these new EU initiatives to strengthen EU-
ASEAN economic and commercial relationships (Joint Press Release, JCCI5, paragraph 4) can 
be observed. For example, a Thai policy-maker viewed the initiation of this New ASEAN 
Strategy positively, and the creation of TREATI as 'a step forward in EU-ASEAN relations' - 'a 
good signal from the EU that it wished to advance its commercial relations with the South East 
Asian region' (Interview, Thai Ministry of Commerce, Bangkok, 16 September 2003). The 
chapter will now examine the motives, priorities, and substance of this 2003 New ASEAN 
Strategy with the aim of establishing its relevance to EU business engagement objectives. 
5.3.1 Motives and Driving Forces 
It can be argued that economic and commercial motives were major driving forces behind the 
Commission's intention to adopt the New ASEAN Strategy in order to revitalise its interregional 
relations with ASEAN, particularly since ASEAN was recovering from the economic crisis in 
1997-1998 and the dynamics of the ASEAN economy seemed to have been restored. This is clear 
when the Commission stresses its concern in the strategy paper that: 'economic imperatives for 
closer co-operation include the fact that South East Asia is set to become one of the most 
dynamic growth areas in the world economy' (2003a: 3). The EU's specific economic and 
commercial motives can be identified as follows: 
The first motive behind this New ASEAN Strategy is to solve political problems 
obstructing further economic and commercial relations. The New ASEAN Strategy can be seen 
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as a sub-regional strategy, following the Commission's 2001 updated Asian strategy (2001c). It 
also illustrates a strong intention of the Commission to overcome political problems, which have 
long hindered potential economic progress between two regions, and thus to move forward its 
economic relations with ASEAN as a region, notwithstanding the fact that the Council still holds 
its Common Position on political problems in Myanmar. It is important to note that in this 
strategy paper the Commission intentionally recognised Myanmar as one of the ASEAN 
members as well as including East Timor, which is not yet a member of ASEAN, in its definition 
of the South East Asian region (2003a: 5, footnote 1). As again emphasised by the Commission in 
this strategy paper, 'thirty years of official relations between Europe and the ASEAN have 
improved mutual awareness, but they have so far failed to realise the true potential of this 
relationship' (2003a: 5). A DG External Relations official, in a similar vein, pointed out: 'this 
new strategy aimed to improve the frozen EU-ASEAN relations, in which political problems 
have been obstructing further development of closer economic relations' (Interview, European 
Commission, DG External Relations, Brussels, 27 January 2004). Therefore, it appears that the 
economic and commercial aim has been dominant. 
The second motivation is responding to the trend towards Free Trade Agreements (FT As ). 
The rapid development of FT As in other parts of the world since the late 1990S94 appears to have 
been one of the major forces driving the EU to adopt this new strategy, particularly the creation 
ofTREATJ. There can be observed not only ASEAN's attempt to create an AFTA by 200895, but 
94 As Sen (2004: 2) noted, a vast majority ofWTO members, who hitherto strictly adhered to a multilateral system of 
world trade, are now parties to one or more FT As. This surge in FT As, which started in the early I 990s, accelerated 
after 1995. Of the 250 FTAs notified to the GA TTIWTO as of December 2002, about 130 were established after 
1995. Among these FT As, over 170 are currently in force, with the remaining expected to be operational soon. WTO 
estimates that by the end of2005, about 300 FT As will be in force all over the world if FT As reportedly planned or 
already under negotiation are concluded by then. 
" At the 4th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 1992, the Heads of Govemment of ASEAN member countries agreed 
on the idea of setting up the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the AFT A, which requires 
that tariff rates levied on a wide range of products traded within the region be reduced to no more than five percent 
and that quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff barriers are to be eliminated. The AFT A was envisioned fOT 
2008, starting in 1993 (ASEAN Secretariat, 1997: 47). Although originally scheduled to be realised by 2008, the 
target of a free trade area in ASEAN was continuously moved forward (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002). 
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also an increasing number of negotiations on FT As between ASEAN (or ASEAN members) and 
other major countries, for example, the ASEAN-China FTA and the US-Singapore FTA. This 
increasing trend towards bilateral FTAs (defined as an FTA involving two economies/regions) in 
Asia, is argued by Sen, as 'an alternative option to advance freer trade [in East Asia] ... when the 
Asian financial crisis 1997-1998 had an impact on the ongoing trade and liberalisation efforts 
within ASEAN and APEC, and thus indirectly on the multilateral efforts within the WTO' (2004: 
3). He also adds that this option was initiated by Singapore, which started pursuing it as a major 
instrument of its commercial trade strategy through FTAs with its trading partners, for example, 
the Singapore-New Zealand FTA (signed in 2000, and came into effect in 2001), Singapore-
Australia FTA (signed in 2003), Singapore-Japan (signed in 2002) and Singapore-European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) (consisting of Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) 
which was agreed in 2002 and came into force in 2003 (2004: 4). Moreover, as Van der Geest 
(2004) noted, 'several other ASEAN countries initiated negotiations towards bilateral FTAs with 
other major players, most notably Thailand (with India) as well as Malaysia (with Japan and 
others),. The US seems be to pursuing a similar strategy in the Asian region by agreeing the US-
Singapore FTA (signed in 2002, came into force in 2004). A US-Thai FTA is also under 
negotiation, whilst Thailand has already signed an FT A framework agreement with Bahrain and 
India and is on the way to concluding similar bilateral deals with Japan and Australia. 
The EU could not neglect this trend, and seemed to pay special attention to two major 
factors: first, the US forging closer economic ties with ASEANI ASEAN members, particularly 
when the US-Singapore FT A was agreed in 2002 and second, China increasing its attention to 
ASEAN, and vice versa, with the result that an ASEAN-China FTA is expected by 2010. This 
tendency towards bilateral FTAs between ASEAN and the EU's major economic competitors led 
the EU to realise that 'most of Europe's main economic partners and competitors are currently 
forging economic partnerships and alliances with the region and/or its individual members, which 
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could chal\enge EU interests in the region' (European Commission, 2003a: 8). Therefore, the 
Commission stressed that: 
'The EU will have to play its part in this intense inter-weaving of economic ties with 
South East Asia. Its strategy should be both "offensive", seeking to improve the EU's position in 
this important market, and "defensive", protecting its existing economic interests in the region' 
(2003a: 8). 
Not surprisingly, the EU's economic and commercial interests in the Asian market are a 
major driving force. In responding to this world FTA trend, the TREATI was initiated as a crucial 
element of the 2003 New ASEAN Strategy with the EU's expectation that 'the TREA TI could 
pave the way for a future preferential trading agreement' (Joint Press Statement, the 3rd AEM-EU 
Consultation). 
In addition, the initiation of TREA TI can be seen as the EU's response to Thailand and 
Singapore's desires to pursue bilateral FTAs with the EU. For example, the Thai Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra twice requested the opening of negotiations on a bilateral FT A with the EU; 
first in 2002 during his official visit to Brussels with Mr. Romano Prodi, the President of 
European Commission 1999-2004, and second in 2003 with Mr. Pascal Lamy, Trade 
Commissioner 1999-2004 during his visit to Thailand in March 2003 (Interview, Thai 
Government official, Government House, Bangkok, 18 December 2003). However, the 
underlying thrust of the European Commission policy as expressed in this New ASEAN Strategy, 
particularly the TREATI, is that the EU stiII prefers to have a regional FT A with ASEAN by 
using a flexible approach and WTO-plus policy, rather than bilateral FT As with different 
ASEAN countries (see detail on TREATI later). 
Besides responding to the world FT A trend, the third reason motivating the EU in 
initiating this New ASEAN Strategy can be understood by taking into account the linkages 
between two levels of EU commercial engagement in Asia, EU-ASEAN relations and ASEM. It 
can be argued that the marginal achievements of the AS EM economic process during almost a 
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decade of its operation, particularly the low capability of AEBF, TF AP and JPAP in producing 
tangible outcomes to enhance trade and investment between Europe and Asia (discussed in 
Chapter 4), has also inspired the Commission in initiating its new interregional strategy towards 
ASEAN. 
It is noticeable that, as with the ASEM's key Action Plans, TF AP and JP AP, discussed in 
the previous case study, the TREATI is also seen by the Commission as a 'trade action plan' 
(2003a: 16), which aims 'to expand trade and investment flows' and 'to [establish] an effective 
framework for dialogue and regulatory co-operation on trade facilitation, market access, and 
investment issues between the two regions' (2003a: 3-4). Although they share a common aim of 
expanding trade and investment between the two regions, the EU has intended to use the EU-
ASEAN framework as an instrument to produce more concrete outcomes, while leaving ASEM 
only for broader dialogue and networking between the two regions. As a DO Trade official 
emphasised: 'the EU-ASEAN framework is expected to produce more concrete outcomes than 
the ASEM' (Interview, European Commission, DO Trade, Brussels, 28 January 2004). 
5.3.2 Priorities 
In its Communication outlining the 'New Partnership with South East Asia', the Commission 
identified six strategic priorities of the EU's relations with ASEAN: 
a) Supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism 
b) Human Rights, democratic principles and good governance 
c) Mainstreaming Justice and Home Affairs issues 
d) Injecting a new dynamism into regional trade and investment relations 
e) Continuing to support the development ofless prosperous countries 
f) Intensifying dialogue and co-operation in specific policy areas (2003a: 3). 
Among these six strategic priorities, it is argued that point D, or the economic priority of 
'injecting a new dynamism into regional trade and investment relations' seems to have attracted 
most attention from both the EU and ASEAN sides. This economic and commercial priority can 
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be seen as a follow up to the AEMMl4 in Brussels on 27-28 January 200396 (some months 
before the adoption of this strategy), when all EU and ASEAN Ministers 97 agreed on 'injecting 
new momentum into EU-ASEAN relations' by emphasising that: 'future ASEAN-EU co-
operation should contribute to new dynamism in the trade relationship including expanding trade 
and investment flows, closer co-operation on trade facilitation, market access and investment 
issues, and to foster greater understanding and co-operation on issues of mutual interest in order 
to make progress in the multilateral trade negotiations' (Joint Co-Chairmen's Statement, 
AEMMI4). This focus on improving EU-ASEAN economic and commercial relations, therefore, 
became a crucial part of the 'New Partnership with South East Asia' strategy. 
5.3.3 Substance 
While emphasising its economic and commercial driving forces and priorities, two noteworthy 
substantive proposals were offered by the Commission in this new EU strategy towards ASEAN: 
new bilateral Co-operation Agreements with individual ASEAN countries, and the TREA TI. 
Both of them reflect a new 'flexible approach', which can be argued as the most significant 
mechanism of this New ASEAN Strategy. 
New Bilateral Co-operation Agreements with Individual ASEAN Countries: A Flexible 
Approach 
The first significant substantive proposal offered by the new strategy is the Commission 
declaration that 'EU will offer new Bilateral Agreements to countries in the region' (2003a: 4). 
This indicates the Commission's intention to move forward its frozen relationship with ASEAN 
during the late 1990s by aiming to adopt new Bilateral Co-operation Agreements with individual 
,. As argued earlier, after some years of set back of the EU-ASEAN relationship due to political problems, the result 
of AEMMl4 in January 2003 proved to be successful and paved the way for revitalising EU-ASEAN relations . 
• 7 During this l4~ AEMM in Brussels, all Foreign Ministers of the EU and ASEAN sides, the European 
Commissioner for External Relations, the EU High Representative for CFSP and the ASEAN Secretary General 
joined the meeting. Moreover, Myanmar also had the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs attended this meeting (Joint 
Co-Chairmen's Statement, AEMMl4, Brussels, 27-28 January 2003) 
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ASEAN members. As a Commission official emphasised, 'rather than amending the 1980 EC-
ASEAN Co-operation Agreement, the Commission instead considers a possibility to adopt a new 
Bilateral Co-operation Agreement with different ASEAN countries in order to overcome political 
constraints obstructing closer co-operation between the two regions'. He also added: 'while 
having to accept the Council's Common Position on Myanmar, the Commission is unable to 
make any change, amend or go forward on the 1980 EU-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement' 
(Interview, European Commission, DO External Relations (South East Asia Unit), Brussels, 27 
January 2004). As Pierre Arnilhat, Head of Unit for South East Asia, DO External Relations also 
emphasised to the European Parliament, 'the EC/ASEAN agreement was by now obsolete, but 
Myanmar's participation in ASEAN made it impossible, for the moment, to negotiate a new 
agreement; a "region to region" comprehensive and flexible dialogue mechanism, called the 
TREA TI would therefore be proposed. In addition, Bilateral Agreements would be concluded 
with those wishing to pursue this option' (European Parliament, 2003). 
This flexible approach, and the option offered by the Commission to some ASEAN 
countries to start negotiating Bilateral Agreements with the EU, in turn illustrates the 
Commission's 'way out' from its institutional tension with the Council, which tends to focus 
more on political problems in South East Asia, particularly the Myanmar problem. As the 
Commission explicitly noted, this new strategy with its more flexible approach could help 'to 
avoid this particular [Myanmar] case stalling relations with the region as a whole' (European 
Commission News, 2003). The Commission aims to use this flexible approach to push forward 
the EU's economic and commercial relationship with ASEAN/or potential ASEAN members, 
who seem to be experiencing a dynamic recovery from the financial crisis, while- also maintaining 
its support for the Council's Common Position on the human rights situation in Myanmar. 
Nonetheless, the flexible approach is still pursued within the EU-ASEAN interregional 
framework. 
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In order to put into effect this flexible approach, the Commission provided a 'menu' of 
sectors from which both sides could choose, through informal consultation at ASEAN and/or 
bilateral level. This so-called 'Menu for a Strengthened Dialogue with South East Asia' appeared 
in Annex III of the Commission's Communication (2003a: 32). The menu includes a number of 
areas in which both sides may decide to either initiate or intensify the level of their dialogue and 
co-operation. As the Commission noted, 'informal consultations should allow partners to identify 
those sectors and determine the aims and format of their co-operation (regional and/or bilateral; 
exchange of information, regulatory co-operation and harmonization, technical and financial co-
operation etc.), (2003a: 32). The Commission also emphasised that this flexible approach is 
designed 'to ensure that both sides enter into dialogue and co-operation on subjects of true 
mutual interest' (2003a: 20). 
The areas of co-operation offered by the Commission in this strategy paper cover a 
greater range than that of the 1980s Co-operation Agreement, which only included 'commercial 
and economic co-operation and development co-operation' (EC-ASEAN Co-operation 
Agreement, Kuala Lumpur, 7 March 1980). In economic and trade issues, co-operation is 
possible in the following areas: Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS), Regulatory Co-operation and 
Industrial Products, Customs, Investment, Competition, Electronic Commerce (Information 
Society), Services, Intellectual Property, Consumer Protection, Industrial Policy. Some new areas 
of co-operation are also added, such as justice and home affairs matters (for example, migration, 
combating organised crime), science and technology, higher education and culture, transport, 
energy, the environment, and information society (2003a: Annex 3, 30-48). This wide range of 
areas of co-operation is recognised by the Council as a sign of 'more mature relations' between 
the EU and South East Asia (2004, paragraph 10) or what the Commission calls 'a modem 
policy-agreement' (Interview, European Commission, DG External Relations, Brussels, 23 
September 2005). 
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The 'New Partnership with South East Asia' Communication was finally approved 
(without debate) by the General Affairs & External Relations Council on 26 January 2004; the 
Council, however, strongly emphasised the importance of the political agenda, particularly in 
respect of human rights and democracy in South East Asia, stressing 'the importance of the EU's 
commitment to an integrated approach in its external relations with South East Asia, whereby 
trade and investment matters are inherently linked to issues of good governance, human rights, 
poverty reduction and the rule oflaw,98 (2004, Paragraph 8). This in a way reflects an internal 
tension within different institutions of the EU itself. While the Commission seems to put forward 
the need to strengthen economic and commercial ties between the EU and ASEAN, the Council 
is likely to have been more concerned with the political agenda, particularly in promoting human 
rights and democracy in the South East Asian region. In November 2004 the Council gave a 
mandate to the Commission to start negotiating Bilateral Co-operation with 6 ASEAN countries, 
except Burrna/Myanmar99. The Commission seemed to be satisfied with this result (Interview, 
European Commission, DG External Relations, Brussels, 23 September 2005). 
Thailand and Singapore are the first two ASEAN countries with which the Commission 
has started to prepare negotiations for Bilateral Co-operation Agreements. During the ASEM5 
Summit in Hanoi, Negotiations for Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) between the 
EU-Thailand and between the EU-Singapore were launched on 8 October 2004. Prime Minister 
Jean Claude Juncker, incoming President of the European Council, President Romano Prodi of 
the European Commission (at that time), and Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra of the Kingdom 
of Thailand, and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of the Republic of Singapore confirmed their 
intent to launch official negotiations for the conclusion of bilateral Partnership and Co-operation 
" Moreover, the Council also 'recalls the inclusion of the "essential element" clause in the Union's conclusion of co-
operation agreements with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and calls upon the Commission to make full use of this 
clause in promoting co-operation in the field of human rights, as a complement to the dialogue on this matter as well 
as to ensure its inclusion in possible new agreements with countries in the region' (Council, 2004, Paragraph 8). 
99 Also except Cambodia, Lao, and Vietnam because these three countries already have Bilateral Co-operation 
Agreements with the EU. 
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Agreements between EU and Thailand and between EU and Singapore (European Commission 
News, 8 October 2004a). A Commission official noted in January 2004 that 'the Bilateral 
Agreements with Thailand and Singapore will be used as a model for other South East Asian 
countries'; however this is still an on-going negotiation process between the European 
Commission and Thai and Singaporean governments (Interview, European Commission, DG 
External Relations, Brussels, 27 January 2004). The most recent interview with a Commission 
official responsible for implementation of the New ASEAN Strategy in September 2005 
suggested that the Bilateral Agreements with Thailand and Singapore are at the final stage of 
negotiation. After confirmation in March 2003, negotiations with Indonesia may be start soon, 
while Malaysia and Philippines have informally expressed their interest (Interview, European 
Commission, DG External Relations, Brussels, 23 September 2005). The EU-Thai Bilateral 
Agreement will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI/oO 
The second, but equally important, substantive component of this new EU strategy towards 
ASEAN is the TREATI, adopted as part of the New ASEAN Strategy. The TREATI can be seen 
as a new mechanism pushed forward by the Commission, and especially by DG Trade - a real 
initiator and a manager of the TREA TI - 'to expand trade and investment flows and establish an 
effective framework for dialogue and regulatory co-operation on trade facilitation, market access, 
and investment issues between the two regions' (European Commission, 2003a: 16). This 
creation of TREAT I reflects DG Trade's strong attempt to reinvigorate the EU-ASEAN 
economic and commercial relations on an interregional basis. As Pascal Lamy, the EU Trade 
Commissioner 1999-2004 emphasised while announcing the TREA TI: 
100 Although TREA TI stands for 'Trans-Regional' EU-ASEAN Trade Initiation, it is argued that TREA Tl in fact 
falls within the EU-ASEAN interregional relations, with a flexible framework. 
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'With today's move we open a new chapter in EU-ASEAN trade relations ... TREATI will 
thus enable the establishment of a closer economic relationship between two important trading 
regions, and thereby permit serious consideration to be given to a potential Free Trade Agreement 
following the successful outcome of the current WTO round of trade talks' (European 
Commission News, 2003). 
While responding to the trend towards FTAs in Asia and the rest of the world (mentioned 
in Section 5.3.1), a potential FTA between the EU and ASEAN seems to have motivated DG 
Trade's initiation ofTREA TI in 2003. Although the Commission announced that 'the TREAT! 
could pave the way for a future preferential trading agreement' (Joint Press Statement, 3'd AEM-
EU Consultations), the Commission stilI stressed its preference to negotiate a FT A with ASEAN 
as a region, rather than bilateral FT As with different ASEAN countries by noting that: 'EU-
ASEAN co-operation on trade issues should take place, where feasible, on a region-to-region 
basis' (TREAT!, 2003). Moreover, the Commission also set a major condition that 'TREATI will 
thus permit serious consideration to be given to entering into a FT A following the successful 
outcome of the current round of multilateral trade negotiations, ... based on the "WTO-plus" 
principle' (2003a: 3\). 
This means, according to the Commission, 'TREAT! is not a FTA with ASEAN'; rather, 
as a DG Trade official responsible for TREATI pointed out, 'TREAT! only aims at building a 
'framework for co-operation' between the EU and ASEAN, or 'building working groups to 
overcome trade and investment barriers and harmonising standards between two regions, without 
committing to any change of legal framework' (Interview, European Commission, DG Trade, 
Brussels, 28 January 2004). In other words, TREATI is seen by the Commission as 'process of 
dialogue and co-operation' which '[should] aim at informing partners about each other's 
regulatory systems and eventually develop into an exercise of approximation and harmonisation' 
(European Commission, 2003a: \6), thus representing' a pragmatic and concrete approach to 
facilitate trade and investment through regulatory co-operation' (DG Trade, 2004). In addition, 
DG Trade also emphasised that 'the TREAT! aims in particular to tackle NTBs by building 
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understanding and co-operation among officials who work on the NTBs legislation, keeping both 
sides informed and exchanging views in order to reduce existing and prevent new NTBs' 
(Interview, European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 28 January 2004). 
Although TREA TI is obviously a regional trade action plan - not a formal treaty-
between the EU and ASEAN, substantial diversity within ASEAN, especially the various levels 
of development and differing priorities within ASEAN, meant that the Commission had to create 
a 'flexible framework' for TREATI (TREATI, 2003: 30), following the flexible approach of the 
New ASEAN Strategy mentioned earlier. This flexible framework in TREA TI is called 'EU+X' 
formula, which means that' ... each South East Asian country would select from a comprehensive 
menu of commonly defined and agreed activities, addressing different areas relating to trade and 
investment facilitation - agricultural and industrial product standards, customs procedures, 
intellectual property rights, services, etc., choosing to sign up for each one when they desire to do 
so' [and] 'within this commonly-agreed framework, a specific activity could thus commence with 
the involvement of two or more ASEAN countries, and gradually expand its membership, 
towards the ultimate goal of having all countries participate on an equal basis' (TREATI, 2003: 
30). The use of the EU+ X formula or generally a flexible framework within the TREA TI implies 
the use of bilateralism within an interregional framework. Though TREA TI is seen as a regional 
trade action plan, its implementation is done bilaterally between the EU and different ASEAN 
countries. As noted in the TREA TI, 'each country should develop its own individual roadmap 
under the regional framework, establishing plans to progress and participate in the various 
activities within a certain timeframe' (TREA TI, 2003: 30). 
The SEOM-EU Consultation - a senior official level meeting created since 1999 as a new 
mechanism under the EU-ASEAN institutional framework - has been used as a platform to 
negotiate and discuss TREA TI matters between the Commission and ASEAN officials (economic 
or commercial officials). The SEOM-EU in turn reports to the AEM-EU Trade Commissioner 
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meeting. Besides the on-going implementation of TREA TI activities, recently at the AEM -EU 
Consultation meeting in April 2005 in Halong Bay, the EU and ASEAN sides agreed to set up a 
'Vision Group', which is an initiative of Peter Mandelson, the EU trade Commissioner (since 
2004), in order to study the possibility of creating FTA between the two regions. The Vision 
Group first met in Hanoi in July 2005 (Mission of Thailand to the European Communities, 
Brussels at www.thaieurope.net). However, given that progress at the WTO level seems to face 
some difficulties and is still unpredictablelOI , some major ASEAN countries, like Thailand and 
Singapore, view bilateral FT As between the EU and their countries as a more desirable option. 
5.3.4 EU-ASEAN Relations as 'Intergovernmental' Dialogue 
The development of EU-ASEAN economic and commercial relations described in the earlier 
sections indicates that the EU-ASEAN institutional structure neither has a formal mechanism to 
engage firms nor aims to involve business sector into its economic and commercial framework. 
Unlike the ASEM economic framework into which a business body like the AEBF has been 
integrated, interregional EU-ASEAN relations remain 'intergovemmental' in nature. The reason 
is perhaps that the EU has already had AEBF as a mechanism to engage business at the 
transregionallevel, thus at the EU-ASEAN interregionallevel the EU does not see the same need. 
In September 1994 the first EU-ASEAN Business Conference was held in Stuttgart, 
Germany (under the EU-ASEAN framework and back-to-back with the 11th AEMM (ASEAN 
Annual Report, 1994-1995), but it was the first and the last one. The continuity of the EU-
ASEAN Business Conference was replaced with the first AEBF meeting in Paris in October 
1996. This implies that the EU aimed to incorporate this EU-ASEAN business meeting into the 
broader framework of the AEBF and AS EM. This perhaps was simply to avoid overlap between 
101 This is argued for the period after the failure ofthe Cancun WTO Round in September 2003, and before the start 
ofthe Hong Kong WTO Round in December 2005, where the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) will be 
renegotiated. 
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two regional frameworks in Asia. Again, in 1996 the EU expressed its concern to involve 
business in the EU-ASEAN framework through the 1996 ASEAN strategy (discussed earlier); 
however, as noted earlier this strategy was not successfully implemented due to the Myanmar 
problem and the economic crisis in Asia in 1997-1998, finally leading to the 'freezing' ofEU-
ASEAN relations during that period. In 2003, the New ASEAN Strategy and the TREA TI were 
initiated in order to revitalise EU-ASEAN relations and more specifically to pave the way for a 
further FT A with ASEAN. This raises an interesting question: do this New ASEAN Strategy and 
the TREA TI foresee more direct business involvement in the EU-ASEAN economic and 
commercial framework? The research conducted by the author provides evidence that instead of 
attempting to include business into the EU-ASEAN institutional framework, this new strategy 
and TREA TI still focus on EU-ASEAN relations as an intergovernmental dialogue exclusively 
among diplomats and policy-makers. 
Unlike the ASEM process, there is a notable lack of business driving forces behind the 
creation ofTREATI, and the TREATI was in fact, as accepted by the Commission, 'a pure EU 
initiative' (Interview, European Commission, DO Trade, Brussels, 28 January 2004). Because it 
is an intergovernmental framework, TREA TI is seen by the Commission as having 'more 
capacity [than ASEM] to produce more concrete outcomes in enhancing trade and investment ties 
between the EU and ASEAN'. In addition, the Commission strongly emphasised that' AS EM and 
EU-ASEAN relations are different frameworks: while the ASEM is seen as a dialogue for 
meeting and networking among leaders, the EU-ASEAN framework is aimed at producing more 
tangible outcomes' (Interview, European Commission, DO Trade, Brussels, 28 January 2004). 
Last but not least, it is important to note that the implementation ofTREATI is still at its 
initial stage lO2; thus it logically focuses mainly on the diplomatic and policy-making level of 
102 In January 2004, the TRTA TI Roadmap for the implementation and its work plan for 2004 were adopted at the 
4th AEM-EU Consultation in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. 
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interaction between the Commission and ASEAN government officials. As a DG Trade official 
confirmed, 'at this early stage the TREAT! does not aim to involve or engage any business in the 
formal and institutionalised way ... rather the TREATI only aims to strengthen the existing 
government-to-government dialogue between the EU and ASEAN both regionally and bilaterally 
by building the bilateral framework for co-operations which then could lead to stronger regional 
co-operation between EU-ASEAN in the future' (Interview, DG Trade, European Commission, 
Brussels, 28 January 2004). At the same time, the Commission also tried to introduce the 
TREATI to business on the ground by organising the TREAT! workshop on 'TREATI: What it 
means for business?' in March 2004, in Bangkok. This however was primarily an information 
event as opposed to an attempt to engage business directly. 
To conclude the argument so far, the exploration of the EU-ASEAN interregional 
relations in the earlier sections has suggested that at this early stage the New ASEAN strategy 
and the TREAT! (adopted in 2003) do not yet appear to engage business within the 
intergovemmental framework. The next section of the chapter aims to explore further whether the 
EU has initiated different mechanisms/tools to engage business at the interregionallevel. 
Economic co-operation programmes can be seen as another form of EU indirect business 
engagement strategy towards ASEAN. 
5.4 THE EU'S ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION PROGRAMMES AND BUSINESS 
ENGAGEMENT 
While the previous section has shown that EU-ASEAN relations remain intergovernmental in 
nature and that the EU has not yet aimed to engage business directly into the institutional 
framework of EU-ASEAN relations, this section argues that the EU has one rather distinctive 
strategy to engage business in Asia: through economic co-operation programmes. It is important 
to note that these economic co-operation programmes are not only specifically for ASEAN, but 
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also include the wider context of Asia (including for example, China and South Asia), of which 
ASEAN is one of the main beneficiaries. Nonetheless, the use of economic co-operation 
programmes as commercial tools can be recognised as a significant element of the EU's 
commercial strategy towards ASEAN at the interregionallevel since the mid-l 990s until 
recently. 
In this section, the chapter first explores the increasing importance of economic co-
operation programmes as commercial instruments and business engagement in Asia since the 
mid-1990s, and investigates different types of EU economic co-operation programmes towards 
Asia, including the Asia-wide programmes, the multi-country programmes, and particularly the 
EU-ASEAN interregional programmes. Two economic co-operation programmes aiming to 
engage business, EBIC initially adopted for ASEAN and then expanded to other Asian countries, 
and Asia-Invest Programme under the Asia-wide programmes in which ASEAN is one of the 
beneficiaries, will be investigated in detail. 
5.4.1 Increasing Importance of Economic Co-operation Programmes as Commercial 
Instruments and Business Engagement in Asia and ASEAN 
Since the mid-l 990s, the EU's use of economic-co-operation programmes as commercial 
instruments to promote trade and investment and particularly to engage business has increasingly 
been evident as part ofEU commercial diplomacy and market access strategy. As already 
mentioned in Chapter 2 (Section, 2.4.4.), it is impossible to understand the overall picture of the 
EU's commercial strategy (particularly towards emerging markets, such as Asia and Latin 
America) without taking into account aid and development assistance offered by the EU. This 
implies an increasing importance of the EuropeAid Co-operation Office - one department of the 
European Commission - in managing the EU's commercial diplomacy alongside DG Trade and 
DG External Relations. In the case of Asia, an official from the EuropeAid Co-operation Office 
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emphasised, 'rather than focusing only on giving aid and development assistance, managing the 
use of economic co-operation programmes in facilitating trade and investment to Asia has also 
become one of our major tasks' and 'the EuropeAid Co-operation Office has played an 
increasingly important role in supporting economic and commercial relations between the EU 
and Asia' (interview, European Commission, EuropeAid Co-operation Office, Brussels, 13 June 
2003). A DO Trade official also agreed that 'apart from the EU's trade policy managed by DO 
Trade, co-operation programmes have become more important as the EU's commercial 
instruments towards Asia' (Interview, European Commission, DO Trade, Brussels, 13 June 
2003). 
When considering particularly the case of ASEAN, the EU's co-operation programmes 
towards ASEAN were not initially aimed to serve economic obj ectives; however the situation 
started to change during the 1990s. The evolution of EU' s financial assistance towards ASEAN 
1976-1995 shown in Table 5.4 indicates the increasing importance ofEU's economic co-
operation programmes towards ASEAN during the 1990s, compared to their non- existence in the 
1970-1980s (when only development co-operation programmes existed). Since its inception in 
the 1ate-1980s, economic co-operation towards ASEAN accounted for 33.79 million Euros, 
representing 34.99% of the total EU financial assistance toward ASEAN in 1988-1991, and 
accounted for 112.96 million Euros, representing 24.5% of the tota1460.91 million Euros for the 
period 1992-1995 (Commission, 1996c, Annex 7: 8). This represents a significant increase ofEU 
assistance towards ASEAN in the 1990s. 
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Table 5.4: Evolution of EU Financial Assistance Evolution toward ASEAN (Million Euros) 
1976-1979 
1980-1983 
1988-1991 
1992-1995 
6.59% 
33.79 
100% 
135.61 
100% 
92.75% 
71.66% 
0.66% 
30.08 
European Commission 1996c, Annex 7: 8 
135.61 
100% 
150.83 
100% 
100% 
100% 
Moreover, the Commission explicitly expressed its concern in the 1996 ASEAN strategy 
that: 'to take account of the extremely dynamic evolution of the ASEAN countries, our co-
operation programmes have been geared towards an increased economic content and the focusing 
of development schemes on disadvantaged areas and populations' (1996c: 16). This 1996 
strategy established, for the first time, the use of EU aid and development co-operation as a 
means to promote trade and investment between the EU and ASEAN. Robles also makes a 
similar observation: 'with the progress of industrialisation in South East Asia, ASEAN began to 
be perceived by actors in the EU - firms, states, and the EU itself - less as a developing region 
and more as a part of an East Asia region competing with Europe' (2004: 66). This new EU 
perception changed the nature ofEU's financial assistance towards ASEAN during the late-I 990s 
to a more economic and commercial-oriented focus, with an emphasis on economic co-operation 
projects which promote trade and investment between two regions, rather than pure aid and 
development co-operation. 
Since then the use of economic co-operation programmes as commercial instruments to 
facilitate trade and promote investment as well as to engage business has become a feature of 
EU's commercial strategy towards ASEAN, as well as the broader context of Asia. However, 
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following what Robles argued earlier - that, ASEAN is seen less as a developing region but more 
as part of an East Asia region - it is not surprising that ASEAN has often been engaged as part of 
the broader context of Asia while implementing this commercial strategy. 
The wide range ofEU co-operation programmes towards Asia can be observed10l , 
including beneficiaries from not only ASEAN, but also from a regional grouping in South Asia 
(or SAAR) and China. According to its 'Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for Multi-
Country Programmes in Asia 2005-2006', the Commission (2004a) divided its co-operation 
programmes towards Asia into three broad categories: Asia-wide programmes, sub-regional 
programmes for ASEAN and SAARC, and multi-country programmes corresponding to specific 
needs (for example, ASEM programmes). First, the chapter explores Asia-wide programmes and 
other multi-country programmes, in which ASEAN is one of many beneficiaries; secondly, it 
turns to explore EU co-operation programmes towards ASEAN in particular. 
Asia-Wide Programmes and Other Multi-Country Programmes 
Apart from the particular programmes towards ASEAN through the EU-ASEAN interregional 
framework, ASEAN countries also benefit from the Asia-wide programmes and other multi-
country programmes offered by the EU, through the ASEM framework. For instance, the ASEM 
Trust Fund II 2002-2005 aims to contribute and consolidate the process of economic and social 
reform in Asian countries affected by the Asian financial crisis of 1997; China, Indonesia, 
Vietnam Philippines, Thailand are among the beneficiaries. For the Asia-wide programmes l04, 
ASEAN is one ofthe main beneficiaries among other eligible Asian countries 105. As the 
103 See Annex 5.1, page 337 for a list ofEU co-operation programmes towards Asia, including the beneficiaries, the 
amount of budget given by the EU, the operation period, and objectives. 
104 The EC has launched since the mid-I 990s a series of Asia-wide horizontal programmes. Some ofthese 
programmes are now entering in their second phase, whereas others have just started (European Commission, 2004a: 
IgJ'Asia_wide programmes cover in principle all Asian countries, which are eligible under the ALA 
Regulation: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Cambodia, China, East Timor, India, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
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Commission emphasised in its 2003 ASEAN Strategy, among currently five types of Asia-wide 
regional programme being run, ASEAN and South East Asian countries benefit from these 
programmes as follows: 
(i) Asia-Invest: Business Co-operation. From its inception in 1997 until 2002 [Asia 
Invest Phase I], 38% of activities implemented under the Asia-Invest Programme involved South 
East Asia, representing a commitment 7.05 million Euros 
(ii) Asia IT&C: Co-operation in Information Technology and Communication. South 
East Asian organisations have participated in 62% of the projects since 1999, 
representing an EC commitment of 14 million Euros 
(iii) Asia Urbs: Co-operation in Urban Development. IS million Euros has been 
committed to projects involving South East Asian countries, which represents 67% of the total 
allotted to Asia. 
(iv) Asia-Link: Co-operation in Higher Education. South East Asia is by far the largest 
sub-region in Asia in terms of submitted proposals and implemented projects, to which 6.7 
million Euros has been committed. 
(v) EU-Asia Pro Eco: Co-operation in Environmental Issues. These projects cover areas 
such as sustainable agriculture and forestry management. This programme was launched in 
October 2002, and five South East Asian countries are involved in the first 10 projects that have 
been selected (European Commission, 2003a: fichel). 
While not aiming to explore each of the above programmes in detail, the chapter argues 
that among the Asia-wide programmes, the Asia-Invest programme can be seen as representing a 
significant commercial and business engagement instrument 'to facilitate partnerships between 
European and Asian companies, and to promote capacity building for Asian companies and 
business associations in order to attract new trade and investment' (Commission, 2004a, Annex 
2-4). However, while ASEAN is one of the main beneficiaries alongside other eligible Asian 
countries, including China, the question raised here is: to what extent does ASEAN actually 
benefit from this Asia-wide programme in promoting the EU-ASEAN economic and commercial 
relations? The Asia-Invest Programme will be evaluated in Section 5.4.3. 
Thailand, Vietnam (2004a: 4). 
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Economic Co-operation Programmes towards ASEAN 
Besides the Asia-wide programmes and the multi-country programmes (for example, in the 
ASEM framework), the EU also provides specific co-operation programmes for ASEAN. The 
Commission (2004a: 15-16) stressed that there are a significant number of programmes 
undertaken with ASEAN under the EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement for a total financing 
commitment of some 75 million Euros. Projects include interventions on: Trade (Standards, 
Quality and Conformity Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights), Energy, Environment (Centre 
for Biodiversity Conservation), Capacity building (APRIS support for regional integration) and 
Higher education (ASEAN-EU University N etwork Programme) (See a list of EU Co-operation 
Programmes toward AsiaJASEAN in Annex 5.1, page 337). 
Among these programmes/projects, the 'ASEAN-EU Regional Cooperation on Standards, 
Quality and Conformity Assessment Programme' and' ASEAN-EC Intellectual Property Rights 
Cooperation Programme', aiming to bring it into line with EU practices and international 
standards and to upgrade the ASEAN Intellectual Property system, respectively, can be seen as 
substantial commercial instruments of the EU in facilitating trade and supporting both EU and 
Asian businesses. For example, in the area of Intellectual Property, the 'EC-ASEAN Patents and 
Trademarks Programme (ECAP I)' \06 (from September 1993 to June 1997) was created to assist 
ASEAN countries in promoting their systems for the protection of Industrial Property Rights. 
This in turn helped in protecting European business interests in Asia concerning Intellectual 
Property issues. Moreover, the EU launched a new economic co-operation programme called 
'EC-ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Co-operation Programme' (ECAP 11), officially started 
106 The ECAP I was implemented with the six original ASEAN member states namely Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore. After joining ASEAN in June 1995, Vietnam participated in all regional 
ECAP I activities. 
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in July 2000 and running for five years with a total budget of 5 million Eurosl07• The overall 
objectives of ECAP II are: to foster trade, investment and technology exchange between Europe 
and ASEAN and to foster intra-ASEAN trade and investment (ECAP Offical Website at 
www.ecap-project.org/ecap/). 
However, there was an interesting observation concerning the Commission's evaluation 
of these EU-ASEAN co-operation programmes, noted in the Commission's (2004a: 13) 'Strategy 
Paper and Indicative Programme for Multi-Programme in Asia 2005-2006', that although the EC-
ASEAN programmes have made a valuable contribution to promoting co-operation at regional 
level, some of these programmes may in retrospect have been overly ambitious (Biodiversity, 
IPR) and were not in pace with ASEAN's own agenda which have sometimes been in advance of 
the realities of ASEAN 'integration. In consequence, the Commission concluded that 'region to 
region co-operation with ASEAN has proven more complex than bilateral co-operation' (2004a: 
13). Therefore, it seems the Commission has suggested that bilateral co-operation might be a 
better option for ASEAN, when it introduced a new and more flexible approach that 'co-
operation ... can be bilateral, regional or a mix of both' (2004a: 16). This is in line with the 
flexible approach of the New ASEAN strategy mentioned earlier, which allows for new Bilateral 
Co-operation Agreements with individual ASEAN countries. 
Taking into account the EU indicative budget for 200512006 for co-operation programmes 
towards Asia shown in Table 5.5, it is important to note that ASEAN benefits from the 
substantial regional envelopes, both Asia-wide programmes and specific EU-ASEAN co-
operation assistance, accounting for 10-15 million Euros from the total indicative budget for 
107 While ECAP I focused on industrial property tights, this new programme expands the scope of activities to all 
fields of intellectual property tights: patents and industrial designs, trade marks, copyrights and related tights, 
geographical indications, layout-designs of integrated circuits, protection of undisclosed infonnation. It also covers 
activities in the area of enforcement. It comptises a regional component coveting Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, and national components coveting the same countries except Vietnam. 
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200512006 of approximately 85-100 million Euros, compared to only 2-5 million Euros for 
SAARC. Moreover, it is important to note that the EU also devotes the amount of 15-25 million 
Euros to trade and investment co-operation under the Asia-wide programmes (which includes the 
Asia-Invest Programme), compared to the same amount on environment but more on higher 
education (24-35 million Euros) 108. 
Table 5.5: The EU's Indicative Budget for 2005/2006 
Asia-wide Programmes Trade and Investment 15-25 millions 
Higher Education 24-35 millions 
Environment 15-25 millions 
ASEAN 10-15 millions 
SAARC 2-5 million 
Reserve 15 millions 
TOTAL 85-100 millions 
Source: European ComrrussIOn, 2004a: 27-28 
The financial commitment the EU makes to these co-operation programmes, both the 
Asia-wide programmes (particularly in trade and investment) and specific programmes towards 
ASEAN, indicates the significance of the use of economic co-operation programmes as 
commercial instruments towards ASEAN and the crucial role of the EU as 'financer' in engaging 
business in South East Asia. Instead of trying to directly engage business into the EU-ASEAN 
interregional framework which remains predominantly intergoverrunental in nature, the EU 
prefers to play a background and framework role by giving financial support and funding through 
these economic co-operation programmes for business or business associations to organise their 
own trade and investment facilitation/promotion activities (in the case of the Asia Invest 
Programme). While the ASEM and AEBF focuses on a process of dialogue and networking 
among EU and Asian public and private sectors, particularly governments and business, at 
transregionallevel, the EU's interregional strategy with ASEAN through the use of these 
108 The budget for higher education is as high as 24-35 million Euros for 2005/2006 because it includes a budget for 
a new scholarship programme called Erasmus Mundus in Asia, targeting more Asian students to study in Europe. 
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economic and co-operation programmes aims at producing more concrete outcomes at the local 
level, supporting business co-operation, promoting joint ventures, tackling particular trade 
problems, for example, intellectual property and standards (in the case of EU-ASEAN 
programmes). 
Moreover, it is important to note that these EU economic co-operation programmes aim 
particularly to support SMEs, rather than large transnational companies, from both Europe and 
Asia. This is, for the Commission, because' SMEs often do not have the means to keep up with 
developments in foreign markets, and cannot bear the high costs involved in looking for partners 
on the other side of the world' and 'such difficulties mean that SMEs have tended to benefit the 
least from the enormous opportunities for technology transfer, trade and investment between 
European and Asian companies' (European Commission Delegation in Thailand, 1997: 5). 
Therefore, these economic co-operation programmes can particularly facilitate European and 
Asian business co-operation. 
Key examples of the economic co-operation programmes to engage business and to 
produce concrete outcomes in support of trade and investment between the EU and South East 
Asia used in this chapter are: EBIC initially adopted for ASEAN and then expanded to other 
Asian countries, and the Asia-Invest Programme under the Asia-wide programme, in which 
ASEAN is one of the beneficiaries. While the EBIC aims to facilitate trade and investment by 
providing information to EU and Asian firms on trade, infrastructure, factor costs, and 
regulations and standards, the Asia Invest Programme aims to promote investment between the 
two regions by supporting business match-making opportunities, partnership-building and 
capacity strengthening activities. The chapter now turns to examine the EBIC and Asia Invest 
Programme in terms of their objectives and operations and to evaluate the extent to which these 
programmes have been produced concrete outcomes in promoting trade and investment relations 
between the two regions, as the EU intended. 
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5.4.2 European Business Information Centre (EBIC)109 
It was at the AEMMII in September 1994 that the idea of the EBIC was initiated and the 
Ministers agreed 'to complete by the end of 1994 the constitution of a network of European 
Business Infonnation Centres in ASEAN capitals' which 'will provide valuable infonnation to 
businessmen on market conditions in Europe and ASEAN' (Joint Declaration the AEMMll, 
Paragraph 12). Following the AEMMll initiative, EBIC offices were established in four major 
ASEAN countries, including Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam (an EBIC in Indonesia 
was planned, but has never taken off) as well as in two South Asian countries, India and Sri 
Lanka (EuropeAid Co-operation Office, 2004b and 2004c). See Table 5.6 for a list ofEBIC in 
Asia. 
Table 5.6 EBIC Offices in Asia (South East Asia and South Asia) 
EBIC Philippines 1996-2000 
EBIC Thailand 
EBIC 
EBIC Indonesia 
EBIC Sri Lanka 
EBIC India 
*Never 
taken 
1998-2002 
2000-2002 
The European Chamber of 
Commerce of the 
Philippines 
Note: No European 
Chamber of Commerce as 
such 
Commerce in Vietnam 
European Chamber of 
Commerce of Sri Lanka 
The Council of EU 
Chambers .of Commerce 
in India 
Also called 'Business Infonnation 
Development Service II (BID Il) 
Project as it was extended from BIC 
I 
some 
months of its operation 
Source: adopted and accumulated by the Author from interviews and questionnaire feedbacks, 
and the EuropeAid Co-operation Office (2004b and 2004c) 
109 EBIC is one of the EU economic co-operation programmes towards ASEAN operating between 1994 and 2002, 
thus it is not included in Annex 5.1, page 337 which is a list of more current programmes. 
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Adopted as part of the EU's co-operation programmes, the EBIC programme was directed 
and managed by the EuropeAid Co-operation Office of the European Commission. Two general 
objectives of the EBIC stated by the Commission are: I) to raise the profile of the EU among the 
business community in the partner countries and II) to contribute to the development ofthe Asian 
partner countries. Following these objectives, the EBIC core activities include: 
(i) providing information to Asian businesses or associations (such information will be on 
issues related to the EU single-market such as customs and tariffs, market access, standards, 
technical certification) 
(ii) promoting the take-up by Asian applicants of EU cooperation programmes 
(particularly Asia-Invest) and the training opportunities they offer, so as to facilitate skills and 
capacity building in the Asian business communities, 
(iii) collaborating with and servicing the member states embassies or other bilateral 
business associations in the Asian countries, by building up a resources and information base 
(covering both EU and single market issues as well as such information on the local business 
regulations) that will be at the disposal of the embassies to assist them in their own business 
cooperation initiatives, and etc (EuropeAid Co-operation Office, 2004a). 
These EBIC objectives and activities mentioned earlier reflect the Commission's attempt 
to engage business by establishing an EU-Ievel agency at the local level to assist business on its 
day-to-day business activities and to coordinate with both public and private sector agencies, 
including Member States Embassies, national Chambers of Commerce, and other business 
associations. The EBIC was strategically seen by the Commission as the EU 'service' agency to 
help facilitate trade and investment between the EU and ASEAN, as well as to bring the EU 
closer to business communities, particularly in the area of trade by providing information on the 
Single European market. The EBIC perhaps can be seen as following the model of the JETR0110 
representative offices in Asia to assist Japanese business in third countries. 
110 JETRO is a government-related organization (under Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry-METI) 
that works to promote mutual trade and investment between Japan and the rest of the world. Originally established in 
1958 to promote Japanese exports abroad, JETRO's core focus in the 21 st century has shifted toward promoting FDI 
into Japan and helping Japanese SMEs maximise their global export potential. (JETRO website at www.jetro.goJp, 
accessed April 2005). 
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However, the implementation of the EBIC programme was no easy task, and EBIC 
offices faced a number of operational difficulties which meant that they were not a success in 
every Asian country. After some years of six EBIC offices operating in South East Asia and 
South Asia, the Commission decided to end the EBIC programme in 2003 with significant 
achievements in some countries but only marginal achievements in the others. 
Both the Commission's evaluation of the EBIC programme and interviews and 
questionnaire research conducted by the author with officials of the EU and the EBIC offices in 
Asia suggest a variety of outcomes and achievements of the EBIC programme in different Asia 
and ASEAN countries. For example: 'the EBIC in Vietnam was operating successfully until 2003 
when the Commission decided to end the EBIC programme!!!' (Questionnaire Feedback, Former 
Executive Director ofEBIC Vietnam, 16 February 2004); the EBIC Offices in the Philippines, 
India and Sri Lanka were also running successfully but were closed in 2000 (for the Philippines) 
and in 2002 (for India and Sri Lanka) (EuropeAid Co-operation Office, 2004b and 2004c). 
However, the EBIC in Thailand faced a number of operational problems from its establishment in 
1999, and was closed in the same year after only a few months of operations (Interview, 
Delegation of the European Commission in Thailand, Bangkok, 26 August 2003). The planned 
EBIC in Indonesia did not even take off (EuropeAid Co-operation Office, 2004b and 2004c). In 
Vietnam, India and Sri Lanka, the European Chambers of Commerce and the Delegations of the 
Commission in those countries carried the EBIC activities forward. In Thailand where there is no 
European Chamber ofCommerce ll2, the Delegation in Bangkok absorbed some activities of the 
EBlC into a new section under the delegation called 'Business Information Centre- BIC', 
established in 2004 (Interview, Delegation of the European Commission in Thailand, Bangkok, 
III The EBIC in Vietnam was operating until 30 September 2003. After two years of operation, it managed over 1000 
enquiries, more than lOO seminars with over 5500 participants (EBIC Vietnam website, accessed February 2004) 
'" In Thailand, there is no European Chamber of Commerce as a legal entity (Thai law does not allow this), but there 
is an infonnal networking process between Chambers of Commerce of European countries in Thailand (See Chapter 
6). 
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26 August 2003). The roles of the Delegation of the Commission as a trade facilitator, 
particularly the BlC will be discussed further in the case study of Thailand (See Chapter 6, 
Section 6.4.2). 
In this respect, the marginal achievements ofthe EBIC as an EU-level agency to facilitate 
trade and investment in ASEAN countries seems partly due to uneven distribution of commercial 
competence between the EU and Member States (while trade policy falls under the Community's 
exclusive competence, trade and investment promotion and investment issues are still under 
Member States' competence) that made EBIC operations on the ground more difficult. This 
uneven distribution of commercial competence also led to overlapping and confusion of roles, 
responsibilities, and activities of EU-level organisations like the EBIC and Member States' 
business organisations such as national Chambers of Commerce (obviously, in the case of 
Thailand). The Commission's aim of using the EBIC as an agency 'act[ing] in a manner 
complementary to the public and private sector agencies of the member states, to increase the 
capacity of Asian business to engage in mutually beneficial linkages with EU businesses' 
(EuropeAid Co-operation Office, 2004a) was rather difficult to achieve. In the case of Thailand, 
some Chambers of Commerce even expressed their strong opinion that the EBIC activities 
somehow were overlapping with that of the Chambers and Embassies (Interview, German-Thai 
Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 7 August 2003; Interview, British Chamber of Commerce 
Thailand, Bangkok, 27 August 2003). This implies that there is still a gap between the EU and 
the business community at local level in Thailand (This point will also be further discussed in the 
case of Thailand in Chapter 6). 
However, apart from the issue of uneven competence, it is important to note that the 
success or failure of the EBIC office also varies according to particular conditions and situations 
in different ASEAN countries. For instance, in the case of Vietnam, individual Member States 
Embassies and business organisations are not yet well represented, so there is more incentive to 
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cooperate under the EU's umbrella. Thus, the EBIC could play a more important role. On the 
other hand, in some other ASEAN countries, where there are stronger and well-represented 
national business organisations and Member States in the country, the need to have an EU-
agency like the EBIC would appear to be less pressing. 
The EU seemed to learn from the EBIC experience that rather than trying to engage 
business on its day-to-day business activities, it should pursue its role only at the 
frameworklbackground level. The promotion of day-to-day business activities and trade and 
investment promotion issues remains a responsibility of the Member State Embassies and their 
national business organisations such as Chambers of Commerce. As a EuropeAid Co-operation 
official noted, the Small Project Facility (SPF) - a programme of EU financial support at bilateral 
level- which has commenced in a number of Asian countries, for example, Bangladesh, China, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam - in many 
cases carries out similar types of activities to those undertaken through the EBIC programme 
(Questionnaire feedback, EuropeAid Co-operation Office, 31 March 2004). Detailed discussion 
of the SPF Project in Thailand will be dealt with in the next chapter (See Section 6.4.3), but it 
appears that the EU prefers to play only a financier role in engaging business within South East 
Asian countries. The Asia-Invest Programme also reflects this EU intention. 
5.4.3 The Asia-Invest Programme 
The Asia-Invest programme is another example of the EU's economic co-operation programmes 
(part of the Asia-wide programme mentioned earlier) aimed at engaging business, of which 
ASEAN is one of the main beneficiaries. Generally, it aims to support co-operation between the 
EU and Asian business networks and to strengthen the business environment to increase trade 
and investment flows between the two regions through a method of providing business contracts, 
financial support and investment intelligence. The Asia-Invest Programme targets business 
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participation from the EU Member States and Asian countries ll3, not only limited to ASEAN. 
With particular attention paid to the SMEs, the Asia-Invest programme aims at 'assisting 
European and Asian SMEs in forming partnerships, by providing information on potential 
markets, investment opportunities and joint ventures' (European Commission Delegation in 
Thailand, 1997: 5). This Asia-Invest aim of creating interregional partnerships and networking 
among businesses is reflected organisationally in Diagram 5.2 below. The Programme has 
already been in action for two phases: Asia-Invest Phase I from 1997-2002 and Phase II from 
2003-2007. 
Diagram 5.2: Asia-Invest Structure 
Asia-Invest 
Secretariat 
B /- ~ B U U S S 
I I 
N European Business Contracts Asian N 
E Network Financial Support Network E 
S Investment Intelligence S 
S S 
Source: European Commission Delegation in Thailand, 1997: 5 
113 The ~ligible applicants ofthe Asia-Invest Programme Phase I are from the 15 EU Member Staies and 17 
developing countries in Asia as governed by the ALA-Regulation, Council Regulation (EEC) 443/92 of25 February 
1992: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, East Timor, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam. In Asia-Invest Phase n. eligible applicants 
are 25 EU Member States and 19 Asian countries (Mongolia and North Korea were added) (Asia-Invest Programme 
Website at http://europa.eu.intlcommleuropeaidl). 
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Asia-Invest Phase I (1997-2002) 
Starting its operations in 1997, Asia-Invest Phase I (1997-2002) offered different 'tailor-made' 
instruments to support business co-operation between the two regions. They are: 
(i) The Business Priming Fund, which accounted 41 % of the total activities, aims at 
providing support and part-financing to groups of European! Asian enterprises to prepare them for 
business co-operation. 
(iii) The Asia Interprise and Asia Partenariat, which accounted for 20% and 14% 
respectively, provide opportunities for business-to-business meetings offering a platform for 
European and Asian companies to discuss concrete co-operation projects. 
(iii) The Asia Investment Facility, which accounted for 25%, covers activities designed to 
identify, evaluate, and promote focused investment opportunities (Asia-Invest Programme, 'Asia-
Invest: A European Community Initiative', No Date). 
These instruments reflected the EU's intention to engage business by providing financial 
support through the Asia-Invest Programme. In order to implement these instruments, Asia-
Invest Phase I obtained total funding of approximately 30 million Euros (EuropeAid Co-
operation Office, 2003:1). 
The EuropeAid Co-operation Office is responsible as the Asia-Invest Secretariat in 
Brussels, managing the 'Calls for Proposals' process of selecting business participations which 
would be grated funding from the programme 1 14. In this respect, the EuropeAid Co-operation 
Office stresses the 'market-driven' nature of the programme: 'grants are awarded on a co-
financing basis to high-quality proposals submitted by intermediary organisations as applicants, 
who must be non-profit making and support activities to enhance trade and investment' (2003:1). 
These include, for example, Chambers of Commerce, trade and investment agencies, business 
and industrial associations and technology, management, standards and quality institutes. The 
EuropeAid Co-operation Office also intends that '[these] intermediaries, as key economic 
operators, play a significant role as "multipliers", extending the benefits of the Programme to a 
wider number 0 f SMEs' and 'projects are implemented in partnership between intermediaries 
114 However, in the Asia-Invest Phase II (2003-2007), the Calls for Proposal is managed by the European 
Commission Delegation in that third country, with a close co-operation from the EuropeAid Co-operation Office as 
Secretariat in Brussels. 
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from at least one of the EU Member States and at least one of the eligible Asian countries I 15, 
(EuropeAid Co-operation Office, 2003: I). In this respect, it can be argued that the Commission 
plays a frameworkibackground role by giving financial support to Asian and European Chambers 
of Commerce or other business intermediaries in implementing the Asia-Invest instruments into 
action via their existing business networks and partnerships. This means that rather than directly 
engage business, the EU prefers to play only a 'financier' role to support business through the 
Asia-Invest Programme - a situation that parallels the position described in the previous section 
(on EBIC). 
The 5-year-implementation of the Asia Invest Phase I programme led to about 160 
projects and activities, with benefits, in particular, for SMEs; for instance, 43 matchmaking 
events between European and Asian companies in various sectors; 4 high-profile, large-scale 
matchmaking projects in India (1999), Singapore (1997), Malaysia (2002), and China; 26 tailor-
made studies for groups of European companies aimed at monitoring/researching markets in 
Asia, conditions for doing business and market entry strategy in multiple sectors (including one 
of ASEAN called 'New Business Opportunities for EU Companies in the ASEAN area' 
(European Commission, 2005g)); and 25 training seminars for Asian SMEs on various aspects of 
how to do business with the EU and seminars for EU companies on business co-operation 
opportunities in Asia (EuropeAid Co-Operation Office, 2003: 2). This implies a significant level 
of achievement by the Asia-Invest mechanism in the eyes of the European Commission. The 
EuropeAid Co-operation Office emphasised the Commission's appreciation of the Asia-Invest 
programme as 'one of the most successfully-implemented co-operation programmes in promoting 
trade and investment ties between the EU and Asia' (Interview, European Commission, 
EuropeAid Co-operation Office, Brussels, 13 June 2003). Not only the EuropeAid Co-operation 
'" Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, East Timor, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam. Singapore, Brunei, Hong Kong and Macao. 
223 
office, but officials from DO Trade and the European Commission Delegation in Thailand 
recognised an increasingly important role for the Asia-Invest Programme as a regional 
commercial instrument in supporting the EU-Asian commercial relations (Interview, European 
Commission, DO Trade, Brussels, 13 June 2003; Interview, European Commission Delegation in 
Thailand, Bangkok, 26 August 2003). 
Asia-Invest Phase 11 (2003-2007) 
With this record of achievement, it is not surprising that the Commission extended the 
Programme into Phase II for the period 2003-2007, with a commitment of 35 million Euros, in 
which three major aims will be pursued through different instruments: first, supporting more 
business to business match-making and partnership building (through Asia-Venture, Asia-
Interprise, and Asia Partenariat); second, enhancing Asian private sector development (Asia-
Invest Technical Assistance and Asia Investment and Trade Facilitation Studies), and third, 
increasing institutional capacity building, networking and dialogue between Asian and European 
business intermediary organisations (Asia-Invest Alliance and Asia-Invest Forum) (Asia-Invest 
2003-2007 Flyer, Asia-Invest Website at http://europa.eu.intlconunleuropeaidJ).Itis important to 
note that the third mechanism represents a new approach of Asia-Invest Phase n, added to those 
used in from Phase I. 
ASEAN in Asia-Invest Programme 
To focus more specifically on the ASEAN share in the Asia-Invest Programme, it can be argued 
that the Asia-Invest Programme seems to be less central to ASEAN or to particularly promote 
EU-ASEAN trade and investment relations than that with China. The EuropeAid Co-operation 
Office's statistics indicate that among projects funded under the Asia-Invest Phase I, ASEAN 
224 
appears to be the smallest beneficiary 1 16. While China and Germany are the two dominant 
beneficiaries (from European and Asian sides, respectively) of the programme with a number of 
projects targeted on China, ASEAN applicants are relatively marginal and the business 
community in ASEAN countries did not seem to take up the opportunity offered by the EU 
(EuropeAid Co-operation Office, No Date). The Asia-Invest Secretariat in Brussels also 
expressed concern at the lack of ASEAN country applicants and projects targeted on promoting 
EU-ASEAN relations, compared to applicants from China (Interview, European Commission, 
EuropeAid Co-operation Office, European Commission, Brussels, 13 June 2003). 
At the same time, the research conducted in 2003 for this thesis suggests that in the case 
of Thailand, the Asia-Invest Programme (Phase I) either was not well recognised by business or 
was widely criticised by a number of Chambers of Commerce for its bureaucratic, complicated, 
and time-consuming nature (Interviews, German-Thai Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 7 
August 2003; Franco-Thai Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 15 September 2003; and Thai-
Finnish Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 17 September 2003). This in turn seems to indicate a 
gap between the EU and business on the ground as well as a problem oflack of business 
awareness and/or interest in the EU activities and projects, i.e., applying for financial support 
from the EU (particularly in the case of Thailand). 
In this respect, in Asia-Invest Phase 11, the two new mechanisms (Asia-Invest Alliance 
and Asia-Invest Forum), aiming at supporting a dialogue and networking between Asian and 
European business intermediary organisations, and between public and private sectors, were 
introduced (as noted earlier). In order to promote greater visibility of the opportunity offered by 
the Asia-Invest Programme anlOng businesses in ASEAN countries, 'Asia-Invest Forum 
116 Among the Asia-Invest Phase I funded projects, beneficiaries are, for example, China (23 projects with an of 
projects targeting at China); Germany (23 projects with different target countries, i.e., China, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand, India); Italy (18 projects with different target countries China and ASEAN countries); France (16 projects 
with China and ASEAN countries); Vietnam (15 projects targeting at Vietnam) (EuropeAid Co-operation Office, 
Asia-Invest CaUs for Proposal-Contracts Awarded (1997-2010) by Applicant countries, ND). 
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Thailand' was held on 14-15 November 2005, before the EU-Thailand Partenariat 2005 (a major 
match-making event) on 17-18 November 2005 in Bangkok. As a Commission official 
emphasised 'Thailand is still underrepresented in the Asia-Invest Programme' (Interview, 
EuropeAid Co-operation Office, Brussels, 17 October 2005). This Asia-Invest Forum in Thailand 
could not only enhance the visibility of the Asia-Invest Programme, but also could in turn 
promote dialogue and networking among commercial actors at the local level (which will be 
argued in detail in Chapter 6). 
Moreover, generally the Commission also initiated an attempt to deploy EU external 
assistance more rapidly and more efficiently. As already noted in Chapter 2, in May 2000, the 
Commission adopted the Communication on the reform of the management of external 
assistance ll7 (2000b) which includes the 'Devolution to Delegations' policy, giving more 
important roles to the Delegations and enabling the Delegations to play a key role in 
implementing cooperation and development programmes 'to ensure effectiveness and ownership 
of aid management' (2000b: 20). As a consequence, the implementation of the Asia-Invest Phase 
11, for example, budgetary and financial management, was transferred to the Delegations in close 
co-operation with the EuropeAid Co-operation Office in Brussels (Interview, European 
Commission Delegation in Thailand, Bangkok, 26 August 2003). Alongside the recent 
establishment of a number of new Delegations in South East Asia (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3 
and Table 3.1), these Delegations are expected to effectively implement the EU co-operation 
programmes, including the Asia-Invest Programme, thus producing concrete outcomes and 
supporting EU-ASEAN trade and investment ties, particularly among SMEs. 
117 On 16 May 2000, the European Commission decided to take its reform a step further by carrying out an ambitious 
programme to improve the quality of projects and the speed of their implementation. The aims are: to improve 
significantly the quality and responsiveness of project management; to reduce substantially the time taken to 
implement approved projects; to ensure that financial, technical and contractual management procedures are in line 
with the highest international standards of propriety and accountability; to improve the impact and visibility of EU 
co-operation to development. (European Commission, 2000b) 
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5.5 CONCLUSION: THE EU'S COMMERCIAL AND BUSINESS ENGAGEMENT AT 
INTERREGIONAL LEVEL 
This chapter has investigated EU-ASEAN interregional relations and the EU's cornmercial and 
business engagement at this interregionallevel. It observed that unlike the AS EM in which a 
business body like the AEBF has been integrated as part of the ASEM economic framework, 
formally and strategically linking governments and business together, the EU-ASEAN 
institutional structure neither includes business into its intergovernmental framework, nor has it 
attempted to do so. 
Though the EU-ASEAN relationship formally started in the 1970s, the EU had not 
considered EU-ASEAN interregional relations as a framework for encouraging European 
business to invest in South East Asia or ASEAN, rather only as a framework for political 
dialogue and for managing the 1980 EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement. It was only in the 
mid-1990s that the Commission started to recognise the importance of ASEAN as a growing and 
attractive 'market', setting up its first formal strategy towards ASEAN in 1996 (though it was not 
successfully implemented due to political objections). Moreover, the first EU-ASEAN Business 
Conference was held back-to-back with the AEMMll in 1994 in Karlsruhe, Germany (ASEAN 
Annual Report 1994-1995); however this EU-ASEAN business conference was finally subsumed 
under the first AEBF in 1996. In this respect, the EU can engage business through the 
ASEMlAEBF channel in the wider context of Asia, including not only ASEAN, but also North 
East Asian countries, i.e. China, Japan and South Korea. At the same time, for the EU, EU-
ASEAN interregional relations remain an intergovernmental dialogue exclusively at policy-
making and diplomatic level, with less business involvement. The 2003 'New Partnership with 
South East Asia' and particularly the creation of TREA TI also confirm this EU intention. 
Instead of being driven by business forces or the needs of the private sector, the TREATI 
is a pure Commission initiative adopted as part of the 2003 New ASEAN Strategy to respond to 
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an increasing importance of FT A trend in the world economy at the beginning of 2000s, 
especially that of its major economic competitors (the US and China) with ASEAN countries. 
The TREA TI, though, does not promise the establishment of EU-ASEAN FT A, and only aims at 
setting up a 'framework for co-operation' to promote trade and investment. This is to be pursued 
by building informal working groups (by sector) among officials to overcome trade and 
investment barriers, informing partners about each other's regulatory systems and eventually 
developing into an exercise of approximation and harmonisation of regulatory framework 
between the two regions - the process which, as viewed by the EU and ASEAN, 'could pave the 
way for a future preferential trading agreement' (Joint Press Statement, the 3,d AEM-EU 
Consultation). This TREAT! initiation reflects the top-down nature of the EU-ASEAN 
interregional relations, in which business is less involved. 
While not attempting to formally involve business in the EU-ASEAN institutional 
framework, the EU pursues a different strategy with indirect or 'soft' instruments to engage 
business at this interregionallevel. Economic co-operation programmes towards Asia! ASEAN 
have increasingly been used as commercial instruments with which to engage business in Asia 
since the late 1990s. The chapter has examined the EBIC and the Asia-Invest Programme as two 
examples of this process. The investigation and observation of these two economic co-operation 
programmes as part of the broader development of EU-ASEAN commercial relations has 
illustrated some characteristics of the commercial and business engagement instnunents used, 
strategies developed, stakeholders engaged, and roles played by the EU at this interregionallevel 
as follows: 
First, the investigation of the EBIC and Asia-Invest Programmes indicates a rather 
different commercial and business engagement strategy of the EU at interregionallevel, 
compared to that of the ASEM and AEBF at transregionallevel (discussed in Chapter 4). 
Although it is undeniable that EU strategies at these two different levels are interconnected and 
228 
share a common goal offacilitating trade and investment and supporting business co-operation 
between two regions, they represent different approaches and types of instruments pursued by the 
EU. The AEBF, as well as TFAP and IPAP, under the ASEM economic framework emphasises 
the building of a 'process' of dialogue and networking among governments and business at 
strategic level and are aimed more at big/internationally competitive business, whilst the EBIC 
and Asia-Invest Programme, through representing regional programmes, target business at the 
bilateral level, focus more on producing concrete outcomes 10caIly and give particular attention 
to SMEs. For example, the EBIC aimed at establishing an EU-Ievel agency in different 
AsianlASEAN countries to assist business locally, while the Asia-Invest programme aims at 
building business co-operation by providing opportunities for business contracts and match-
making, and giving financial support to business intermediaries both from the EU and from Asia. 
While the achievement of the EBIC - the EU-Ievel agency explicitly aimed at engaging 
business on the ground - seems to be marginal, the Asia-Invest Programme has proved to be 
more successful in engaging business, particularly SMEs. This achievement of the Asia-Invest 
Programme is reflected in its extension to Asia-Invest Phase 11 for the period 2003-2007. The EU 
experience from both co-operation programmes suggests the EU prefers to engage business only 
indirectly, by providing financial support through a programme like Asia-Invest to local 
intermediaries and business and private organisations, who organise their own business activities 
through their existing business networks. This would suit the needs of business 10caIly. This 
reflects the EU's intention to engage business indirectly. Hence, the EU plays a financier role in 
this interregionallevel. 
Secondly, while the ASEM as transregionalism, as we mentioned in the Chapter 4, is 
closer to multilateralism in terms of supporting the EU's collective role at the multilateral and 
global level, there can be observed a number of policy-linkages between the interregionallevel of 
EU-ASEAN relations and the bilateral level. The EU's commercial strategy towards ASEAN 
229 
often involves its implementation at bilateral level (in different individual ASEAN countries). In 
particular, the 'New Partnership with South East Asia' strategy strongly reflects the EU's new 
focus on using a bilateral approach, but within the framework of EU-ASEAN relations in order to 
reinvigorate its relations with ASEAN. For example, there can be observed the Commission's 
negotiations on Bilateral Agreements with different ASEAN countries such as Thailand and 
Singapore, while the EU-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement seems to be outdated and rather 
marginalised due to political problems in Myanmar. Not only this EU offer of new Bilateral 
Agreements with different ASEAN countries, but also the TREA TI focuses on a 'flexible 
approach'. Although TREA TI is seen as a regional trade action plan, its implementation is 
undertaken bilaterally. This fact shows the practice ofbilateralism within the interregional 
framework and the close link between interregionalism and bilateralism. This close linkage will 
be also observed when we will discuss the role of the EU in a bilateral context - that of Thailand 
- in Chapter 6. 
Finally, evidence provided by this chapter might lead to a conclusion that business 
engagement is not a major aim in EU-ASEAN interregional relations, that political issues tend to 
dominate, and that the EU's business engagement with ASEAN at this interregionallevel is 
consequently uneven. Although the EU uses economic co-operation programmes to engage 
business in ASEAN, it is done as part of the wider context of Asia, including China and South 
Asian countries. However, it is important to note that while China seems to be the most dominant 
beneficiary of this programme, the ASEAN applicants have very limited involvement. This 
confirms the trend that ASEAN as a region is likely to be less interesting for the EU in terms of 
pursuing commercial and business engagement, partly due to diversity within ASEAN, unsolved 
political problems, and the low progress of ASEAN integration itself. Rather than attempting to 
foster its interregional relations with ASEAN, the EU particularly the Commission seems to 
move towards bilateralism in its relations with ASEAN. This trend will be observed in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 
The EU in Thailand 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
While the preceding two chapters have analysed the EU's commercial and business engagement 
at the regional level, both transregional (ASEM) and interregional (EU-ASEAN), this chapter is 
devoted to an investigation of the EU in Thailand, to EU-Thai economic and commercial 
relations, and more specifically to the commercial and business engagement strategies adopted by 
the EU at the bilateral level with Thailand. It emphasises the exploration of EU commercial and 
business engagement at this bilateral level by seeking to explain 'what actually happens' (Bale, 
2002: 16) in different Asian countries (in this case Thailand), and how and with what effects the 
EU's commercial and business engagement strategies have been implemented locally. 
Thailand is used here as an empirical study since it is recognised as one of the leading 
ASEAN countries, one of the most important EU trading partners among ASEAN, and one of the 
most attractive FDI destinations in South East Asia. Importantly, among ASEAN countries, 
Thailand - which has never been colonised by any European country - seems to offer a relatively 
neutral arena in which to investigate the EU's roles in the bilateral context in Asia. 
This chapter begins by giving an overview of EU-Thai bilateral relations, including recent 
trade and investment trends, economic and development co-operation, and bilateral institutional 
structure. Particular attention will be paid to an investigation of the European Commission 
Delegation as the EU's :commercialrepresentation' at this local level, developing its own 
instruments, strategies, and roles alongside other commercial actors (both states and firms), 
including Member State Embassies, Chambers of Commerce, European business, and local 
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business. This results in what the chapter caUs 'commercial networking' among these commercial 
actors, where the Delegation has played a proactive and cooperative role. 
More specifically, the chapter explores the roles played by the Delegation in this 
commercial networking process, particularly in engaging Member State Embassies through a 
process of 'diplomatic co-operation' (Bale, 2002: 10) and in assisting different business 
stakeholders, both European firms to access the Asian markets, and on the other hand local firms 
to enter the EU market. This means the EU through the Delegation has positively engaged both 
states and firms at this local level. The significant roles of the Delegation observed in the case of 
Thailand are market opener, trade and investment facilitator, financier, and coordinator. Finally, 
the observation of roles and activities of the European Commission Delegation as a commercial 
representation in Thailand, despite the fact that it still shares commercial competence with 
Member States Embassies, helps illustrate the instruments used, strategies developed, 
stakeholders engaged, and roles played by the EU as a commercial actor in Thailand. 
6.2 EU-THAI BILATERAL RELATIONS 
Colonialism was an initial form of Western penetration, both by Western governments and 
business into Asia. Among South East Asian countries Thailand is the only country which was 
not colonised by any of the European powersllS• Without such special colonial relations, it is 
argued that among ASEAN countries Thailand is a more neutral case through which to look at 
the EU's commercial role at the bilateral context, whereas in other ASEAN countries the pattern 
of EU commercial strategies and the role of the EU might be influenced by particular European 
historical experiences, for example, the strong British influence in Malaysia. The chapter starts 
by giving an overview of EU-Thai commercial relations since the rnid-1990s up to 2004, 
lIB However, this is not to say that there was no European colonial influence in Thailand; some scholars have 
observed European commercial expansion in Thailand since the 1680s (Bassett, 1997:263). 
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including trade and investment trends, development and economic co-operation, and bilateral 
institutional frameworks. 
6.2.1 EU-Thai Commercial Relations: Trade 
EU-Thai commercial ties have been centred on trade. As the Commission states, 'the EU and 
Thailand maintain long-standing and fruitful contacts, mainly on trade and economic issues' 
(2002d: 3). Regarding bilateral trade, the EU is one of the major trading partners of Thailand 
(together with the US, Japan and ASEAN). As shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 and Tables 6.1 and 
6.2, since 1995 the EU has held a consistent share of approximately 15% of Thai total trade (both 
imports and exports). 
Figure 6.1: Thai Exports to Major Trading Partners (1995-2001) 
'iooftotal 
ThaI Exports 
1995 1998 1999 
Year 
2000 2001 (H1) 
I!JUS .ASEAN10 oEU o JAPAN I 
Source: European Commission 2002d: 27 
Table 6.1: Thai Exports to Major Trading Partners (1995-2001) 
1995 1998 1999 2000 2001(HI) 1995 1998 1999 2000 
USA 7809 10747 11574 16010 7147 17,8% 22,3% 21,3% 21,3% 
ASEAN(IO) 8355 8614 10094 14558 6991 19,1% 17,9% 18,6% 19,4% 
EU 6611 8513 8209 11829 6096 15,1% 17,6% 15,1% 15,7% 
Japan 7355 6619 7671 11 110 5690 16,8% 13,7% 14,1% 14,8% 
World 43810 48257 54320 75145 36152 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: European Commission 2002d: 27 
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Figure 6.2: Thai Imports from Major Trading Partners (1995-2001) 
% of total Thai 
Imports 
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Source: European Commission 2002d: 27 
Table 6.2: Thai Imports from Major Trading Partners (1995-2001) 
1995 1998 1999 2000 2001(HI) 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001(HI) 
USA 6603 5364 5970 7942 4389 12,0% 14,1% 12,8% 11,8% 12,4% 
ASEAN{lO) 6937 5413 7414 11233 5715 12,6% 14,2% 15,9% 16,6% 16.1% 
El! 8761 4765 5468 6877 43.97 j6,Q% 12,5% 11,7% 10,2% 12,4% 
Japan 16782 9027 11392 16655 7933 30,5% 23,7% 24,4% 24,7% 22,4% 
World 54940 38103 46773 67482 35467 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: European Commission 2002d: 27 
The recent trade statistics produced by the DG Trade shown in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3 
indicate that during 2000-2003 total EU imports from Thailand accounted for approximately 11-
13 billion Euros (representing 1.25-1.36% of total EU imports) and total EU exports to Thailand 
6-7 billion Euros (representing 0.73-0.86% of total EU exports) (European Commission, 2005f). 
Table 6.3: EU Trade with Thailand (2000-2004IMillion Euros) 
Year Imports Yearly Share of Exports Yearly Share of Balance Imports 
% total EU % total EU + 
chanee imports chanee exports Exports 
2000 i3 514 1.36 6602 0.77 -6912 20116 
2001 13 124 -2.9 1.33 7709 /6.8 0.86 -5415 20834 
2002 11 978 -8.7 1.27 6931 -/0./ 0.77 -5047 18909 
2003 11 801 -/.5 1.25 6423 -7.3 0.73 -5378 18224 
2004 12842 8.8 1.25 7000 9.0 0.73 -5841 19842 
Average -1.3 1.5 -0.3 
annual erowth 
Source: European Commission, 2005f 
234 
Figure 6.3: EU Trade with Thailand (2000-2004/Million Euros) 
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Source: European Commission, 2005f 
A different picture of Thailand's trade with the EU is shown in Table 6.4 and Figure 6.4; 
during 1999-2003 Thailand's imports from the EU amounted to approximately 5-8 billion Euros 
(giving the EU 10.74-13.11% of total Thai imports), and Thailand exported to the EU 9-12 
billion Euros (thus the EU accounted for 15.76-17.89% of total Thai exports). Moreover, 
Thailand ran a trade surplus with the EU during the period 1999-2003. These statistics broadly 
indicate that in terms of bilateral trade the EU is more important to Thailand, than Thailand to the 
EU and that Thai exporters still heavily rely on the EU market. 
Table 6.4: Thailand's Trade with the EU (1999-2003/Million Euros) 
Year Imports Yearly EU Exports Yearly EU Balance Imports + 
% Share of % Share of Exports 
change total change total 
Imoorts exports 
1999 5620 12.48 9475 17.89 3855 15095 
2000 7004 24.6 10.94 12 174 28.5 16.86 5170 19 177 
2001 8705 24.3 13.11 12084 -0.7 17.13 3379 20789 
2002 7688 -1l.7 1l.76 11 148 -7.7 15.76 3460 18836 
2003 6890 -/0.4 10.74 10782 -3.3 15.69 3892 17671 
9m 2003 5 138 10.91 8001 15.73 2863 13 138 
9m 2004 5673 /0.4 10.32 8566 7./ 15.24 2892 14239 
Average 5.2 3.3 4.0 
annual 
~rowth 
Source: European ComrmsslOn, 2005f 
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Figure 6.4: Thailand's Trade with the EU (1999-2003/Million Euros) 
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Source: European Commission, 200Sf 
Products traded between the EU and Thailand include machinery, agricultural products, 
office/telecommunication equipment, transport equipment, chemicals, textile and clothing (see 
Figure 6.S). According to Tables 6.S and 6.6, during 2002-2004 machinery, agricultural products, 
and textiles and cloth can be seen as the three most significant products dominating EU-Thailand 
bilateral trade relations. In 2004, machinery products accounted for 40.9% of total EU imports 
from Thailand, followed by agricultural products (13.9%) and textiles and clothing (10.2%). EU 
exports to Thailand are dominated by machinery products (36.2%) and chemicals (16.4%). 
Figure 6.5: The EU Merchandise Trade with Thailand by Product (2004) 
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Table 6.5: EU Imports from Thailand by Product (2000-2004) 
TOTAL 13,514 100.0 11,978 100.0 12,842 100.0 1.25 
Primary Products 2,120 15.7 1,747 14.6 1,871 14.6 0.61 
of which: 
Agricultural prod. 2,005 14.8 1,681 14.0 1,786 13.9 2.26 
Energy 3 0.0 0.0 9 0.1 0.01 
Manuf. Products 10,785 79.8 10,185 85.0 10,799 84.1 1.60 
of which: 
Machinery 5,082 37.6 4,551 38.0 5,253 40.9 2.08 
Transport equipm 835 6.2 1,205 10.1 1,117 8.7 1.14 
of which: 
Automotive prod. 767 5.7 1,086 9.1 756 5.9 1.80 
Chemicals 275 2.0 192 1.6 231 1.8 0.27 
Textiles and cloth. 1,446 10.7 1,345 11.2 1,316 10.2 1.89 
Source: European Commission, 2005 
Table 6.6: EU Exports to Thailand by Product (2000-2004) 
TOTAL 6,602 100.0 6,931 100.0 7,000 100.0 0.73 
Primary Products 644 9.8 631 9.1 719 10.3 0.68 
of which: 
Agricultural prod. 452 6.8 430 6.2 459 6.6 0.78 
Energy 19 0.3 18 0.3 19 0.3 0.07 
Manuf. Products 5,473 82.9 6,064 87.5 5,900 84.3 0.73 
of which: 
Machinery 2,368 35.9 2,747 39.6 2,533 36.2 0.92 
Transport equipm 585 8.9 542 7.8 644 9.2 0.41 
of which: 
Automotive prod. 366 5.6 402 5.8 291 4.2 0.29 
Chemicals 994 15.1 1,088 15.7 1,151 16.4 0.76 
Textiles and cloth. 152 2.3 150 2.2 154 2.2 0.45 
Source: European Commission, 2005f 
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Thailand is also a beneficiary ofthe EU's OSpll9, especially in respect of its agricultural 
and fishery exports to the EU. As Cuyvers (1998:4) observes, among the top ten beneficiaries of 
the EU's OSP (1995/1996) Thailand ranked in fourth place accounting for 7.7% in 1995 and 
6.6% in 1996 of imports benefiting from OSP, following China (32% and 29.4%), India (11.6% 
and 9.9%), and Indonesia (8.9% and 7.5%). For example, Thai shrimp exporters had been 
benefiting from the EU's OSP scheme, which allows the import duties on shrimps from Thailand 
at the reduced tariff rate; however, as Cuyvers notes, in December 1996, the Commission decided 
to halve Thailand's OSP benefits for shrimps as from 1 January 1997, and to abolish these 
benefits as from 1 January 1999, in conformity with the provisions of Council Regulation 
1256/96 (1998: 11-12). As a result, EU import duties on shrimps from Thailand were increased 
from 4.5-6% in 1996 (with the GSP rate) to 9.7-13.5% as from 1997, and then to 14.4-20.0% as 
from 1999. Therefore, with this higher tariff rate, as Thai officials noted, it was very difficult for 
Thai shrimp exporters to compete with other competitors for the EU market, for example, 
Indonesia and Malaysia, who still gained the EU import duties on shrimp at the OSP rate at 4.5%. 
The Thai shrimp exports to the EU reduced dramatically (Interview, Mission of Thailand to the 
European Communities, 13 September 2005, Brussels). This case on the graduation of Thai 
shrimp from the EU's OSP scheme indicates a dependency of Thai trade on the EU market and in 
particular on the EU's OSP scheme120• 
During the period 2002-mid 2003 there was also another difficulty facing Thai exports for 
poultry and shrimp based products, which are among the top Thai export products to the EU. The 
I" In practice, the GSP is implemented through Council regulations during the ten-year cycle'. Council Regulation 
(EC) No 250112001 contains the legal provisions for the GSP scheme applicable for the period of 01 January 2002 to 
31 December 2005. However, a new GSP scheme was adopted on 27 June 2005 through Council Regulation (EC) 
No 98012005, for the period of I January 2006 to 31 December 2008 (DG Trade website at 
http://europa.eu.intlcommltrade/issues/globaVgsp/index_en.htm). 
120 However, in 2005, Thailand received back the reduced tariff for shrimp exports to the EU under the EU's new 
GSP scheme starting from January 2006 (Mission of Thailand to the European Communities, in www.thaieurope.nel, 
15 July 2005). 
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European Commission Delegation in Thailand reported: 'in March 2002 the EC customs 
laboratories found cancer causing veterinary drugs, notably nitrofurans and chloramphenicols, in 
food products originating from Thailand' (European Commission Delegation in Thailand News 
Releases, 2002b). Furthermore, in January 2004 there was confirmation of an avian influenza 
outbreak in poultry in Thailand and some other Asian countries, therefore, the Commission 
adopted in 2004 two decisions suspending the imports into the EU of chicken products and pet 
birds from all Asian countries affected by the disease, including Thailand (European Commission 
News, 2004b and 2004c). In 2005, avian influenza spread into Europe, and as a protective 
measure to prevent the wide spread of this avian influenza, the COInrnission extended the 
suspension of importation of fresh poultry meat from Thailand until September 2006121 • 
As agricultural products are the most important export products from Thailand to the EU, 
these problems offood quality and safety of Thai exports, have been a major concern of the EU, 
and have thus caused major problems for Thai exporters since the beginning of 2000 until 
recently. David Byme, European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection (1999-
2004), during his visit to Thailand in 2004 stressed to the Thai business community that: 
'Thailand's ambitions of being a key player on the world market for food and foodstuffs will be 
strengthened by this commitment to food safety' (Byme, 2004). In this respect, the EU through 
the Bangkok Delegation has played a supportive role in assisting ThailASEAN exporters to 
overcome such problems, for example, by organising a seminar on food safety in May 2004 - a 
pilot initiative under the EU's TREAT! (mentioned in Chapter 5) - to inform them on the EU's 
rules and regulations on this particular issue. This indicates the Delegation's role as trade 
facilitator and its task in implementing TREATI at the bilateral level (See Section 6.4.2). 
121 However, although the EU has banned fresh/or frozen poultry meat products from Thailand, processed/boiled 
chicken meat products can still be exported to the EU (Thai Agricultural Office in Brussels, at www.thaieurope.ne~ 
20 March 2005). 
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6.2.2 EU-Thai Commercial Relations: Investment 
The evolution of EU FDI towards Thailand suggests a rather different story from trade. The EU 
FDI flow towards ASEAN and Thailand is still limited, compared to overall EU FDI outflows 
(see Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4) and compared to US and Japanese FDI flows to Thailand (See Table 
6.7). Among ASEAN countries, EU FDI flows during 1999-2001 to Thailand only accounted for 
9.8%, compared to 47.7% to Singapore, and 12.7% to Malaysia (See Figure 5.4 in Chapter 5). 
Moreover, in Thailand EU investors are also facing increased competition from Asian investors 
(outside Japan), from ASEAN countries themselves, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong 
(European Corrunission, 200Sg: 17) 
Table 6.7 EU FDI Flows towards Thailand (compared with the US and Japan) 
E'l·"'"';llilj.m..l'l:r"·rr!Jiltij~&W:f,m .. ll:W.t'IGilill·' ~~~~~~~ ~..::~ '\;Zi l..,'-'J ,(.tl?:u' 'ill J 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Change (Jan-
(Jan-Ju1) Ju120011 same 
period of2000) 
EU 1826 2174 3238 2885 834 780 369 20.71% 
(10.1%) (13.0%) (22.9%) (52.7%) (25.0%) (13.5%) (15.6%) 
Japan 6125 5005 4800 1162 663 2905 1042 -34.35% 
(33.9%) (30.0%) (33.9%) (21.2%) (19.9%) (50.4%) (44.2%) 
USA 2004 2208 2630 400 (7.3%) 1137 1026 766 75.29% 
(11.1%) (13.2%) (18.6%) (34.1%) (17.8%) (32.5%) 
Asia NIEs 4101 4512 2689 592 436 1222 302 -57.15% 
(22.7%) (27.1%) (19.0%) (10.8%) (13.1%) (21.2%) (12.8%) 
Total 18070 16675 14161 5478 3336 5759 2357 -17.04% 
Investment 
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Change (Jan-
(Jan-Jul) Jul20011 same 
period of2000) 
EU 1891 3319 3569 2252 1140 731 286 -41.88% 
(6.7%) (19.9%) (24.8%) (36.9%) (27.5%) (11.8%) (17.2%) 
Japan 7576 5005 2883 1322 1363 2422 732 -70.49% 
(27.0%) (30.0%) (20.0%) (21.7%) (32.9%) (39.2%) (44.2%) 
USA 2529 2208 1998 596 964 838 149 -79.88% 
(9.0%) (13.2%) (13.9%) (9.8%) (23.2%) (13.6%) (9.0%) 
Asia NIEs 4939 4512 3292 888 837 1463 280 -82_01% 
(17.6%) (27.1%) (22.9%) (14.6%) (20.2%) (23.7%) (16.9%) 
Total 28079 16675 14393 6095 4147 6171 1658 -76.65% 
investment 
Source: European Commission, 2002d: 28, Annex 2 
Furthermore, during the post-financial crisis period there can be observed a decline in EU 
FDI outflows towards Thailand, particularly from 1999 to 2003 (see Figure 6.6). Various reasons 
can explain this declining trend; among them are the impact of the 1997/1998 financial crisis and 
more importantly the growing attraction of China, India and other ASEAN countries as a better 
destination for foreign investment. This decline has been a concern of both Thailand and the EU. 
The EC-Thailand Joint Statement between Thaksin Shinawatra, Prime Minister of Thailand and 
Romano Prodi, President of the Commission of the European Communities (1999-2004) 
announced in Brussels, 13 June 2002 emphasises the importance of investment by stressing 'the 
potential of Thailand as a trade and investment hub in the region'_ During his visit to Thailand 
(31 March-l April 2004), the EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy (1999-2004) strongly 
emphasised the concerns of European business that' _ .. during 2002, foreign investment has 
continued to decrease, with European investment stagnating' and 'the EU has now lost its 
ranking as Thailand's largest investor following the Asian crisis' (Lamy, 2003). As for the 
reverse picture, Figure 6.6 indicates that compared to the EU investment flows into Thailand, the 
Thai investment flows into the EU during 1999-2003 were even more limited. 
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Figure 6.6: EU FDI Flows with Thailand (1999-2003/Billion Euros) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
I Cl Inflows • Outflows 0 Balance I 
Source: European Commission, 2005g 
6.2.3 Economic and Development Co-operation 
The 1980 EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement has been the main framework for bilateral 
exchanges, and there is no bilateral co-operation agreement between the EU and Thailand l22. In 
the absence of an EU-Thai Bilateral Co-operation Agreement, interregional co-operation and the 
ASEM dialogue process have been two main frameworks for bilateral exchanges. Through these 
frameworks, the Conunission (2002d: 29) reported in 2002 a number of EU-supported 
projects/programmes in Thailand, both bilaterally (in the sectors of energy, public health, 
environment, narcotics, NGO co-financing, humanitarian assistance, for a total EC grant of 59.3 
million Euros), and in the context of regional programmes (of benefit to Thailand), such as 
ASEAN co-operation (82.2 million Euros), Asia co-operation (166.4 million Euros), and ASEM 
co-operation (18.25 million Euros) (See Table 6.8). 
12' The 2003 'New Partnership with South East Asia' strategy, with its 'flexible' approach paved the way for the new 
Bilateral Co-operation Agreement with different ASEAN countries within the interregional framework. In October 
2004 during the ASEM5 Summit in Hanoi, Negotiations for Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCAs) 
between the EU-Thailand and between the EU-Singapore were launched confinning that the new Bilateral Co-
operation Agreements with Thailand and Singapore were under negotiation. In the case of Thailand, the new 
Bilateral Co-operation Agreement was at its final stage in 2005 and is expected to be signed in 2006. More detail will 
be discussed in Section 6.2.5. 
242 
Table 6.8: EC-Projects/Programmes in Thailand (between mid 1990s-2002) 
Bilateral Co-operation 
Energy 
Public health/ 
AID Programme 
Sector 
EnvironmentINatural resources 
Rural development 
Narcotics 
NGO Co-financing 
Humanitarian assistance to refugees! displaced persons 
Total 
ASEAN Co-operation 
Sector 
Higher Education 
Intellectual Property Rights and Standard 
Energy 
Environment 
Total 
Asia Co-operation 
Sector 
I. Higher Education 
2. Investment and Promotion 
3. Environment 
4. Infonnation Technology and Communication 
5. Urban Cooperation 
6. Transportation 
7. Drug Abuse Prevention 
8. Human Rights 
Total 
ASEM Co-operation 
Sector 
1. Environment 
2. Financial and Social Sector Refonn 
Total 
Source: European Commission, 2002d: 29 
243 
No. of EC grant (million €) 
projects 
I 3.0 
I 4.8 
4 15.45 
2 24.50 
0.60 
4 1.39 
9 9.56 
22 59.3 
No. of EC grant (million €) 
programme 
2 9.74 
2 21.3 
2 43.0 
8.5 
7 82.2 
No. of EC grant (million €) 
programme 
I 40.0 
45.0 
8.0 
25.0 
30.0 
I 15.0 
2 3.2 
0.2 
9 166.4 
No. of EC grant (million €) 
programme 
I 3.25 
I \5.0 
2 18.25 
The substantial amount of financial assistance flowing from the EU to Thailand shown in 
Table 6.8 undoubtedly reflects the EU's focus on using these co-operation programmes/projects 
as important tools to engage closer into the Asian regionlThailand, and particularly to produce 
tangible outcomes in promoting EU-Thai relations. Since the late 1990s, as already argued in 
Chapter 5, regional economic co-operation has increasingly been viewed as a significant EU 
commercial instrument to promote business co-operation and trade and investment ties between 
the EU and Asia. This similar trend can also be observed in the bilateral context between the EU 
and Thailand, as emphasised in the most recent EU country strategy paper towards Thailand. 
On 8 May 2002, the Commission (2002d) adopted its 'EC-Thailand Country Strategy 
Paper 2002-2006', which focuses mainly on co-operation issues and on how to manage EC 
financial assistance for economic and development co-operation projects/programmes in 
Thailand. In fact, as a DG External Relations official emphasised, this strategy paper neither 
represents an overal1 country strategy nor an explicit commercial strategy for Thailand, but rather 
a 'co-operation strategy'. It also includes the 'National Indicative Programme (2002-2004)" a 
plan for managing a 10 million Euro budget for EU bilateral co-operation towards Thailand 
(Interview, DG External Relations, Brussels, 27 January 2004). 
In the Commission's (2000e) National Indicative Programme (adopted as part of the EC-
Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006), two important trends can be observed. First, there 
is a shift in EU financial assistance to Thailand from pure development co-operation towards 
more economic-oriented cooperation. The Commission emphasised: 'Thailand's socio-economic 
indicators are such that co-operation should be primarily economic and only exceptional1y focus 
on development in key areas for national development where the EC could provide a real added 
value' (2002d: 3). This confirms significant use of economic co-operation as a commercial tool to 
promote EU economic interests in Thailand. Secondly, there is an increased emphasis on bilateral 
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instruments, or in this case bilateral economic co-operation to promote trade and investment. As 
the Commission stressed, 'in view of the increasing importance of bilateral economic relations, 
and of the momentum initiated with the Doha Development Agenda, the EC's bilateral co-
operation strategy with Thailand will focus on technical assistance and capacity-building 
activities in the sectors of trade, investment, and related areas for sustained co-operation (focal 
area 1)' (2002: 3). This Commission attempt is thus translated into a new bilateral instrument 
called 'the EU-Thai Small Projects Facility (SPF), proposed as part of this country strategy. The 
implementation of SPF projects in Thailand is managed by the Bangkok Delegation, which thus 
plays a financier role in supporting different commercial stakeholders in Thailand (See detail in 
Section 6.4.3). 
6.2.4 Institutional Structures in EU-Thai Relations 
Since the first 'EC-Thailand Senior Officials' Meetings' (SOM) took place in Bangkok on 6 
March 1992, EU-Thai bilateral issues have been addressed in this regular SOM led by the 
Commission on the EC side and by the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Thai govemment 
side. At SOM7 on 28-29 March 2001, both sides agreed on the initiation of a new institutional 
framework in order to strengthen bilateral co-operation between the EU and Thailand. This new 
institutional framework, as the Commission noted, includes three significant developments: 
First, the SOM is upgraded to the level ofPennanent Secretary (Thai Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs) and Deputy Director-General (DG External Relations, the European Commission); 
Second, regular political contacts between the Commission and the Thai Minister of 
Foreign Affairs will be organised in the margins of multilateral meetings (AS EM, ARF etc), on 
an annual basis if necessary, to review bilateral and regional/multilateral issues; 
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Third, a co-ordination mechanism, with 3-monthly meetings, is established to monitor 
ongoing co-operation at project level and to oversee the follow-up of new project proposals as 
well as to assess the overall co-operation (Commission, 2002d: 20). 
While the first component means nomination of higher-level representatives from both 
sides, the second component shows deepening ofbiIateral relations within the regional and 
multilateral contexts. As a result ofthe third of these components, 'the European Commission-
Thailand Working Group' was created and first met on 8 October 2002 as a new form of bilateral 
dialogue. As Klauspeter Schmallenbach, Ambassador-Head ofthe Delegation of the European 
Commission to Thailand at that time emphasised, '[it] is the ideal forum to deal with the 
efficiency and effectiveness of EU-Thailand cooperation. As a result, the annual EC-Thailand 
SOM will be able to devote more time to other key issues which will help give further impetus to 
our already healthy relationship' (European Commission Delegation in Thailand News Releases, 
2002a). The Working Group comprises three sub-Working Groups on co-operation (between the 
Commission and Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs), on trade and investment (between the 
Commission and Thai Ministry of Commerce) and on agriculture (between the Commission and 
Thai Ministry of Agriculture) in which the Delegation in Thailand usually represents the 
Commission, if there is no representative from Brussels to join them (Interview, Thai Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, Thailand, 18 September 2003). 
After the adoption of this new institutional arrangement in 2001-2002, the recent EU-
Thai bilateral institutional structure can be explained through three levels of cooperation as 
shown in Diagram 6.1: first, periodic meetings between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Commissioner for External Relations, second, Senior Official Meetings (SO M), and third, 
Working Group meetings; however it must also be remembered that this EU-Thai bilateral 
cooperation is carried on within the broad regional framework of Asia, AS EM, and EU-ASEAN 
co-operation. 
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Observed through the bilateral institutional structure is an important role for the European 
Commission Delegation as an actor in managing the EU-Thai relations at the local level. This 
reflects the EU's 'statelike' character which allows the EU to have its 'representation' in world 
arenas (multilateral and regional levels) and in third countries (bilateral level), though it is not a 
state in traditional terms. As already argued in Chapter 2, Section 2.3 .2, although still operating 
alongside continuing activities of Member States, the Delegations as the Commission's external 
representation play a number of significant roles, particularly in the area ofEU commercial 
diplomacy. These commercial roles of the European Commission Delegation in Thailand will be 
analysed in Section 6.4. 
Diagram 6.1: EU-Thai Institutional Structure 
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Source: Adapted by the author and validated by the European Commission Delegation in 
Bangkok (Interview, European Commission Delegation in Thailand, Bangkok, 23 July 2004). 
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6.2.5 Towards the EU-Thai Bilateral Co-operation Agreement 
On the basis of the above institutional structures, it can be observed that the EU-Thai bilateral 
relations have been developed within the regional and interregional frameworks; but there is no 
Bilateral Co-operation Agreement between the two parties. In 2003, the Commission adopted a 
new strategy towards ASEAN and the South East Asian region which offered the possibility for a 
new Bilateral Co-operation Agreement between the EU and different ASEAN countries (See also 
Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3 and Footnote 122, page 242). Thailand was among the first ASEAN 
countries to express its interest in starting negotiations on a Bilateral Agreement with the EU, 
when the Thai Prime Minister visited Brussels in 2002 (even before the 2003 ASEAN strategy 
was officially announced). Negotiations for a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) 
between the two parties were officially launched in the ASEM5 Summit in Hanoi, on 8 October 
2005. Since then the negotiation process has started, and in 2005 the EU-Thai Bilateral 
Agreement is at its final stage, and is expected to be signed in 2006. This Agreement will be used 
as a model for other countries in the South East Asian region123 • 
The most recent EC-Thailand Joint Statement between Thaksin Shinawatra, Prime 
Minister of Thailand and Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the Commission, announced in 
Brussels, on 12 October 2005, in the occasion of the Thai Prime Minister's visit to Brussels, 
underlines the importance of the new agreement between Thailand and the European Community 
as setting 'a modem policy agenda': apart from cooperation on trade and investment issues 'this 
agreement will also provide the basis for a new cooperative partnership in many other areas, 
particularly in science and technology research and alternative energy sources, which are crucial 
for sustained economic growth' (EC-Thailand Joint Statement, 2005). 
"' At the same time, the EU is also finalising the negotiation for a Bilateral Agreement with Singapore and is 
starting a negotiation process with Indonesia. The Philippines and Malaysia have also infonnally expressed their 
interests in starting negotiating such bilateral agreement with the EU. (Interview, European Commission, DG 
External Relations, Brussels, 23 September 2005). 
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A DG External Relations official emphasised the importance of this new agreement as 'a 
big step-forward in EU-Thai bilateral relations, particularly in terms of regulatory convergence', 
'a symbol for an enhanced partnership' and 'a political signal for a better relations in the long-
term future' (Interview, European Commission, DG External Relations, Brussels, 23 September 
2005). Particularly for a closer co-operation on trade and investment issues, both parties will co-
operate on the areas of Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) issues, Technical Barrier to Trade 
(TBT) issues, Customs cooperation and Trade Facilitation, Investment, Competition policy, 
Service, Intellectual, Industrial and Commercial Property Rights, and Tourism. More specifically, 
in order to facilitate business cooperation between the two parties the initiation of a Thailand-EU 
Business Forum is also emphasised in the draft Agreement. This Agreement will also cover co-
operation in many new areas, for example, transport, environment, energy, Intellectual Property, 
education and culture, migration, etc (Interview, European Commission, DG External Relations, 
Brussels, 23 September 2005). This forthcoming EU-Thai Bilateral Co-operation Agreement, 
which aims at 'a forward-looking relationship with a more structured and strategic perspective' 
(EC-Thailand Joint Statement, 2005), indicates the EU's (particularly the European 
Commission's) increasing interest in formulating closer co-operation on the bilateral basis with 
Thailand. 
Apart from investigating EU-Thai relations in terms of strategy formulation, in the next 
section the chapter will examine the European Commission Delegation's role as a commercial 
actor in Thailand, carrying on its bilateral dialogue with Thailand alongside Member State 
Embassies at the local level. 
6.3 THE EU IN THAILAND: AN 'ON THE GROUND' INVESTIGATION 
The overview of EU-Thai bilateral relations discussed in the earlier section has suggested that 
despite the importance of Thailand as one of the EU's key economic partners (particularly in 
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trade) in South East Asia, the Commission has not yet issued (or even planned to issue) a bilateral 
commercial strategy towards Thailand (as for example the EU does with its separate commercial 
strategies towards China as well as Japan). Although in 2002 the Commission adopted a country 
strategy paper for Thailand, it is not a commercial strategy as such but in fact represents a 'co-
operation strategy' emphasising only EU-Thai co-operation issues and how to manage the EU's 
financial assistance towards Thailand through cooperation projects/programmes. Moreover, the 
Bilateral Co-operation Agreement, as mentioned earlier, is not yet signed. 
In the absence of a distinct Brussels-originated commercial strategy towards Thailand, 
and of the Bilateral Agreement, this part of the chapter investigates what roles the EU plays and 
what instruments the EU has to manage its bilateral relations with Thailand at the local level. 
This focus on 'what actually happens' is argued in line with Bale's (2002: 16) concern with the 
importance of cooperation at the 'mundane' level and the roles of the European Commission 
Delegations in third countries, when he analysed CFSP. The chapter applies this mundane level 
of analysis to EU commercial diplomacy under the First Pillar, or more specifically to the 
European Commission Delegation as a form of 'commercial representation' in Thailand. 
6.3.1 The European Commission Delegation in Thailand 
The European Commission Delegation in Thailand was established in 1979 (at that time, also 
accredited to BurmalMyanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Malaysia), as the first Delegation in the 
Asian region (even before India in 1983 and China in 1988). Since the late 1990s the European 
Commission has been expanding its network of Delegations in Asia, from 10 Delegations in 1994 
to 19 Delegations in 2004, for example, some new Delegations were opened in Singapore (in 
January 2003) and in Malaysia (in April 2003) (See Table 3.1 in Chapter 3). The Delegation is 
led by a Head of the Delegation, which is equivalent to an Ambassador position. In applying 
Bruter's (1999: 196) classification of three types of Delegations, development-oriented, trade-
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oriented and mixed - three emphases which are different in different host states, the chapter 
argues that the Delegation in Thailand seems to represent a move from a development-oriented 
role in the 1980s towards a mix of development and trade-oriented roles in the 1990s and more 
recently. This can be linked to the increased importance of Thailand and Asia as markets for the 
EU and European companies. Therefore, among the three divisions of political section, project 
and operations section, and trade and economic section shown in Diagram 6.2 of the organisation 
chart of the Delegation in Thailand, it appears that the two legs of project and operations, and 
trade and economic are dominant. Hence, the tasks and activities ofthe Delegation in Thailand 
focus mainly on the issues of development and economic co-operation (recently towards an 
increasing importance of economic co-operation projects) and trade and economics (with the 
establishment of a BIC in 2004) (See Section, 6.4.2 and 6.4.3). 
More specifically, while trying to understand the commercial roles played by the 
European Commission Delegation in Thailand, one has to bear in mind that the EU is not a state, 
but perfonns some state-functions. Therefore, rather than being recognised as an 'EUlEuropean 
Embassy', the Delegation can be viewed as one of a group of 'Embassies without a state' (Bruter, 
1999: 183). The European Commission Delegations in third countries still exist alongside the 
Member State Embassies, who represent individual Member States and continue to protect and 
promote Member States' national interests in traditional statehood tenns. This results in a 
'double-representation' between the Delegation and Member State Embassies in Thailand. 
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Diagram 6.2: Organisation Chart of the European Commission Delegation in Thailand 
Head of the 
Delegation 
.L .... 
Political Trade and 
Section Economic 
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Project i- i-Operation 
Press and Section, Business 
Information for example, Information 
Asia-Invest Centre 
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Source: Interview, European Commission Delegation in Thailand, Bangkok, 23 July 2004 
6.3.2 European Commission Delegation as Part of Commercial Networking Process 
Alongside the Delegation and Member State Embassies, there can also be observed in Thailand a 
variety of commercial stakeholders/actors, including for example business (both European 
business and local business), Chambers of Commerce and other business organisations and 
associations. It is argued that these commercial stakeholders/actors are mutually engaged and 
interact within what can be termed a process of 'commercial networking', in which the 
Delegation plays its own commercial roles (in its own right)124, but alongside Member State 
Embassies and other commercial actors. The commercial stakeholders/actors within this 
commercial networking process observed from the case of the EU in Thailand can be identified 
as follows: 
124 This chapter focuses on investigating the EU as a commercial actor in Thailand. In doing so, an empirical 
research was conducted by the author through a wide range of method of interviews, questionnaires, networking and 
constant contacts with policy·makers, both in Brussels, in Thailand. See a list ofinterviews in Bibliography, page 
316. 
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European Commission Delegation and Member State Embassies: Double-Commercial 
Representation 
All 25 EU Member States have their Embassies and Consulates in Thailand and their main duty 
is to represent their national interests as would be accepted in the traditional statehood concept, 
and to coordinate their inter-state relations with Thailand at bilateral level. In 1979, the 
Commission opened its external service in Thailand, the European Commission Delegation, 
working alongside, rather than replacing, the Member State Embassies. As the Commission 
stressed, 'the Delegations are not there to "compete" with Member State Embassies ... the task of 
the Delegations, beyond the representation of Community interests, is one of co-ordination and 
cooperation in the interests of projecting the image of a Union which is active, imaginative and 
united' (200If: Paragraph 1.2). In focusing particularly on the area ofEU commercial diplomacy, 
the Commission notes that 'the Delegation exercises powers conferred by the treaty on the 
European Community, in third countries, by promoting the Community's interests as embodied 
in the common policies, chiefly the CCP, but also many others, including the agricultural, 
fisheries, environmental, transport and health and safety policies' (DG External Relations 
Website at http://europa.eu.intlconunlexternaIJelations).This means that the European 
Commission Delegation represents the EU, deploying its own commercial instruments and 
strategies, playing roles as a commercial actor, and engaging other commercial stakeholders, 
particularly in the area of the EU commercial policy, and the other policies under the First Pillar, 
where the EU has an exclusive competence; however this representation exists alongside that of 
Member State Embassies. This then leads to a form of 'double-commercial representation' 
between two European commercial actors - the Delegation and the Embassies. 
While the Embassies represent the Member States' national interests and the Delegation 
represents the EU's 'common' interests at the local level, it is impossible to deny that their works 
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and responsibilities are sometimes overlapping. This in turn links to the earlier discussion of the 
EU's 'statelike' character in its commercial diplomacy, and particularly to the problem of divided 
commercial competence between the EU and Member States within a complex decision-making 
process (discussed in detail in Chapter 2). Thus, it is interesting to investigate the way in which 
the Delegation and Member State Embassies co-operate as European commercial representation 
in ensuring the 'common' position of the EU, and especially in engaging and assisting European 
business and in interacting with other commercial actors in the process of commercial networking 
in Thailand (See more detail in Section 6.3.3). 
Business Stakeholders 
'European business' is a vague concept, representing a variety of business interests and 
objectives. Among European firms, differences in nationality and in focus of activities matter. On 
the one hand, European business still represents strong 'national-champions' rather than 
'European champions'. Interviews conducted in Thailand with European business communities, 
Member State Embassies, and national Chambers of Commerce (December 2002-September 
2003) suggest that European firms do not seem to be united, rather they are diversified in 
interests, strategies, languages and business cultures, and they prefer to seek initial support and 
contact from their national Embassies, national business organisations and Chambers of 
Commerce. As we shall see, while also recognising this fact, the EU does not aim to replace the 
works of Member State Embassies and national business organisations, but rather to support and 
cooperate with them in assisting European business. 
Not only nationality but also size of business does matter. Big and internationally 
competitive firms are likely to depend more on their own business strategy and their own 
connections and bargaining power, and less on the EU, while SMEs seek more support from both 
the EU as well as Member States in terms of market access, lobbying and reducing trade and 
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investment barriers. While the AEBF - the EU formal channel for business engagement at the 
transregionallevel- targets particularly big business, it can be noted that EU business 
engagement strategies and instruments at the interregional and bilateral levels mostly aim at 
assisting SMEs 12S. 
It is also crucial to emphasise the competition among European businesses. Following 
Stopford and Strange's argument about the competition among firms in Triangular Diplomacy, it 
is not surprising that European firms might also compete among each other for market access in 
shared sectors in the host country, and that European firms who already established their bases in 
the host country might try to protect their local market from new competitors, even from the same 
country. Such diversity in the notion of 'European business' also means that it is rather difficult 
to define their 'common' interest. Nonetheless, a Commission official still emphasised that 'the 
Delegation only works to defend the collective interest of European business as a whole, not of a 
particular company or of a particular Member State' (Interview, European Commission 
Delegation in Thailand, Bangkok, 26 August 2003). 
When aiming to analyse different business stakeholders whom the EU aims to engage at 
this bilateral level, there is a need to distinguish between 'home' and 'host' firms. From the EU 
perspective, 'home firms' always refer to European firms that seek market access to Asia and 
Thailand, and European firms who have already established their bases in the host country, while 
'host firms' mean local (Thai) business l26. In this respect, it is clear that the Delegation needs to 
have a variety of commercial instruments, strategies, roles in engaging and assisting different 
business stakeholders in this process of commercial networking in Thailand. A number of 
12' For example, the Asia·lnvest and EBIC porogrammes, dealt with in detail in Chapter 5, can be seen as one ofthe 
Commission's instruments in promoting business co·operation among SMEs between Europe and Asia (See Chapter 
5, Section 5.4.2 and 5.4.3). 
126 The focus of this chapter is in fact on the European home firms (on how and in which way the EU engages and 
incorporates European business interests as part of its commercial diplomacy); however the host firms (local firms) 
are also involved in the broader picture. This is because the EU (through the Delegation) does also assist them in 
accessing the EU markets. 
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commercial strategies, instruments and roles deployed by the Delegation will be explored further 
in Section 6.4. 
Chambers of Commerce and Other Business Associations 
Apart from Member States Embassies and the European Commission Delegation, there can be 
observed other national business associations, i.e., Chambers of Commerce, who play crucial 
roles in supporting and assisting European business in specific national contexts. In Thailand, all 
foreign Chambers of Commerce, including all Chambers of Commerce of European countries, 
are legal entities, official groups registered with the Thai Ministry of Commerce 127, and each 
chamber president is a director to the Board of Trade of Thailand (BOT). All foreign Chambers 
of Commerce in Thailand are members of the umbrella organisation the Joint Foreign Chamber 
of Commerce in Thailand (JFCCT), comprising 22 foreign Chambers of Commerce and 3 
Business Associations in Thailand. Apart from their individual networking and lobbying 
activities, the Chambers of Commerce from different European countries also coordinate under 
the JFCCT activities and coordinate among themselves via their regular meetings. Table 6.9 
shows a list of Chambers of Commerce from different EU countries in Thailand. 
127 All foreign Chambers of Commerce are established under Thai Chamber of Commerce Law, 1966 which does not 
allow the establishment of 'European Chamber of Commerce' as one legal entity, but only 'bilateral' Chambers, for 
example, Franco-Thai Chamber of Commerce, German-Thai Chamber of Commerce (interview, Franco-Thai 
Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 15 September 2003). 
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Table 6.9: List of Chambers of Commerce of EU Countries in Thailand 
Source: Commission Delegation in Thailand Website 
It is important to note that while only 11 of the 25 Member States' businesses are 
represented through their national business associations l28, the others - mostly from new EV 
Member States - do not have their own business representations in Thailand. Their Embassies 
and Consulates in Thailand, if they have one, are responsible for this task and activities. It is 
important to note here some overlapping and interchangeable roles and responsibilities between 
the Chambers and the Member State Embassies. Both of them work closely in supporting day-to-
day activities of their business and firms. For example, Member States like Spain and Austria do 
not have their own Chambers of Commerce in Thailand; in this case, their Embassies deal with 
all economic and commercial issues between their home countries and Thailand. (Interview, 
Embassy of Spain, Bangkok, 11 September 2003 and Interview, Austrian Embassy, Bangkok, 16 
September 2003). 
Another point to bear in mind when analysing the network of Chambers of Commerce in 
Thailand is that unlike in some other Asian countries, for example in the Philippines, Vietnam, 
South Korea, where there exists a 'European Chamber of Commerce' as a single organisation 
12. Belgium and Luxemburg are represented through one Chamber, the Belgium-Luxemburgffhai Chamber of 
Commerce (BLTCC). 
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playing an active role in assisting European business, there is no 'European Chamber of 
Commerce' as one legal entity in Thailand (See Footnote 127, page 256). There only exists a 
loose network among them. Although there have been attempts by the Commission to encourage 
the establishment of a European Chamber of Commerce in Thailand, 'this attempt proved 
problematic and unsuccessful' (Interview, Franco-Thai Chambers of Commerce, Bangkok, 15 
September 2003). 
Not only does a European Chamber of Commerce not exist in Thailand as a distinct 
entity, but also different Chambers of Commerce of Member States vary in aims, focuses, sizes 
and structures. For instance, the German-Thai Chamber of Commerce (GTCC), established in 
1962, seems to be the biggest in terms of organisation with almost 40 staff and about 500 
Membership, while the British Chamber of Commerce (BCCT), established earlier in 1946, is the 
oldest with about 580 Members but only 7 staff. Some Chambers have wider scope of activities, 
roles and responsibilities than the others. The GTCC deals with both business networking and 
trade and investment promotion activities between Germany and Thailand129, while most other 
Chambers in Thailand only represent business and social networking among business people 
from their home countries in Thailand, leaving trade and investment promotion tasks to their 
national Embassies. For example, the French Economic and Commercial Section in the French 
Embassy is a relatively large organisation with approximately 22 staff, not only dealing with 
broader bilateral economic and commercial relations between France and Thailand but also being 
responsible for trade and investment promotion activities (Interview, French Embassy in 
Thailand, Bangkok, 3 September 2003), while the FTCC, with 7 staff, only aims at building 
business networking among French business in Thailand (Interview, Franco-Thai Chamber of 
Commerce, Bangkok, 15 September 2003). This is the same in the British case, where the BCCT 
129 By transferring trade and investment promotion tasks to the GTCC, the German Embassy deals only with the 
broader bilateral economic and commercial policy between Germany and Thailand (Interview, Embassy ofthe 
Federal Republic of Germany, Bangkok, 13 August 2003). 
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only aims to support British business networking in Thailand (Interview, the British Chamber of 
Commerce Thailand, Bangkok, 27 August 2003). 
Moreover, smaller Chambers of Commerce, for example the Thai-Italian Chamber of 
Commerce (TICC), the Netherlands-Thai Chamber of Commerce (NL-TCC) and Belgium-
LuxemburglThai Chamber of Commerce (BLTCC) also focus mainly on building business 
networking among their businesses in Thailand, while their Embassies are responsible for trade 
and investment promotion (Interviews, Royal Embassy of Belgium, Bangkok, 16 September 
2003; Interview, the Embassy ofItaly, Bangkok, 15 September 2003; Interview, Royal 
Netherlands Embassy, Bangkok, 18 September 2003). 
The lack of a 'European Chamber of Commerce' as one entity in Thailand supports the 
point noted earlier that in Thailand European businesses still seek initial business contacts 
through their national Chambers of Commerce and Member State Embassies, representing their 
characteristics as 'national champions', rather than 'European champions'. A main duty of these 
national Chambers of Commerce is, therefore, to assist business from their home countries (those 
that are members of the Chamber) to do business in the host country by, for example, providing 
them with market information and business consultancy, building business and social networking 
in the host country, solving business disputes, lobbying the host government for particular 
business issues, and organising match-making events and trade fairs. These activities aim at 
supporting and promoting trade and investment ties between Thailand and their home countries. 
The above observation suggests that in supporting the works of Member State Embassies, the 
national Chambers of Commerce also play useful roles in assisting European business in 
Thailand. Thus, they should be taken into account as part of the commercial networking process. 
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6.3.3 Uneven Relationships but Effective Division of Labour within the Commercial 
Networking Process 
The European commercial actors - both states, firms, and the ED represented by the European 
Commission Delegation - already identified in the preceding section interact and are mutually 
engaged within the process of commercial networking. In this section, the chapter aims to explore 
how these groups of European commercial actors are related to one another. Research conducted 
by the author suggests that within this commercial networking process, a set of 'uneven' 
relationships among them can be observed. While there is a close' diplomatic co-operation' 
between the Member State Embassies and the Delegation with a clear division of labour 
regarding the shared ED-Member State commercial competence and a close relationship among 
Member State Embassies, national Chambers of Commerce and business from their home 
countries, however, there exists a wide gap between the Delegation and business. These uneven 
relationships can be explained in details as follows: 
Diplomatic Co-operation 
As noted earlier, the European Commission Delegation and the Member States Embassies can 
both be seen as forms of local commercial representation, and the ED through the European 
Commission Delegation in many significant respects exercises commercial autonomy and 
competence (though still shared with the Member States Embassies). Though being recognised as 
a double commercial representation at this local level, they seem to closely coordinate, 
particularly in representing European business interests. 
Observations made by the author suggest that all ED trade policy issues and other 
commercial issues which fall under the Union's exclusive competence, for example, WTO and 
agricultural issues, have been transferred to the Delegation, however, the Embassies still retain 
their commercial competence on investment and trade and investment promotion, and still assist 
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the businesses from their home country in solving particular business disputes/problems. As an 
EU official at the Delegation in Bangkok emphasised, 'if the trade disputes either fall under the 
EU's commercial competence or concern the common European interest, the Embassies transfer 
the case to the Delegation' (Interview, European Commission Delegation in Thailand, Bangkok, 
26 August 2003), though one has to bear in mind that to distinguish a 'common' interest of the 
EU from the interest of Member States is rather difficult. 
Interviews conducted with a number ofEU and Member State Embassy officials, 
particularly commercial attaches in Thailand 130 provided evidence that Member State Embassies 
and the Delegation do cooperate and play distinctive roles in assisting different business 
stakeholders, defending the interests of European business in Thailand, and promoting trade and 
investment between the two regions. Importantly, there exists an effective division of labour 
between them identified by the EU-Member State commercial competence formulated in 
Brussels. While commercial competence issues have been the focus of a long, on-going debate 
between the Commission and the Member States (through the Council) in Brussels (observed in 
Chapter 2), the chapter, instead, observes a pattern of more 'cooperative' relations between the 
EU and Member States, particularly among the commercial attaches and counsellors of the 
Delegation and Member State Embassies, at this local level. 'Diplomatic co-operation' (Bale, 
2002: 16) in the area of commercial diplomacy thus exists in Thailand. 
Moreover, as a commercial attache of the Delegation stressed, there is once a month 
meeting among the commercial attaches from the Delegation and Member States Embassies in 
order to discuss bilateral commercial issues between the EU and Thailand (Interview, European 
Commission Delegation in Thailand, Bangkok, 26 August 2003). A number of interviews with 
commercial attaches and counsellors of different Member State Embassies in Thailand also 
confirmed a helpful and co-operative role of the Delegation, particularly in the area of trade 
130 See interview list in Bibliography, page 316. 
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policy (Interviews, Bangkok, August-September 2003). An official from the French Embassy in 
Thailand, for example, emphasised, 'in a country without the European Commission Delegation, 
the work on trade and commercial issues of the Embassy can be more difficult; the Delegation 
has been very helpful for us' (Interview, French Embassy in Thailand, Bangkok, 3 September 
2003). 
Closer Relationship among Member State Embassies, Chambers o/Commerce and Business 
It is not surprising that the Member State Embassies and the national Chambers of Commerce 
have closer relations with the European business communities in third countries than do EU 
bodies. This relates to what the chapter has argued before about support for 'national champions', 
rather than 'European champions', and the vague identity of 'European' business. Both 
Embassies and Chambers of Commerce usually have direct contact with business from their 
home countries in the process of representing and defending their interests in Thailand. For 
instance, the GTCC serves German business communities in terms of trade and investment 
promotion, business consultancy and networking; and French business also has very close contact 
with the French Embassy in terms of trade and investment promotion and relies on the Franco-
Thai Chamber of Commerce in terms of business networking. A senior official from the Franco-
Thai Chamber of Commerce pictured the close co-operation among French commercial 
organisations in Thailand as a 'triangle of networking between the French Embassy, Chamber 
and business', but rather noted 'the irrelevant role of the EU within this network' (Interview, 
Franco-Thai Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 15 September 2003). This indicates that 
nationality does matter. The Member State Embassies with close co-operation with their national 
Chambers of Commerce represent national business interests in Thailand and promote trade and 
investment between Thailand and their home countries in traditional statehood terms. The EU 
does not have a competence on this trade and investment promotion. 
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European Commission Delegation-Business Gap 
While the close relationships between the Embassies, the national Chambers of Commerce and 
business can be observed, there appears to be a gap in Delegation-business relations. Rather than 
having direct contacts with business or dealing with day-to-day business activities, the 
Delegation intentionally plays only a background/framework, and neutral role in supporting 
business. As a senior commercial attache ofthe Delegation noted: 'the EU has to play a neutral 
role in assisting business .. .it cannot act on behalf of one particular company or Member State. A 
business problem has to involve a common interest of EUlEuropean business as a whole, 
otherwise the EU cannot intervene' (Interview, European Commission's Delegation in Thailand, 
Bangkok, 26 August 2003). 
As a result of this background/framework role, the Delegation's profile is relatively low 
among the business communities in Thailand. Even contact between the national Chambers of 
Commerce and the Delegation has hardly existed. Both business communities and the national 
Chambers of Commerce usually contact their national Embassies first, not the Delegation. 
However, while it is important to note that for Chambers of Commerce of bigger Member States, 
a stronger and more proactive role for the Delegation seems to be unnecessary, different views 
can be observed from some Chambers of Commerce and Embassies from smaller Member States, 
for example, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy. These organisations seem to be more 
optimistic about a stronger and more active role of the Delegation, in order to supplement their 
bargaining power in the host country. 
Recognising this wide gap, in 2004 the Delegation, despite a monthly meeting among 
commercial attaches from the Delegation and Member States Embassies, aimed to initiate more 
regular meetings between the Delegation and Chambers of Commerce in order to gain more 
market access information from business and to communicate more with the business community 
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(Interview, European Commission Delegation in Thailand, Bangkok,14 July 2004). This in a way 
reflects a new attempt on the part of the Delegation to play a more proactive role in engaging 
business in Thailand. 
Effective Division of Labour 
Despite the uneven relations discussed earlier, this investigation of the commercial networking 
process in Thailand has shown that different European commercial actors within the process 
perfonn distinctive roles in engaging different business stakeholders, reflecting an 'effective 
division oflabour' within this networking process. As already argued, in tenns of the shared EU-
Member State commercial competence, the EU has its exclusive competence in trade policy, and 
thus all trade policy related activities have been referred to the Delegation, while other 
commercial issues, such as trade and investment promotion and investment issues which are stilI 
under the Member States' competence, fall under the Embassies' responsibilities and tasks. As a 
result, on the one hand, the Embassies play a crucial role in promoting trade and investment 
between Thailand and their home countries and dealing with particular business interests of their 
home businesses. On the other hand, the Delegation plays only a background/framework role, for 
example by facilitating trade and investment, reducing trade and investment barriers, setting up a 
framework for a better market access, to support both European 'home finns' who are looking for 
market access into Thailand and local finns looking for market access into the EU market. In 
addition, the national Chambers of Commerce, who usually have closer contacts and relations 
with business, play a crucial role in assisting day-to-day business activities. They mainly engage 
and serve the interests of European businesses who have already established their bases in 
Thailand (or European home finns) in tenns of business and social networking. 
In this respect, the Embassies' and Chambers of Commerce's roles and duties in Thailand 
can be easily understood by representing national 'state' interests in traditional tenns; however 
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the Delegation represents the collective interest of the EU. The roles of the Delegation - which 
reflect some 'statelike' characteristics of the EU - are worth investigating in more detail: what 
roles and in which way the Delegation can play in representing, defending and promoting 
'common' interests of European business in Thailand? The next section is devoted to a more 
detailed exploration of this issue. 
6.4 ROLES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION DELEGATION IN THAILAND 
In the previous part the chapter has investigated a broad picture of interconnected relations 
between commercial actors within a process of commercial networking in Thailand. This part of 
the chapter aims to specifically explore what roles the European Corrunission Delegation plays in 
this networking process, what instruments it has and how it can translate these instruments and 
roles into engagement with different business stakeholders at the bilateral level. The roles of the 
Delegation in relation to business engagement as observed in the case of Thailand are: market 
opener, trade and investment facilitator, financer, and co-ordinator, reflecting the mix between 
trade and development oriented roles of the Delegation, and more generally, some statelike 
characteristics of the EU as a commercial actor. 
6.4.1 Market Opener 
Since the mid-1990s business engagement has become a significant part of the EU's commercial 
diplomacy towards third countries, including those in Asia. As already argued in detail in Chapter 
2, the EU's market access strategy can be seen as part of this business engagement trend. The 
Corrunission officially adopted in 1996 its first market access strategy focusing on supporting 
European business in accessing the third country markets. Since then, the EU has emphasised the 
issue of market access as a means to improve European competitiveness in the global political 
economy. Thailand - one of the most attractive markets in South East Asia - is no exception in 
the implementation of these market access strategies. 
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While the Member State Embassies and the national Chambers of Commerce assist their 
home businesses in accessing the third country markets on a day-to-day basis, the Delegation also 
plays a crucial role as a 'market opener' in assisting business at the background/framework level, 
facilitating trade and investment, reducing trade and investment barriers, ensuring fair market 
access and confirming that the host country complies with international commitment (chiefly 
WTO rules). As the Delegation in Bangkok has explicitly stated: 'the EU has taken a proactive 
and practical stance in assisting its exporters enter the Thai market ... this is done by identifying 
obstacles to trade and when necessary providing assistance in eliminating these barriers in order 
to ensure trade partners comply with their international commitments' (The Delegation of the 
European Commission's Website). In order to perform this market opening role, as an EU official 
at the Delegation in Bangkok emphasised, 'the Delegation has a close co-operation with Member 
State Embassies in following market access complaints received from the business community' 
(Interview, European Commission Delegation in Thailand, Bangkok, 26 August 2003). 
The same official also explained that European companies can report business 
problems/disputes and trade and investment barriers impeding their access to the Thai market, 
either to their Embassies or directly to the Delegation. This suggests that the issue of shared 
commercial competence between the EU and its Member States relates to the division oflabour, 
roles, and activities of the Delegation and Member State Embassies at this local level. In this 
respect, the Embassies play a significant 'middle man' role in transferring business complaints 
and requests they receive from their businesses and Chambers of Commerce, if they fall under 
the EU's exclusive competence, to the Delegation. Closely collaborating with the Commercial 
Sections of the Member State Embassies, the Delegation investigates and follows up these market 
access complaints, but only if they affect the European 'common' interest as a whole. However, 
where business complaints belong to Member States' competence, involve particular national 
interests, or involve particular company interests, the Embassies and/or Chambers of Commerce 
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have to manage such complaints under Member States' competence on behalf of the business 
(Interview, European Commission Delegation in Thailand, Bangkok, 26 August 2003). 
Nonetheless, to distinguish the' common' interest of the Union from the Member States' and to 
decide which case the EU could assist is not easy for the Delegation; against this background it is 
understandable that the Delegation seems to be sensitive to the possibility of bias by assisting one 
particular European Member State/company, but not others. 
This Delegation role of following and investigating business complaints follows one of 
the Commission's important instruments for gaining market access, the TBR (See Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4.2). The TBR can be seen as the Commission's unique tool which seeks to defend the 
interests of European businesses in third markets, and the Delegation plays a crucial role in 
implementing this instrument at the local level. In order to take action (where business 
complaints fall under the EU's common interest and its exclusive competence) to solve business 
problems, the EU has two available instruments: the use ofWTO dispute settlement at the 
multilateral level, and/or the use of diplomatic pressure (through the Delegation) by lobbying 
related organisations in opening particular market sectors at the bilateral level. In fact, before the 
complaints are sent to the Commission in Brussels, the Delegation also plays a crucial role in 
receiving and refining complaints from the business community, and usually takes action by 
lobbying the host government for market opening. This market opening role of the Delegation 
reflects the significant degree of local commercial autonomy the Delegation has particularly in 
the trade policy area, and thus some statelike functions of the EU (particularly the Commission'S) 
activities in Thailand. 
Although the Commission's commercial competence in the area ofWTO dispute 
settlement is potent, in practice there is only a small number of cases in which the EU intervenes 
to defend the interests of European business through the WTO channel, as most of them could be 
solved at bilateral level or by diplomatic pressure/or lobbying of the Delegation and/or the 
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European Commission in Brussels. In the case of Thailand, an official from the Delegation in 
Bangkok emphasised that: while receiving and refining business complaints, the Delegation 
mostly takes action at the bilateral level by directly contacting the Thai govemment organisations 
who deal with particular sectors and problems. Examples of some successful cases when the 
Delegation assisted European companies to enter the Thai market are to be found in the 
cosmetics, alcohol and automotive sectors (Interview, European Commission Delegation in 
Thailand, Bangkok, 14 July 2004). This implies a crucial role for the Delegation as a market 
opener on the ground. 
There is no question that the market opening role of the EU, particularly the Delegation, 
can be useful for business. However, businesses also have to be assertive and make a complaint 
either to the EU or Member State Embassies when there is a discrimination problem against them 
in the local market. As was also stressed by an EU official, 'the business has to inform the 
Delegation of their problem and it has to be a "discrimination problem", so that the Delegation 
can play its market opening role' (Interview, European Commission Delegation in Thailand, 
Bangkok, 14 July 2004). This implies that the market opening role of the Delegation is only at 
, 
the background and framework level. 
6.4.2 Trade and Investment Facilitator 
Another significant role of the Delegation observed in Thailand is that of trade and investment 
facilitator. When trying to understand this Delegation's role, it is important not only to be aware 
of the unevenness of EU-Member State commercial competence in trade and investment, but to 
distinguish between the action of 'facilitation' and 'promotion'. This part of the chapter aims to 
explore both trade-investment competence and facilitation-promotion issues, by arguing that the 
Delegation only plays the role of trade and investment facilitator, rather than that of promoter. 
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Trade Facilitation 
Although trade policy falls under the EU's commercial competence, research conducted by the 
author suggests that the role of the Delegation in Thailand appears to cover only trade facilitation, 
but not trade promotion. Rather, the Member State Embassies, in co-operation with the national 
Chambers of Commerce, deal with trade promotion and day-to-day business activities, for 
example, business consulting, match-making service, organising trade fairs, and assisting their 
businesses on particular business disputes and problems. Examples of EU attempts to play such a 
trade facilitation role at this local level can be observed from the establishment of the EBIC 
programme in 1999 and the BIC under the management of the Delegation in 2004, as well as the 
implementation of TREA TI at the bilateral level. 
The first attempt of the EU to play a trade facilitation role was the establishment of a 
EBIC office in Thailand in 1999 (as well as the EBIC offices in other Asian countries) as an EU-
level 'service' agency to assist business at the local level by help facilitating trade, putting the EU 
closer to business communities, particularly in the area of trade, and providing infonnation on the 
Single European market (See also Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2). However, following the shared 
European Commission-Member State commercial competence, the EBIC was supposed to deal 
only with requests from Thai businesses or the 'host finns', while the Member State Embassies 
and their national business associations deal with their home businesses or the 'home flnns', as 
well as other requests relating to trade promotion. As the Commission explicitly stressed in its 
strategy paper for establishing the EBIC in Thailand: 'infonnation requests from EU companies 
or associations ofEU companies will be referred by the EBIC to the commercial section of the 
Embassy of the enquirer's country, or to any other competent agency of the country, while 
infonnation requests from companies or associations of the host country [in this case Thailand] 
will be dealt with by the EBIC' (EuropeAid Co-operation Office, 2004a). 
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However, in practice, to achieve the EBIC aim of 'acting in a manner complementary to 
the public and private sector agencies of the member states to increase the capacity of Asian 
business to engage in mutually beneficial linkages with EU businesses' (EuropeAid Co-operation 
Office, 2004a) as the Commission expected, proved more difficult. Despite some successful 
experience with the EBICs in other Asian countries131 , the EBIC in Thailand instead created 
some confusion and overlaps in tasks and activities between the EBIC and national Chambers of 
Commerce. Hence, the EBIC in Thailand faced a number of operational problems from its 
establishment in 1999 and was closed in the same year after only a few months of operations 
(Interview, European Commission Delegation in Thailand, Bangkok, 26 August 2003). The past 
experience of the EU with the operation ofEBIC in Thailand led to an increasing sensitivity on 
the part of the EU in distinguishing between 'trade facilitation' and 'trade promotion' issues. 
In May 2004, the Delegation made a new attempt to establish a 'Business Information 
Centre' (BIC) - a department under the Delegation -, which focuses mainly on trade facilitation 
in line with the aim of the EBIC. An EU official responsible for the BIC at the Delegation in 
Thailand stated that: 'while internalising some of EBIC tasks, the BIC emphasises giving 
information on rules and regulations of the European Single Market and targeting only Thai 
companies to enter the EU market. .. The BIC is seen as the main entry point of essential trade-
related enquiries oflocal business about the EU market' (Interview, European Commission 
Delegation in Thailand, Bangkok, 14 July 2004). The BIC services include: 
(i) EU market access information: customs and tariffs, environmental requirements, food 
safety legislation, standards and technical certification, Intellectual property, statistical data; 
(ii) Building capacity of Thai businesses: organising seminars, workshops, and other 
public events focusing on issues related to doing business with the EU; 
(iii) Promoting EUcThailand cooperation progranunes: Asia Invest, Asia Pro-Eco, Asia-
IT&C, and the SPF; 
III It is important to note here that the EBIC is some Asian countries were more successful than in the others, 
depending on the particular business environment in different Asian countries. 
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(iv) Raising the profile of the EU: increasing the visibility of the EU in Thailand and 
encouraging cooperation among the EU business community (European Commission Delegation 
in Thailand, No Date). 
It is important to note that the BIC focuses mainly on assisting Thai and local firms 
accessing the EU market, but 'not offering assistance in trade promotion - e.g. by looking for 
potential joint venture partners - this is not the competence of the Delegation', an official at the 
Delegation in Bangkok strongly emphasised (Interview, European Commission Delegation in 
Thailand, Bangkok, 14 July 2004). 
Apart from EBIC and BIC, another example of the Delegation's trade facilitator role 
worth mentioning here is the implementation of TREA TI at the bilateral level. Although the 
TREA TI represents a new 'trade action plan' for ASEAN (See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3), the 
Delegation in Thailand plays an active role in implementing the TREA TI activities by organising 
a number of seminars and conferences at the bilateral level, for example a TREA TI seminar on 
food safety in 28 May 2004 in Thailand, which 'brought together some 300 members of food 
exporting industries, local authorities and inspection bodies as well as traders and experts from 
across the ASEAN region' (European Commission Delegation in Thailand New Releases, 2004) 
in order to give them information on the EU's rules and regulations on food safety, thus helping 
Thai exporters access the EU market, and facilitating trade between the two regions. 
Investment Facilitation 
Although investment is not yet under the EU's commercial competence, the Delegation has also 
cooperated with Member States and played a useful role in facilitating and setting up a 
framework for investment, which means to reduce investment barriers, to ensure a fair and 
opened investment environment, and to confirm that Thailand complies with its multilateral 
commitments (chiefly WTO rules). 
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Not only the Delegation, but the Commission in Brussels also plays a significant role in 
assisting European investors to enter the Thai market. One classic example of the EU's lobbyist 
role in relation to investment facilitating and market opening for investment in Thailand is the 
case of telecommunications. The liberalisation process for telecommunications in Thailand has 
been difficult and delayed and the telecommunication sector has become one of the concerns for 
European business, particularly European telecommunication businesses investing in Thailand, 
under the management of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a telecom tycoon elected in 2001. 
Among the three mobile telecoms providers in Thailand, the Prime Minister's family-
owned Advanced Info Service (AIS)ll2leads the market, followed by its major competitor, Total 
Access Communication (DTAC), of which Norway's Telenor AS owns 29.94 %133. Moreover, in 
2001, France Telecom entered the Thai mobile phone market through Orange SAl34 joint venture 
with TelecomAsia (TA)1lS. However, after only short a period of operation in Thailand, in March 
2004, Orange sold 39 per cent of its stake back to TA, giving TA full management control afTA 
Orange (83 %) while dropping Orange's share to 10 per cent. The Nation - one ofthe leading 
English-language Newspapers in Thailand - called this a 'Massive Divestment' (The Nation, 
'Massive Divestment: Orange SA sells stake in Thai unit', 10 March 2004). Following this 
telecoms market situation in Thailand, it appears that the EU, both the Delegation and the 
Commission in Brussels played a significant role in lobbying the Thai govemment on behalf of 
European business for market access and a fair regulatory regime in the Thai telecoms market. 
132 Shin Corp, the company founded by Prime Minister Thanksin, is the main shareholder of AIS of 43.06%. SingTel 
of Singapore owns 19.35% in AIS (AIS Website). . 
13) However, the Telenor stake of29.94% in DTAC in fact exceeded the limitation offoreign ownership share 
allowed by the Thai telecoms business law (only at 25%), which caused concerns on the rather protective Thai 
telecoms market among European business. 
13' In Augusl2000, France Telecom acquired Orange plc from Vodafone for a lotal consideration of £25.1 biIIion. 
(Orange Website, accessed al23 May 2004). 
13' TelecomAsia is a major provider of fixed-line lelephony, cable and satellite TV and multimedia. The major 
stakeholder of 44.45% is the Charoen Pokphand Group (CP Group), one of Asia's largest agro-industrial 
conglomerates. In April 2004, TA has changed its name to TRUE. (TA Websile, as al23 May 2004). 
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The issue of limitation of foreign ownership share only to 25% and the amendment of the 
telecoms business law to increase this to 49% was raised twice by the EU Trade Commissioner 
from 1999-2004, Pascal Lamy with the Thai Prime Minister. The first time was on 13 June 2002 
in Brussels, when together with the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, Mr. 
Lamy explicitly stressed that 'the protectionist characteristic of Thai telecoms business law is 
opposed to Thailand's multilateral commitments in WTO'. Again, on 31 March 2003, during his 
official visit to Thailand, Mr. Lamy emphasised to the Prime Minister that: 'the limitation of 
foreign share ownership in local telecoms firms at 25% and slow process to amend it has given a 
negative signal to foreign investors' (Interview, Government House, Bangkok, 18 September 
2003). 
While the liberalisation of Thailand's telecoms market is seen as a test of Thaksin's 
commitment to market liberalisation and providing a level playing field for foreign investors 
competing in the Thai market, in May 2002, the Cabinet agreed to amend telecom legislation to 
raise the foreign share ownership cap in local telecom firms from 25% to 49% (The Nation, 
'Foreign Ownership: New 49% telecom limit approved', 15 May 2002). This telecommunication 
case demonstrates that in addition to business lobbying Thai government on its own, the EU 
could play a supporting role in facilitating investment (if a business dispute or problem affects a 
common interest of European business as a whole) by emphasising the use of the WTO 
commitments as a principle, even though investment is still not under the EU's exclusive 
competence. 
6.4.3 Financier: Economic-Oriented Co-operation Programmes 
The third role of the Delegation as a 'financier' is closely related to the EU's use of economic co-
operation prograrnmes as alternative 'soft' commercial instruments to engage Asia at the 
interregional (EU-ASEAN) level (See Chapter 5, Section 5.4). Among ASEAN, Thailand has 
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often been chosen as a regional hub for the EU-ASEAN projects! programmes, for example 
ECAPI and ECAP II economic co-operation programmes to promote Intellectual Property Rights 
have their bases in Bangkok (See also Table 6.8). 
In fact, co-operation between the EC and Thailand commenced in the 1970s; and in the 
early stages the EC's emphasis was placed on assisting government crop diversification efforts 
and boosting farmers' incomes. Since the mid-1990s the focus of co-operation has shifted 
towards more economic-oriented activities in line with Thailand's rapid growth. As the 
Commission strongly emphasised in its Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative 
Programme for Thailand, 'the period 1994 to 1999 has shown Thailand rapidly evolving from the 
status of aid recipient to that of economic partner' ... As a result, '[activities] during the period of 
the present strategy (2002/6) should be mainly economic, with EU development aid to be used 
only in exceptional circumstances' (2002d: 15,5). Two priority areas for EU bilateral co-
operation with Thailand were identified by the Commission in this country strategy paper: trade 
and investment and reform of the health system. According to the Commission, the EC's bilateral 
co-operation strategy with Thailand will focus mainly on two focal areas: technical assistance and 
capacity-building activities in the sectors of trade, investment, and related areas for sustained co-
operation and the sector of public health and health services through the consolidation of 
previous assistance to the Health Reform process, however, other sectors are considered as non-
focal areas and will be addressed under the existing thematic and regional (ASEAN, AS EM, 
Asia) programmes (2002d: 3). 
According to the Commission's National Indicative Programme for Thailand (2002-
2004), from the total budget of 10 million Euros allocated to Thailand,S million was earmarked 
for focal area 1 (trade, investment and related areas for sustained co-operation) and another 5 
million for focal area 2 (public health and health services) (2002e: 5). Focal area 1 reflects the 
use of economic co-operation programmes as a commercial tool to promote bilateral economic 
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relations with Thailand, particularly, trade and investment which includes technical assistance 
and capacity building to help Thailand in implementing its WTO commitments, namely in key 
areas agreed at Doha; supporting the Thai administration and companies to adapt to 
developments in EC legislation; and promoting EC investment and market access in Thailand 
(2002d: 21-22). 
In order to implement this economic-oriented priority (focal area 1), the Commission 
initiated a new instrument called 'the Small Project Facility' (SPF), which aims to contribute to 
the reinforcement of the EU-Thailand comprehensive partnership, by providing financial 
contributions to 'small, but strategic EU-Thai projects' and 'promote economic links (trade and 
investment, and related areas for sustained co-operations) between the EU and Thailand' 
(European Commission, 2002d: 7). The European Commission Delegation in Thailand has 
played an increasingly important role in implementing this new Commission instrument. The 
SPF project, like other co-operation projects/programmes, i.e., Asia-Invest, is now managed and 
administrated by the Delegation, with close supervision by the Commission's EuropeAid Co-
operation Office in Brussels (previously these co-operation programmes/projects were principally 
administrated only by the Brussels office). This increasing responsibility of the Delegation in 
implementing the EU's co-operation programmes/projects is in line with the devolution policy of 
the Commission, adopted in May 2000 with the aim of delivering EU external assistance more 
rapidly and more effectively (see Chapter 2). The SPF, which is now an on-going project in 
Thailand under full management of the European Commission Delegation, not only reflects the 
Commission's intention to give the Delegation more power and responsibility to play its crucial 
role in third countries, but also indicates the EU focus on using a bilateral approach in producing 
concrete outcomes in the Asian region. 
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6.4.4 Coordinator: Representing A Single EU Voice? 
Apart from market opener, trade and investment facilitator, and financier, a last but not least 
significant role of the Delegation is that of a 'coordinator' among Member State Embassies, 
business organisations and firms in Thailand. In fact, the Commission expects the Delegation to 
play such a role as it is clearly stated: 'the Delegations are not there to "compete" with Member 
State Embassies ... The task of the Delegations, beyond the representation of Community 
interests, is one of co-ordination and cooperation in the interests of projecting the image of a 
Union which is active, imaginative and united' (200If: Paragraph 1.2). This means the 
Delegation is expected play a coordinator role among them, representing an EU single voice in 
third countries. 
In the case of Thailand, the investigation conducted by the author suggested that the EU 
single voice and the Delegation's pro active coordinator role could be observed in only some 
areas of commercial co-operation, those falling under the EU exclusive competence, and with 
some groups of commercial stakeholders. For some bigger Member States and big business, the 
EU single voice is often neglected (except in the particular case of the Thai telecommunication 
market, when Brussels plays a crucial role in lobbying the Thai government) as they either have 
their own, long established connections in Thailand or have their own bargaining power. For 
instance, big German businesses often lobby directly to the Thai government, rather than bring 
the case to the EU. Moreover, European businesses which have already established their bases in 
Thailand, do not assign much importance to the Delegation; they contact and rely more on their 
national Chambers of Commerce in terms of business connections and networking. On the other 
hand, for smaller or less heavily involved Member States, this coordinating role of the Delegation 
is crucial as it can increase bargaining power in lobbying the Thai govemment. Interviews with 
Spanish, Italian, Belgian and the Netherlands Embassies in Thailand suggested that these 
Embassies recognise and appreciate the coordinating role of the Delegation in lobbying the Thai 
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government on behalf of the EU as a whole, and that they anticipate a stronger and more 
integrated role of all European Embassies under the Commission Delegation (Interview, Embassy 
of Spain, Bangkok, II September 2003; Embassy of Italy, Bangkok, 15 September 2003; Royal 
Embassy of Belgium, 16 September 2003; and Royal Netherlands Embassy, 18 September 2003). 
The coordinator role of the Commission Delegation is not necessarily or equally important to all 
Member States and business stakeholders. Despite a variety of views from different Member 
States and different business stakeholders, it appears that in the case of Thailand there are some 
areas where the EU plays a useful coordinator role, representing both Member States and 
business interests. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) are one striking example, when the 
Delegation plays a significant role as a coordinator, collaborating with Member States and 
business in dealing with IPR infringements in Thailand. 
IPR infringements have been wide spread in Thailand, obviously harming the interests of 
European business, for example, French and Italian luxury and brand name products. The EU has 
not only made an effort at the interregionallevel by financing a number of the EU-ASEAN co-
operation programmes such as ECAPI and ECAPII to protect and promote IPR in ASEAN (as 
mentioned in Chapter 5), but also at the bilateral level the Delegation has been closely 
cooperating with Member State Embassies in representing European business interests in IPR and 
lobbying the Thai government, particularly the Thai Intellectual Property Department, Ministry 
of Commerce, to take some action (Interview, Ministry of Commerce, Bangkok, 19 September 
2003). 
Another instrument the EU uses is co-operative networking between the European public 
and private sector at bilateral level within the 'European Union Intellectual Property Rights 
Network', which was initiated and is managed by the Delegation in Thailand. This IPR Network 
aims at 'bringing together some one hundred representatives of European companies, EU 
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Member States Embassies and the Delegation, [to] seek solutions to the IPR abuses faced by 
many European businesses in Thailand [and will] pool the knowledge, expertise and experience 
of EU companies in Thailand facing IPR problems' (European Commission Delegation in 
Thailand News Releases, 2003b). The IPR network is a striking example of strong co-operation 
between European public and private sector bodies in dealing with EU common business 
interests, and also indicates the Delegation's role as a coordinator among European public and 
private sectors within this network, which can then lobby the Thai government on behalf of 
European business. 
As Ambassador-Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand 
Klauspeter Schmallenbach at that time emphasised, 'to make headway in the fight against IPR 
abuse in Thailand we need to present a united front. Closer co-operation between the European 
private and public sectors through the EU IPR Network is one way we can do that' (European 
Conunission Delegation in Thailand New Releases, 2003b). This co-operative networking in a 
particular area and sector (in this case IPR) was viewed by an EU official at the Delegation as a 
model for other cooperation in other industrial sectors in Thailand (Interview, European 
Conunission Delegation in Thailand, Bangkok, 26 August 2003). 
6.5 CONCLUSION: THE EU'S COMMERCIAL AND BUSINESS ENGAGEMENT IN 
THAILAND 
The previous two chapters explored the EU's commercial and business engagement at two 
different 'regional' levels in Asia, transregional (ASEM) and interregional (EU-ASEAN). In the 
transregionallevel, the EU plays a strategic role by creating the AEBF, a process of dialogue and 
networking between governments and business integrated as part of the ASEM economic 
framework, while in the interregional (EV-ASEAN) level, the EU emphasis is on using economic 
co-operation programmes as indirect commercial tools to promote business co-operation between 
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Europe and Asia, for example the Asia-Invest and EBIC programmes. Equally important in the 
multi-level analysis of this thesis is the investigation of the EU's commercial and business 
engagement at the bilateral level or, to put it more crudely, 'what actually happens' locally. In 
doing so, particular attention has been paid to examining the roles of the European Commission 
Delegation in Thailand - as the EU's conunercial representation at this locallevel-, exploring 
what instruments and strategies it has, and in which ways the Delegation, in collaborating with 
the Member State Embassies and other commercial groupings, can represent, engage, and defend 
interests of different business stakeholders. Empirical research conducted by the author has 
suggested major characteristics of the EU's commercial and business engagement at this local 
level through the observation of work and activities of the Bangkok Delegation as follows: 
In the absence of a Brussels-originated, fonnal EU commercial strategy towards Thailand, 
the chapter has instead observed a process of 'commercial networking' happening at this local 
level among the commercial actors/stakeholders, including the Delegation, Member State 
Embassies, business stakeholders, national Chambers of Commerce. Within this networking 
process, the Delegation has played a co-operative role and assumed a positive orientation towards 
these commercial actors/stakeholders, engaging and incorporating interest of both states and 
finns. This implies a proactive role of the Delegation not only in assisting business and finns 
(both European home finns to enter the Thai markets and Thai local finns to enter the EU 
markets) but also coordinating with Member State Embassies and other commercial groupings in 
defending EU 'common' interest, and in some cases representing the EU single voice towards the 
host country government. 
However, the chapter has also observed an uneven relationship among the commercial 
actors in this commercial networking process. While the Delegation and Member State 
Embassies - as a fonn of double-conunercial representation - seem to have closer relationships 
and co-operate effectively, thus leading to a close 'diplomatic co-operation' among commercial 
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attaches dealing with the EU and Member States trade and commercial issues, the Delegation 
seems to have a low profile among businesses and there is a wide gap between the Delegation 
and business sectors (as well as Chambers of Commerce) in Thailand. However, the Member 
State Embassies, who have a closer contact with national Chambers of Commerce and business 
from their home countries, play a 'middleman' role between them. Therefore, it is argued that 
there is an effective division of labour between European commercial actors within this 
networking process. 
Secondly, and more specifically, when trying to understand what roles the Delegation - as 
an 'Embassy without a state' (Bmter, 1999: 183) - plays in engaging both states and firms in the 
commercial networking process, the chapter has investigated four distinctive roles of the 
Delegation in Thailand, namely market opener, trade and investment faciIitator, financer, and 
coordinator. These roles indicate that rather than intending to engage business on day-to-day 
basis, the Delegation tends to play an active background role in setting a framework for business, 
facilitating trade and investment, and ensuring that the third country complies with multilateral 
commitments (chiefly WTO). Moreover, as a consequence of the EU's uneven commercial 
competence in trade and investment, the Delegation's roles and activities emphasise trade policy 
issues, which fall under Community competences, and not investment which is still the Member 
States' competence. It is also crucial to distinguish between trade and investment 'facilitation' 
and 'promotion' as the roles and tasks of the Delegation only cover facilitation of trade and 
investment, while the Embassies and their national Chambers of Commerce cover trade and 
investment promotion. The Delegation only acts when there is a 'discrimination problem' and 
when business dispute falls under Community competence and/or affects the common interests of 
European business as a whole. This affinns an effective division oflabour between the 
Delegation, Member States Embassies, and national Chambers of Commerce in assisting 
different business stakeholders in Thailand. 
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Thirdly, while investigating the EU's commercial and business engagement at this local 
level, the chapter has observed a closer linkage between interregional (EU-ASEAN) and bilateral 
(EU-Thailand) levels. In the light of the earlier comparison between two regional frameworks of 
the EU-ASEAN and ASEM, it was argued that the EU seems to focus on the transregional 
(ASEM) level as a platform for 'dialogue and networking' with a close link to multilateral 
(WTO) framework, while it expects more of the EU-ASEAN interregional framework to produce 
more tangible outcomes at the bilateral level. This means a close link between interregional and 
bilateral levels, and the EU's focus on the implementation of its interregional (EU-ASEAN) 
strategy at the bilateral level. As argued in Chapter 5, the 2003 'New Partnership with South East 
Asia' Strategy adopted by the Commission has a new mechanism, the 'flexible' approach, which 
paves the way for new Bilateral Co-operation Agreements with individual ASEAN countries on 
different tracks and at different times (according to various levels of development and differing 
priorities), but within the interregional framework. This new bilateral approach of the EU, with 
the forthcoming EU-Thai Bilateral Agreement expected to be signed in 2006, emphasises the use 
of bilateral ism in South East Asian region, rather than interregionalism. 
Another example of close linkage between interregional and bilateral levels is the 
implementation of TREAT I at the bilateral level. While being an EU-ASEAN interregional trade 
action plan in nature, the TREA TI activities are undertaken at the local level, through the work 
and activities of the Delegation in Thailand. Moreover, a number of EU-ASEAN economic co-
operation programmes, for example the Asia-Invest Programme, are also implemented at the 
bilateral level as part of the Delegation's tasks and activities. However, the ASEM activities have 
no involvement at this local level. Research conducted by the author suggested that the 
Delegation in Thailand has very little knowledge about the ASEM activities, mentioning that the 
ASEM is managed by the Commission in Brussels, but it is well informed about co-operation at 
the EU-ASEAN level. 
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Last but not least, it is possible to observe that as a consequence of diversity among 
ASEAN countries, the EU has tended to initiate more bilateral co-operation programmes, for 
example the SPF project, with the aim of serving the particular needs of different ASEAN 
countries and to foster closer bilateral economic relations between the EU and different ASEAN 
countries. The EU-Thailand SPF Project started in 2004 in turn indicates that the EU's 
commercial strategy is tending to move towards a bilateral approach (with close link with 
interregionalism), pursuing more concrete outcomes in enhancing trade and investment 
bilaterally. 
To conclude, the EU plays a significant role as a commercial actor, not only at the 
transregional (AS EM) and interregional (EU-ASEAN) levels, but also at the bilateral level. 
However, one has to bear in mind that identifying the EU's commercial roles in Thailand does 
not mean that these roles are a default pattern for all Asian countries. Rather the commercial 
strategies, roles, and instruments of the EU are likely to vary by different bilateral relations with 
different Asian countries, and even among ASEAN countries themselves. Thus, the Delegation 
plays a significant role in managing and directing the bilateral relationships with Thailand, but 
this may not be the case elsewhere. The roles of Delegation might be different in different 
ASEAN countries, an issue which would merit further investigation. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has explored the EU's commercial strategies towards Asia, with a particular focus on 
the engagement of business. As suggested, such investigation takes its cue from the IPE debates 
on the roles of states and firms in the world. It has found of particular relevance the work of 
Stopford and Strange on the differentiated roles of states and their interactions with firms in the 
changing global political economy, and those of other authors on the concepts of 'competition 
state', 'catalytic state' and the balance between 'confrontation' and 'cooperation' in state-firm 
relations, producing what can be termed 'cooperation state'. Furthermore, this thesis has explored 
the formulation and implementation ofEU commercial diplomacy. The claim is that the EU (as a 
form of quasi-state actor) can perform some statelike functions as revealed by the adoption of its 
own commercial strategies, instruments, and roles alongside both states and firms in the global 
political economy. Thus, the EU is presented as a potent commercial actor and a formidable 
participant in the international arena. 
The analysis ofEU commercial diplomacy suggests the emergence since the mid-1990s 
of a particular business engagement focus formulated and articulated by the European 
Commission. This development underwrites the attempt to engage business more closely into EU 
commercial strategies and also indicates a new area in the commercial diplomacy of the EU. 
Hence, the EU seems to have brought state-functions and firms together, performing positive and 
proactive roles - comparable to those of catalytic, competition and cooperation states - as 
opposed to merely defending its commercial interests. 
Within the broad focus on states and firms in EU commercial strategy, Chapters 4-6 
undertook an empirical investigation of the place of business engagement in overall EU 
commercial strategies towards Asia. Thus, in response to its research questions this thesis has 
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explored three different but interconnected dimensions of EU commercial engagement: 
transregional (ASEM), interregional (EU-ASEAN) relations, and bilateral (EU-Thailand) 
relations. This investigation was guided by a set of research questions set out at the beginning of 
the thesis as follows: 
First, what are the main features of the EU's commercial strategies towards Asia and how 
have they been translated into EU-Asian institutional frameworks at different levels of EU 
commercial engagement in Asia? Specifically, how far do these strategies reflect a multi-level 
approach, and how far do they reflect the aims of business engagement? 
Secondly, how have the aims of EU commercial strategies been translated into specific 
activities within EU-Asian relations? Specifically, how has implementation taken place at 
different levels, and how has it incorporated business engagement? 
Thirdly, what are the key areas of variation between business engagement activities at 
different levels, and how effective have EU activities at these different levels been? 
This chapter, therefore, assesses the results extracted from the empirical investigation. 
Consequently, it uses this evaluation as the basis for both a reconsideration of the EU's 
commercial and business engagement in Asia, and a general appraisal of the debates on EU 
commercial diplomacy and state-firm relations. In this respect, it is possible to ask how the 
emergence of the EU as a quasi-state commercial actor in the global political economy in general, 
and in Asia in particular, has modified state-firm relations in the global political economy, and 
how this helps us think about the role of the EU in the global political economy. This chapter 
thus proposes a model to understand EU commercial diplomacy towards Asia, comprising 
different stakeholders, not only states and firms, but also the EU and other commercial actors. It 
is expected that the investigation and evaluation of EU commercial and business engagement 
strategies in the particular case of Asia could help facilitate the general understanding of the EU 
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as a quasi-state commercial actor performing some statelike functions alongside both states and 
firms, in the global political economy. 
REVIEWING THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: PATTERNS OF EU COMMERCIAL 
AND BUSINESS ENGAGEMENT IN ASIA 
Chapters 4-6 have investigated business engagement as part of the overall EU commercial 
strategies towards Asia at three different levels: transregional (ASEM) relations, interregional 
(EU-ASEAN) relations and bilateral (EU-Thailand) relations. While emphasising that these are 
part of a multi-level analysis, the evidence not only indicates that the EU has different 
instruments, strategies, and roles, but also that it attempts to engage different stakeholders (both 
states and firms), at these three distinctive but interconnected levels of engagement. This leads to 
a significant variation in the patterns of the EU commercial and business engagement in Asia. 
Table 7.1 (columns A, B, C and D respectively) indicates the different instruments used, 
strategies developed, stakeholders engaged and roles played by the EU at the three levels of 
analysis. 
The Transregional Level 
At the transregionallevel, as discussed in Chapter 4, AEBF (a business body which was 
institutionally integrated into the ASEM economic pillar) represents a formal channel for EU 
business engagement in Asia (not only South East Asia, but also the wider context of Asia, 
including also China, Japan and South Korea). While aiming to establish 'a dialogue between 
entrepreneurs' and 'a dialogue between businessmen and government representatives' 
(Chairman's Statement, AEBF1), the AEBF, with its informal structure, is designed to produce 
policy recommendations fed to the ASEM governments through the regular participation of the 
AEBF representatives in the AS EM Summit and in the EMM and SOMTI (and vice versa, 
SOMTl officials in the AEBF). Through this institutionalised connection, policy-makers from 
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Europe and Asia can in principle have direct contact with business, which tends to provide policy 
input to support the ASEM economic process (for example by shaping TFAP and IPAP, the two 
key ASEM Action Plans on trade and investment). In other words, the EU seemed to base its 
initial aims and expectations in respect of AEBF on its potential as 'a generator of policy 
outcomes' and to hope that the institutionalised connection between the AEBF and other 
economic bodies under the AS EM economic pillar could in principle pave the way for the AEBF 
as a useful commercial instrument to produce tangible outcomes in promoting trade and 
investment between Europe and Asia. 
However, Chapter 4 has suggested that such expectations have not been fulfilled so far 
and the direct role of AEBF in promoting trade and investment between the two regions has been 
marginal. Statements by EU officials, AEBF Contact Points, business associations, involved in 
the AEBF process, as well as Asian representatives confirm this negative assessment of AEBF. 
Nonetheless, rather than only focusing on AEBF as a forum to produce immediate outcomes, 
Chapter 4 argued that the EU emphasises the importance of AEBF as 'a process for dialogue and 
networking'. In this respect, the AEBF is recognised by the EU as a peak organisation for 
gathering both govemment and business (targeting particularly big business) from the two 
regions in one forum. This reflects the EU's attempt to pursue a 'grand' business engagement 
strategy at transregional level. 
This grand business engagement strategy can be understood as an EU response to the 
changing global political economy mentioned in Chapter 1 (structural changes and the increasing 
importance of non-state actors and firms, leading to a new state-firm diplomacy), in general, and 
to a significant shift towards a greater participation of EU based non-state -actors and firms in the 
Asian region, in particular. Thus, the creation of AEBF in 1996 can be seen in the light of the EU 
aim to bridge the missing link in the Triad world economy, and to emulate the creation of ABAC 
under the APEC in 1993 to support the Asia-Pacific region, and the T ABD in 1995 to support 
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transatlantic relations. Such broader business and global driving forces thus made it logical for a 
peak organisation such as AEBF to link more closely to the multilaterallgloballevel; hence, there 
is less policy-linkage between the transregional organisation of AEBF (including TFAP and 
lPAP activities) and the interregional (EU-ASEAN) and bilateral (EU-Thailand) levels than 
might be anticipated. The EU, therefore, focuses on this grand business engagement strategy at 
the transregionallevel as a means to support its position as a major commercial actor in the 
global political economy, and more importantly to balance the power between Triad members in 
Asia. The EU plays a strategic role at this grand level of engagement. 
The Interregional Level 
Investigation of EU-ASEAN interregional relations in Chapter 5 showed that, unlike the creation 
of AEBF at the transregionallevel, the EU does not yet seem to have formulated a formal 
business engagement strategy as part of the EU-ASEAN institutional framework. Rather, EU-
ASEAN relations remain intergovemmental in nature, involving exclusively policy-makers and 
diplomats. The Commission's 2003 'New Partnership with South East Asia' strategy - a new EU 
initiative to move forward its economic and commercial relations with ASEAN, and the TREATI 
- a new trade action plan for ASEAN, do not aim to directly engage business into the new EU-
ASEAN economic and commercial mechanism (neither in the SEOM-EU Consultation Meeting 
created since 1999 nor in the AEM-EU Trade Commissioner Consultation Meeting created since 
2000). There is no direct business involvement at this interregionallevel. 
Rather than directly engaging business into its interregional framework, the EU focuses 
on the use of economic co-operation programmes as indirect commercial instruments. The Asia-
Invest Programme and EBIC Programme, key examples of two economic co-operation 
programmes aiming to engage business in Asia, including ASEAN, have reflected the EU's 
intention to use these programmes as alternative 'soft' commercial instruments to produce more 
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concrete outcomes at the local level in supporting business, while focusing on the AEBF as a 
formal process of dialogue and networking. Both Asia-Invest and EBIC programmes directly 
target assistance to SMEs, rather than big business, as does the AEBF. However, the EU 
experience in implementing these two programmes suggests that the EU only prefers to play a 
financier role, providing financial support to business intermediaries, for example Chambers of 
Commerce and other business organisations, to organise their own business activities, which 
would better suit the needs of business locally. Moreover, the results from Chapter 5 also 
observed an implementation of a number of EU's interregional strategies and instruments at the 
local level and a close policy-linkage between interregionalism and bilateralism. 
The Bilateral Level 
Chapter 6 focused on the EU's involvement in Thailand, which has a rather different nature from 
engagement at the transregional and interregionallevels. It focused particularly on the roles of the 
European Commission Delegation as a form of commercial representation in third countries (in 
this case Thailand), performing significant commercial roles and activities alongside Member 
State Embassies and other commercial actors. In the absence of a distinct Brussels-originated 
commercial strategy towards Thailand, Chapter 6 surprisingly observed 'a process of commercial 
networking' happening among commercial actors at this local level. Evidence from Chapter 6 
confirms that as part of this process of commercial networking the Delegation plays positive and 
cooperative roles in engaging different commercial stakeholders (both states and market 
operators), including Member State Embassies, business (both home and host firms) as well as 
other business associations (primarily national Chambers of Commerce). Four distinctive roles of 
the Delegation in Thailand in engaging different stakeholders could be identified: market opener, 
trade and investment facilitator, financier, and coordinator. 
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Empirical results from Chapters 4-6 thus confirm the assumption made at the outset of the 
thesis that business engagement occurs as part of EU commercial diplomacy. However, in the 
case of Asia this business engagement varies in pattern and form, according to different levels of 
EU commercial engagement in Asia. As a result, it has also been argued that the EU plays 
distinctive roles through various kinds of commercial instruments aiming to engage different 
business stakeholders at these distinct but interconnected levels (as shown in Table 7.1). This 
thus implies a complex picture of EU commercial and business engagement in Asia: on the one 
hand this reflects the diversity of the Asian region, on the other hand the complexity of EU 
commercial diplomacy and the character and functions of the EU as a quasi-state, performing its 
roles alongside Member States whose interests vary. The next section aims to analyse these 
empirical results accumulated from Chapters 4-6 in the light of the ideas about state-firm 
relations, and particularly the proactive roles of the EU, put forward in Chapters 1-2. 
POSITIVE BUSINESSE ENGAGEMENT AND THE PROACTIVE ROLES OF THE EU: 
COMPETITION, CATALYTIC, AND COOPERATION STATE? 
This section explains the overall inferences from the thesis, not only from the evaluation of the 
results of the empirical discussion in Chapters 4-6, but also from linking these to the conceptual 
claims of Chapters 1-2. In doing so, it evaluates the implications of the empirical investigation in 
the light of arguments about state-firm relations, including Stopford and Strange's idea of 
Triangular Diplomacy, and particularly the proactive roles of the EU. While emphasising the use 
of a multi-level analysis in the empirical investigation, this section explores the occurrence or 
absence of Triangular Diplomacy and the positive and proactive roles of the EU towards business 
and firms, or what can be termed 'positive business engagement' at different levels of its 
commercial engagement in Asia (See Table 7.1, Colunin E). Moreover, it is also important in this 
analysis to take into account both strategy formulation and strategy implementation, or 'what the 
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Commission is aiming to do?' and 'what actually has been implemented! translated into action?' 
This distinction in turn helps illustrate the impact of EU commercial and business engagement 
strategies in Asia. 
In terms of strategy formulation, business engagement strategy has emerged as part of 
overall EU commercial diplomacy, alongside a shift from a protectionist approach during the late 
1970s and early 1980S136 towards a more liberal approach in the EU's trade and commercial 
strategies during the 1990s (McGuire, 1999:82; Hanson, 1998: 56). This shift of strategies can be 
seen as responding to changes in the global political economy, in which the issue of 
competitiveness has become crucial, non-state actors (particularly firms) have increasingly been 
important actors alongside states, and states have to compete for world market shares as a means 
to wealth and survival in the world economy (Stopford and Strange, 1991: 1). The EU - though 
not a state in traditional terms - is no exception to this general trend. In order to increase its 
global competitiveness and to secure its position as an economic power in the global political 
economy (in competition with the US and Japan), the EU has to pursue a positive approach 
towards business and firms. 
Such attempt to play positive and proactive roles in relation to business and firms can be 
observed through the business engagement strategies and instruments adopted by the 
Commission, since its first 'market access strategy' in 1996. Since then the issue of 
competitiveness and market access have become a key theme of the EU's commercial strategies, 
and the Commission has become a key supporter of European business in accessing third country 
markets (and vice versa, opening EU markets to the world). This means that a positive orientation 
towards business engagement has emerged as a crucial part of EU commercial diplomacy, and 
136 Hanson noted that this protectionist approach in the EU trade policy followed the recessions of the I 970s and 
1980s which were characterised by stagnating or declining levels of output and rising levels of unemployment. At 
the time most Europeans saw rising unemployment as the direct result of growing imports, particularly from Japan 
and the newly industrialising countries. Thus many concluded that increased protectionism was necessary, and 
numerous economic theories were advanced, particularly in Great Britain, France, and Germany, advocating higher 
trade barriers (1998: 58). 
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that the EU increasingly plays pro active roles in relation to business and firms, alongside the 
traditional, and rather defensive, trade policy instruments, i.e., anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and 
safeguards, which seem to be in a declining trend. In this respect, it can be argued that the EU has 
pursued proactive roles that are comparable to those of (i) a 'competition state' - which 'pursues 
increased marketisation ... that contribute to national wealth, more competitive in international 
and transnational terms' (Cerny, 1990; Cerny 2000c: 301) or (ii) a 'catalytic state' - which 
'forges or strengthens partnerships with other actors, i.e., firms, rather than going it alone' 
(JVeiss, 1998: 211). Thus, the EU has embodied a move from 'confrontation to cooperation' 
(Dunning, 1993b) in relations with business and firms, performing a role of 'cooperation state'. 
This shift towards a more positive EU approach towards businesses has also been 
observed in Asia, whose markets have received increasing attention from the EU (as well as from 
the US and Japan). Chapter 3 observed the formulation of business engagement as part of the EU 
commercial strategy framework towards Asia. Since its first Asian strategy in 1994 the 
Commission has been focusing on the issues of market access, trade and investment facilitation, 
as well as providing assistance to businesses to access Asian markets. In this context, Asia is 
important for the EU as a market or a set of markets, rather than as a collection of states. This 
reflects a conscious attempt by the EU to become a form of competition, catalytic and 
cooperation state, in other words to pursue positive and proactive roles in relation to business and 
firms. In Stopford's and Strange's terms, this means that the EU has set out to become an active 
participant in Triangular Diplomacy. 
Although there is evidence (at the strategy formulation level) that the EU has pursued a 
positive business engagement progranune, the evidence from Chapters 4-6, which focused 
particularly on the implementation of the EU's commercial and business engagement strategies 
towards Asia, shows a rather different picture. Given the variation of instruments, strategies, and 
roles of the EU in engaging different business stakeholders at different levels in Asia, it is 
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suggested that the EU is likely to play proactive roles - comparable to those of catalytic, 
competition, and co-operation state - in engaging business more closely into its commercial 
diplomacy framework, or pursuing positive engagement towards business, at some levels, but not 
at others. In other words, implementation of positive business engagement strategies varies in 
different contexts. See Column E, Table 7.1. 
As noted above, the establishment of AEBF under the AS EM economic pillar indicates 
the EU intention to create a grand and formal business engagement strategy, (which might be 
termed a pursuit of Triangular Diplomacy) and proactive roles towards business at the 
transregionallevel. However, the investigation and evaluation of AEBF in Chapter 4 suggested 
that the impact of this EU grand strategy seems so far to be modest. During the early years of 
AEBF, business was more active and enthusiastic in playing a policy input role as part of this 
process: both in supporting the work of ASEM's Summit, SOMTI, EMM, and IEG and in 
implementing TFAP and IPAP. However, recent years have been marked by a declining interest 
of business in participating in AEBF meetings, and a waning support for the work of ASEM. The 
reason for this trend is that the ASEM governments do not seem to respond quickly and with 
concrete measures to the AEBF Political Recommendations. Not only does this show a lack of 
AEBF ability to produce fast and tangible outcomes in general, but also, as argued in Chapter 4, 
the TFAP and IPAp ll7 - two key ASEM Action Plans -have not yet been successfully 
implemented in promoting trade and investment between the two regions. 
However, despite the marginalisation of AEBF in terms of tangible outcomes, this should 
not be perceived as a failure of the EU business engagement strategy. Instead, for the EU, the 
value of AEBF lies in representing a peak transregional organisation to support a process of 
dialogue and networking. After almost a decade of AEBF operation, the EU still insists on 
Jl7 While there have been some activities under TFAP recently (2005), the IPAP activity was stopped altogether in 
2003. 
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maintaining it as a useful process of dialogue and networking for public and private sectors, 
particularly governments and business, from Europe and Asia. Recently, in order to make the 
AEBF process more effective AEBF9 in Hanoi in 2005 set up a core group, reinforcing the role 
of AEBF as Business Advisory Council to ASEM, and also decided that in the future AEBF will 
meet every two years in connection with the ASEM Summit (Chairman's Statement, AEBF9). 
This decision to organise an AEBF meeting every 2 years, instead of every year, seems to 
confirm the EU's intention to use AEBF mainly as a process for dialogue and networking, rather 
than a medium for generating speedy and concrete outcomes. Importantly, although the AEBF 
has not yet proved to be successfully implemented, it still confirms the EU's attempt to pursue 
proactive roles in business engagement at this transregionallevel. 
At the interregionallevel, the investigation of the EU indirect business engagement 
strategy - the use of economic co-operation programmes as 'soft' commercial instruments -
towards ASEAN in Chapter 5 showed even less positive results. The EU does not seem to 
consider EU-ASEAN interregional relations as a framework for business engagement. Instead, 
ASEAN has been included in the broader business engagement strategy of the EU in Asia. For 
instance, the Asia-Invest and EBIC programmes are not only aimed at ASEAN but also cover the 
wider context of Asia, including China and South Asia. Importantly, as Chapter 5 suggested, 
ASEAN is the least notable beneficiary in Asia-Invest Programme, compared to China, and the 
positive result ofEBIC operations can only be observed in some ASEAN countries, but not the 
others. Hence, the EU's attention to indirect business engagement towards ASEAN at the 
interregionallevel is still uneven. It is also possible to conclude that ASEAN as a region seems to 
be less important for the EU in promoting business' interests. This trend is even more visible with 
the increasing economic importance of China and India in Asia. A positive pursuit of Triangular 
Diplomacy and the framing of proactive roles for the EU do not seem to occur at this 
interregionallevel. 
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At the bilateral level, despite the lack of a fonnal EU framework to engage business, the 
European Commission Delegation in Thailand has played both positive and cooperative roles, 
together with the Member State Embassies in assisting business, helping both European business 
to enter Thai markets, and local business to enter European markets. These proactive roles of the 
Delegation in Thailand include market opener, trade and investment faciIitator, financier, and 
coordinator. For example, the Delegation plays a useful role as market opener in assisting 
European home finns to achieve better access into Thai market. For local business, the 
Delegation assists them through the establishment of 'Business Infonnation Centres (BIC)" 
which provide infonnation on the European Single Market, EU laws and regulations for local 
exporters. Moreover, the Delegation also plays a financier role by giving financial support to 
business organisations/intennediaries such as national Chambers of Commerce in Thailand 
through the bilateral economic co-operation programme called Small Project Facility (SPF), 
particularly as this contributes to the promotion of bilateral trade and investment between EU and 
Thailand. Not only assisting business, the Delegation also coordinates among Member States 
Embassies, particularly among commercial attaches and diplomats, leading to what the thesis 
calls 'diplomatic co-operation' especially in the area of trade and commercial policy, which falls 
under the Community's exclusive competence. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that at this 
bilateral level the EU through the European Commission Delegation not only plays positive roles 
in relation to business and finns (as the thesis initially assumed), but also supports the emergence 
of a stronger EU single voice among Member States towards the host countries. Chapter 6 
observed the emergence of commercial networking and these positive roles of the EU in 
engaging both Member States and business, and other commercial stakeholders in Thailand. 
Hence, there is an active development of state-finn relations and thus in principle occurrence of 
aspects of Triangular Diplomacy at this bilateraIllocal level. 
295 
THE EU AS COMMERCIAL ACTOR IN ASIA: SOME STATELIKE ROLES 
Evidence from the investigation conducted in this thesis confirms the EU's 'presence' as a 
commercial 'actor' in Asia, which has been more evident since the mid-1990s (its first Asian 
strategy in 1994). This EU presence in Asia has developed alongside the increasing importance of 
EU commercial diplomacy and of the EU as a commercial actor in global, regional and bilateral 
political economy during the post-Cold War period. Although the EU-ASEAN interregional 
dialogue started in the I 970s with the EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement signed in 1980, it 
focused particularly on political dialogue (there was no ministerial meeting between Economic 
Ministers from the EU and ASEAN sides, but only the AEMM which was essentially a Foreign 
Ministers' Meeting). This might be because, as Robles argued, at the early stage ofEU-ASEAN 
relationship 'the EC itself did not seem to consider an interregional relationship as a mechanism 
for encouraging European firms to invest in South East Asia' (2004: 101). This confirms the lack 
of EU interest in the Asian region and in developing a stronger economic and commercial 
framework with Asia, particularly ASEAN, before the mid-1990s. It was not until 1994 that the 
first Asian strategy was adopted, and in 1996 that the ASEM process was created, symbolising 
the EU's initial, but relatively late, attempt to promote trade and investment between the EU and 
Asia. Since then the significance of the EU as a commercial actor in Asia has been evidenced by 
a set of commercial strategies and instruments adopted by the European Commission (as argued 
about the formulation of the EU's commercial and business engagement strategies towards Asia 
in Chapter 3, Sections 3.2 and 3.3). The investigation of the implementation of the EU's 
commercial and business engagement strategies and activities in Asia undertaken in Chapters 4-6 
suggested that the EU adopts different instruments and strategies, and performs ·distinct roles in" 
different levels ofEU commercial engagement in Asia: transregional (ASEM), interregional (EU-
ASEAN), and bilateral (EU-Thailand). 
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Apart from revealing a variation in the pattern of EU commercial and business 
engagement at different levels of engagement (argued earlier in section, see also Table 7.1), the 
evidence from Chapters 4-6 also heIps understand the characteristics of the EU as a commercial 
actor in Asia as well as its accumulation of statelike features in the global political economy. As 
argued in Chapter 2, the credentials of autonomy, representation and influence I 38 make it possible 
to analyse the roles of the EU as a commercial actor in Asia, and as a statelike commercial actor 
in the global political economy. 
Autonomy: Sharing Commercial Autonomy between the Commission and Member States 
The European Commission - despite the fact that its commercial autonomy is still limited by the 
restriction inherent in the Community's commercial competence and its interaction with the 
Member States - pursues its commercial ideas, objectives and priorities, adopts its own 
commercial strategies and instruments, and performs its own roles in Asia. The evidence 
presented in Chapters 4-6 confirms that while performing significant roles as a commercial actor 
in Asia, and a number of state like functions, it is important to bear in mind that the EU is not a 
state in traditional terms. Within the area of commercial diplomacy or the First Pillar, the 
Commission has exclusive competence only in trade policy, but not in investment, which still 
falls under the competence of Member States. As a consequence of this shared commercial 
competence, particularly on trade and investment issues, the EU's commercial activities in Asia 
at all levels of engagement seem to focus mainly on trade issues, while investment issues have 
been managed by the Member States. 
At the transregionallevel, Chapter 4 observed an EU attempt to bring investment issues 
into the ASEM economic framework by initiating an ASEM investment Action Plan called IP AP 
and the Investment Expert Group or lEG. However the implementation and impact of these 
'38 Rather than evaluating the EU in terms of the qualifications of traditional statehood, namely sovereignty, 
recognition and control (See Chapter 2, Section 2.3). 
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ASEM activities on investment seems to be rather modest. The ASEM initiatives and activities 
on trade seem to produce more positive results than those on investment. The investigation and 
evaluation of both TF AP and IP AP in Chapter 4 has shown that the TF AP is more successful and 
still an on-going activity, while the !PAP, particularly the lEG meeting, has been stopped since 
2003. Moreover, according to an EU official, there is no sign of renewing IPAP activity or 
initiating a new co-operation on investment at the ASEM level until recently (Interview, DG 
Trade, European Commission, 18 November 2005, Brussels). 
At the interregional EU-ASEAN level, evidence in Chapter 5 suggested that the EU only 
plays a framework and background role in facilitating trade and investment environment between 
EU and ASEAN; the EU only aims to assist business indirectly. The Asia-Invest Programme is 
an example of the EU economic co-operation programme aiming to promote investment between 
two regions, targeting particularly at the SMEs. However, through the Asia-Invest Programme, 
the EU only plays a financier role, giving financial support to business intermediaries, for 
example Chambers of Commerce, to implement their own investment promotion activities. The 
Commission, while not infringing directly on the Member States' commercial competence in 
investment, intends that '[these] intermediaries, as key economic operators, play a significant role 
as "multipliers", extending the benefits of the Progranune to a wider number of SMEs' 
(EuropeAid Co-operation Office, 2003: 1). It is thus clear that when it comes to promoting 
investment and assisting business, the EU only plays a framework role and Member States still 
represent their national business interests, encouraging their businesses to invest in Asia. More 
importantly, Chapter 5 observed the initiation of TREA TI as new trade Action Plan between the 
EU and ASEAN, aiming' to expand trade and investment flows and establish an effective 
framework for dialogue and regulatory co-operation on trade facilitation, market access, and 
investment issues between the two regions' (European Commission, 2003a: 16). But there has 
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been no EU attempt to involve investment issues directly into the EU-ASEAN commercial 
framework. 
While investigating the autonomy and roles of European Commission Delegations as a 
form of commercial representation at the bilateral level, Chapter 6 confirmed that the Delegation 
in Bangkok shares its commercial competence with Member State Embassies. Apart from shared 
Delegation-Embassy competence in trade and investment issues as inherited in the Community's 
commercial competence, in practice the Delegation and Member State Embassies' tasks and 
activities are also distinguished between the actions of 'facilitation' and 'promotion' issues. 
While Member State Embassies and their national Chambers of Commerce are responsible for 
trade and investment promotion activities and dealing with day-to-day business activities for 
business from their home countries 1J9, the Delegation roles cover trade and investment 
facilitation, for example, facilitating harmonisation of regulatory frameworks, lobbying Thai 
govemment organisations for a better access to Thai market, and providing information on the 
EU Single Market. Such effective division of labour between the Delegation and Member State 
Embassies leads to what Chapter 6 called 'diplomatic co-operation' at the local level. This shared 
commercial autonomy between the Commission and Member States observed in all levels ofEU 
commercial engagement in Asia reflects the complexity of EU performance of statelike functions 
in its commercial relations with Asia. 
139 Both home finns who seek a market access into Thailand, and home finns who have already establish their 
business in the country. However, the work and responsibilities of Member State Embassies and their national 
Chambers of Commerce are sometimes overlapping. See Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2. 
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Representation: Distinctive, but Interconnected Commercial Representation 
Rather than recognition - the tenn nonnally used as a qualification of state actors when 
participating in the international system, the second credential this thesis has used to analyse the 
EU's commercial diplomacy toward Asia is that of representation. As has been argued elsewhere, 
the EU's commercial representation in Asia, or what the thesis also calls commercial engagement 
in Asia, is divided between three different levels: EU representation as part of the transregional 
AS EM process, EU representation in EU-ASEAN interregional relations, and lastly and 
distinctively, bilateral representation in third countries through the European Commission 
Delegation. 
Although the empirical investigation in Chapters 4-6 observed different types of 
strategies, instruments and roles of the EU in these three levels of engagement, they are arguably 
interconnected, reflecting the linkages ofEU's commercial policy between different levels. The 
AS EM can be viewed as having a closer link to the multilaterallgloballevel. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the issues discussing in the ASEM and AEBF seem to be complementary and 
compatible with that ofWTO, where EU commercial representation seems to be at its most 
highly-developed. The ASEM is recognised by the EU as a peak transregional organisation, if not 
to produce speedy and tangible outcomes, but to support the EU position in the global political 
economy, and more importantly to balance the power between Triad members in Asia. It is thus 
not surprising that Chapter 4 observed less involvement of ASEM and AEBF activities at the 
locallbilaterallevel. At the same time, Chapter 5 observed a closer linkage between the EU's 
representations at interregional and bilateral levels, or between interregionalism and bilateralism. 
This means the EU's commercial strategy towards ASEAN often involves its implementation at 
bilateral level (in different individual ASEAN countries). In particular, the 'New Partnership with 
South East Asia' strategy strongly reflects the EU's new focus on using a bilateral approach, but 
within the framework of EU-ASEAN relations in order to reinvigorate its relations with ASEAN 
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countries. As a result of this 2003 ASEAN strategy, there can be observed the Commission's 
negotiations on bilateral agreements with different ASEAN countries, such as the EU-Thailand 
and EU-Singapore negotiations, but within the interregional framework. The TREA TI is seen as 
a regional trade action plan, but its implementation is undertaken bilaterally. Therefore, the tasks 
of the Delegation as the EU's commercial representation in Thailand involve some ASEAN 
activities, for example TREA TI, but do not involve those arising from ASEM. 
Whilst observing that these three levels of the EU's commercial representation are 
interconnected, this thesis provides evidence of a recent shift of EU attention towards a bilateral 
rather than an interregional approach in Asia and particularly South East Asia14o• As argued in 
Chapter 5, EU-ASEAN interregional relations have often faced difficulties and setbacks due to 
political problems in South East Asia (particularly Myanmar human rights and democracy 
problems). Although the 2003 EU ASEAN strategy officially incorporates the use of a flexible 
approach or the use ofbilateralism within the framework of interregionalism, it is argued that it 
indirectly and implicitly indicated the Commission's focus on the use of a bilateral approach 
towards the South East Asian region. This in turn illustrates the Commission's 'way out' from its 
institutional tension with the Council, which tends to focus more on political problems in South 
East Asia, particularly the Myanmar problem. Crucial here is the Commission's offer of new 
Bilateral Co-operation Agreements with different ASEAN countries mentioned earlier, rather 
than trying to renew the EU-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement which is by now obsolete, and has 
become impossible to pursue under the Council's on-going Common Position towards 
BurmalMyanmar. 
Another example is when the EU has tended to initiate more bilateral co-operation 
programmes, for example the SPF project, with an aim to serve the particular need of different 
ASEAN countries and to foster closer bilateral economic relations between the EU and those 
''''The EU also deals bilaterally with the sub-region of North East Asia, (namely China, Japan and South Korea). 
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countries. As Chapter 6 shows, the EU-Thailand SPF Project started in 2004 and the intention to 
initiate the EU-Thai Business Forum (as mentioned in a draft Bilateral Co-operation Agreement 
between the EU and Thailand to expected to be signed) in turn indicates that the EU's 
commercial strategy is tending to move towards a bilateral approach (with close links with 
bilateral interregionalism), pursuing more concrete outcomes in enhancing trade and investment 
bilaterally. Not only a number of new Delegations were opened in Asia, for example, in Malaysia 
(in April 2003) and in Singapore (in January 2003), in order to 'raise the EU's profile across 
Asia, [through 1 strengthening and broadening the network of Delegations across the region ... ' 
(Commission, 2001c: 19), but also the Delegation has been granted more power in managing 
economic co-operation programmes in order to best serve local needs through the Commission's 
'Devolution to the Delegations' policy (2000b). In Asia, EU representation at bilateral level has 
thus increasingly become important. 
Influence: Focusing on Process and Performing A Background and Framework Role 
Although the EU cannot claim to have full control over a 'European' territory or markets, as 
traditional statehood implies, the discussion of the EU's commercial representation in different 
levels of engagement affirms that the EU does have influence in Asia. However, such influence 
can be better understood from the perspective of the statelike functions performed by the EU as a 
commercial actor in Asia. 
As initially assumed (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3), the EU's commercial influence seems 
to be most apparent at multilateral level (in the WTO) and also at regional levels - where the EU 
has set up two institutionalised frameworks for co-operation with Asia: the ASEM transregional 
organisation and the EU-ASEAN group-to-group arrangement. However, this thesis indicates that 
during the 1994-2004 period these two regional arrangements did not seem to produce speedy 
and concrete outcomes in promoting EU-Asian commercial relations. Rather, the EU has used the 
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AS EM as a platfonn for dialogue and networking between public and private sectors, particularly 
governments and business, from Europe and Asia; and the EU-ASEAN process as an indirect 
fonn of business engagement through economic co-operation programmes. The marginal 
achievement of the EU in producing tangible outcomes in Asia, both at transregional and 
interregionallevels, does not mean a failure of the EU's commercial and business engagement 
strategies. Instead, it points to the fact that the EU has focused on setting up a framework process 
for the promotion of EU-Asian commercial relations (alongside the Member States). As a quasi-
state actor, the EU plays a proactive role in supporting and building a favorable framework for 
business and finns, but only at the background/framework level. 
As observed in Chapter 6, at the bilateral level, the EU plays four significant roles as 
instanced by the Delegation in Thailand: market opener, trade and investment facilitator, 
fmancier, and coordinator. This has also suggested a background role for the Delegation in 
setting a framework for business, facilitating trade and investment, and ensuring that the third 
country complies with multilateral commitments (chiefly WTO). Rather than engaging business 
on a day-to-day basis, the Delegation focuses on building a process of commercial networking 
among commercial stakeholders, both states and finns, at the local level. While the EU plays a 
cooperative role among Member State Embassies in Thailand, it only assists business when there 
is a problem of discrimination, and where this affects a common interest of the EU. Otherwise, if 
it falls under Member State national interest, the Member State Embassies take full 
responsibility. 
Hence, this thesis has observed at all three levels of the EU's commercial engagement in 
Asia that it tends to perfonn a framework and background role. The conjecture is that such 
inference attests to the statelike character of the EU as a commercial actor in Asia, but at the 
same time it also limits that role in crucial respects. 
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THE EU, STATES, AND FIRMS IN GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Chapter 1 used the concept of Triangular Diplomacy as a means of generating questions about the 
relations between states and firms in the changing global political economy during the post-Cold 
War period. Not only that, but it has also facilitated a broader understanding of the EU as a 
commercial actor in Asia in particular, and the place of the EU in the global political economy, or 
IPE, in general. 
The thesis has been devoted to the analysis of state-firm relations in the European context, 
where the EU is viewed as a statelike commercial actor, adopting its own strategies and 
instruments and performing particular commercial roles alongside both states and firms. Results 
from the empirical investigation reported in Chapters 4-6 of this thesis confirmed that the EU, 
though not representing a state in traditional terms, has joined both states and firms in a set of 
relations displaying some characteristics of Triangular Diplomacy. This development, however, 
has arguably modified the pattern of state-firm relations assumed in the original version of 
Triangular Diplomacy suggested by Stopford and Strange. In the particular context of Europe, 
states and firms not only bargain between themselves, but the EU has become a formidable actor 
among them. As noted above, it also performs an important set of roles that can be compared to 
those of 'competition', 'catalytic' or 'cooperation' state. 
On this basis, it is possible to reformulate the original Stopford and Strange image 
of Triangular Diplomacy. There is a requirement to acknowledge the commercial actorness 
of the EU, which points to a more complex and dynamic set of relations between the EU, 
states and firms. Diagram 7.1 shows the original Triangular Diplomacy model, whilst 
Diagram 7.2 shows how this might be adapted to reflect the EU's presence and role l41 • 
141 The two models might not be entirely comparable. This is because the original version of Stopford and Strange's 
Triangular Diplomacy only inspired the creation of this modified model. Importantly, the necessary caveat is that 
such adaptation is merely suggestive and it needs further research in order to elaborate fully its implications. 
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Yet, it is claimed that the proposed (tentatively called) model of Quadrilateral 
Diplomacy reflects the new complexity of relationships between the major commercial 
stakeholders/actors in EU commercial diplomacy towards third countries or regions (in this 
particular case, towards Asia). The Quadrilateral Diplomacy framework suggests that the 
modelling of interactions in the global political economy would have to take into account 
not only the Member States of the EU and Asian governments (which represent states in 
traditional terms), but also the EU, itself, as a commercial actor in its own right performing 
some statelike functions, including the engagement of business. 
In this respect, the model of Quadrilateral Diplomacy is not intended to play down the 
significance of Triangular Diplomacy for the explanation of state-firm relations in IPE. Rather, 
the modified model can be seen as taking forward, modifying and contributing to the original 
version of Triangular Diplomacy in the following ways: 
First, the modified model distinguishes between the notions of 'Home' and 'Host' in EU-
Asian commercial relations. Stopford and Strange used their Triangular Diplomacy model to 
investigate the relationships between host-states (of developing countries) and foreign-owned 
firms (particularly MNCs from developed countries). Thus they particularly referred to 'states' in 
the Triangular Diplomacy as 'host states' or 'host governments'. The modified model broadens 
this idea by first, distinguishing between 'host' and 'home' in the discussion of state-firm 
relations, and secondly, adding the EU as an actor into this model. It is important to note that the 
EU does not replace Member States in this modified framework. Rather they act alongside each 
other, playing complementary or competing rolesl42• In doing so, major stakeholders/actors in 
EU-Asian commercial relations, can be identified as follows: the EU and Member States as home 
'42 However, one should also be bear in mind that there can also be observed a number of cases when the interests of 
the Member States, as well as of'European' firms are in conflict and in competition in relation to accessing Ihe third 
country markets. 
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states, Asian govemments as host states, European business as home firms, and local business as 
host firms. 
Secondly, in the modified framework, there exist sets of interdependent 
relationships among the commercial actors: home states, host states, home firms and host 
firms interdependently interact, engage or bargain among each other (Diagram 7.2. 
illustrates this interdependency through the use of arrows pointing towards each other in the 
modified framework). Six such sets of relationships can be identified: (i) Home states-
Home firms (ii) Home states-Host firms (iii) Home states-Host states (iv) Home firms-Host 
states (v) Home firms-Host firms (vi) Host states-Host firms. However, as noted above, this 
thesis has only focused on these as they are reflected in the formulation and implementation 
ofEU strategies, but they provide potential for further investigation. 
Thirdly, a key difference between the model of Triangular Diplomacy and the 
modified model worth pointing out here is that the former (as used by Stopford and 
Strange) investigates the relations between host states from developing countries and firms 
from developed countries who aim at accessing the third country markets and negotiating 
with the relevant host govemments; but the reformulation proposed here could be used as a 
means to investigate the relations between the EU and its Member States, which represent 
advanced-industrialised home states, in engaging and supporting business in an emerging 
economy like Asia. Thus, in this modified model the EU seems to play a positive and 
proactive role in relation to both states and firms, as opposed to a more defensive role of 
states in the original version of Stop ford and Strange's Triangular Diplomacy. While 
reiterating that the elaboration of the modified model is merely suggestive, this thesis 
claims that such pattern of relations can be deduced on the basis of its empirical 
investigation (in particular Chapters 4-6). However, the main focus of the thesis has been 
the investigation of the formulation and implementation of EU commercial diplomacy 
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towards Asia, and particularly the exploration of the proactive role of the EU as a quasi-
state commercial actor (and not the detailed examination of the framework of interactions 
that it participates in). 
In exploring the possibility for an emergence of this model of a state (quasi-state )-firm 
diplomacy in the case of the EU and Asia, it is clear that the business engagement required by the 
modified model is not equally visible in all three levels of the EU commercial engagement. As 
argued in Chapter 4, at the transregionallevel the EU has attempted to pursue positive business 
engagement by creating the AEBF as an institutionalised channel to engage business closely into 
the EU's commercial diplomacy; however the result was only modest. Despite the EU's 
ambitious intentions, the EU has not yet been successful in fostering positive engagement of 
business at this transregionallevel. At the interregionallevel, Chapter 5 confirmed that EU-
ASEAN relations remain intergoverrunental in nature and that the EU does not aim to engage 
business at this level. Yet, this thesis suggests that the EU has one rather distinctive 'soft' 
strategy to engage business in Asia: economic co-operation programmes. Empirical investigation 
conducted in Thailand as part of Chapter 6 suggested that at the bilateral level not only 
Triangular Diplomacy but what might even be termed Quadrilateral Diplomacy seems to emerge. 
In the absence of distinct Brussels-originated commercial strategy towards Thailand, and given 
that the Bilateral Co-operation Agreement is yet to be signed, Chapter 6 surprisingly observed a 
'quadrilateral commercial network' among diplomats from the Delegation and Member States 
Embassies as well as other commercial actors, principally national Chambers of Corrunerce, at 
this local level. The EU through the Delegation plays positive roles not only in assisting business 
but also in co-operating among Member States, resulting in commercial networking between 
states, firms and the EU, happening in the case of Thailand. Hence, the modified model of a 
complex state-firm-EU relationship has emerged at this bilateral level. 
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Yet, as the case of Thailand attests, the occurrence of state-finu diplomacy varies in 
different contexts ofEU's commercial engagement in Asia. In this way the thesis contributes to 
understanding the BU's positive engagement in Thailand, particularly the positive and co-
operative roles played by the European Commission Delegation on the ground; however, such a 
result should not be seen as not a default pattern of the EU's positive engagement towards states 
and business in other Asian countries. The occurrence or absence of such engagement is a prime 
topic for further comparative research into the BU's commercial engagement in different Asian 
countries. 
In this manner this thesis makes a contribution to not only academic but also policy 
debates. In tenus of academic debate, it has provided the IPE angle, or the analysis of business 
engagement, in the study of EU' s external relations towards third countries, by not only taking 
into account the government-to-government or intergovernmental relations between home states 
(the EU alongside Member States) and host states, but also more complex and dynamic 
relationships between EU commercial strategy and the EU's business engagement activities. It is 
also expected that the empirical evidence and results reported here can, to a certain extent, make 
a useful contribution to policy-making processes in both Europe and Asia, by illustrating the 
current pattern of the EU's commercial and business engagement in Asia and evaluating its key 
characteristics. Finally, the analysis of the implementation of EU commercial strategies and 
policies towards Asia at different levels of engagement might be useful for policy 
recommendations, and thus as a means to improve and move forward the prospects ofEU 
commercial diplomacy towards Asia. 
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Annexes 
Annex 3.1: List of European Commission's Strategy Papers towards Asial43 
I) Broad Asia Strategy Papers 
- New Asia Strategy in 1994: 'Towards a New Asia Strategy', Brussels, 13 July 1994-
COM (94) 314 final 
- Updated Asia Strategy in 2001: 'Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced 
Partnerships', Brussels, 4 September 2001 - COM (2001) 469 final 
- 'Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for Multi-Country Programmes in Asia 2005-2006', 
Brussels, 20 April 2004 
11) ASEM Strategy Papers 
- 'Regarding the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) to Be Held in Bangkok on 1-2 March 1996", 
Brussels, 16 January 1996 - COM (96) 4 final 
- 'Perspectives and Priorities for the ASEM process', Staff Working Paper, Brussels, June 1997 
- 'Perspective and Priorities for the ASEM Process (Asia-Europe Meeting) into the New Decade', 
Brussels, 18 April 2000 - COM (2000) 241 final 
- 'Vademecum: Modalities for Future ASEM Dialogue; Taking the Process Forward', Brussels, 
18 July 2001 
- 'Fourth Asia Europe Meeting Summit in Copenhagen September 22-24, 2002 (ASEM4): Unity 
and Strength in Diversity', Staff Working Paper, Brussels, 23 July 2002 - SEC 2002 
Ill) South East AsiaJASEAN Strategy Papers 
- The First ASEAN Strategy in 1996: 'Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations', 
Brussels, 3 July 1996 - COM (96) 314 final 
- 'Investing in Asia's Dynamism: European Union Direct Investment in Asia', Joint 
UNCTADlEuropean Commission Report, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg 
- The New ASEAN Strategy in 2003: 'A New Partnership with South East Asia', Brussels - COM 
(2003) 399 final 
- Transregional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREAT/), ANNEXrr of 'New Partnership with 
South East Asia' Communication - COM (2003) 399/4, p. 30 
IV) Bilateral Strategy Papers toward Thailand 
- The "EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006", 28 February 2002 
- 'National Indicative Programme for Thailand (2002-2004)' in 'the EC-Thailand Country 
Strategy Paper 2002-2004', Brussels, 28 February 2002 
143 This is not a comprehensive list, rather examples of significant European Commission's strategy papers towards 
Asia at different levels of engagement, accumulated by the author for the purpose ofthis research. 
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Annex 4.1: ASEM Activities 2002-2004 
(Source: ASEM Infoboard Website at www.aseminfoboard.org) 
1. Political Activities 
1.1. ASEM Foreign Ministers' Meeting (FMM) 
- FMM 5 (Bali, 23-24 July 2003) 
- FMM 6 (Kildare, 17-18 April 2004) 
1.2. Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) 
- AS EM SOM (Jakarta, 12-13 May 2003) 
- AS EM Preparatory SOM (Bali, 21-22 July 2003) 
- Informal AS EM SOM (Rome, 13-14 November 2003) 
- ASEM FMM 6 Preparatory SOM (Kildare, 16 April 2004) 
- ASEM SOM (Hanoi, 6-7 September 2004) 
- AS EM 5 Preparatory SOM (6 October 2004) 
1.3. Coordinators'Meeting (CM) 
- CM (Brussels, 28-29 January 2003) 
- CM (Tokyo, 7-8 July 2003) 
- CM (Dublin, 16 January 2004) 
- CM (Hanoi, 10 March 2004) 
- CM (Tokyo, 9 July 2004) 
1.4. Others 
- ASEM Seminar on Anti-Terrorism (Beijing, 22-23 September 2003) 
2. Economic Activities 
2.1. ASEM Economic Ministers' Meetings (EMM) 
- EMM 5 (Dalian, 23-24 July 2003) 
2.2. ASEM Senior Officials' Meeting on Trade and Investment 
- 9th ASEM SOMTI (Paris, 5-6 June 2003) 
2.3. ASEM Economic Coordinators' Meeting (ECM) 
- ASEM ECM (Tokyo, 25 February 2003) 
- ASEM ECM (Brussels, 14 April 2003) 
- ASEM ECM (Malahide, 5 March 2004) 
2.4. Meetings ofTaskforcefor Closer Economic Partnership 
- 1 st Meeting of Taskforce (Madrid, 6 May 2003) 
- 2nd Meeting of Taskforce (Tokyo, 8-9 September 2003) 
- 3rd Meeting of Taskforce (Frankfurt, 22 November 2003) 
- 4th Meeting of Taskforce (Bangkok, 11-12 March 2004) 
- 5th Meeting ofTaskforce (Barcelona, 17 May 2004) 
2.5. Others 
- ASEM TFAP 2nd e-commerce Seminar (Helsinki, 23-24 September 2002) 
- ASEM TFAP SCA (Brussels, 10-12 December 2002) 
- 8th ASEM Meeting on Standards and Conformity Assessment (Brussels, 10-
12 December 2002) 
- 1 st ASEM Consultation on WTO Doha Development Agenda (Hanoi, 17-18 
January 2003) 
2 
- ASEM Symposium on Multilateral and Regional Economic Relations (Tokyo, 
24-25 March 2003) 
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- 2nd ASEM Consultation on WTO Doha Development Agenda (Paris, 5 June 
2003) 
- 8th Asia-Europe Business Forum (Seoul, 27-29 October 2003) 
- TF AP Standards and Conformity Assessment Working Group (Brussels, 29-
30 April 2004), 
- 9th Asia-Europe Business Forum (Hanoi, 7-8 October 2004) 
- ASEM Seminar on Future of Employment and Labour (Berlin, 1-2 June 2004) 
- AS EM Symposium on "Iron Silk Road" (Seoul, 17-18 June 2004) 
3. Financial Activities 
3.1. ASEM Finance Ministers' Meeting (FnMM) 
- FnMM 5 (Bali, 5-6 July 2003) 
3.2. ASEM Deputy Finance Ministers' Meeting 
- AS EM Deputy Finance Ministers' Meeting (Bali, 7-8 June 2003) 
- ASEM Deputy Finance Ministers' Meeting (Cork, 1-2 March 2004) 
3.3 - ASEM Core Group Meeting (Washington D.C 24 April 2004) 
3.4. Others 
- 1 st Customs Enforcement Seminar (Penang, 10 March 2003) 
- 7th ASEM Customs Enforcement Working Group Meeting (Penang, I I -13 
March 2003) 
- ASEM Customs Directors General and Commissioners Meeting (Seoul, 30 
September - I October 2003) 
- ASEM Symposium on Combating Underground Banking and the Need of 
Supervising Alternative Remittance Service in European and Asian Countries 
(Berlin, 30-3 I October 2003) 
- 3rd ASEM Seminar of Simplification and Harmonization on Custom 
Procedures ( Jakarta, 8-9 December 2003) 
- 7th ASEM Customs and Procedures Working Group Meeting (Jakarta, 10-I I 
December 2003) 
- I st Steering Committee Meeting of ASEM Anti-Money Laundering Initiative 
(Bangkok, 12 September 2003) 
- 1st ASEM Bali Initiative Workshop on Deposit Insurance System and 
Valuation (Jakarta, 19-23 January 2004) 
- 2nd ASEM Bali Initiative Workshop on Deposit Insurance System and 
Valuation (Jakarta, 14-16 July 2004) 
4. Cooperation on other clusters 
4.1. Cultural Cluster 
- ASEM Conference on Cultures and Civilization (Beijing, 3-4 December 2003) 
- The Asia - Europe Seminar on Cultural Policy (Bangkok, 24-27 June 2004) 
4.2. Educational Cluster 
- 2nd Expert Meeting for AS EM DUO Fellowship Programme (Seoul, 14 
November 2003) 
- 2nd Meeting on the AS EM Education Hubs (Singapore, 2-5 November 2003) 
- ASEM Symposium on Educational Exchange (Tsukuba, Japan 17- I 8 
November 2003) 
3 
4.3. Environmental Cluster 
- AEETC PPGG Meeting (Hunan, 23-24 October 2002) 
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- 2nd ASEM Environment Ministers' Meeting (Lecce, 12-13 October 2003) 
4.4. Global Issues 
- ASEM Seminar on Promoting Gender Equality to Combat Trafficking in 
Women and Children (Bangkok, 7-9 October 2002) 
- 1st ASEM Meeting for Directors on Management of Migratory flows between 
Europe and Asia (Copenhagen, 10-12 December 2002) 
- ASEM Child Welfare - Experts' Meeting on the Judicial Protection of Children 
(Manila, 3-5 March 2003) 
- ASEM Seminar on Enhancing Support and Cooperation for Strengthening 
Social Policies to Assist Trafficked Woman and Children (Bangkok, 1-3 
September 2003) 
- 2nd ASEM Meeting for Directors on Management of Migratory Flows between 
Europe and Asia (Beijing, 12-14 November 2003) 
4.5. Technological Cluster 
- Globalization and ICT- The Role of Government, Private Sector and Civil 
Society in an Information Society for all (Malmo, 10-12 March 2003) 
- Expert Group TEIN (Trans-Eurasia Information Network) (Kualar Lumpur, 20-
21 May 2004) 
4.6. Agricultural Cluster 
- Preparatory Meeting for ASEM High Level Conference on Agricultural 
Cooperation (Dalian, 22-23 September 2003) 
- ASEM High Level Conference on Agricultural Cooperation (Beijing, 12 
November 2003) 
4.7. Public Health Cluster 
- ASEM Seminar on the Management of Public Health Emergency (Beijing, 
23-24 October 2003) 
4.8. Human Rights Cluster 
- ASEM Human Rights and Economic Relations Workshop 2 (Bangkok, 22-23 
February 2003) 
- 5th ASEM Human Rights Informal Seminar (Lund, 16-17 May 2003) 
- 6th ASEM Human Rights Informal Seminar (Suzhou, 16-17 September 2004) 
5. ASEF 
5.1. Meeting of Board of Governors (BOGs) 
- 12th meeting of BOGs (Kuala Lumpur, 31 October - 1 November 2002) 
- 13th meeting of BOGs (Berlin, 8-9 May 2003) 
- 14th meeting of BOGs (Singapore, 6-7 November 2003) 
- 15th meeting ofBOGs (Dublin, 27-28 May 2004) 
5.2. 7th Asia-Europe Young Leader's Symposium (Ho Chi Minh City, 24-29 August 
2003). 
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Annex 4.2: AEBF8 Working Groups 
(Source: AEBF8 Official Website at www.imagecity.co.kr/aebfS) 
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Annex 4.3: ASEM TFAP Working Groups (with Facilitator Countries) 
(Source: from DG Trade Official, European Commission, email received 21 November 2005 
1) CUSTOMS: 
Facilitators : Commission, (Taxud/B/l, Isabel Menendez Ros), Japan 
2) SPS: 
Facilitators : Thailand, China, The Netherlands, Commission (Sanco/E/3, Wolf·Martin Maier); 
3) STANDARDS: 
Facilitators: Commission (Trade/E/!, Bjorn Nilssen), Thailand, Korea 
4) E-COMMERCE: 
Facilitators: Korea, Finland, Commission (Trade/G/!, Maria Stafilidou) 
5)IPR 
Facilitators : Thailand, France, Commission (TradeIH/2, Pedro Velasco Martins) 
6) DISTRIBUTION: 
Facilitators: Belgium, Singapore 
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Annex 5.1: List of EU Co-operation Programme towards AsialASEAN 
Source: European Commission, 2004: Annex 2-4 
I. Asia-Wide Programmes 
TITLE BENEFICIAR AMOUNT START END OBJECTIVES IES 
€ 
Asia-Link 1998/002-571 Developing 42,793,800 February 2002 December 2005 To promote sustainable partnerships 
2003/005-753 Asian countries (for contracting) and linkages between higher education 
HIGHER EDUCATION covered by the institutions in Europe and Asia. 
ALA 
Regulation 
(South Asia, 
South East 
Asia, China). 
Asia Urbs (phase I and Idem 46,000,000 July 1998 December 2004 To promote durable links between 
11) 1995/002-544 (for contracting) European and Asian local 
1995/002-545 2003/005- communities through support to 
732 partnership projects led by local 
URBAN governments (in the field of urban 
DEVELOPMENT management, urban socio·economic 
development, urban infra-structure, 
urban environment). 
Asia Invest (phase I and Idem 59,800,000 March 1998 December 2007 To facilitate partnerships between 
11) 1995/002-624 (for contracting) European and Asian companies and to 
1995/002-6272002/004- promote capacity building for Asian 
032 companies and business associations 
TRADE AND in order to attract new trade and 
INVESTMENT investment. 
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Asia Pro Eco Idem 31,500,000 November December 2007 To promote a "cleaner" Asia, 
2001/002-598 2002 (for contracting) development and adoption ofless-
ENVIRONMENT polluting and more resource efficient 
products, processes and services in the 
Asia Region, especially in the waste 
and water sectors. To promote 
exchanges on environment policies 
and technologies. 
Asia Information and Idem 45,000,000 August 2000 December 2004 To promote mutually beneficial 
Communication (for contracting) partnership projects in Information 
Technology 
(Asia IT & C) Technology and Communication 
(phase I and 11) between Europe and Asia. 
1997/003-152 
2003/005-627 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGIES 
225,093,80 
TOTAL COMMITTED 0 
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11 ASEAN Programmes 
TITLE BENEFICIARIES AMOUNT START END OBJECTIVES 
€ 
ASEAN-EU University 9 ASEAN 7,000,000 January 2000 January 2006 (end To facilitate EU-ASEAN co-
Network Programme countries of activities) operation through linkages in the 
(AUNP) 1997/002-663 signatories to EC- field of higher education 1 To 
HIGHER EDUCATION ASEANCo- strengthen the capacities of 
operation universities in South East Asia. 
Agreement 
EC-ASEAN COGEN 7 developing 16,757,684 January 2002 December 2004 To accelerate, among others through 
Programme (COGEN ASEAN countries (end of activities) full scale demonstration projects, the 
Ill) 1997/004-601 signatories to EC- implementation of proven, clean and 
ENERGY ASEANCo- efficient European cogeneration 
operation technologies using biomass, coal and 
Agreement 144 gas as fuels within the industrial 
sectors in the ASEAN region. 
EC-ASEAN Energy 7 developing 21,500,000 March 2002 February 2007 To stimulate regional energy 
Facility 2000/002-585 ASEAN countries (end of activities) projects and initiatives proposed by 
ENERGY signatories to EC- the energy industry from the EU and 
ASEANCo- ASEAN. 
operation 
Agreement 
ASEAN Regional 9 ASEAN 9,424,000 July 1997 February 2004 To promote the establishment ofa 
Centre for Biodiversity countries (end of activities) regional network between the EU 
Conservation (ARCBC) signatories to EC- and ASEAN and within ASEAN in 
1997/002-973 ASEANCo- the biodiversity sector (training, 
BIODIVERSITY operation research, database). 
Agreement 
'44 Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam 
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ASEAN Programme for ASEAN Secretariat 4,000,000 February 2003 December 2007 To strengthen EU-ASEAN relations 
Regional Integration (end of activities) as a whole and complement the on-
Support (APRIS) going EC-ASEAN dialogue. To 
2002/002-649 assist the ASEAN Secretariat in 
INSTITUTION Jakarta (institution building). 
BUILDING 
EC-ASEAN Intellectual ASEAN 7,500,000 November 1996 July 2005 (end of To enhance investment and trade by 
Property Rights Secretariat, activities) contributing to upgrade the ASEAN 
Programme (lPR) Cambodia, Laos, IPR systems, in line with the highest 
1996/003/137 Indonesia, international standards and practices. 
INTELLECTUAL Philippines, 
PROPERTY RIGHTS Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam 
ASEAN To achieve further economic co-
EC-ASEAN Regional Secretariat, 9,000,000 February 1998 December 2005 operation 
Economic Co- operation Indonesia, (end of activities) by the adoption by ASEAN 
Programme on Philippines, of internationally compatible 
technical 
Standards, Quality Thailand regulations and standards; 
conformity 
and Conformity assessment procedures; quality 
Assessment structures and practices. 
1996/004-641 
STANDARDS 
TOTAL COMMITTED 75,181,684 
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III Other Programmes Corresponding to Specific Needs 
TITLE BENEFICIARIES AMOUNT START END OBJECTIVES 
€ 
Second phase ofEC Developing ASEM 3,500,000 Dec 2002 December 2006 To promote cultural and intellectual 
support to the Asia- countries covered (end of activities) exchanges between the civil 
Europe Foundation by ALA societies in Asia and Europe. 
(ASEF) 2002/002-706 Regulation 
CULTURE 
ASEM Trust Fund 11 5 Asian ASEM 20,000,000 August 2002 2005 (end of To contribute and consolidate the 
20011002-599 FINANCE countries: China, activities) process of economic and social 
Indonesia, Vietnam reform in Asian ASEM countries 
Philippines, affected by the Asian financial crisis 
Thailand of 1997. The Fund is managed by 
the World Ban1e 
Trans-Eurasia 6 Asian ASEM 10,000,000 March 2004 2007 (end of To establish a regional backbone 
Information Network Countries: China, activities) network in the ASEM countries and 
(TEIN) 2003/005-629 Indonesia, to link it to the European Research 
INFORMATION Malaysia, Network. To increase the 
TECHNOLOGIES Philippines, communication between research 
Thailand and and education communities of both 
Vietnam regions and within the Asia region. 
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TITLE BENEFICIARIES AMOUNT START END OBJECTIVES 
€ 
EU-Asia Civil Aviation South Asia: 15,000,000 December 2001 August 2006 (end To enhance space air safety and 
Co-operation Project Bangladesh, of activities) increase EU-Asian industrial co-
1998/003-277 AIR Bhutan Maldives, operation in the area of civil 
TRANSPORT Nepal, Pakistan, aviation. 
Sri Lanka; South 
East Asia: 
Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, 
Philippines, 
Thailand, Vietnam 
Asia Initiative for Bangladesh, Sri 18,540,000 March 2003 December 2007 To increase the quality and 
Reproductive Health Lanka, Nepal, (end of activities) accessibility of reproductive health 
for Youth RHIY A (II) Pakistan, Vietnam, care in seven South and South East 
2002/002-471 HEALTH Cambodia, Laos Asian countries 
Integrated Pest Vietnam, 12,000,000 March 1999 October 2004 (end To promote sustainable, profitable 
Management (IPM) for Philippines, of activities) and enviromnentally sound 
Cotton in Asia Pakistan, China, production of cotton in six Asian 
1996/002-644 India, Bangladesh countries. 
ENVIRONMENT 
Trust Fund with To start in 2004 
International Trade 
Centre 
Framework Cllntract To start in 2004 
forTRTA 
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Annex 6.1: Sample of Questionnaire Form 
Questionnaire 
"European Commercial Strategies towards Asiaffhailand" 
Miss Ajaree Tavornmas, Ph.D Researcher 
European and International Studies Department, Loughborough University 
I Purpose: To obtain information and evaluation from EU officials of the EU's 
commercial strategies and policies towards Asia/Thailand, particularly the impact of the 
EU Investment Promotion Action Plan (IP AP) in AsialThailand. 
11 About the Research Project: 
Title: "Representing European Business: The Role of the European Union in Commercial 
Strategies towards Asia during the 1990s" 
Supervisor: Michael Smith, Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics, Department of 
European and International Studies, Loughborough University 
Aim: To analyse the EU's commercial role, representation and capacity in promoting 
European business in Asia, and Thailand in particular, by answering two main research 
questions: 
- What have been the main forces shaping EU commercial strategies towards Asia 
(understood as the ASEM-l 0), and how have broad strategic frameworks been translated 
into more specific institutions and policies? 
- In this context, to what extent, under what conditions and how can EU commercial 
strategies and policies promote European investment and defend the interests of European 
business in Asia/Thailand? 
III Confidentiality: This questionnaire guarantees high confidentiality and will be used 
for academic purposes only. 
IV Time for Return: In the interest of this research, could you please return this 
questionnaire via email beforeI5June2003toA.Tavommas@lboro.ac.uk 
Thank you very much for your time in completing this questionnaire. 
Miss Ajaree Tavornmas, 
Ph.d Researcher, 
European and International Studies Department, Loughborough University 
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Personal Information 
Initial Last Name Name 
Position 
Organisation 
Area of Responsibilities 
Contact Address 
Email 
A. EU Commercial Strategies towards Asia/Thailand 
1) How do you evaluate the EU commercial status and the impact ofEU commercial 
strategies in Asia/Thailand? Please specify if possible the key aims and instruments of 
policy as you see them. 
A.I 
2) What role do you see the EU as playing in its commercial strategies in Asia/Thailand? 
Is this a concrete and pro-active or background/framework role? 
3) Do you think the EU has developed coherent commercial strategies and policies 
towards different Asian countries? What do you see as the key areas of success and 
failure in EU strategies? 
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A.2 
A,3 
B. EU-Representing/Promoting/Defending Business in Asia/Thailand 
4) How do you evaluate the EU role in representing/promoting/defending European 
business and investment in AsialThailand? To what extent do you feel the EU should 
play this kind of role? 
5) How useful are the multilateral bodies ie. WTO or OEeD in promoting European 
business and investment in Asia? How does EU policy relate to the frameworks 
provided by these other organisations? 
BA 
B.5 
6) How useful are the EU-Asia inter-regional dialogues and networking-in the context of 
EU-ASEAN agreements and the ASEM, in promoting European business and 
investment in Asia? 
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7) To what extent do you see the Investment Promotion Action Plan (JP AP), under the 
ASEM framework, as useful in promoting EU business and investment in 
Asia/Thailand? 
8) What do you see as the progresses of the Investment Promotion Plan (JP AP) at the 
present time in Asia and Thailand? How likely is it, in your view, that more will be 
achieved in the next five years? 
9) What other frameworks, programmes, dialogues, and networking do you see as 
significant in promoting European business and investment in Asia? If appropriate, 
please recommend any key documents on how the EU promotes European business 
and investment in Asia. 
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B.6 
B.7 
B.S 
B.9 
C. Member States. European Firms. and Host (Thai) Government 
10) How do you evaluate the role of the EU Member States in promoting their own 
business and investment in AsialThailand? How important in this role is the framework 
provided by EU initiatives such as ASEM in general and the Investment Promotion 
Action Plan in particular? 
C.lO 
11) How do you evaluate the role of the European business/firms in promoting their own 
business and investment in AsialThaiIand? How important in this role is the framework 
provided by EU initiatives such as ASEM in general and the Investment Promotion 
Action Plan in particular? 
C.lI 
12) What role do you think the EU Member States and European business/firms expect or 
prefer the EU to play in Asia? And vice versa? 
C.l2 
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13) * What do you see as the key issues in gaining market access for EU firms in Asia, 
Thailand? How do you evaluate the role of Asian govemmentslThai govemment in 
facilitating market access for European business/firms in Asia/Thailand? 
C.13 
D. EU Resources in Asia: EU Delegations in Asia 
14) Do you think the EU has sufficient commercial instruments and resources-both in 
terms of staff, organisation, and finance -in Asia, particularly in relation to promoting 
EU business and investment in Asia? Do you think the EU has sufficient European 
Commission delegations in Asia? What actions, in your view, would be required to 
make good any shortfalls in resources or representation? 
0.14 
15) In your view, what are and what should be the major roles, tasks and activities of the 
European Commission delegations in Asia? 
0.15 
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16) * How do you evaluate the role of European Commission delegations as the main fonn 
ofEU commercial representation in Asia? To what extent do you see them as useful 
and active bodies in representing EU business interests and promoting European 
investment in Asia? 
D.16 
17) * How close is the cooperation between the European Commission and the delegations 
in Asia in terms of operating and implementing the EU commercial strategies and 
policies (such as the Investment Promotion Action Plan) in Asia? What do you see as 
the major problems facing the European Commission in implementing agreed EU 
strategies and policies in Asia? 
D.17 
18) In your view, to what extent and how is European business interested or involved in 
the European Commission delegations' commercial activities in Asia? 
D.18 
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E. Conclusion 
19) Do you agree with the following statement: "At the inter-regional level, the EU can 
form viable strategies and policy frameworks, whilst in specific national contexts, the 
EU tends to leave more room for its Member States' commercial policies and 
European business' strategies"? 
E.19 
20) In your view, at the present time does the EU have the appropriate EU level-
organisation/institutions in individual Asian countries to promote more European 
business and investment in Asia? If yes, please specify? Ifnot yet, do you think the EU 
should develop such organisation in the near future? What kind of organisation should 
it be? 
E.20 
F. Further Information 
21) Please recommend any other persons or organisations who might be contacted and 
whose views would be useful in answering this questionnaire. 
F.21 
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22) Would you be willing to participate in a more detailed interview covering matters 
raised in this questionnaire? YESINO 
F.22 
Thank you for responding to this questionnaire. As noted in the Introduction, responses 
will be treated as confidential and will not be personally attributed in use of the 
questionnaire data. 
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